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2Abstract
The most serious foreign policy challenge that the Russian Federation faced from 
1991 to 1996 was whether and how to respond to outbreaks of conflict within its 
neighbouring states. Unlike under the Soviet Union, there were open, diverse and complex 
debates about whether Russia should react to these conflicts, and if so, by what means. These 
foreign policy debates among the political elite and the ensuing policies form the subject of 
this thesis.
The thesis asks what the dominant ideas expressed in these debates about foreign 
policy were, and whether they were reflected in Russia's policies towards specific military 
conflicts in the CIS States. To answer these questions, the thesis first derives insights about 
the role of ideas and debates within international relations literature which are helpful for the 
subsequent analysis of Russian foreign policy debates. It then identifies the dominant foreign 
policy ideas and foreign policy orientations, traces the major stages in the debates and the 
policies, and compares Russia's political debates, policies and actions towards the Moldova- 
Transdniestria, Georgia-Abkhazia and Tajikistan conflicts.
Using interviews and both primary and secondary sources, the general finding of the 
thesis is that broad foreign policy ideas and orientations provided the backdrop against which 
debates occurred and policies were formulated or pursued. Ideas and debates were crucial 
factors in developing and defining an official pragmatic nationalist foreign policy orientation 
that crystallised in the later period. On the whole, there was congruence between the 
dominant ideas within the debates and the foreign policies enacted towards specific conflicts. 
Specific foreign policies towards the conflicts developed in response to the general debate 
(clash of ideas), which in turn responded to the domestic conditions and particular events in 
the near abroad. Military actions tended to start independently as local initiatives, and then 
fall in line with government policy.
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8Chapter One: Introduction
1. Russia’s Political Debates About Foreign Policy
In 1991, the Soviet Union disbanded into fifteen new states. As the former dominant 
republic in the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation was the largest and most powerful of 
these states. As well as accruing advantages stemming from this position, Russia also 
inherited many difficulties, responsibilities and challenges.
In terms of foreign affairs, Russia was suddenly faced with having to develop, almost 
from scratch, policies towards the fourteen newly independent states. A whole range of 
political, economic and military relations had to be forged and old Soviet ties either 
dismantled or rebuilt. Although Russia inherited many Soviet foreign policy institutions, the 
new government’s information and expertise about how to create foreign policy concerning 
the fourteen states were limited. The creation of policies was further complicated by the fact 
that Russia was undergoing its own economic catastrophe and domestic identity crisis 
following the sudden collapse of both communism and empire.
The most serious foreign policy challenge that Russian faced from 1991 to 1996 was 
how to respond to outbreaks of conflict within its new neighbouring states. Soon after the 
Soviet Union broke up, many hostilities erupted, ranging from minor border skirmishes to 
outright war. The Russian government was confronted with urgent decisions about whether 
or not it should react to these conflicts, and if  so, by what means. After 1991, unlike under 
the Soviet Union, there was an open, diverse, complex political debate about these questions. 
It is this foreign policy debate and the ensuing policies which form the subject of this thesis. 
It examines the evolution of debate and policy from the collapse of the Soviet Union in 
December 1991 until the Presidential elections in June 1996, a period encompassed by 
President Boris Yeltsin’s first term in office.
Of course, the political elite and their debates did not operate in a vacuum. The 
participants in the foreign policy debates acted within institutional and political settings 
which at times constrained or enhanced their ability to influence policy. Foreign policy ideas
9must be understood in terms of the political process by which they are selected. Thus, this 
thesis examines the interplay of debate, the adoption of a consensus view and its reflection in 
policy. The changing nature of the conflicts created both opportunities and constraints for 
new policy direction and promotion.
2. Context: The Search for a New Russian Foreign Policy in a Period of 
Uncertainty
After the collapse of the Soviet Union there was considerable uncertainty over 
Russia's identity, her new role in the post-Soviet space, and specifically, the course of action 
that would best further her interests in the "near abroad" states.1 Russian leaders and the 
Russian public were faced with an almost paralysing degree of confusion about which 
policies would produce greater national security and which would best protect Russian 
interests. This uncertainty, combined with political and institutional instability, enhanced the 
importance of ideas and debate in the development of Russian foreign policy. Russian leaders 
could not just work on autopilot or on conventional policy lines. This was a time when 
politicians and policy-makers had to rethink their positions fundamentally and develop new 
ones from scratch.
The confusion over how to develop Russian foreign policy was not unexpected. First, 
Russia, itself a new state, had to develop relations with the rest of the world and with the 
fourteen other new states which emerged from the Soviet Union -  all of which had appeared 
suddenly and at approximately the same time. Russia faced a new geopolitical situation. It 
had inherited eighty percent of the former Soviet territory and sixty percent of the Soviet 
population. Its economy and resources were comparatively limited, as was its military power. 
The Russian political elite and public faced great anxieties due to many internal problems 
including a severe economic crisis and the rise of crime. From 1991 to 1996, many dramatic 
events occurred -  the 1993 coup attempt, the first Chechen war, Russia’s first experiments
1 The “near abroad” includes all o f the former Soviet republics besides Russia. The term is used in opposition to 
the “far abroad” which includes, the rest o f the world. During the period o f study 1991-96 the term “near 
abroad” was frequently used. Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov dropped the official use o f this term in 1996.
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with democratisation and elections. Moreover, Russia had lost its former position as a 
superpower on the international stage. The threat of the Cold War was gone, but the 
perception of insecurity was great.
Within these radically new and uncertain internal and external contexts, and without 
the previous guidance of a Marxist-Leninist philosophy, Russian politicians needed and 
wanted to find new ways to think about foreign and security policies. There was no obvious 
or clear direction, especially with regard to the near abroad. The uncertainty goes a long way 
towards explaining why many politicians’ foreign policy ideas shifted throughout this period 
-  and why some even held contradictory and confused views. It also helps to explain why 
fundamental ideas were so important in helping politicians choose among the various foreign 
policy options available to the new Russian state. There was little time for the political elite 
to develop highly nuanced and knowledgeable views -  and there were also pressing issues to 
be tackled in the domestic arena. Even by 1996 -  the end of the time frame encompassed by 
this study -  Russia’s foreign policy was still at a very early stage in its evolution.
Many types of relations could hypothetically have been used to protect Russian interests 
in the near abroad. In fact, Russia’s political elite advocated various designs which all claimed 
to advance Russian national interests. Because the participants in the foreign policy debate had 
divergent preferences over potential ways to act, there was no natural or single policy choice 
available. Of course, foreign policy ideas were also advocated for pragmatic reasons, especially 
in order for politicians to preserve power.2 Foreign policy strategies are generally designed not 
only in relation to the external environment but also with domestic political consumption in 
mind. However, in the case of Russia, it was not always obvious which foreign policy choice 
would strengthen a politician’s political bargaining power. Choices had to be made. Ideas 
mattered in making those choices, and they helped to shape the foreign policy agenda.
2 Russian politicians used specific ideas to express dissatisfaction with the regime and to compete with rivals. 
Moreover, Yeltsin and his government often co-opted the ideas o f the political opposition, and even the 
politicians themselves into the administration -  especially when there was a crisis or just before elections.
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3. Approach/Methodology and Sources
Specifically, this thesis asks what were the dominant ideas expressed in these debates 
about foreign policy and were they reflected in Russia’s policies towards specific military 
conflicts in the CIS states? To answer this two-fold question, the thesis first identifies the 
broad ideas about foreign policy that helped to structure the foreign policy thinking of the 
Russian political elite and their narrower policy orientations towards the near abroad.
Second, the thesis outlines the major stages in the evolution of the debate and policy, 
outlining three broad periods of historical importance -  each of which had differing results in 
terms of foreign policy.
Third, the thesis examines and compares the conflicts in the CIS states in which 
Russia was militarily involved: the separatist war between Moldova and Transdniestria; the 
separatist war between Georgia and Abkhazia; and die civil war in Tajikistan. In each case, 
Russia’s key interests in the conflict are examined to discover how constraining the 
environment was and how much uncertainty or room for debate over foreign policy choices 
really existed. The first half of each case study examines Russia’s key interests in the 
particular conflict -  its security, diaspora and economic interest -  and, briefly, how they were 
conditioned by Soviet and Tsarist history. The second half of each case study examines the 
debates over Russia’s foreign policy options towards each particular conflict, the 
government’s official policy position and Russia’s military action on the ground.
These three steps allow us to examine the relations among the evolution of ideas in 
the Russian political debate, Russia’s foreign policy output and Russia’s military 
involvement in each particular conflict. The procedure allows for comparison across the three 
cases and reveals whether, and to what extent, the dominant ideas expressed in the political 
debate about foreign policy in general were reflected in Russia’s policies towards some 
military conflicts and not others. Of course, as in all historical studies it is difficult to 
demonstrate a definitive relationship between ideas and action.
Although some scholars have commented on the general political debates about 
Russian foreign policy, this thesis is original in that it examines in detail Russia’s political
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debates and official rhetoric as well as its policies and military involvement in three specific 
conflicts on its territorial periphery. It seeks to discover whether either the debate and/or the 
policies concerning the specific conflicts reflected the dominant foreign policy ideas within 
the general foreign policy debate or whether they were irrelevant.
The principal sources used to describe the political debates are Russian newspapers 
and journals. These are an enormous and direct source for identifying politicians’ views on 
foreign policy 1991 to 1996. Also examined are political party platforms, party pamphlets, 
political memoirs and books written by members of the Russian political elite. Parliamentary 
debates are examined only as reported in Russian media sources, since the most important of 
them -  namely detailed committee discussions -  are generally not available to the public. 
The thesis pays particular attention to the participants in the foreign policy debate who most 
prominently discussed the particular conflicts and those who represented the different foreign 
policy ideas and perceptions across the political spectrum. The analysis is supplemented with 
direct participant foreign policy views and insights derived from interviews conducted by the 
author. (See Appendix 1 for details).
The examination of Russia’s official foreign policy position and its military actions 
is developed primarily from official statements and documents found in the Russian media 
and Russian government reports. This is supplemented by documents from international 
organizations such as the United Nations, as well as Russian and Western academic studies 
about the conflicts.4 This ensemble of materials provides a comprehensive account o f the key
3 The newspapers examined include: Krasnaya Zvezda. the army newspaper; Nezavisimava Gazeta (and its 
supplement), Nezavisimove vovennove obozrenive (independent military review), Izvestiva. Segodnya. 
Argumentv i faktv. Rossivskava Gazeta. Rossivskive Vesti. Pravda. Komskomolskava Pravda. Den’. 
Sovetskava Rossiva. Moskovskive Novosti. Moskovskive Komsomolets. Megapolis-Express. Sovershenno 
Sekretno. Voennava Mvsl’. Literatumava Gazeta. Novava Yezhednevnava Gazeta, Sovetskava Rossiva. 
Obshchava Gazeta. English language newspapers in Russia: Moscow Times. New Times. Kommersant Daily. 
Also used are: Official Kremlin International Newsbroadcast: news dispatches from Itar-Tass. RIA and TV 
broadcasts from NTV and ORT. Journals examined include: International Affairs (Moscow). Obozrevatel. 
Mirovava Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnve Otnosheniva. Mezhdunarodnava Zhizn’ Diplomatichesky Vestnik 
(official publication o f MFA), Pro et Contra. Svobodnava Mvsl’. Iuridisheskava Gazeta, Sobranie 
Zakonodatelstvo Rossivskoi Federatsii.
4 The key monograph-length examinations o f Russia’s involvement in CIS conflicts include: Roy Allison, 
Peacekeeping in the Soviet Successor States. Chaillot Paper 18, (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, WEU, 
November 1994); Roy Allison and Christoph Bluth, Security Dilemmas in Russia and Eurasia (London: RIIA, 
1998); Vladimir Baranovsky, Russia and Europe: The Emerging Security Agenda (New York: SIPRI and
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political elite foreign policy views and the major details concerning Russia’s foreign policy 
towards the conflicts.
4. Parameters of the Thesis
a) The Political Elite
Although foreign policy was debated among journalists, academics, diplomats, the 
military and the wider public, this thesis focuses almost exclusively on the Russian political 
elite. Here the political elite involved in the foreign policy debate is defined to include the 
officials involved in the presidential and governmental administration (particularly the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence), members of parliament 
(particularly those in foreign policy committees) and leaders of the key political parties. Of 
course, many of these foreign policy participants were either previously or simultaneously 
academics or diplomats. Some also switched their occupational and foreign policy positions 
during the period of study.5 The transfer from academic to political jobs and back again was 
relatively common. Significantly, many of those participating in the debate were actively 
involved in the creation of Russian foreign policy. For example, Foreign Minister Andrei 
Kozyrev both outlined his foreign policy ideas (which evolved from 1991 to 1996) and made 
key decisions about how Russia’s foreign policy would be pursued. This thesis attempts to 
present a representative sample of the key participants in the debates from across the political 
spectrum -  while concentrating on those most active in the debates and those involved in 
policy-making.
Oxford University Press, 1997); Pavel K. Baev, The Russian Army in a Time o f  Troubles. (London: Sage 
Publications, 1996); Lena Jonson and Clive Archer (eds.), Peacekeeping and the Role o f Russia in Eurasia 
(Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 1996); Lena Jonson, Keeping the Peace in the CIS: The Evolution o f Russian 
Policy , Discussion Paper 81 (London: RIIA, 1999); Hans-Georg Ehrhart, Anna Kreikmeyer and Andrei 
Zagorsky (eds.), Crisis Management in the CIS: Wither Russia? (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 
1995); and Dov Lynch, Russian Peacekeeping Strategies in the CIS (London: Macmillan and RIIA, 2000).
5 For example, Yevgeny Primakov was head o f Russia’s Federal Intelligence Services (FIS) before replacing 
Andrei Kozyrev as Foreign Minister in 1996. Sergei Stankevich went from being an academic to presidential 
adviser to speaking as an independent commentator. Vladimir Lukin was the Chair o f the RSFSR Supreme 
Soviet Committee on Foreign Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations, then ambassador in Washington in 1992 
and in 1993 one o f the leaders of the political movement Yabloko and Chair o f the Foreign Policy Commission 
o f the First Duma.
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b) Near Abroad and Case Studies
After the Soviet Union broke up, Russia no longer had a specific enemy nor was it 
under any immediate threat from abroad. Apart from internal threats, its greatest 
vulnerabilities were seen as coming from its near abroad. The newly independent former 
Soviet republics were the major focus of Russia’s foreign policy from 1993-96, and relations 
with these states were among the most important external problems addressed by Russia’s 
political elite.
Although Russian foreign policy encompassed many economic, political, diplomatic 
and military activities, this thesis is limited to an examination of Russia’s debate and policies 
towards conflicts in the CIS states in particular because these conflicts offered the greatest 
potential external danger to the stability of the former Soviet Union. While debating how to 
react to these specific conflicts, Russian politicians were forced to confront a whole range o f 
key issues at the heart of the new state’s foreign policy: the future of the Russian diaspora, 
the role of Russia’s military and Russia’s economic relations with the former Soviet 
republics. As we shall see later, in each case there were many different reasons for Russia’s 
involvement in any specific CIS state. The issue of Russia’s military involvement in the CIS 
conflicts also has significance because it has often been described as the single most 
important example of Russian “quasi-imperialism”. Whether or not this is an accurate 
description of Russia’s debates and policies will be explored.
The particular case studies -  the Moldova-Transdniestria, Georgia-Abkhazia and 
Tajikistan conflicts -  were chosen for this thesis because they are the only cases in which 
Russia became active militarily in CIS conflicts.6 They are also helpfully representative of 
the three main regions of the near abroad -  Central Asia, the Transcaucasus and the 
“European” states -  and thus highlight the similarities and differences in Russian debate and 
policy towards each region.
6 The Russian military was only indirectly involved in the Nagomo-Karabagh conflict between Armenia and 
Azerbaijan. Russia’s military was involved in South Ossetia, and this will be very briefly considered in the 
Abkhazia chapter, but because the conflict was over by early 1992, there was very little debate about the issue.
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c) Foreign Policy Ideas and Orientations
Although Russia’s political elite was in general agreement that the near abroad conflicts 
threatened Russian security, three main foreign policy orientations developed, each of which 
represented distinct views about how Russia should react to the military conflicts in the CIS 
states. From 1991-1996, these general sets of ideas -  “liberal westemist”, “pragmatic 
nationalist” and “fundamentalist nationalist” -  competed for political dominance in Russia. 
The thesis uses this three-fold classification developed by Neil Malcolm et al. to examine the 
debates and to determine which foreign policy ideas influenced or dominated the debates and 
policies in each of the three case studies.7
Very briefly, liberal westemists in Russia widely interpreted the definition of security 
to include economic and political problems as well as military issues. They interpreted the 
settlement of CIS conflicts as being only one of Russia’s major security interests and wanted 
to limit Russia’s involvement where possible. The conflicts were understood as being 
resolvable, and solutions lay not in the use of force but in negotiations and multilateral efforts 
by organizations such as the United Nations (UN) or the Organisation for Security and Co­
operation in Europe (OSCE). In 1993, most of those who had held liberal westemist ideas 
switched to the pragmatic nationalist position which posited that the Russian-speaking 
diaspora should be rigorously defended. They proposed it should be carried out by peaceful 
means such as by advocating international law and human rights, but they were convinced 
that Russia had a major role to play.
7 The terms and classification used in this thesis are derived from Neil Malcolm, Alex Pravda, Roy Allison and 
Margot Light, Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy (London: Oxford University Press, 1996). Other 
scholars have used a variety o f terms to define the different groups o f views. For example, Vera Tolz refers to 
Westemizers, isolationists, and imperialists/unionists in “Russia: Westemizers Continue to Challenge National 
Patriots”, RFE/RL Research Report. 11 December 1992, pp. 1-9; Ren6e de Nevers divides them into 
“internationalists, centrist post-imperialists, neocommunists and agrarians, and extreme nationalists” in Russia’s 
Strategic Renovation. Adelphi Paper 289 (London: IISS, 1994); Judith Kullberg identifies four “ideological 
types”: westemizers, moderate reformers, democratic socialists and communists/nationalists in “The Ideological 
Roots of Elite Political Conflict in Post-Soviet Russia”, Europe-Asia Studies, vol.46, no.6 (1994), pp.929-953; 
Dov Lynch labels three groups: ‘radical nationalist’, ‘liberal internationalist’ and ‘centrist nationalist’ in 
Russian Peacekeeping Strategies in the CIS (London: Macmillan and RIIA, 2000); Karen Dawisha and Bruce 
Parrott use a fivefold division in Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, Russia and the New States o f  Eurasia 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
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The pragmatic nationalists position advocated Russia’s active involvement in the 
Former Soviet Union (FSU), including forceful action, if necessary, to achieve peace in the 
region, and sought international approval for its role as peacekeeper in the area. Following their 
definition of Russian security interests as primarily geopolitical, the pragmatic nationalists 
advocated political, economic, and even military means to secure Russian interests and were 
supportive, though wary, of multilateral resolution efforts.8 In effect, this position eventually 
became official government policy.
Finally, fundamentalist nationalists believed the conflicts to be “zero-sum” and that 
unilateral force was necessary both to enhance conflict resolution and to protect the diaspora. 
Despite differences, they were not interested in integrating Russia into the world economy or 
building relations with the West. Instead, they proposed various measures to recreate a 
greater Russia. This position was never adopted by the Russian government.
d) Limitations
Of course, despite their significance in the history of political theory, the concepts of 
“ideas” and “debate” are somewhat slippery. Political rhetoric must always be treated with 
scepticism. Political ideas may be devoid of meaning. For example, in Russia as well as in 
the West, politicians often are considered to be “democrats” and “patriots” and all claim to 
represent the “real” interests of the nation. This may be especially true in Russia where 
democratic concepts have not had a long opportunity to grow, and where they have not 
become imbued with an accepted meaning as part of civil culture and civil society.
Thus, it is clear that in examining political elite opinion one must not always take the 
content of the speeches or texts themselves at face value, but must recognize that attempts to 
define foreign policy are often simply a means of gaining partisan advantage and/or 
mobilizing popular support. This may be especially true when individuals or political groups 
do not have responsibility for making foreign policy, and know that they probably will not be
8 See Sergei Stankevich, “Derzhava”, Nezavisimava Gazeta. 28 March 1992, p.4.
9 This phenomenon is examined in Chapter Three where it is shown that politicians across the political spectrum 
adopted the vague ideas o f “eurasianism”, “national idea” and “great power”.
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faced with such responsibilities in the future. On the whole, politicians are more interested in 
retaining or gaining power than remaining committed to any specific idea or set of policy 
prescriptions. While policy issues are always framed to suit politicians’ purposes, an analysis 
of their thinking can help us to understand why one policy is chosen over another. Moreover, 
changes in rhetoric are significant because they signal changes in perceptions, which, if 
integrated into official pronouncements and positions, may affect policy output.
e) Key Constraints on Foreign Policy
Of course, there were several limits to the development of Russian foreign policy. 
The parameters of Russia’s foreign policy actions were set primarily by its weak economy 
and the poor state of its military. However, those involved in debating foreign policy did not 
necessarily take these constraints much into consideration -  a fact that helps to explain the 
discrepancies between debate, official policy statements and foreign policy outcomes. 
Nevertheless, the constraints on foreign policy became more evident over time and they did 
affect foreign policy thinking -  particularly mainstream foreign policy views.
The Soviet collapse left Russia much weaker than its still impressive size and 
resources would imply. To a large extent, Russia’s economic problems explain why its 
government could not have pursued expensive neo-imperialist projects even if it had wanted 
to. However, these same economic problems were also humiliating to Russia’s national pride 
and therefore helped to provoke an assertive foreign policy rhetoric and an anti-Western 
backlash inside the country.
The dire state of the Russian military severely constrained Russian policy options. 
Russia’s military spending greatly contracted after the end of the Soviet Union. Real military 
spending decreased dramatically from $146 billion to $73 billion during the period 1992 -  
1996. (See Table 1.1.)
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Table 1.1 Russian Military Expenditure 1992-199610
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
$ billion 146 114 101 86 73
%GDP 10.8 8.9 8.3 7.4 6.5
However, although Russia’s economy and military were suffering in the period of this 
study, they remained very strong in comparison to those of the other smaller states examined 
in this study -  Moldova, Georgia and Tajikistan. Russia’s economic might and the size of its 
population were far greater and its armed forces and defence budget comparatively much 
larger that these former Soviet states. Even by 1996, when Moldova, Georgia and Tajikistan 
had made substantial steps in building up their armies, their forces were still miniscule in 
comparison to Russia’s. Given the enormous discrepancies in population between Russia’s 
and the other states, as well as in GNP and armed forces, there was considerable potential, 
given substantial political will, for Russia to dominate these states. (See Table 1.2.)
Table 1.2 Russia, Georgia, Moldova and Tajikistan: Power Indices11
Population
(millions)
GNP
(Sbillions)
Total Armed 
Forces 
(thousands)
Defence
Budget
(Smillions)
Russia 148 1,100 1,240 31,000
Georgia 5.4 3.3 33 60
Moldova 4.3 1.1 11 15
Tajikistan 6.1 1.1 7-9 70
10 These figures are from The Military Balance. 1999-2000 (London: IISS, 2000) p. 110. Estimates o f Russia’s 
real military spending vary because o f the lack o f transparency. Estimates o f ruble purchasing-power parity 
(PPP) with the US dollar also vary considerably.
1‘These figures are from 1996. Billion (bn) signifies 1,000 million. Adapted and reorganized from The Military 
Balance. 1997-98 (London: IISS, 1998).
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5. Thesis Outline
Chapter One introduces the topic, provides the general line of argumentation and 
discusses the aims, justification, sources, methodology, concepts and thesis plan. The thesis 
asks what the dominant ideas expressed in these debates about foreign policy were, and 
whether or not they were reflected in Russia’s policies towards specific military conflicts in 
the CIS states. It will be argued that the ideas manifested within the political debate about 
conflicts in the near abroad had an important, if varying, role in each of the three case 
studies.
Chapter Two examines the role of political debate and ideas in the international 
relations literature, in order to provide a foundation for later empirical studies of Russian 
foreign policy and the three case studies.
The chapter focuses on those general theories in which political debate and ideas are 
considered significant in order to determine how and to what extent ideas matter in foreign 
policy development -  and how best to model these influences in the study of foreign policy. 
It derives insights about the role of ideas which may be helpful in the thesis’s subsequent 
analysis of the Russian foreign policy debates. In particular, it shows how new ideas develop 
and the “pathways” or “mechanisms” by which ideas are thought to affect foreign policy 
choice. The analysis provides guidance for the more detailed specification of the approach 
used in the thesis while relating the thesis to ongoing theoretical discussions and 
controversies in the discipline. The chapter concludes by delineating the specific approach 
used in this thesis to explain how, and why, particular ideas broadly influenced Russian policy 
towards conflicts in the CIS states 1991-96.
Chapter Three and Four together provide a broad context to the particular debates 
about Russia’s involvement in specific conflicts in the FSU. Although Russian politicians 
and other members of the political elite debated the details of each specific conflict they were 
always grounded within the general debates about foreign policy.
Chapter Three examines the dominant ideas in Russian debates about foreign policy. 
First, it identifies the key ideas which make up the three foreign policy orientations and the
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specific political party proposals. With the end of the Soviet Union, there were many 
different ideas which could have been used define Russia’s national identity, its geography, 
mission, self-perception, and economic and political direction. These underlying preferences 
structured the various options or ways of thinking about foreign policy. These ideas about 
Russia are then categorized in the thesis into the three foreign policy orientations of the 
political elite: fundamentalist nationalism, pragmatic nationalism, and liberal westemism.12 
Each orientation suggested a “road map” which broadly corresponded with the different 
policy options towards the near abroad and the conflicts in the Former Soviet Union. The 
specific foreign policy proposals of the key political parties are then examined within these 
three orientations. Finally, the rise and fall of ideas from 1991 to 1996 is outlined in order to 
foreshadow the detailed examination of the evolution of foreign policy orientations in 
Chapter Four.
Chapter Four charts the evolution of the debate concerning these foreign policy 
ideas from 1991-1996. After an overview of how foreign policy ideas were voiced in the 
domestic political process, the thesis identifies three stages during this period in which 
pragmatic nationalist ideas eventually become dominant. The general contours of the debate 
are examined in terms of the relation to both the government’s foreign policy position and 
the key foreign and military policies towards the conflicts in the FSU during those years. 
Pragmatic nationalism is found to have affected foreign policy choice through the domestic 
political process by creating road maps which reduced uncertainty and suggested specific 
policies, and by the institutionalisation of these ideas into official policy concepts and 
doctrine.
Chapter Five, Six and Seven examine the Russian political debates and foreign 
policies towards Georgia’s separatist conflict with Abkhazia, Moldova’s separatist conflict 
with Transdniestria and the civil war in Tajikistan. The case studies locate the specific 
debates about Russian military involvement within the context of events and interests.
12 The classification o f types o f  foreign policy thinking and breakdown o f stages from 1991-96 is provided to 
give an overall view o f how ideas and policy changed during the period under study. O f course, ideas never fit 
perfectly into neat categories, and o f  course, there the time period was fluid, with each stage running into the 
next.
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The case studies are structured similarly to allow for comparison. The argument that 
ideas and debate matter in the development of policy is contrasted with the opposing 
contention that the material setting (the constraints and incentives facing policy decision­
makers) is the crucial determinant. Each case study, therefore, begins with an examination of 
Russia’s key interests in the particular conflict -  defined here as its security, economic and 
diaspora interests -  and briefly, how they were conditioned by Soviet and Tsarist Russia’s 
history. Key Tsarist and Soviet policies are explored to give some understanding of the main 
issues, assets and problems that Russia inherited after 1991, as well as how the regions were 
perceived by the Russian political elite. Any existing discrepancies between Russia’s “real” 
interests and its perceived or officially declared interests are highlighted to show how 
constraining the environment was and how much uncertainty or room for debate over choices 
really existed.
Moving to the situation since 1991, each chapter explores the emergence and 
evolution of the conflicts as well as Russia’s military involvement. The core of each chapter 
examines Russia’s debates and policies towards each particular conflict and draws parallels 
with the overall debate about foreign policy in general. The debates and policies are studied 
in detail in chronological stages from 1991-1996. In each stage, the dominant foreign policy 
ideas within the debate are explored and broadly examined in relation to Russia’s foreign 
policies and military action in that period. These divisions are not absolute in that each stage 
melded into the next, however, they are used in the thesis to demonstrate the changing 
contours of foreign policy thinking and the changing policy output in the conflicts.
Each of the conflicts differed in its character, roots and development as well as in the 
nature of Russian military involvement. The states varied in terms of size, population, 
political stability, presence of Russian military bases and forces, presence of Russian 
diaspora and, to a lesser extent, in terms of economic significance. Each state had different 
emotional and historic ties with Russia. The conflicts also varied in terms of their length, 
seriousness, type etc and in terms of their perceived and actual importance to Russia. All of 
these factors influenced how the Russian elite understood the conflict and therefore how they
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affected the particular debate. However, it should also be borne in mind that all three cases 
were characterised by an initial period of high uncertainty and confusion which was 
gradually replaced by a more coherent policy to end the conflicts.
Chapter Eight summarizes the underlying shifts in Russian foreign policy ideas and 
debates and shows whether and how they significantly influenced realignments in foreign 
policy towards the three conflicts. The debates were one of the many variables which 
affected Russian foreign policy. It concludes that international relations and Russian foreign 
policy approaches which omit ideas and political debates may be missing an important 
element in the study of foreign policy development.
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Chapter Two; Ideas and Political Debates in Theoretical Approaches to 
Foreign Policy Development
This chapter examines the role of political debate and ideas in the international 
relations literature. It carries this out in order to provide a foundation for later empirical 
studies of Russian foreign policy and three case studies.
The chapter focuses on those general theories in which political debate and ideas are 
considered significant in order to determine how and to what extent ideas matter in foreign 
policy development -  and how best to model these influences in the study of foreign policy. 
The purpose is to derive insights about the role of ideas which may be helpful in the thesis’s 
subsequent analysis of the Russian foreign policy debates -  not to describe all the competing 
international relations theories.
In particular, this chapter seeks to discover what international relations theorists say 
about the “origin” and “transmission” of ideas (i.e. how new ideas develop) and the 
“pathways” or “mechanisms” by which ideas are thought to affect foreign policy choice. The 
analysis provides guidance for the more detailed specification of the approach used in the 
thesis while relating the thesis to ongoing theoretical discussions and controversies in the 
discipline. The chapter concludes by delineating the specific approach used in this thesis to 
explain whether, and how, particular ideas were broadly reflected in Russian political and 
military policy towards conflicts in the CIS states 1991-96.
1. The Role of Political Debates and Ideas in the Theoretical Approaches to 
Foreign Policy
For thousands of years philosophers and historians have grappled with the role of 
ideas in social and political life, and from the beginning of the discipline of social science its 
practitioners also have debated this fundamental question. However, not until the 1960s, in 
the wake of the so-called “behavioural revolution” in political science, was it widely 
accepted among social scientists that international behaviour could not be understood 
adequately in terms of rational, objective laws. In response, theories of international relations
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from the late 1960s on began to focus on domestic variables, including ideas, to help explain 
states' foreign policy outcomes. Since then, the role of ideas in foreign policy has been 
extensively examined at the individual, domestic, international and transnational levels. 
Many of these approaches have advanced strong criticisms of the earlier prevalent rational 
explanations of behaviour. Today, ideas are increasingly being studied as one of the many 
variables that affect foreign policy in attempts to build sophisticated and comprehensive 
theories which integrate different levels of analysis.
Although ideas and debate have been examined at many different levels of analysis, 
this chapter is limited to the individual and domestic levels which helpfully highlight the 
origin or source of ideas and the means by which ideas influence behaviour. This limitation 
has been imposed because the thesis is concerned with ideas (stated beliefs) expressed by 
individual Russian foreign policy participants within the domestic political process, and 
whether or not they were reflected in Russian policy towards military conflicts in the CIS 
states.
2. Ideas/Political Debates and Grand Theories
Although this chapter is concerned with middle-range theories, it is helpful to first 
briefly identify and locate them within the grand theories which are used to organize the 
entire field of international relations.
The realist (or power politics) approach is a powerful, simple and elegant theory of 
international politics. Realism, in essence, builds its explanations on what are considered the 
most general and enduring features of international politics -  the struggle for power and 
security by states within an anarchic international system -  as a persuasive explanation for 
conflict within the international arena.1 There is little doubt that realism offers significant
1 See the classic Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. 4th edition 
(New York: Knopf, 1967). The realist approach embraces an interrelated set o f assumptions about the world: 
international politics is about states and their interactions; states seek power, particularly military power, 
because there is nothing else to guarantee their security; the relations between states are guided by an amoral 
calculation o f whatever bests serves the interests o f  the state; the political realm is distinct from the economic 
realm; and in such an amoral, power-driven world, states must always be on guard for their own “national”
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insights into explaining foreign policy -  in its purest form; however, its proponents do not 
take into consideration ideas or debate.
A major problem with realist theories is that they can easily become tautologies, truisms 
which are impossible to refute. Arguments can always be constructed to prove that any action is 
intended to enhance or preserve the power of the state. By dismissing other important variables, 
realist explanations tend to ignore the process by which state interests are shaped, the content of 
these new interests and the role of ideas or debate in the process. To this extent, realist 
arguments should be seen as only part of the overall explanation of state behaviour in foreign 
affairs.
Only when “national interests” are clear, unambiguous and permanent can realist 
theory adequately explain foreign policy behaviour. In fact, the concept of “national interest” 
is empirically empty in that it can be defined variously in different circumstances. In the 
case of Russia during the years 1991-1996, there may have been no clear national interest. 
Perhaps there were conflicting interests. Moreover, the interests of self-seeking politicians do 
not always coincide with so-called perceived national interests. Besides objective factors, 
broad subjective criteria also guide policy choices. Thus, in any explanation of Russian 
foreign policy, the realist assumption of states as unitary and rational actors may be 
challenged by other perspectives which acknowledge cooperation and domestic decision­
making -  including ideas and political debates.
This thesis is more in line with the classical “liberal” theories of international politics 
which are founded on a focus on the individual (including ideas and debates about policies) and
interest.
2 However, as Legro and Moravcsik explain, “Instead o f challenging competing liberal, epistemic, and 
institutional theories, realists now regularly seek to subsume their causal mechanisms. Realism has become little 
more than a generic commitment to the assumption o f rational state behaviour”. Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew 
Moravcsik, “Is Anybody Still a Realist?”, International Security, vol. 24, no. 2 (Fall 1999), pp.5-55, p.53.
3 Masato Kimura and David W. Welch argue that national interests are idiosyncratic and best treated 
exogenously in a detailed explanation o f interest-formation and interest-specification in “Specifying Interests: 
Japan’s Claim to the Northern Territories and its Implications for International Relations Theory”, International 
Studies Quarterly, vol.42, no.2 (June 1998), pp.213-244. They argue that states decide for themselves what their 
interests are - doing so for reasons that are often difficult to discern, often specific to historical, political, 
cultural contexts. What states prefer is an empirical question. Thus scholars should look for patterns not only in 
what states want but also in how they go about pursuing them.
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the possibility of improvements in the condition of individual and social existence. Whereas 
realists interpret international relations as an endless and vicious struggle for power among 
states, liberals see them as die relations among individuals, societies and states engaged in co­
operative activities as well as confrontational behaviour. The realist view that states act in a 
coherent, determined fashion in the calculated pursuit of an agreed national interest, dominated 
by the pursuit of power and military security, is seen as an oversimplification. Instead, liberals 
emphasise “the role of institutions and other linkages between nation-states that facilitate and 
promote co-operation, co-ordination, and non-violent modes of conflict resolution”.4
This thesis is broadly located within the liberal interpretation which considers 
Russian foreign policy towards the CIS conflicts as the result of a complex interplay between 
various agencies of government, pressure groups, organizations and influential individuals at 
both domestic and international levels. In other words, in contrast to the simplest forms of 
realism, other levels of analysis (individuals, groups and other domestic structures as well as 
events/conditions in the international system) are examined.5 Within a wide context, the 
thesis examines whether ideas and debates have a significant, if varying, role in the formation 
of foreign policy.
3. Ideas/Political Debates and Middle-Range Theories
Middle-range theories are used to explore empirical explanations of selected aspects 
of international politics. They may be realist (for example the international systemic 
approach and the rational actor model) or not. Middle-range theories are particularly relevant 
to this thesis because they relate most directly to empirical research of the role o f ideas and 
debate in foreign policy. These theories include the international systemic approach at the 
broadest level, and other levels of analysis including those at the individual and domestic 
political level. This thesis examines the role of ideas predominantly at the individual and
4 Bruce Russett and Harvey Starr, World Politics: The Menu for Choice (San Francisco: Freeman, 1981), p.25.
5 At the systemic level o f analysis, state behaviour is seen as a reaction to the external environment. At the state 
level, behaviour is in response to both the external and internal environments. The individual level examines the 
actions and attitudes o f individual policy makers.
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domestic levels of analysis because it focuses both on how ideas and perceptions define 
foreign policy purposes and action and how they affect the attitudes and actions of the 
political elite.
a) The International Systemic Approach
The international systemic approach argues that foreign policy outcomes result solely 
from changing external constraints (structures in the international system), not from domestic 
change. States are assumed to be rational, unitary actors with stable and basically similar 
domestic preferences and decision-making procedures. Thus, in its "pure” form, this 
approach examines foreign policy as a response to the international systemic level.6 
Domestic-level factors are rarely considered, and the process through which elite preferences 
and state interests change and guide policy outputs is generally ignored. Instead, states are 
seen to recognize structural change in the international system, reorder their interests, and 
adapt. However, some scholars use a "soft" realist approach and do consider domestic 
variables. For example, William Wohlforth uses a process-oriented classical realism to 
explain Soviet behaviour but also employs some domestic-level causal variables and stresses 
the importance of perceptions.
Neo-realist Kenneth Waltz compares the international system to a market, with states
Q
(like firms) engaging in activities that keep them alive and operating. Just as firms will go 
bankrupt if they do not pursue profit-maximizing strategies, so too will states that do not 
pursue self-protective and power-seeking strategies become weakened and/or disappear. 
Because states and not individuals are seen to be the most important units in world politics, 
individuals and their ideas are interpreted either as unimportant, or at most as "unexplained 
variances”. When ideas change, it is seen to be part of a logical and inevitable process of 
adaptation to various international stimuli.
6 Kenneth Waltz, Democracy and Foreign Politics: The American and British Experience (Boston: Little, 
Brown, 1967).
7 William Wohlforth, "Realism and the End of the Cold War", International Security, vol. 19, no.3 (Winter 1994-95), 
pp. 91-129.
Kenneth Waltz offers a lucid account of the neorealist argument in his Theory o f International Politics (London: 
Addison-Wesley, 1979).
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Russia’s new position in the international system 1991-1996 obviously provided new 
opportunities, constraints and feedback -  all of which influenced the country’s foreign 
policies and set some of the context for decision-making and political debate.9 Clearly, 
members of the political elite reacted to the new and novel events from the external 
environment in their formulation of state interests and policies. To this extent, this broad 
approach is unchallengeable.
With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russia found itself in a new, 
geopolitically vulnerable position. By mid-1992 these circumstances included the outbreak of 
conflicts in the CIS states. Russia’s foreign and military policies towards these conflicts, as 
well as towards other perceived dangers to Russian interests, were inevitably reactive. In this 
context, it is unsurprising that Russia would attempt to strengthen its security and retain a 
dominant role in the region. Realists would explain Russia’s involvement in the Former 
Soviet Union (FSU) as the natural exploitation of a “window of opportunity” -  an attempt to 
redress the power vacuum in the region as well as to prevent any third state from taking 
advantage of the new states’ instability and weakness. This, of course, does not mean that 
Russia would automatically be successful. Kenneth Waltz aptly describes Russia’s position: 
“States try to maintain their position in the system. For me that is an axiom. Now, there is 
nothing in anybody’s theory, of anything, that says you’ll succeed”.10
Russia’s new security relations with the West also helped to shape its foreign policy 
contours. Russia’s strategic posture had changed dramatically with the dissolution of the 
Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) and the dismantlement of the stable Cold War strategic 
framework that followed the break up of the Soviet Union. Earlier the WTO had enjoyed 
almost three-fold conventional military superiority over NATO in Europe. But, by 1995, 
Russia’s military force was only about one-third the size of NATO’s and one-fifth the
9 Using this hypothesis, Gorbachev's foreign policy has been explained as a rational, inevitable process o f adaptation 
to external stimuli. See Daniel Deudney and John Ikenberry, "Soviet Reform and the End o f the Cold War: 
Explaining Large-Scale Historical Change", Review o f International Studies, vol. 17, no.3 (July 1991), pp.226-44. 
These authors also suggest eight sources o f change for Soviet foreign policy under Gorbachev in idem, "The 
International Sources of Soviet Change", International Security vol.16, no.3 (Winter 1991/92), pp.74-118.
10 Ken Waltz in “Interview with Ken Waltz”, conducted by Fred Halliday and Justin Rosenberg, Review of  
International Studies, vol.24, no.3 (July 1998), pp.371-386, p.377.
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combined power of the Western states.11 Moreover, the withdrawal of the Soviet military 
from Eastern Europe altered the geopolitical boundaries in Europe.
Russia’s new geostrategic and military vulnerabilities in both the West and the FSU
explain to a large extent why Russia would try to maintain at least a position of strength in its
immediate geographical region. However, this thesis will argue that the actual strategic
situation was more complex. As a new state Russia was trying not simply to maintain its
power base, but also to define its own new position in the world, even though it was still
saddled with many of the ambitions, strengths and burdens of the old Soviet Union.12 The
major problem with the international systemic approach as an explanation of Russian foreign
policy is that it mistakenly treats the state as a unitary actor, and does not ground the national
pursuit of power or security in the interests and incentives of individual foreign policy 
11decision makers. This thesis attempts to resolve this deficiency by concentrating on the 
individual and domestic levels of analysis.
b) The Individual Level of Analysis
In contrast to those who assume that the state is a unitary actor, many foreign policy 
analysts open up the “black box” of the state and attempt to explain foreign policy by the 
way the various units relate to one another. The individual level of analysis focuses on the 
actions and behaviour of individual policy-makers in order to explain how they define 
purposes, choose among courses of action and utilize national capabilities to achieve 
objectives in the name of the state. This level of analysis focuses upon ideologies, 
motivations, ideas, perceptions, values and idiosyncrasies. Otherwise known as micro­
theories of decision-making they are intended to help explain how individual decisions are 
taken within the broad framework of foreign policy. These are opposed to macro-theories 
which explain the relation between state and society.
11 Dorn Crawford, Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE): A Review and Update o f Kev Treaty Elements 
(Washington, DC: United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, December 1995).
12 Russia’s search for its national identity is examined at length in Chapter Three.
13 As shown above in the theoretical section on realism.
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Rational actor models are not examined at this level of analysis because of their 
premises that decision-makers select the most effective and efficient means of achieving a 
given end and that specific individuals and their ideas are generally peripheral to this 
process.14 As President Boris Yeltsin was the politician at the apex of Russia’s centralized 
foreign policy-making institutions between 1991 and 1996, he undoubtedly had a decisive 
impact upon policy outcome. However, precisely how President Yeltsin made foreign policy 
was often unpredicted, maybe even unpredictable, and it is difficult to show that he followed 
any cost or benefit analysis in his decision-making. To quote Yeltsin himself in 1994: “To 
make a decision is like plunging into water for me; I don’t want to analyse whether it is a 
drawback or an advantage”.15
This thesis is in line with the theories which argue that in the real world decision­
makers are not simply confronted by problems; they must examine the world and identify 
and perceive the problems themselves.16 Moreover, the simplest rationalist explanation is 
challenged by empirical investigations that show that feedback from a changing environment is 
rarely obvious and frequently difficult to read or analyse. In fact, leaders and influential groups 
often disagree about the facts in the environment and what they mean. Clearly, international
14 Rational actor models assume that decisions are taken by those individuals who are supposed to take them, 
that the decisions are meaningful and have been rationally mapped out. O f course, rational actor models 
represent something o f an ideal against which actual policy-making can be measured. Personal beliefs or ideas 
play a part in that they help leaders to have a clear sense o f the various objectives and help them to arrange 
multiple objectives into a hierarchy o f  preferences. Rationalist thinking assumes self-interested actors strive to 
maximize their utility under certain constraints (the functionalist approach). Thus in rational actor models o f  
foreign policy, Graham Allison’s Rational Actor Model, for example, governments are assumed to be monoliths 
-  that is, they speak with one voice, hold one view, have one set o f agreed-on values and goals. Government 
preferences are modified in response to a broad array o f international stimuli and foreign policy changes are 
seen to be rational, largely inevitable process o f adaptation to changing external stimuli. In other words, rational 
actor models are within the realist approach. Graham T. Allison, The Essence o f Decision (Boston: Little, 
Brown, 1971). For an overview o f Allison’s models see Jonathan Bendor and Thomas H. Hammond, 
“Rethinking Allison’s Models”, American Political Science Review, vol. 86, no.2 (June 1992), pp.301-322.
15 Yeltsin, President Notes. Moscow 94, p.347 in Lilia Shevtsova, Yeltsin’s Russia: Myths and Reality 
(Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999), p.56.
16 Iver Neumann argues that the constraints o f geopolitics cannot be taken as a wholly objective factor 
independent o f human agency. “Threats do not exist “out there” but are socially constructed as part of political 
discourse.” Neumann argues that people in Russia and the West have colluded in the social construction o f  
“walls”. His thesis is that the forging o f Russian identity by a process o f internal integration has its twin in the 
external differentiation o f Russia from Europe. See Iver B. Neumann, Russia and the Idea o f Europe (London: 
Routledge, 1996).
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factors do play a role in shaping states' interests, but the challenge is to understand how they
matter and under what conditions they matter.
In contrast to the rational actor model at the individual level of analysis, the
approaches outlined below suggest that ideas may be important and that they may influence
the direction and content of policy choices and outputs. However, they have been criticized
for not assuming “bounded rationality” (when “pure” rationality is limited by contextual and
cognitive factors) and for leading, therefore, to idiosyncratic narratives which cannot serve as 
11the basis for theory. They also pose the problem of the relationship of agency to structure
t o
(which is also a central issue in international relations in general). In other words, the 
problem is how to understand policy in terms of both “human choice and social 
determination” -  individuals and their ideas, as well as external factors.19
Psychologists claim that it is impossible to develop a neutral, objective or impartial 
image of reality. Psychological approaches to foreign policy, which became widespread in 
the 1960s, therefore examine how the cognitive processes of human beings influence policy
0C\choices in a non-rational fashion. These approaches stress the importance of ideas and are 
concerned intellectually with the role of beliefs and values primarily in terms of individuals’
^ i
interpretations of reality.
Proponents of the psychological approach argue that even if one could obtain perfect 
information about alternatives and consequences, problems of perception would still render
meaningless the notion of an ideal or perfectly rational choice among alternatives. The
•  •  •  •  00interpretation of information depends on the individual’s belief system and images. The
17 “Bounded rationality” was to be a methodological compromise between an ideal model (rational choice, 
whereby an actor is supposed to choose between the best o f  the alternatives) and reality.
18 See Margot Light, “Foreign Policy Analysis”, in Margot Light and A.J.R. Groom (eds.), International Relations: 
A Handbook o f Current Theory (London: Frances Pinter, 1994), pp.93-108, p.99.
19 Walter Carlsnaes, “The Agency-Structure Problem in Foreign Policy Analysis”, International Studies 
Quarterly, vol.36, no.3 (September 1992), pp.245-70.
20 For a current example see Eric Singer and Valerie Hudson (eds.), Political Psychology and Foreign Policy.. 
(Oxford: Westview Press, 1992).
21 Steve Smith, "Belief Systems and the Study o f International Relations", in Richard Little and Steve Smith, Belief 
Systems and International Relations (Oxford: British International Studies Association, 1988), pp.l 1-36, pp. 17-27.
22 K. J. Holsti defines a belief system as "... a set o f lenses through which information concerning the physical and 
social environment is received. It orients the individual to his environment, defining it for him and identifying for 
him its salient characteristics... [It also] has the function o f the establishment of goals and the ordering of
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possibilities and probabilities provided by the domestic and global environments affect plans, 
decisions and policies only as they are perceived and understood by decision-makers.23
The psychological approach may thus provide insights into the Russian foreign policy 
debates by emphasizing the ideas of Russia’s foreign policy participants. With the break-up 
of the Soviet Union and the end of communism, the members of this elite had many different 
ideas (or “underlying preferences”) about Russia’s identity which structured how Russia’s 
foreign policy options were perceived.
Later, this thesis will identify these underlying preferences and examine whether and 
how they changed over time. Even though specific events put general pressure on decision­
makers to be pragmatic, individual Russians still had to interpret what they perceived in the 
outside world. "Beliefs provide frameworks of perception which are filters of information 
that guide decision-makers as to what should be regarded as relevant and what should not" 24 
What advisers advocate and what policy makers decide are significantly affected by their 
perceptions of their country’s past and present, its role in the world and its relations with 
other states. Personal values and beliefs, as well as how individuals process the information 
they receive, are also pertinent in this process.
Research also indicates a number of circumstances in which ideas and beliefs have 
had a very great effect on decisions and behaviour. These include non-routine situations such 
as crises, ambiguous or uncertain situations, unanticipated events, and decisions made at the 
top of a government hierarchy free from organizational constraints. One hypothesis from 
the observations is that periods of crisis or great uncertainty favour “ideational” shifts, and 
that the nature of the new ideas and beliefs themselves play a crucial role in determining
preferences.” K. J. Holsti, "The Belief System and National Images: A Case Study", in James Rosenau, International 
Politics and Foreign Policy (New York: Free Press, 1969), pp.543-50, p.544. See also Richard Little and Steve 
Smith (eds.). Belief Systems and International Relations (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988). On ideology, see Walter 
Carlsnaes. Ideology and Foreign Policy: Problems of Comparative Conceptualisation (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986).
23 An individual's perception is the process by which an individual selects, organizes and evaluates incoming 
information about the surrounding world. Both perception and interpretation depend heavily on the images that 
already exist in the mind of the individual decision-maker. Bruce Russett and Harvey Starr, World Politics (New  
York: Freeman and Company, 1996), p.249.
24 Michael Clarke, "Foreign Policy Analysis: A Theoretical Guide", in Stelios Stavridis and Christopher Hill (eds.), 
Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy (London: Berg Publishers Limited, 1996), pp. 19-39, p.24.
25 See K. J. Holsti, International Politics (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1988), pp.29-33.
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whether or not change occurs. Russia certainly faced many internal and external crises 
during the period under study -  for example during the parliamentary elections of 1993 and 
1995, and the outbreak of conflicts in the near abroad, as well as an enormous amount of 
uncertainty about the future of Russia’s foreign policy, and even Russia itself. This thesis 
explores whether or not conditions of crisis and uncertainty created “windows of 
opportunity” which allowed ideas to develop or help solve foreign policy dilemmas.
The problem with this “psychological” explanation is that "ideas do not float
97freely". It is, therefore, not satisfactory to simply outline the different foreign policy ideas 
or preferences. This has been acknowledged in recent studies of "knowledge as power" 
which argue that new knowledge (ideas) must also be able to challenge existing evidence or 
interpretations, or create a consensus around new policy issues and develop new approaches
90to solutions. Taking this into account, this thesis not only outlines the evolution of foreign 
policy ideas but also attempts to discover whether any consensus over new approaches 
developed among the political elite concerning Russia’s future policies. It will be argued 
below that in a time of great uncertainty, which included wars, economic depression, and 
which followed the end of communism and the break-up of empire, ideas created “road 
maps” which helped to guide policy and solve strategic dilemmas.
"Cognitive-content learning" theory is another approach used at the individual level 
whereby decision-makers rationalize and analyse their situation according to what they 
consciously believe about the world. In this approach, ideas are considered significant and 
affect elite preferences, interests and ultimately policies though a process of “learning”.
26 This process has been argued in the following recent works: Sheri Berman, The Social Democratic Moment: 
Ideas and Politics in the Making of Interwar Europe (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998) and Kathleen 
McNamara, The Currency o f Ideas: Monetary Politics in the European Union (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University 
Press, 1998).
27 Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Ideas Do Not Float Freely: Transnational coalitions, domestic structures, and the end o f  
the Cold War", International Organization, vol.48, no.2 (Spring 1994), pp. 185-214.
28 See for example Sarah Mendelson who examines the institutional and political context that shaped the ideas 
leading to the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989. She argues that the change of policy was a result o f the 
Gorbachev coalition gaining control o f the political resources and placing reformist ideas squarely on the political 
agenda. Sarah Mendelson, "Internal Battles and External Wars", World Politics vol.45, no.3 (April 1993), pp.327- 
360.
29 Ernest Haas, When Knowledge is Power (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980).
30 However in such approaches the source o f "knowledge" is not examined nor are the broader political processes,
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Advocates of the learning approach argue that leaders and elites become deeply wedded over 
time to organizing concepts and ideas that were dominant in the past. They argue that often 
new leaders coming into power act on new ideas or preferences which determine policy
 ^i
change. This might be assumed to be less relevant in the development of ideas in new 
states, however, it may be useful to understand how Russian foreign policy thinking changed 
in response to its perceived successes and failures in the CIS conflicts.
c) The Domestic Political Level of Analysis
This thesis is primarily but not solely located at the individual level of analysis. It is 
in line with many recent studies which argue that it is not only the understandings of 
individuals and groups that are important in influencing policy-making but also the political 
context and mechanisms (the operational environment) through which ideas and belief 
systems affect policy.32
Such reasoning has led some international relations analysts to change their focus 
towards analysing the broader domestic political context in order to understand how it can 
inhibit or promote the adoption of particular ideas.33 The domestic political context is seen to 
be a crucial determinant of foreign policy because this is where politicians’ political ideas are 
formed and decisions are made -  not from within a vacuum.34 Therefore, reactions and
by which it affects policy, considered. Martin Hollis and Steve Smith develop the notion o f individual "roles" which 
operate within structures, acting as constraints and “enablements”, but also leaving room for personal qualities of 
judgement and skill. See Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, "Roles and Reasons in Foreign Policy Decision-Making", 
British Journal o f Political Science, vol. 16, no.3 (1986), pp.269-86.
31 This explanation was made implicit in Jerry Hough's interpretation o f policies under Gorbachev. Jerry Hough, 
Russia and the West: Gorbachev and the Politics o f Reform (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1988). However, there 
is little evidence that Gorbachev came to power with a specific policy framework for foreign policy reform.
32 Examining international politics from the perspective o f individual states, rather than individuals, or systems 
o f states, state-level analysis explains the behaviour o f states by reference not just to the external environment 
or individuals beliefs, but primarily to the domestic conditions which affect policy-making (including domestic 
political pressures, national ideologies, public opinion etc.) -  otherwise known as the “operational 
environment”.
33 See Checkel who focuses on both the international and domestic institutional contexts in his examination o f the 
"empowerment o f ideas" in late Soviet and very early Russia's foreign policy. Jeffrey Checkel, Ideas and 
International Political Change: Soviet/Russia Behaviour and the End of the Cold War (New York: Yale University 
Press, 1997). See also Kathryn Sikkink, Ideas and Institutions: Developmentalism in Brazil and Argentina (New 
York: Cornell University Press, 1991).
34 Of course, this applies predominantly to modem Western societies where the bulk o f such research has taken 
place. There are some states in which the policy-making establishments have been more carefully isolated from
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feedback from the main political actors, namely the parliament, media, public opinion and 
pressure groups are seen to influence politicians’ ideas and understandings and thus help 
formulate foreign-policy decisions and outputs.35
This thesis focuses upon individuals and their ideas in Russia’s wide domestic 
environment in order to better understand the ways or “mechanisms” by which ideas have 
affected policy. In particular, ideas and political debate may have played an especially 
significant role in Russian foreign policy partly due to the unstable domestic environment 
and the initial lack of expertise and knowledge about the CIS states in the foreign policy­
making environment. Let us now briefly examine the “political bargaining” and the 
“institutionalist” approaches.
i) Political Bargaining /Governmental Model
At the domestic level, foreign policy has been described as the result o f "domestic 
political manoeuvring" -  a product of the leaders’ competition for office. This is relatively 
similar to Graham Allison’s Governmental Model which stresses the social process of 
foreign policy-making and argues that foreign policy is not a result of intellectual choice but 
rather the result of various bargaining games among players in the government.36
In this approach, ideas affect policy but do not in themselves have great importance. 
Instead, interests are interpreted as given and coming prior to any beliefs held by actors. In 
the extreme rationalist interpretation, ideas are simply “hooks” in which “competing elite 
seize'upon popular ideas to propagate and to legitimate their interests, but the ideas
domestic political influences than others.
35 This has been accomplished in many different ways. Andrew Moravcsik identifies three subcategories o f  
domestic theories o f foreign policy. First, "society-centred" theories stress the influence o f domestic social groups 
through legislatures, interest groups, elections, and public opinion on foreign policy outcome. Second, "state- 
centred" domestic theories examine the administrative and decision-making apparatus of the state executive branch. 
Lastly, theories of "state-society relations" emphasize institutions that link state and society such as education and 
administration. Andrew Moravsik, "Introduction: Integrating International and Domestic Theories o f International 
Bargaining", Double-Edged Diplomacy (London: University of California Press, 1993), pp. 3-43.
36 Graham Allison’s foreign policy models are discussed in Graham T. Allison, The Essence of Decision 
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1971). For an overview o f  Allison’s models see Jonathan Bendor and Thomas H. 
Hammond, “Rethinking Allison’s Models”, American Political Science Review, vol. 86, no.2 (June 1992), 
pp.301-322.
36
7^themselves do not play a causal role". In other words, ideas are seen to be instrumentally 
seized on by members of the political elite and used in an attempt to advance their political
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positions and build winning political coalitions. This is a form of domestic-level realism in 
which politics is comprised of power, interests and coalition making. In the crudest form of 
this argument, interests determine policies, relegating ideas to mere tools of convenience that 
are adopted for crass political calculation such as to appease political opposition.
Although this thesis argues that ideas are important, it agrees with the political 
bargaining approach that foreign policy outputs should be understood in terms of the political 
process in which they are selected. It is not enough to outline the foreign policy ideas of 
members of Russia’s political elite, and to know whether a consensus over ideas developed, 
to understand Russia’s policy. In order for ideas to affect policy they must also be placed on 
the political agenda, and this happens only if elements of the senior political leadership 
support the adoption of the ideas or interpretations. Thus, this thesis examines whether a 
consensus of ideas was adopted by those in power and was then translated into policies. It 
also examines Russia’s evolving foreign policy ideas and policies to determine whether a 
consensus of ideas was reflected in the policies.
ii) Institutionalists
The international relations literature also shows that ideas can affect or constrain 
policy when they become embedded in institutions. Administrative agencies, laws, norms 
and operating procedures mediate between ideas and policy outputs. When ideas become
37 Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, "Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework", in Goldstein and 
Keohane, Ideas and Foreign Policy (New York: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp.3-31, p.4. Of course, pure 
rationalists have a highly implausible position in suggesting that without ideas such as paganism, world religion and 
Marxism, that human history would have run the same course.
38 In recent years, coalition-building theories have been prevalent in comparative politics and international relations 
literature. See for example, Peter Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times (New York: Cornell University Press, 1986) 
and Jack Snyder, Myths o f Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University 
Press, 1991).
39 Actors' interests represent their fundamental goals. For political actors these interests are mostly concerned with 
increasing the odds o f retaining political office, and for economic actors these interests involve maximizing income. 
Policy preferences are the specific policy choices that actors believe will help them become re-elected or maximize 
income.
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institutionalised, their impact can be greatly prolonged -  even when no one believes in them 
any more.
Institutionalists are concerned with political influence and especially the mechanisms 
through which ideas or debate affect international politics. "New institutionalist" arguments 
focus on the role of formal and informal political institutions in shaping policy. They largely 
exclude other influences, and are most prevalent in comparative government and political 
economy literatures. Liberal institutionalism focuses on the degree to which institutions play 
an important part in tempering the anarchical nature and unremitting power plays of 
international relations.40 Similar to the political bargaining approach seen above, institutional 
approaches make the important point that the purveyors of new concepts and beliefs do not 
operate within a vacuum.
Individual decision-makers and policy-makers are, of course, embedded within 
government organizations or bureaucracy. However scholars debate how the institutional 
structure (particularly the openness of the policy-making structure) of a country may affect 
the adoption of ideas. Some argue that societal and group pressures have less affect on states 
that have more autonomous political institutions, and thus ideas already established should 
play a greater role in determining the interests of the institutions. In contrast, in countries 
where the policymaking is decentralized and fragmented, it is usually easier for new ideas to 
reach decision-makers but less likely that new, coherent, long-term policies will be based 
upon those ideas. However, these hypotheses are greatly disputed and there is little 
systematic evidence 41
This thesis is premised on the argument that Russia’s foreign policy decision-making 
was relatively chaotic with “impulses felt from all sides”.42 To assess the relative weight of
40 Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in World Political Economy (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1984). For an overview o f  Keohane’s work see Michael Suhr, “Robert Keohane: a 
contemporary classic”, in Iver B. Neumann and Ole Waever (eds.), The Future o f International Relations 
(London and New York: Routledge, 1997), pp. 90-120.
41 See, for example Snyder who makes these assertions in Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and 
International Ambition (New York: Cornell University Press, 1991). Critics argue that this assertion elevates 
process over leadership to a highly questionable level and draws overly stark contrasts in the ways ideas influence 
policy in different political systems.
42 Author interview with Andrei Zagorsky, Author’s Interview. May 28, 1999, MGIMO. He said that because o f
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institutions upon Russia’s foreign and military policy within this context is highly 
complicated. Moreover, within each institution after 1991 there was a plethora of views. 
Nevertheless, this thesis will attempt to indicate whether the dominant foreign policy ideas of 
the Russian political elite were institutionalised. In other words, were they adopted by the 
key foreign policy-making institutions or incorporated into policy through official statements 
or the adoption of new concepts and doctrines?
d) Integrative Approaches
A general criticism of the majority of the approaches seen above is that they are 
exclusively concentrated at either the individual, domestic or international levels of analysis 
and therefore fail to capture the full array of factors (including ideas or debate) affecting a 
complex process.43 There have been many attempts recently to address this criticism and to 
bring domestic variables back into international relations theory. Since it is extremely 
difficult to establish the independent influence of ideas (or other specific factors), 
"interactive-approaches" which stress the interaction between the individual, domestic and 
international levels, have gained prominence.44
One example of the new integrative approaches is the “epistemic” approach45 
Epistemic communities are defined as transnational networks of professionals with 
recognized expertise in a particular domain. These communities, analysts argue, play a key 
role in bringing new ideas into the political process and thus play a central role in shaping 
foreign policy 46
the clash between the Ministry o f Defence and Ministry o f Foreign Affairs, Russia often appeared to have one 
foreign policy run by civilians and another by the military.
43 This o f course is a criticism o f foreign policy analysis in general, not simply the subsection dealing with the role 
o f  ideas. Examples o f important early attempts to integrate variables from the different levels, and to explicitly 
examine the role of ideas include Brecher's research design and William Wohlforth's model -  both of which were 
mentioned above.
44 See for example, Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson and Robert D. Putnam (eds.), Double-Edged Diplomacy 
(Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1993).
45 See for example, Peter Gourevitch, "The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources o f Domestic 
Politics", International Organization, vol.32, no.4 (Autumn, 1978); Thomas Risse-Kappen, Bringing Transnational 
Relations Back In: Non State Actors. Domestic Structures and International Institutions (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995).
46 Here ideas are considered paramount and defined as "consensual knowledge", that is, a set o f shared beliefs
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Another example of “integrative approaches”, which stresses the interaction between 
domestic and international levels, and is more directly applicable to this thesis (which 
examines elites and debates but not those impacting from outside Russia) is the "two-level 
games" approach. In Robert Putnam’s “two-level games”, political leaders are seen to be 
"Janus-faced" -  that is, as trying to achieve their goals in the domestic and international 
arenas simultaneously.47 Thus, to understand their actions, both internal and external 
variables must be examined. The primary importance of politics, interests and power is 
acknowledged and the role of ideas is implicitly assumed, if not explicitly outlined.48
Unlike the international systemic approach, in the “two-level games” the agent is no 
longer the state as a whole but instead (similar to the domestic-level approaches) includes 
central decision-makers, legislatures, and other domestic groups. This approach applied to 
Russian foreign policy also recognizes the inevitability of domestic conflict (bargaining) 
about what the "national interest" and international context requires. As Putnam put it: "A 
more adequate account of the domestic determinants of foreign policy and international 
relations must stress politics: parties, social classes, interest groups (both economic and non­
economic), legislators, and even public opinion and elections, not simply executive officials 
and institutional arrangements”.49 Building from Putnam's hypothesis, Helen Milner, while 
using rational choice theory, similarly argued that domestic politics and international
about particular cause-effect, ends-means relations held by all members o f the epistemic community. Peter Haas 
argues that change in a state's interests is the result o f actions by domestic political elite (members o f a 
transnational epistemic community) who control key government organizations. Peter M. Haas, “Introduction: 
Epistemic Communities and International Policy Co-ordination”, International Organization, vol. 46, no.l 
(Winter 1992), pp. 1-35. The strength o f the epistemic approach is that it integrates international-structural 
factors into its analysis. However, these analysts do not explicitly examine institutions and cannot explain the 
conditions under which an epistemic community comes to influence policy-making. For a recent application of  
the transnationalist approach to the end o f the Cold War see Matthew Evangelista, Unarmed Forces. The 
Transnational Movement to End the Cold War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999).
47 "At the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring die government to adopt favourable 
policies, and politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among those groups. At the international level, 
national governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the 
adverse consequences o f foreign developments. Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics", in Peter 
Evans, Harold Jacobsen and Robert Putnam (eds.), Double-Edged Diplomacy (Berkley: University o f California 
Press, 1993), pp.431-468, p.437.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid. Putnam, p.435.
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relations are inextricably interrelated.50 Links between Russian foreign policy debates, 
domestic politics and foreign policies are highlighted in this thesis.
Very recently, there has been a flurry of new studies which specifically examine the 
role of ideas in international politics. In particular, there is now a significant literature on the 
role of ideas and the end of the Cold War.51 At the same time, the implications of this 
research for the systematic understanding of the role of ideas in international politics and for 
the revision of extant theories remains to be developed.52 Much of this research was 
presented at the “Research Workshop: The Role of Ideas and the End of the Cold War”, at 
Brown University, 14-16 April 2000. The workshop organizers, Nina Tannenwald and 
William C. Wohlforth, suggested three mechanisms by which analysts may examine how 
ideas influence behaviour and policy. First, empirical analysts may focus on the direct effect 
of ideas -  as independent or intervening variables. For example, they may assess the 
proportion of variance explained by ideas as opposed to other independent variables. Ideas 
are thus a residual category, which helps to explain what interests and power alone cannot 
accomplish. Thus, sometimes ideas matter and sometimes they do not. A second approach
50 Milner’s rational choice examination o f why nations co-operate attempts to create a theory o f domestic influences 
-  which includes ideas. She argues that states are not unitary actors but are instead what Dahl calls "polyarchic"- in 
other words they are composed o f various actors with different preferences who share power (often unequally) over 
decision-making. "International politics and foreign policy become part o f the domestic struggle for power and the 
search for internal compromise" (p. 11). Milner identifies three variables necessary to understand policy-making: the 
differences among policy preferences of domestic actors, the nature of domestic political institutions and the 
distribution of information. Therefore in adopting policies, political leaders are influenced by groups with 
conflicting interests as well as by the electoral consequences o f their choices. Milner calls one o f her key variables 
the "structure o f domestic preferences" - that is the differences o f policy positions o f domestic actors over a 
particular issue. As opposed to earlier arguments about the role of preferences in which only societal or political 
actors were examined, here policy is seen as being determined by the strategic interaction among the actors' 
(political and societal) preferences and the institutional context. Helen Milner, Interests. Institutions and Information 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997). Also see Robert Dahl, Polyarchy: participation and organization 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971).
51 On ideas and the Cold War see: Jeffrey Checkel, Ideas and International Political Change: Soviet/Russia 
Behaviour and the End o f the Cold War (New York: Yale University Press, 1997); A.D. English, The Changing 
Face o f War: Learning From History (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1998); E. Herman, “The 
career o f Cold War psychology”, Radical History Review, no.63 (Fall 1995), pp.52-85; and Mathew 
Evangelista, Unarmed Forces. The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1999).
52 For the implications o f this new literature on international relations theory see William C. Wohlforth (ed.), 
Witnesses to the End o f the Cold War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); S. M. Walt, 
Revolution and War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996), and Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse- 
Kappen (eds.), International Relations Theory and the End o f the Cold War (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1995).
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holds that interests can only be conceived in the context of a framework of ideas. That 
framework is used to interpret the world and help people define their interests. Thus, the 
analyst examines how ideas shape interests which in turn influence policies. For these 
scholars, the question is why some ideas are adopted rather than others, why at one particular 
time and not at another. Finally, a third approach coming from the conference argues that the 
most important structures in international politics are ideational, not material. Both actors' 
identities and interests are constituted by ideational structures. Thus, “ideational” structures 
do more than merely constrain behaviour. The impact of ideas is reflected in the categories in 
which people think, the constitutive “rules of the game” which define roles, identities, 
interests and criteria of legitimacy and justification. In this philosophical level perspective, 
ideas provide a framework for the social world.53 This thesis basically follows the second 
approach, and explores how ideas and debates helped to define Russian interests and foreign 
policies towards military conflicts in the near abroad.
4.The Role of Ideas and Debates in International Relations Theoretical 
Literature
The above survey of the international relations literature shows that although 
significant advances have been made in the field, beliefs and ideas are not subject to easy 
classification and analysis, and more can be accomplished on the topic. A major weakness of 
the “ideas literature” is that it is often descriptive as opposed to explanatory and lacks 
systematic analysis of the sources, processes and mechanisms by which ideas aid in the 
development of policies in the field of international relations. Moreover, those analysts who 
examine the role of ideas sometimes make the error of assuming a direct causal connection 
between ideas and policies. They simply assert that ideas matter and claim that it is obviously 
very difficult to explain why or how a particular idea had an impact while other ideas did not.
530n  this last point see Alexander Wendt, Social Theory o f International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999).
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Furthermore, although ideas are always present in policy debates, it is not necessarily 
the intrinsic characteristics of a particular idea that cause it to be chosen. Often the policy 
output can be explained by giving causal weight to other variables, such as material interests, 
and relegating ideas to a minor role. Clearly, politicians have economic and personal 
interests, and use ideas to strengthen their political legitimacy and support. It seems tempting 
to conclude, therefore, that rather than acting as a direct guide to action, "...the role that 
beliefs play in policy-making is much more subtle and less direct... they form one of several 
clusters of intervening variables that may shape and constrain decision-making".54 To 
counter this argument, "ideas scholars" ought to provide evidence against the hypothesis that 
“material” interests are dominant. Instead, however, writers often simply conclude with 
plausible, but unsubstantiated, assertions that ideas are the most important factors in 
determining policies.
Recognition of the problem of uncertainty in history has led many scholars to focus 
on ideas and beliefs as well as (or instead of) the material factors that have traditionally been 
at the centre of international theory. If the international political world is highly uncertain, 
then the ideas actors have about the confusing reality may be especially important 
determinants of that reality. The literature also demonstrates that beliefs, attitudes and policy 
preferences will differ according to individuals’ objective interests and according to their 
views of those interests. Actors often have different views on what the national interest even 
is.
Moreover, decision-makers are also often presented with strong incentives for 
misrepresenting their real intentions or for creating deliberate ambiguity. In such cases, 
determining what decision-makers "really" believed is extremely difficult. In fact, foreign policy 
decision-makers may themselves be confused over ends and means. Thus it is necessary to be 
careful to distinguish political rhetoric from actual policy intentions and outputs.
54 K.J. Holsti, as quoted in Steve Smith, "Belief Systems and the Study of International Relations", in Richard Little 
and Steve Smith (eds.), Belief Systems and International Relations (Oxford: Basil Blackwell and British 
International Studies, 1988), pp. 11-36, p.32.
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In sum, the international relations literature has developed many important insights and 
some confusion about the role of ideas in foreign policy. As difficulties of explanation and 
measurement continue, more varied empirical studies need to be conducted. Much of the work 
to date is within the field of domestic politics and public policy (concentrated in the United 
States) and is focused primarily on elites. More attempts are needed to test empirical 
propositions and build theories as well as to develop richly detailed case studies which can be 
used to sort out the variables at work.
5. Conclusions and the Approach Used in this Thesis
The above brief analysis shows that no single theoretical approach has been able to 
capture the complexity of the role of ideas or political debate in international relations.55 
However, this analysis of the theoretical literature illustrates that the role of ideas and debate 
needs to be further studied at the empirical level. It also indicates that a fruitful examination of 
the role of ideas should be conducted in the following three ways. First, the various Russian 
foreign policy ideas ought to be outlined since the actions taken by humans depend on the 
substantive quality of available ideas.56 Second, there ought to be an attempt to discover 
whether there was congruence between ideas and policy, and to establish, as far as possible, the 
role of ideas in the development of policy and action. Third, other domestic variables as well as 
the international context need to be considered in order to capture the full array of factors 
affecting the complex process of foreign policy-making.
55 Simplification may encourage caricature and pigeonholing, but thinking theoretically means to attempt to discern 
particular patterns in world politics. It means trying to identify the boundaries o f inquiry and explanation and to 
organize phenomena in order to make them intelligible. Significantly, it also means acquiring a knowledge of  
context and meaning.
56 Keohane and Goldstein, helpfully distinguish three types o f beliefs: worldviews, principled beliefs, and causal 
beliefs. "Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework", Ideas and Foreign Policy (New York: Cornell 
University Press, 1993) pp.3-30. Worldviews are embedded in the symbolism o f a culture and deeply affect modes 
o f thought and discourse. For examples, world religions, human rights, Stalinism etc. Principled beliefs consist of 
normative ideas that specify criteria for distinguishing right from wrong and just from unjust -  and also have a 
profound impact on political action. Lastly, causal beliefs are beliefs about cause-effect relationships which derive 
from the shared consensus o f recognized elites. They imply strategies for the attainment o f goals.
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Thus, this thesis does not adopt one particular theory or model but rather adopts 
insights derived from various approaches to understand whether and how ideas mattered in 
Russian foreign policy. The role of ideas may be seen in two stages: the origin and 
production of ideas, and the mechanisms by which ideas influence policy. First, at the 
individual level of analysis, one may examine the origin and/or the “transmission” of ideas 
(i.e. the process of how new ideas develop). The literature tells us that new ideas develop 
during times of crisis, when “windows of opportunity” are opened whereby new beliefs can 
help people solve policy dilemmas. This thesis examines whether this was the case in 
Russian foreign policy during the outbreaks of conflict in the near abroad. The second way in 
which ideas have been said to develop is through a process of “learning”. In this fashion, the 
foreign policy ideas of members of the political elite may have changed because of 
experience or “lessons learned” over time about the successes and failures of Russia’s policy 
or actions. This, too, is examined in the thesis.
However, most relevant to the thesis are the “pathways” or “mechanisms” by which 
ideas are said to affect policy options.57 In each of the following three paths (derived from 
the international relations literature seen above), policy would be different in the absence of 
the particular idea. In the first path, a consensus over underlying preferences may guide 
policy. Ideas thus influence policy by serving as “focal points”, that is by developing 
cohesion among groups.58 Especially when there are no objective criteria on which to base a 
choice, ideas can focus or shape the co-ordination that leads to the adoption of a particular 
policy. Second, ideas may create “road maps” by which ideas guide policy choice by framing 
a consensus over security problems and suggesting policy.59 This is especially significant 
during a time of great uncertainty. After an idea has been selected, this pathway limits the 
adoption of other ideas because it suggests that they are not worthy of consideration. Third,
57 Keohane and Goldstein suggest three "causal pathways" through which ideas hold the potential o f influencing 
policy outcomes Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, "Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework", 
in Goldstein and Keohane, Ideas and Foreign Policy (New York: Cornell University Press, 1993) pp.3-31.
58 Geoffrey Garrett and Barry Weingast develop at great length this hypothesis that shared beliefs may act as "focal 
points" around which the behaviour of actors converges. Garrett and Weingast, "Ideas, Interests and Institutions: 
Constructing the European Community's Internal Market", in Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane, Ideas and 
Foreign Policy (New York: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 173-207.
59 As opposed to the role of cognitive psychology in the emergence o f ideas and the formation o f preference.
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ideas may be institutionalised and put on the political agenda thus making them significant in 
policy decisions.
Following these propositions, Chapter Three outlines the different ideas about 
Russia’s identity and shows how different ideas spawned different policy prescriptions. 
Chapter Four explores whether a consensus developed over pragmatic nationalist ideas and 
whether they created a “road map” by suggesting a policy framework which limited the 
importance of other liberal westemist or fundamentalist nationalist ideas. It also examines 
whether pragmatic nationalism was put on the political agenda. In other words, was it 
institutionalised in official doctrines and concepts and adopted by key foreign policy-making 
institutions?
It must be re-emphasized here that it is difficult to separate out the role of debate and 
ideas from other factors, as power and political opportunism also influence stated 
convictions. Of course, Russian politicians often used ideas to achieve rhetorical and 
domestic goals without truly believing that these visions could actually be realized. However, 
as we shall see, in general the political elite adopted pragmatic nationalist ideas in an attempt 
to create and justify a policy framework that could then be employed to broadly define 
Russia’s foreign and strategic interests. And although ideas about Russian foreign policy 
were often expressed more for domestic reasons than with the aim of directly influencing 
foreign policy, that does not at all mean that they had no influence on foreign policy.60
The opposite argument to the proposition that ideas and debate matter in the 
development of policy is that the material setting (the constraints and incentives facing policy 
decision-makers) is the only crucial determinant. In other words, all models examining the 
importance of ideas depend on an implicit or explicit contrast to explanations rooted in 
material incentives. To counter that argument and to better understand the role of ideas, this 
thesis begins each of the three case study chapters with an examination of Russia’s key 
interests -  and asks how constraining the material environment was. In other words, how
60 This is particularly true o f their expression in political party manifestos and publications where the views 
were less likely to be directly incorporated into polices -  as opposed to the views o f key foreign policy 
participants and foreign policy decision-makers.
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much room was there for debate about the fundamental direction of Russian foreign policy? 
Given the material setting, were there any realistic choices to be discussed? How much 
uncertainty was there over how Russia should react to the particular conflicts? 
Hypothetically, in some cases of Russian involvement in CIS conflicts there may have been a 
lot of uncertainty and thus ideas could have played a major role in the adoption of a 
particular policy option, whereas in other cases there may have been more agreement over 
what Russia should do and the role of ideas and debate could have had less influence.
The first half of each case study (Chapters Five, Six and Seven), therefore, examines 
Russia’s key interests in the particular conflict -  its security, economic and diaspora interests 
-  and, briefly, how these interests were conditioned by Soviet and Imperial Russian history.61 
For example, legitimate security concerns may have included preventing instability on 
Russia’s borders and stopping the potential spill over of conflicts into Russia, including the 
related problems of refugees and arms smuggling. Russia also may have had a real interest in 
ensuring that no hostile outside power would exploit the instability in the CIS states and in 
protecting the ethnic Russian or Russian-speaking diaspora. However, contrary to realism in 
its purest form, the specific content of these interests, and the means by which they were to 
be achieved, were not certain. In fact, Russian interests varied towards each of the fourteen 
former republics. They changed over time, and their relative theoretical and practical 
significance was widely debated. Also, Russia’s interests were often just as much a question 
of internal security, stability and domestic politics as they were based on “objective” 
realities. Thus, discrepancies between Russia’s “real” interests and its perceived or 
officially declared interests are highlighted to show how constraining the environment was 
and how much uncertainty or room for debate over choices existed.
At the purely abstract level one could argue that behind any objective clash of 
interests lie sets of ideas which give practical content to states’ definitions of their interests.
61 For the purpose o f this thesis, the material setting will be defined as Russia’s specific economic, diaspora and 
security interests.
62 This is explained in chapters three and four o f the thesis. Other scholars make this point. See, for example, C. 
J. Dick, J. F. Dunn and J. B. Lough, “Potential Sources o f Conflict in Post-Communist Europe”, European 
Security, vol.2, no.3 (Autumn 1993), pp.386-406.
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Thus there are not separate relations between two distinct things -  foreign policy ideas and 
material interests. The way decision makers define security interests is derived from their 
collective historical, cultural, social, etc. understandings of their worlds. And even when 
the importance of interests is acknowledged, it ought to be understood that "interest" itself is 
culturally constructed, and no action can take place without the benefit of meaning.
The second half of each case study examines the debates over Russia’s foreign policy 
options towards the particular conflict in question and draws parallels with the overall debate 
about foreign policy in general. It attempts to determine which ideas were dominant, and 
highlights any “pathways” by which ideas may have affected policy. The new evidence and 
analyses are examined to determine whether (and if so, how) these case studies confirm or 
disconfirm what is known about the importance of the role of political debates and ideas in 
foreign policy formation.
In a system of interacting multiple causes, ideas and political debate may influence 
Russian foreign policy. The aim in this thesis is to discover whether or not they did in the 
development of Russian policy towards the near abroad during the years 1991-1996. To 
quote Max Weber, "Not ideas, but material and ideal interest, directly govern men's conduct. 
Yet frequently, "world images" that have been created by ideas have, like switchmen, 
determined the tracks along which action has been pushed by the dynamic of interest".64 In 
other words, ideas help to order the world and how it is understood by decision-makers. By 
ordering the world, ideas shape policy agendas, which in turn can influence outcomes.
63 Keith R. Krause (ed.), Culture and Security: Multilateralism. Arms Control and Security Building (London: 
Frank Cass Publishers, 1999).
MMax Weber, "Social Psychology of the World Religions", in Hans. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds.), From 
Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, new edition, (Cornwall: T. J. Press, 1991), pp. 267-301, p.280.
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C hapter Three; Foreign Policy Ideas and Their M anifestation in K ey  
Foreign Policy O rientations
With the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991, an increasingly open and complex 
political debate flourished over foreign policy principles. Under the former Soviet regime, 
foreign policy had generally been the preserve of a small elite core of the Communist Party.1 
With the collapse of the one-party state, a wider range of ideas and interests was vociferously 
articulated in the new domestic political context. The political elite began to express its 
diverging opinions within a burgeoning array of political parties, parliamentary and 
governmental institutions, as well as academic think tanks and the media. Although foreign 
policy-making continued to be highly personalised and focused on the interaction and 
rivalries among key leaders, in practice it was developed within the broad domestic political 
arena and was part of a larger battle over conflicting beliefs and visions mediated by various 
group interests.
The struggle within the political elite over which ideas would guide Russia’s foreign 
policy had significant ramifications in the context of a state with a weak tradition of 
democratic political culture and ill-defined political institutions. In the realm of Russian 
foreign policy formulation, the political elite in parliament, government and political parties 
provided leadership and acted as channels through which the diverse pressures from the 
domestic community were brought to bear on the policy process.
The uncertainty of how to create new foreign and security policies provided the context 
for a broad spectrum of opinions.2 Domestic political groupings with differing foreign policy 
orientations exerted influence upon the Russian foreign policy decision-making process. 
Therefore, despite many practical constraints, a wide range of approaches and alternatives in
1 O f course, the pre-Revolutionary Russian intelligentsia had been publicly active in debating politics, although 
foreign policy in Tsarist Russia was made by a very narrow group. Even throughout the (especially early) 
Communist years, foreign policy disputes among a small section o f the political elite could be discerned. 
Gorbachev, in effect, revived the tradition of debate. Margot Light, The Soviet Theory o f International 
Relations (Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1988).
2 In the Soviet era, the CPSU was in charge o f security policy. The USSR was perceived to be a socialist state 
surrounded by a hostile, capitalist world. The “Brezhnev Doctrine” promoted the idea that force was justified to 
maintain socialism in Eastern Europe.
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terms of both conceptual and specific policy questions influenced Russian foreign policy from 
1991-1996.
This chapter identifies the broad, dominant ideas about foreign policy that helped to 
structure and set the parameters of both the general foreign policy thinking of the Russian 
political elite and also the narrower, more specific, policy orientations and proposals concerning 
the near abroad. The first section identifies and outlines the key ideas expressed by the political 
elite as it sought to define a new national identity for Russia, a new state mission, self­
perception, geography, politics and economics. These key ideas or underlying preferences 
helped to structure how Russians thought about foreign policy, providing the options for debate 
and policy-making. The second section categorizes these ideas into three basic foreign policy 
orientations: liberal westemism, pragmatic nationalism and fundamentalist nationalism. Each 
orientation suggested a “road map” or particular set of foreign policy options and policy 
proposals towards the near abroad. In the third section the main political groups and their 
specific foreign policy views are examined within these three categories. Finally, we focus 
particularly on the ideas which made up the pragmatic nationalist orientation during their 
ascendancy from 1991 to 1996 in order to foreshadow the detailed examination of the evolution 
of foreign policy in Chapter Four.
1. Categories of Ideas
Ideas about a country’s place in the world do not develop in a vacuum. They are tied 
to the specific economic, social and political realities at any given time as well as to the 
dominant ideology of the polity. Therefore although the ideas here are examined in isolation 
they are to be viewed as emerging within a nexus of economic, social and political structures 
within Russia and also worldwide. In the following chapters ideas will be tied to particular 
foreign policy participants.
3 “Everything that goes on in our country in foreign and domestic policy is the consequence o f a restructuring 
o f priorities in the consciousness and behaviour o f people...” Vitaly Tretyakov, editor-in-chief o f Nezavisimaya 
Gazeta. in a roundtable discussion, “Growing Support for New Foreign Policy in Russia”, International Affairs. 
Moscow, vol. 42, no.5/6 (1996), pp. 15-31, p. 18.
a) The Quest for Russian National Identity and National Interests
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Members of the Russian political elite faced many challenges in creating a foreign 
policy for their new state. Since foreign policy is inherently linked to perceptions of national 
identity, one of the basic challenges the encountered was to create a new national identity for 
their country. Politicians often create and manipulate images of their nation and its place in 
the world -  and these images tend to form the basis of their thinking about foreign policy.4 In 
the case of Russia, the domestic debate over foreign policy 1991-1996 was inextricably tied 
to the issue of how Russian citizens defined themselves, their territory and their relationship 
with the outside world. In fact, the variety of foreign policy views and the emotion with 
which they were expressed were reflective of the fact that foreign policy choices were not 
simply based upon perceptions of realist or pragmatic interests but were based upon differing 
conceptions of the “raison d’etre” of Russia.
The difficulty of how to define Russia stemmed partly from that fact that Russia was 
not a nation-state, but rather, as Geoffrey Hosking colourfully described it, “the bleeding 
hulk of an empire”.5 With the break-up of the Soviet Union it was no longer obvious who the 
Russians were or where the borders of the new Russian state should be. Under communism, 
people were supposedly subordinate to one uniform, collective identity. Russians, however, 
had perceived themselves to be the “indispensable bonding agent of the empire”.6 There had
• # 7been a widespread perception of sharing a common fate while under a single state. When 
communism collapsed, people were left without any clear-cut collective or individual
o
identities. Therefore, many analysts argue that after 1991 Russian national identity acquired
4 William Bloom, Personal Identity. National Identity and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990).
5 Geoffrey Hosking and Robert Service (eds.), Russian Nationalism. Past and Present (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1998), p.5.
6Gerhard Simon, “The Historical Prerequisites for Russia’s Modernization”, Aussenpolitik vol.49, 3rd quarter 
(1998), pp.67-85, p.75.
7 Pavel Baev argues this point in his exploration of Russia’s identity crisis in “Russia’s Departure from Empire: 
Self-Assertiveness and a New Retreat”, pp.174-196 in Ola Tunander, Pavel Baev and Victoria Ingrid Einagel 
(eds.), in Geopolitics in Post-Wall Europe (Oslo: International Peace Research Institute, 1997).
8 O f course, even a multinational empire begged obvious questions such as should Russia be based on a Tsarist 
or Soviet tradition? And which peoples should be included? See Dominic Lieven, “Russian, Imperial and Soviet 
Identities”, reprinted from the Transactions o f the Royal Historical Society. 6th Series, vol.8 (London: Butler 
and Tanner Ltd, 1998), pp.254-269. “The adjective “Russian” in the English language is a translation o f two
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a dual nature: on the one hand it was based upon its own ethnic concept and on the other that 
of a multinational state.9
Moreover, without the former Imperial framework, the orphan Russia had in effect to 
recreate itself while altering its self-perception as the “elder brother” of the Soviet Union. 
This process of reinvention continues today, and has been central to the development of 
relations between Russia and the former Soviet republics. In other words, from the early 
modem period until 1991 the creation of empire was a central driving force of politics. 
Colonisation and the expansion of state borders went together and areas were colonised 
beyond the borders of the old Great Russian heartland.10
In 1991, the Russian political elite, as well as the general population, had to come to 
terms with the dramatic collapse of communism and its former empire. Overnight Russia had 
reverted back to its pre-Petrine borders. This realization was (and continues to be) a gradual 
process which involved forging a new post-imperial mentality based upon Russia’s new 
geopolitical realities and weaknesses. National interests had to be disengaged from former 
imperial interests and recreated based upon an understanding of Russia’s new current 
domestic and geopolitical context.
There were various ways in which Russia’s national identity could have been defined. 
Which ideas were chosen to define Russia’s identity (who Russians are, what Russia’s 
borders and the importance of history should be) influenced how the former Soviet states 
were perceived and thus the development of Russia’s foreign policy towards the near abroad. 
One way of defining “who the Russians are” was linguistic, so that Russia would include all 
“Russian-speakers” in the former Soviet states. A second way was to define Russia ethnically 
so that it would be composed only of those with ethnic Russian origins. A third way was to
Russian words with clearly distinct meanings. The first word, rossiyskiy, is traditionally associated with the 
Russian dynasty and state, the institutions through which it ruled and the territory over which it exercised 
sovereignty. By contrast, the word russkiy is linked to the Russian people, culture and language”, p.254
9 In Russia, the state had always been defined as the nation. Nationality (narodnost) was inextricably identified 
with the institutions o f the state which were often seen as the expression o f  a collective will.
10 “Russia’s history... is the history o f a country undergoing colonisation, and having the area o f that 
colonisation and the extension of its State keep pace with one another”. Vasily O. Kluchevsky, A History of  
Russia. 1st publication 1904-21, translated by C. J. Hogarth, 5 vols. (London: J.M.Dent and Sons Ltd., 1931), 
p.209.
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define it as a Slavic entity, thus including all peoples of Slavic origin. Alexander
Solzhenitsyn was a firm advocate of this latter definition. He argued for the reintegration of
Russia with northern Kazakhstan, Belarus and Ukraine. A fourth possibility was to give
Russia a broader “Union” identity. In this fashion, Russians would be defined as an “imperial
people” by their mission to create a supranational state.11 Despite great differences, both
Gennady Zyuganov and Vladimir Zhirinovsky (who was also an advocate of the Slavic
definition) argued for this viewpoint. Fifth, Russia could have been defined as a civic state
whose members are all Russian citizens regardless of their ethnic of culture background.
Galina Staravoiteva, Yeltsin’s advisor on inter-ethnic relations in 1992, for example,
promoted this idea of a de-ethicised nation. Prime Minister Gaidar and Valery Tishkov
(who had the civic definition incorporated in the 1993 constitution) were also early advocates 
1 ^o f this definition.
Another key distinction in the positions on identity concerned Russia’s 1991 borders. 
Generally, those who argued that Russia should be a civic state were in agreement that the 
1991 borders of the Russian Federation should be kept intact. In contrast, those who defined 
Russia in terms of linguistics interpreted Russia as including the Russian Federation and also 
those areas of the Soviet Union inhabited by Russian-speakers. Similarly, those who rejected 
the linguistic definition but believed that Russia had a wider “Union” identity also did not 
accept the 1991 borders. Of course, it was possible to oppose the 1991 borders in principle 
while at the same time agreeing to them in practice.14
The broad importance given to Russia’s history (Soviet or Tsarist) also corresponded 
to the various ways of defining Russians and the Russian state. For example, those who 
defined Russia as a civic state within the Russian Federation’s borders usually believed that 
Russia’s history was of little importance to the future of the country and viewed the collapse
11 Vera Tolz, "Forging the Nation: National Identity and Nation Building in Post-Communist Russia”, Paper 
given at BASEES conference, Cambridge March 98. Also See Vladimir Pastukov, “Paradoksal’nye zametki v 
sovremennom politicheskom rezhime”, Pro et Contra, vol.l (Fall 1996), pp.6-21.
12 Valery Tishkov was Minister of Nationalities from February to October 1992 and participant in the Chechen 
negotiations in 1994 and 1996. See his book Ethnicity. Nationalism and Conflict in and after the Soviet Union 
(London: Sage Publications, 1997).
13 O f course, a civic state was not by definition opposed to an all Slavic or all-union polity.
14 As, for example, German attitudes to partition before 1989.
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of the USSR as a positive event. In contrast, for example, those who perceived Russians as 
having a “Union” identity and who disputed the 1991 borders, generally believed that 
Russia’s history should play a crucial role in her future and that the collapse of the Soviet 
Union was a negative event.
b) Defining Russia’s Mission
The newly independent Russian state faced other fundamentally different choices in 
determining its broad vision of the future. It could have attempted to restore elements of the 
Soviet or Tsarist past and to promote future developments according to a prescribed 
historical or even divine “mission”. In contrast, it could have renounced any overarching 
mission and based its future development on a more step-by-step or ad hoc basis. A third 
option was for Russia to define a new and unique vision for its future. The 19th century 
philosopher Vladimir Solovyov had been the first to coin the term the “Russian idea” 
(Russkaya idea) to describe the nation’s unique historical mission.15 Later, Nikolai Berdiaev 
wrote about Russia’s destiny or “mission” as the “new Jerusalem”. He described the 
“Russian idea” as a political belief in “moral or even eschatological absolutism, secrecy, total 
dedication, conspiracy, martyrdom” and defined Russians as a special spiritual, organic 
people with a mission to transform society.16
After 1991, Russian politicians attempted to redefine the “Russian idea”. This entailed a 
search for a national perspective, or national self-image, which could explain in the context of 
Russia’s history where Russia was trying to go, and its role in the world. In other words, the 
“Russian idea” was not necessarily a rigid and prescribed state ideology but rather a looser set of
1 7values which would replace Marxism-Leninism and around which people could unite. In other
15 See Patricia Cohen, “Russian Philosophy is Given its Head”, The New York Times. March 13, 1999, pp. 
A15, A17.
16 Nikolai Berdiaev, The Russian Idea (London: G. Bles, 1947). Berdiaev was deported in 1922.
17 Eduard Batolov distinguishes between the search for a Russia national idea and national ideology. He writes 
that the national idea “discusses general and quite abstract matters, such as the place in the world to which a 
particular nation is ‘predestined’... the direction o f its movement and the meaning o f its existence. Translated 
into everyday language, these may be expressed as follows: Who are we? Why are we here? Where are we 
going?” An ideology is “a more or less rigid and closed system o f views -  o f the world, society, the state and 
the person -  directed at protecting the interests o f a specific community”. Eduard Batalov, “Where Are We
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words, it was not a political doctrine instituted by the state but a common vision for the nation 
based on the values its people shared.
c) Psychological Identity
The Russian elite also had the choice of defining their new state as a “normal” or 
“great” power. In the search for a new role for Russia, many leaders across the political 
spectrum argued that Russia must regain its status as a great power, although a minority 
rejected any such claim as harkening back to Russia’s old imperialistic ways. The popularity 
of the great power rhetoric was unsurprising given that Soviet Russia had gone from being 
one of two world superpowers to just one more supplicant “at the gates of the West”. In fact, 
by the 1995 elections, all of Russia’s political parties were justifying or supporting their
152policies on the basis of Russia’s supposed “greatness”. Even Foreign Minister Andrei 
Kozyrev, who had previously shunned the phrase, frequently employed in his speeches the 
image of Russia as “doomed to be a great power”. Russian greatness became such a 
dominant idea in Russian foreign policy that Russian analyst Andrei Piontkovsky concluded 
that Russia “has not been ruled by principles, national interests or cynical calculations but 
exclusively by - complexes of phantom grandeur”.19
The rhetorical emphasis on the renewal of Russian greatness was based upon a belief 
that Russia’s enormous territorial size and wealth of natural resources were sufficient to 
guarantee it significance and influence on the world stage.20 There was debate, however, over 
how Russia should act to become a great power. This issue is examined in detail both below 
and in Chapter Four. However, very briefly, the pro-Westemers in the political elite generally 
denied that Russia was unique and instead insisted that Russia was a “normal” power whose
Heading? On a National Idea and a State Ideology”, in Russian Politics and Law, vol.35, no.5 (September- 
October 1997) pp.40-45, pp.41- 42.
18 The author used two collections o f political party platforms to justify her argument: Election Platforms o f  
Political Parties Participating in the Elections for State Duma (Moscow: International Republican Institute, 
December 6, 1995) and Russia’s Political Almanac (Moscow: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
1999). (CD Rom)
19 Andrei Piontkovsky, “Season o f Discontent”, Moscow Times. June 24, 1999. (Johnson List #3358)
20 This was not unusual. The British, and even more so the French, were also determined to count in the world 
after having lost their empires.
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importance in world politics would have to be achieved through working with the West and 
international institutions. In complete opposition, the anti-Westemers believed that Russia’s 
greatness was defined by its opposition to the West and its rightful interest in the former 
Soviet states. The dominant centrist view was that Russia’s greatness depended upon its 
power to define its own, separate interests and act on them.
d) Political and Economic Direction
How Russia was defined psychologically was intertwined with the historic question 
of what direction Russia’s political and economic development should follow. Should Russia 
follow the Western economic and political path of development (i.e. a post-1945 US, 
liberal/capitalist definition) or go its own unique way? In the immediate aftermath of the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union, these simple alternatives concerning Russia’s domestic
9 1policies led to different foreign policies.
Extreme pro-Westemers in the Russian political elite believed that the process of 
liberal reform in domestic politics and economics was desirable and inseparable from the 
successful development of good relations with the West. They advocated Russia’s integration 
into Western institutions such as the European Union (EU), and the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO). They called for the abandonment of both the myth of Western
99hostility and the illusions of Russia’s moral and cultural superiority.
Anti-Westemers, on the other hand, were against marketisation and democratisation. 
They believed that Russia’s integration into Western institutions would be a humiliating 
process that would allow the West a means to control Russia and to interfere in her internal 
affairs. The West’s faith in parliaments and constitutional guarantees was seen by some as a 
symptom of a decaying civilisation that had replaced moral cohesion with empty legalism.
21 Iver Neumann traces the conflict between “Nationalists” and “Westemizers” over their approaches to Europe 
to writings in the Soviet and Tsarist periods. See his book Russian and the Idea of Europe: A Study in Identity 
and International Relations 1800-1994 (London: Routledge, 1995).
22 For example, Tatiana Parkhalina (Deputy Director, Institute o f Scientific Information for Social Sciences 
(INION), and a self-proclaimed extreme pro-Westemer). Author’s Interview with Parkhalina May 24, 1999.
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Of course, it is important not to exaggerate the distinctions between these two basic 
orientations. The Russian elite has always held exceedingly complicated and contradictory 
attitudes about the West. Between these two extremes, a moderate position held that Russia 
should pursue liberal democratic and market reforms but also take into account Russia’s 
unique conditions. Those who held this centrist position proposed an independent path for 
Russia while developing a cautious alliance with the West.
e) Geographical Identity
In the search to define Russia based on geographical considerations, the political elite 
had the option of seeing Russia either as belonging to the West or as part of “Eurasia”. The 
latter, the “eurasian idea”, had originated with some of the emigre thinkers of the 1920s 
(Prince Nikolai Trubetskoi, Nikolai Berdiaev) and was related to Mackinder’s theory of 
“Heartland” which envisioned control over the Eurasian landmass as the “pivot of world 
politics” in the 19th century.24 Eurasianism stood not only for a particular type of culture and 
thinking, but for many it also provided the basis for a policy in which Russia’s geographical 
position was understood as separate from Europe. This interpretation of eurasianism, 
advocated in the 1990s by the philosophers Lev Gumilev26 and Elgiz Pozdynakov27, was 
equal to geopolitical determinism in which the state’s interests are defined in terms o f control 
of a specific territory.
From 1991 to 1996, the eurasianist idea became increasingly attractive because it fit 
with the reality of the eastward movement of Russia’s borders and justified a focus on the
23 See Vladimir Shlapentokh, “ Old, New and Post Liberal Attitudes Towards the West: From Love to Hate”, 
Communist and Post-Communist Studies. vol.31,no.3 (1998), pp. 199-216.
24 Sir Halford Mackinder, “The Geographical Pivot o f History”, Geographical Journal, vol.20, no.4 (April 
1903), reprinted in The Scope and Methods o f Geography and the Geographical Pivot o f History (London: The 
Royal Geographical Society, 1951), pp.30-44, p.38.
25 See Jens Fischer, Eurasismuss: Eine Option Russischer Aussenpolitik? (Berlin: Berio Verlag Amo Spitz, 
1998). The real question here is not whether Russia is a Eurasian country by strict definition (geography, 
civilisation, idea) but whether Russia chooses to define itself as Eurasian. In other words, how Russia’s foreign 
relations develop will be decided within Russia.
26 Lev N. Gumilev, Ot Rusi do Rossii (Moscow: Ekoproc., 1992).
27 Elgiz Pozdnyakov, “Russia is a Great Power”, International Affairs. Moscow, vol.39, no.l (January, 1993), 
pp.3-13. Pozdnyakov explains that the eurasianist view holds that Russia is a geopolitical balance or bridge 
between Europe and Asia. He interprets the consequences o f  eurasianism as geopolitical determinism.
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renewal of ties with the CIS states as well as Russia’s Eastern neighbours. Eurasianist ideas 
also flourished at this time because economic disparity between Russia and the West was 
increasing and security concerns and cultural differences between Russia and Europe were 
reinforcing the historic feeling of Russian “otherness” from Europe.29 In Russia there was a 
sense of humiliation, dependence on and resentment of the West.30 Eurasianism was, 
therefore, a useful alternative concept with which to guide Russia’s separate foreign policies 
as well as to provide support and credence to a range of political orientations.
From 1991-96, members of the elite across the whole political spectrum referred to 
the eurasianist idea in their writings and policy prescriptions. Some politicians even used the 
premise that Russia was the centre of the Slav and Turkic peoples across the Eurasian 
continent to support their belief that Russia should ultimately reintegrate with the regions of 
the former Soviet republics.31 Others used eurasianist ideas not only to support their foreign 
policy goals but also to appeal to the Muslim peoples living within Russia itself.32
Although politicians widely adopted the vague idea of eurasianism, they differed in how 
to implement policies based on it. Many nationalists and communists presented the eurasianist 
idea alongside their ideas for a strong state and spiritual regeneration.33 For example, as will be 
shown below, the Communist Party stressed the need for a Russia-centred, Eurasian and 
geopolitical approach as the cornerstone of its foreign policy. A minority of extremists used 
eurasianism as a justification for potential future expansionism and an increased emphasis on 
military and security interests. By 1993, an increasing number of former westemizers also
28 Sergei Stankevich, political advisor to Yeltsin argued for eurasianism in Nezavisimava Gazeta. March 28, 
1992, p.4.
29From 1991 to 1996, Russia was, to a limited extent, courted into joining economic and security institutes o f  
the “New Europe” but not ones in which Russia helped to form or would exert great influence.
30 Eurasianism had been popular among the White emigration. Their humiliation because o f their loss o f status 
and their situation as despised guests in the West helps to explain eurasianism’s psychological attractions. As 
well, the fact that eurasianism in 1890-1930 had a Tsarist/conservative or Bolshevik/revolutionary thrust shows 
that in both cases it was against Western liberalism.
31 For example, Sergei Stankevich. See Aleksandr Rahr , “‘Atlanticists’ versus ‘Eurasians’ in Russian Foreign 
Policy”, RFE/RL Research Report, vol.l, no.22 (May 29 1992), pp. 17-22.
32 Roman Szporluk, “The National Question”, in Timothy J. Colton and Robert Levgold (eds), After the Soviet 
Union from Empire to Nations (New York/London: W.W. Norton, 1992), pp.84-112.
33 Deputy Sergei Baburin interpreted eurasianism as geographical and authoritarian as well as belief in the 
special character o f Russia. Author’s Interview with Baburin, May 22, 1999.
58
adopted the slogan of “Eurasia” in order to gain popular support for their liberal westemist 
agenda.34 These “liberal eurasianists” argued that Russia should support Western ideas such as 
the market economy and political pluralism, but also adopt the eurasianist idea of Russia as a 
bridge between East and West.35
2. The Key Ideas/Stated Views Underlying the Three Basic Foreign Policy 
Orientations Among the Political Elite 1991-1996
The fact that there were not yet well-defined Russian political groups and parties with 
stable membership makes it difficult to classify the members of the political elite and their 
foreign policy during the period 1991-96. Differences among political groups were often 
ambiguous, and the presumed adherents of one school of thought frequently mixed 
incoherent ideas and images, thereby defying classification. Moreover, convictions among 
the political elite often changed with shifts in the constellation of power and the unstable 
domestic context.36
Nevertheless, the different ideas or ways of thinking about Russia seen above 
structured three key foreign policy orientations: liberal westemism, pragmatic nationalism 
and fundamentalist nationalism. These orientations informed different foreign policy 
options and policies towards the former Soviet republics. Each orientation served as a “road 
map” by suggesting particular policies and limiting others. In this way ideas shaped foreign 
policy choices.
Unsurprisingly, some members of the Russian political elite were more concerned
T O
with their own personal interest than with the interests of the state. However, there were a
34 Author’s Interview with Yabloko leader Grigory Yavlinsky, July 25,1995.
35 The British elite had adopted similar geopolitical ideas post-empire -  e.g. they saw Britain as being a bridge 
between the US and Europe.
36 Of course, it is often difficult to ascertain what politicians sincerely believe. This thesis focuses rather on 
publicly stated views. The frustration o f  Russian academics in trying to analyse Russia’s foreign policy can be 
summarised in Russian academic Dimitry Trenin’s (Carnegie Institute) exasperated comment that “There is no 
Russia: only lots of players, playing many games at once”. Author’s Interview with Trenin May 25, 1999.
37A s used throughout this thesis the terms liberal westemism, pragmatic nationalism and fundamentalist 
nationalism are borrowed from Neil Malcolm et al. Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1996).
38Personal interest often equates to monetary interest. In an interview with the author, radical democrat Duma
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number of politicians involved in thinking and writing about how to make Russian foreign 
policy. As is illustrated below, three disparate, basic foreign policy orientations determined 
the prevailing trends that guided policy. As for the general Russian public, it must be 
emphasised that it was overwhelmingly preoccupied with daily survival, and similar to the 
general public in most states, it paid little attention to the details of foreign policy debates.
The three orientations examined below are “ideal types”. Individual politicians, of 
course, held more nuanced views which varied in intensity and over time. In each case, the 
combination of ideas which composed the orientation is examined (see Table 3.1) and then 
the resulting foreign policy path is drawn (see Table 3.2). The three orientations therefore are 
examined only briefly and in isolation here because they are examined in detail within the 
context of their chronological evolution and their interplay with those people who gave voice 
to them, in Chapter Four.
a) Liberal Westernist Ideas and Foreign Policy Orientation
The typical liberal westernist foreign policy orientation was based upon the premise 
that Russia’s identity should be defined as a civic state in the boundaries of the Russian 
Federation. This orientation was founded on the idea that Russia had no usable Tsarist or 
Soviet history on which to base its new policies, and that the break up of the Soviet Union
deputy Konstantin Borovoi stressed personal interest, often monetary, as a primary motivating factor for 
Russian politicians. “You can buy deputies’ support here for everything. It’s all about money. You buy support 
for a proposal by paying money directly. It’s very simple here, it is a bribe country. For example, it can cost 
today 70 million rubles, maybe a little more, to buy support for NATO activities in Yugoslavia. In this sense 
Duma deputies are very pragmatic... Zhirinovsky’s position (he is like a crazy man, but at the same time very 
pragmatic) is to get as much money as possible from his interactions with Iraq or Milosovic or the Baltics. It is 
the same thing with our military institutions; they act like lobbies to get money and to survive. They use their 
influence with politicians in order to influence political decisions. The Chechen war was a perfect vehicle for 
them to get money, it was very clear, very understandable”. Author’s Interview. May 21, 1999. See also “Cash 
for questions scandal in Moscow”, The Times. October 27, 1999. Vladimir Trofimov, chief o f staff o f  the 
Duma’s International Affairs Committee, was arrested for allegedly taking cash for asking questions and 
proposing Bills to parliament (S500 per question and $10,000 for Bills).
9 Many o f the author’s interviews with academics emphasised these last two points. For example, Russian 
academic Dimitry Trenin (Carnegie Institute) repeatedly stressed that Russia is a “country without a purpose; 
the people are disoriented and concentrating on survival”. Author’s Interview with Russian academic Dimitry 
Trenin, May 25, 1999. Russian academic Irina Zviagelskaya (Institute o f Oriental Studies, Russian Academy o f  
Sciences and participant in Tajik negotiations) emphasised that the foreign policy debate is constrained by three 
factors: a realisation that the democratisation process is not working; people are tired o f talking about politics; 
and the enormous polarisation o f wealth. Author’s Interview with Irina Zviagelskaya, June 8, 1999.
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was a positive act. This accorded well with the parallel goals of liberal democracy, market 
reforms and the prioritisation of relations with the West.
Liberal westemizers denigrated the nationalist search for a unique Russian “national 
idea” or a separate Russian path as simply a way of justifying the recreation of an empire. 
They also rejected the eurasianist idea that Russia could become a bridge between Europe 
and Asia. Instead, for them Russia was a “normal” state, with no overarching mission, whose 
future was to be a modem, liberal state coexisting in a benign international environment.40 
The liberal westemizers’ worldview was one of a peaceful, non-antagonistic world with 
principled beliefs (ideas of how the world ought to work) of equality among nations, anti­
imperialism, protection of human rights and freedoms, and respect for international law.
It follows that politicians with these views developed policy positions which relegated 
relations with the former Soviet republics to a secondary position vis a vis with the West. Their 
policies toward the near abroad were based upon the principles of equality of states, mutually 
advantageous co-operation and non-interference in other states’ domestic affairs. With Russian 
interests placed squarely in the West, the only threat to Russia was deemed to be the return of 
communism or its growth in other states 41
As will be clarified below, many of the early liberal westemizers’ ideas were somewhat 
unrealistic -  the belief in the rapid marketisation of Russia, the swift development of peaceful 
co-operation among world states and, especially, the premise that Russian and Western interests 
would from now on coincide on most issues.
b) Fundamentalist Nationalist Ideas and Foreign Policy Orientation
In contrast to the liberal westemizers, fundamentalist nationalists (which included the 
extreme nationalists and communists) believed in an ethnic or Slavic definition of Russia. 
Russia’s borders were thus seen either to extend beyond the Russian Federation or to be
40 Andrei Kozyrev, “Vneshnyaya Politika Rossii”, Rossivskava Gazeta. December 13 1992, p.2.
41 The liberal westemists’ domestic political preference for a democratic state and rapid transition to market 
economy helped to explain their understanding o f a benign international environment and their belief in 
diplomacy over force. Conversely their belief in a benign international environment and faith in international 
organizations and institutions served their domestic goals of economic marketisation and democracy.
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narrowly confined to the areas populated by ethnic Russians in Russia. Despite differences, 
fundamentalist nationalists agreed that certain elements of Russia’s history were highly 
significant to Russia’s future; that the collapse of the Soviet Union was negative; and that the 
West was to blame for it. They agreed that Russia’s spiritual essence and prestige had to be 
saved and that it ought to continue its historical, even divine, mission to create an “organic 
society”. The typical fundamentalist nationalist worldview was one of hostile states in which 
Russia was losing its status as a Great Power. This view of Russia surrounded and threatened 
by enemies fit with the domestic policy of the fundamentalist nationalists which was anti­
democratic and anti-marketisation -  and was not unlike the former Soviet perception of 
threat which had been used to justify the centralisation of power in communist hands.
Correspondingly, the princip^ foreign policy proposals of the fundamentalist 
nationalists were not centred on trying to integrate Russia into the world economy or to build 
relations with the West. Instead, they wanted to recreate a greater Russia -  which for 
example, some, envisioned as the rebirth of the Soviet Union, others as a unitary Russian 
state modelled upon the Tsarist Empire. Therefore, many continued to advocate in some form 
the restoration of the territory of the former Soviet Union. The key threats to Russia were 
seen as coming from the West or Turkic states, but these would be offset by Russia’s close 
relations with the near abroad.
Despite the similarities, however, it will be shown later in this chapter that there were 
important differences among the fundamentalist nationalists -  most prominently between 
Zhirinovsky’s Liberal Democratic Party of Russia and the more cohesive communists, 
represented from 1993 mainly by Zyuganov’s Communist Party of the Russian Federation.
c) Pragmatic Nationalist Ideas and Foreign Policy Orientation
A third category of foreign policy ideas within the Russian political elite was 
constituted by the pragmatic nationalists. For them, Russian identity was generally defined 
linguistically and thus they strongly championed the defence of Russian-speakers in the near 
abroad. They agreed with the fundamentalist nationalists that Soviet and Russian historical
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legacies ought not to be completely dismissed, that the collapse of the Soviet Union was 
unfortunate and that the country’s former prestige must be restored. Members of the political 
elite in this category accepted the liberal westernist goal o f liberal democracy and 
marketisation but wanted the process of transition to take Russian conditions into account. 
They were wary of one-sided relations dominated by the West. They also envisioned Russia 
as great power with its own interests and a mission based on its geopolitical position between 
East and West.
The pragmatic nationalists’ views led them to advocate a “unique but non­
expansionist” foreign policy which would allow Russia to regain its status as a great power 
but without empire. “Russian special interests in the CIS” was substituted for “Great Power 
interests", and military force was deemed acceptable if necessary to protect these vaguely 
defined interests. Pragmatic nationalists were, in essence, political realists who argued for a 
rational analysis of national interests and their defence. They advocated a balanced foreign 
policy to reflect Russia’s real needs in specific circumstances. These specific interests were to 
be derived from “objective” factors such as geopolitics -  the space Russia occupied in Eurasia, 
its socio-ethnic makeup, and concrete economic interests. Thus, unlike the liberal westernist 
position, they held more views typical of the foreign policy elite of other developed states.
The pragmatic nationalists understood the world as organised according to the 
principle of “Balance of Power” in which strong states protect their spheres of interests and, 
unlike the liberal westemists, they identified specific threats to Russia which included the 
treatment of the Russian diaspora and NATO expansion. Thus, their view of the international 
environment was more hostile than that of the liberal westemists but more ambivalent than 
that of the fundamentalist nationalists.42
42 Glenn Chafetz divides political leaders views’ about international politics in three categories: Those who see 
the world as interdependent and highly institutionalised (the liberal view); those who see it as a “Hobbesian war 
of all against all” (the communists and chauvinists) and those who take a middle view (here “pragmatic 
nationalists”). Chafetz uses role theory to examine the sources o f these theories o f international politics. See 
Glenn Chafetz, “The Struggle for a National Identity in Post-Soviet Russia”, Political Science Quarterly. 
vol. 111, no.4 (1996-97), pp. 661-688, p.662.
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Table 3.1 General Ideas and Stated Views Which Formed Foreign Policy Orientations
CATEGORIES 
OF IDEAS
LIBERAL
WESTERNISM
PRAGMATIC
NATIONALISM
FUNDAMENTALIST
NATIONALISM
IDENTITY 
(WHO 
ARE THE 
RUSSIANS)
CIVIC: 
RUSSIANS IN 
RUSSIA
LINGUISTIC: 
RUSSIAN- 
SPEAKERS IN FSU
UNION: ETHNIC 
RUSSIANS OR 
SLAVS IN FSU, OR 
ETHNIC: ETHNIC 
RUSSIANS IN
HISTORY NO USE IMPORTANT CRUCIAL
COLLAPSE OF 
USSR POSITIVE NEGATIVE
NEGATIVE/BLAME
WEST
RUSSIA’S
BORDERS
RUSSIAN
FEDERATION
RUSSIA (AND 
PARTS OF FSU)
RUSSIA AND PARTS 
OF FSU/RUSSIAN 
FEDERATION
WORLDVIEW PEACEFUL,UN ANTAGONISTIC
BALANCE OF 
POWER
HOSTILE, 
SURROUNDED BY 
ENEMIES
GEOGRAPHY WEST EURASIA EURASIA
SELF
PERCEPTION
“NORMAL”
POWER
GREAT POWER 
WITH OWN 
INTERESTS
GREAT POWER 
WITH EMPIRE
MISSION 
(RUSSIAN IDEA)
NO MISSION
UNIQUE,
GEOPOLITICAL
MISSION
HISTORICAL, 
DIVINE MISSION
DOMESTIC 
POLITICS AND 
ECONOMICS
LIBERAL 
DEMOCRACY 
AND MARKET 
REFORMS 
MODELLED ON 
WEST
LIBERAL 
DEMOCRACY 
AND MARKET 
REFORMS, 
TAKING RUSSIAN 
CONDITIONS 
INTO ACCOUNT
ANTI-DEMOCRATIC 
AND ANTI- 
MARKETISATION
43 The breakdown o f these elite views into three foreign policy orientations called liberal westemism, pragmatic 
nationalism and fundamentalist nationalism is adapted from Neil Malcolm et al., Internal Factors in Russian 
Foreign Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).
64
Table 3.2 Russian Foreign Policy Orientations and Proposed Policies
FOREIGN
POLICIES
LIBERAL
WESTERNISIM
PRAGMATIC
NATIONALISM
FUNDAMENTALIST
NATIONALISM
FOREIGN
POLICY
DIRECTION
WEST OWN PATH EXPANSIONISM OR ISOLATIONISM
THREATS COMMUNISM
ANY WHICH 
THREATENS FSU 
INTERESTS 
(diaspora, NATO 
expansion)
WEST/PAN TURKIC
RELATIONS 
WITH FSU
NOT
SIGNIFICANT CRUCIAL CRUCIAL
BROAD 
POLICY 
PROPOSALS 
TOWARDS FSU
SUPPORT 
SOVEREIGNTY, 
EQUALITY OF 
STATES, NON 
INTERFERENCE
PROTECT RUSSIAN 
INTERESTS/ 
SUPPORT RIGHTS 
OF RUSSIANS IN 
NEAR ABROAD
FUTURE 
REINCORPORATION 
OF CERTAIN FSU 
AREAS/ 
ISOLATIONISM
d) Foreign Policy Orientations and Views about How to React to Conflicts in CIS States
The ideas within the three key foreign policy orientations seen in Table 3.1 not only 
account for the different foreign policy proposals seen in Table 3.2 but also on the whole the 
policy responses to the outbreaks of conflict during this period. Although the political elite 
generally agreed that military conflicts in the CIS threatened Russian security, the three 
foreign policy orientations differed strongly concerning how Russia should react to such 
conflicts. See Table 3.3.
Very briefly, the liberal westemizers widely interpreted the definition of Russian 
security to include economic and political issues as well as military ones. They therefore 
interpreted the settlement of CIS conflicts as being only one of Russia’s major security
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interests and wanted to limit Russia’s involvement. The CIS conflicts were understood as 
being resolvable. Solutions lay not in the unilateral use of military force (which would 
counter the goal of integrating Russia into the Western international community) but in 
negotiations and multilateral efforts through organizations such as the UN or OSCE. 
Moreover, the proponents of liberal westemism argued that accepting the need to send Russian 
troops into volatile regions would mean agreeing that Russia faced a hostile international 
environment and feared that taking such actions could boost anti-democratic forces within 
Russia. They held that the Russian diaspora should be protected through reinforcement of 
human rights and international law.
Pragmatic nationalists agreed with the liberal westemizers that Russian security was 
at risk due to conflicts in the near abroad. However, they interpreted the conflicts as more 
likely to be zero-sum -  in which one party’s gain in the conflict was by definition equal to 
the other side’s loss. They considered the key threats to Russia to be those concerning 
Russia’s interests in the near abroad, advocating Russia’s active involvement in the FSU 
(including forceful involvement to achieve peace in the region) and a search for international 
approval for her role as peacekeeper. The pragmatic nationalist definition of Russian security 
interests as primarily geopolitical meant that they advocated political, economic, and even 
military means to secure the fate of the Russian diaspora and were supportive, though wary, 
of multilateral resolution efforts.44 In contrast, although the fundamentalist nationalists also 
generally believed the conflicts to be zero-sum, security interests were seen to be primarily 
military and unilateral military force was generally understood to be of paramount necessity 
both for conflict resolution and in order to protect the diaspora. International involvement in the 
post-Soviet space was generally understood as undesirable 45
44 See Sergei Stankevich, “Derzhava”, Nezavisimava Gazeta. March 28, 1992, p.4.
45Yury Glukhov, "Russian Foreign Policy Under Fire", Pravda. February 24,1992, p.2.
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Table 3.3 Foreign Policy Orientations and Stated Views about Conflicts
STATED
VIEWS
LIBERAL
WESTERNISM
PRAGMATIC
NATIONALISM
FUNDAMENTALIST
NATIONALISM
RUSSIAN
INTERESTS
NEW DEFINITIONS OF 
SECURITY 
(e.g. Environmental)
GEOPOLITICS
COMMUNISTS EXTREMENATIONALISTS
MILITARY AND 
ECONOMIC
MILITARY AND 
OTHER
MEANS TO 
SOLVE 
CONFLICTS
■ NEGOTIATIONS, 
MULTILATERAL 
ACTION 
NO MILITARY 
FORCE
NEGOTIATIONS
MULTILATERAL
ACTION
MILITARY FORCE 
(IF NECESSARY)
VARIOUS
INCLUDING
MILITARY
FORCE
■ MILITARY 
FORCE
■ UNILATERAL 
ACTION
■ OR NON­
INVOLVEMENT
MEANS TO 
PROTECT 
DIASPORA
HUMAN RIGHTS
INTERNATIONAL
LAW
POLITICAL,
ECONOMIC
SANCTIONS
MILITARY AND 
NON-MILITARY 
ACTION
MILITARY FORCE
3. The Three Foreign Policy Orientations and Specific Policy Proposals o f Key 
Political Groups
With the break-up of the Soviet Union in December 1991, political parties and the 
Russian parliament became increasingly significant sources of opposition activities including 
the articulation of various foreign policy beliefs and strategies. However, as early as the 
August 1991 coup, the many political movements that had been spawned under Gorbachev’s 
“glasnost” and were united in their opposition to the communist centre, began to fragment. 
The loss of a common “anti-Communist” purpose gave rise to a fluid and unstable, nascent 
party system, with political parties, factions and groups continually appearing, splitting, 
dissolving and merging. By 2 February 1992, thirty-eight political organizations were 
registered with the Russian Ministry of Justice. By May 1993 this number had risen to 
1,800.46 However, despite the weaknesses of the new political parties, a few dominant parties
46 The proliferation and instability o f political parties may simply reflect the general confusion about political 
loyalties and uncertainty about the future o f Russia. The rise o f multiple parties may also be seen as an indicator 
of a deep crisis o f cultural identity. In Russia this was accompanied by a legacy o f cynicism, alienation and 
despair engendered by Leninist rule and unfamiliarity with norms o f civil participation.
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represented in legislative institutions increasingly influenced the political process by means 
of their own political, financial and informational resources.47
On the whole, party stances on foreign policy were based more on basic ideas and 
beliefs than on substantive analyses of the issues. Key political leaders in the years 1991-96 
adopted ideas from the three foreign policy orientations outlined above (liberal westernist, 
fundamentalist nationalist and pragmatic nationalist) and their choices led to the creation of 
specific foreign policy proposals which are explored below 48 This section, therefore, examines 
key political party leaders’ public expression of the “ideal-type” orientations outlined above.
At this formative stage the political parties were very weak, unstable and with limited 
financial resources. Nevertheless, three main political blocs congealed and developed foreign 
policy proposals congruent with the three key foreign policy orientations discussed above. 
Very simply, the radical opposition composed of the communist and nationalist forces 
adhered to fundamentalist nationalist views; the reformists or liberal democrats promoted 
liberal westernist views and the centrists presented pragmatic nationalist views.
a) Communists and Nationalists: Fundamentalist Nationalist; Proponents
The left-wing Communist Party of the Russian Federation led by Gennady Zyuganov 
and the right-wing Liberal Democratic Party led by Vladimir Zhirinovsky were the two 
largest and most influential communist and nationalist political groups during 1991-1996 49
47 See Micheal McFaul, Sergei Markov and Andrei Ryabov (eds.), The Formation o f the Political Party System 
in Russia (Moscow: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1998).
48Although political parties did not very often focus on a set o f well-defined foreign policy issues (they hardly 
ever do so in Western democracies either), they did simplify and focus policy options and thus provided 
guidance to both the public and the foreign policy decision-makers. Even when precise foreign policy options 
are not clearly set out by a party, it is important to understand the basic thrust o f their ideas which if  later 
expanded could promote a future policy (assuming the ideas remain unchanged). It must be continually kept in 
mind that ideas were deployed not as a scholastic exercise, and often not as a guide to realistic foreign policy, but 
largely as a political tool to gain votes and create cohesion in their respective movements. See, Ian Budge and 
Dennis J. Farlie, Explaining and Predicting Elections: Issue Effects and Party Strategies in Twenty-Three 
Democracies (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983), p.22.
49 There were many other smaller and more extreme parties outside the power elite. For example, extreme-right 
fascist group Russian National Unity (RNU) headed by Alexander Barkashov (which was created in September 
1990 but did not have representation in the Duma). Another political party, the Russian Party led by Nikolai 
Bondareek also argued for an ethnic Russia state. Dimitry Vasiliev and the organisation Pamyat (begun in the 
1980s and which lost out to other nationalist organisations in the 1990s but continued to hold demonstrations) 
argued for the Russian Empire to remain intact with the ethnic Russians the rulers o f a Slavic nation. Alexander
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Despite many differences, both were active in advocating a fundamentalist nationalist 
orientation, comprising a centralised, authoritarian, anti-Western, expansionist great power 
state with a mission to renew historical practices and ties -  especially in the former Soviet 
states.
i) Gennady Zyuganov and The Communist Party of the Russian Federation
The Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) was revived in Feb 1993 and 
began to forge a popular communist-patriotic synthesis which featured some of the old 
values of Marxism-Leninism alongside Russian nationalist and traditionalist ideas.50 Its 
leader Gennady Zyuganov promoted a form of national socialism which argued that the class 
struggle had been replaced by a clash of civilizations between Russia and the West which 
threatened Russia’s existence. This mix of ideas allowed Zyuganov to promote an alliance of 
communists and nationalists, “the red-brown alliance”, which demanded that Russia be 
allowed to pursue its own unique path of development based upon spiritual values -  although 
the content was mostly unspecified. In the words of Valery Solovey, Zyuganov’s overall 
thinking formed “an ideological, political and propagandists myth couched in a quasi- 
scholarly form”.51 This myth was sometimes wrapped in extreme Russian nationalist 
discourse but, as shall be shown later, his actual foreign policy prescriptions were more 
moderate than his rhetoric.
Barkashov, “Krizis mirovoi tsivilizatsii, rol Rossii i zadachi russkogo natsionalnogo dvizhenia” (The Crisis o f  
World Civilization, the Role o f Russia and the Russia National Movement), Russ' ; k>» Porvadok. no. 1-2 
(1995), pp.l, 2.
50 However, Zyuganov did reject many o f the ideological traditions of the Communist Party o f the Soviet Union 
(CPSU), unlike hard-line Communists Viktor Anpilov and Nina Andreeva who still upheld dogmatic Leninism 
and Stalinism. Zyuganov supported democracy, mixed ownership and constitutional federalism.
51Author’s Interview with Solovey, June 1, 1999. Also see Joan Barth Urban and Valery D. Solovey, Russia’s 
Communists at the Crossroads (Oxford: Westview Press, 1997). This was the first book to examine the multiple 
components o f the post-Soviet Russian communist movement and the CPRF’s organisational and programmatic 
development and conduct. Although the authors explore the differences among the communist political groups, 
they stress the fact the groups all agreed that Russia was being changed into a colonial outpost o f the West 
which was led by the US, and that the dissolution o f the USSR was an act o f treason by Yeltsin and Gorbachev, 
p. 104.
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In Zyuganov’s worldview, the real threat came from the West. He blamed the 
collapse of the Soviet Union on the West and treacherous politicians such as Gorbachev and 
Yeltsin. The West, led by the United States, was seen as attempting to build a “new world 
order” which envisioned the introduction of a global regime of political, economic, and 
military dictatorship. Thus, in Zyuganov’s terms, those who resisted the break-up of the 
Soviet Union and those who now resisted Russia’s subordination to the West (including its 
individualism, immorality, materialism and protestant egoism) were “patriots” “whose duty it 
was to help Russia fulfil its “special historic responsibility”. Russia was seen as uniquely 
positioned to stop the spread of evil, immorality and militarism from the West and spread its 
superior Russian (and Slavonic) culture. He depicted Russia as “the pivot and chief bulwark 
of the Eurasian continental block, the interests of which conflict with the hegemonic 
tendencies of the United States”.54
Zyuganov argued that the Soviet Union was the true historical continuation of the 
Russian imperial tradition and insisted upon the artificiality of the current boundaries of the 
Russian Federation. He advocated a doctrine which would “absorb all the valuable and 
positive elements that characterised the international activity of both pre-Revolutionary 
Russia and the USSR”.55 He envisioned Russia’s future as a multinational, secular, great 
power with strong links to its Communist past.
It therefore is clear that with the end of communism, Zyuganov was attempting to 
substitute a new mission or “Russian idea” for Marxism-Leninism. He wrote that the former 
Union must be re-established as a “great power” state (derzhava) which would lead to the
52 Gennady Zyuganov, Derzhava (Moskva: Informpechat, 1994) p.40.
53 See the following o f Zyuganov’s works: Drama vlasti (Moscow: Paleia, 1993) p. 174; Veriu v Rossiiu 
(Voronezh:“Voronezh”, 1995) and Za linei gorizonta (Moskva: Informpechat, 1995). Zyuganov’s analytical 
centres, Spiritual Heritage and RAU Corporation, were dominated by former Marxist-Leninists in charge o f  
finding new definitions and theories o f the nation.
54 For his foreign policy views see Zyuganov Pravda. December 10, 1993, p .l, and for Zyuganov's report to the 
Third CPRF Congress see Sovetskava Rossiva. January 24,1995, p. 1.
55 A collection o f Zyuganov’s thoughts and ideas 1993-95 that were written in various newspapers and 
magazines while he was organising his opposition movement has been published. The book has been translated 
into English in full as part three “Russia and the Contemporary World: Let Russia Be Russia”, in Gennady 
Zyuganov, Vadim Medish (ed.) My Russia: The Political Autobiography o f Gennady Zyuganov (London: 
Sharpe, 1997), pp. 91-138. See especially pp. 122-124.
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resurrection of Moscow into the “Third Rome”.56 He felt he had a positive mission to restore 
the “Union” or “Fatherland”, as well as to preserve Russia’s spiritual and cultural 
distinctiveness.
These ideas led Zyuganov to propose a new foreign policy based upon what he called
c o
“healthy pragmatism”. He rejected the former excessive ideologisation of foreign policy 
and the old communist goal of “world revolution”. Instead, he argued that Russia should 
oppose as much as possible the growth of American hegemony and seek positive elements 
from Russia’s past. A contradictory mix of isolationism in world affairs and the development 
of international ties characterised Zyuganov’s general foreign policy orientation. In terms of 
relations with the CIS states, Zyuganov consistently argued until 1996 that the collapse of the 
Soviet Union was dangerously destabilising and that the voluntary restoration of the union of 
former Soviet peoples was an historical necessity dictated by both Russian needs and those of 
world security. 59 In the 1995 election platform, the Communist Party of the Russian 
Federation (CPRF) called “upon the governments and peoples of the illegally disintegrated 
Soviet Union to recreate a single unified state in good will”.60 Zyuganov supported the need 
to strengthen Russia’s military (mostly for defensive purposes), an act which was strongly 
supported by the large numbers of former military and security officials within the party.61
56 Zyuganov, Derzhava (Moskva, Informpechat, 1994), p.37, p.43.
57 Zyuganov’s ideas were greatly influenced by both Sergei Kurginyan and Aleksandr Prokhanov. See the 
discussion between Kurginyan and Prokhanov in Den’. January 1-9 1993, pp. 1-2. Kurginyan’s Experimental 
Creative Centre in Moscow regularly produced ideological materials for Zyuganov. See Veljko. Vujacic, 
“Gennadiy Zyuganov and the Third Road”, Post-Soviet Affairs, vol. 12, no.2 (April-June 1996), pp. 118-154.
58 Author’s Interview with Zyuganov, June 29, 1996, Duma. Zyuganov’s outline o f his foreign policy platform 
was reported by Intercon Daily Report on Russia. March 27, 1996 (Lexis-Nexis).
59 See Zyuganov’s comments in Vladimir Andean, Izvestiya. February 3, 1996, p.3.
60 CPRF platform in Election Platform o f Political Parties Participating in the Elections for State Duma 
(Moscow: International Republican Institute, December. 6, 1995), p.44.
61 Even by 1996, when it was clear that the old Soviet Union would not be resurrected, Zyuganov headed 
several attempts to pass the Duma resolution denouncing the dissolution o f the Soviet Union. His reasoning 
behind these attempts was not that the Soviet Union should be re-created, but rather that there continued to be a 
real need for a political and moral assessment o f the Belovezhskaya Agreements which could later promote the 
gradual reintegration o f some o f the former Soviet republics. This resolution was put before the Duma 14 times. 
Author’s Interview with Valery Solovey, June 1, 1999 and Thomas de Waal “Russian MPs vote in favour o f  
reviving the Soviet Union”, The Times. March 16, 1996, p. 11. For the reactions o f ten o f the leaders o f  the 
former Soviet states to the Duma’s passage o f  the resolution denouncing the Belovezhskaya agreements see 
Intercon Daily Report on Russia. March 18, 1996 (Lexis-Nexis).
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Zyuganov believed that Russia had significant interests in the near abroad. In 1996 he 
wrote that while “restoring the destroyed geopolitical space, we should remember that 
everything connected with the territory of the former Soviet Union is a zone of our vital 
interests.”62 Issues which he deemed important to Russia included conflicts, crime, economic 
divergences, and access to transportation and communication structures. In particular, he 
stressed that Russia should be concerned with the fate of the Russian diaspora in the near 
abroad which he saw as an integral part of the Russian nation.64 Zyuganov verbally supported 
the use of Russian military force to solve particular conflicts but he did not argue that Russia 
should be generally involved in military adventurism in the former Soviet states. Despite his 
strong rhetoric, when asked about specific foreign policy options Zyuganov argued in 1996 
that Russia should act only in ways that would bring the state economic and political benefit, 
and should avoid actions which could result in direct losses or damages to the country.65
ii) Zhirinovsky and the Liberal Democratic Party
The position of the ultra-nationalists, represented in the 1993 and 1995 parliaments 
by Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s extreme nationalist thinking, was a mixture of largely
contradictory ideas which make serious analysis of its foreign policy position difficult.66 For
£*!
example, he stated that he desired both peace and imperial conquest. However,
Zhirinovsky’s Liberal Democratic Party was the only political party to focus on foreign 
policy and he consistently used great power chauvinist ideas to advocate his vision of a statist 
and expansionist Russia.
62 Zyuganov’s outline o f his foreign policy platform was reported by Intercon Daily Report on Russia. March 
27,1996 (Lexis-Nexis).
63Alexei Podberiozkin,“Vyzovy bezopasnosti Rossii” (The challenges to the securing o f Russia” Svobodnava 
Mvsl’. no. 12 (1996), pp.67-69.
64 Zyuganov quoted in Nezavisimava Gazeta. December 15, 1995, p.2.
65 Author’s Interview with Zyuganov, June 29,1996.
66 Robert Service concludes his analysis o f Zhirinovsky’s ideas by saying that Zhirinovsky is “part fascist, part- 
communist, part liberal, part imperialist, part fantasist. He blends Russian chauvinism, Marxism-Leninism, 
eurasianism, European fascism, individualism, Slavophilism, multiculturalism and the contemporary 
consumerism. Robert Service, “Zhirinovskii: Ideas in Search o f an Audience” in Geoffrey Hosking and Robert 
Service (eds.), Russian Nationalism Past and Present (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998) pp.179-197, p.196.
67 Zhirinovsky election speech on Red Square, June 20, 1996.
68 Vladimir Zhirinovsky, Rossivskava Gazeta. December 3, 1993, p .l. Also Author’s Interview with Alexei
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Zhirinovsky’s foreign policies included many of the same general ideas expressed by 
Zyuganov.69 For example, Zhirinovsky asserted that the break-up of the Soviet Union was 
unacceptable, that the United States was at fault and that Russia should now continue its 
historical mission -  and once again what this mission was was unclear. Also similar to 
Zyuganov, Zhirinovsky used the idea that Russia’s statehood and culture were under threat 
from the West. However, for Zhirinovsky, pan-Turkism was depicted as an even greater 
enemy than the West. With this hostile worldview, Zhirinovsky like Zyuganov drew up his 
plans to “save Russia”.
Based upon his ideas, Zhirinovsky’s minimalist foreign policy goal was to restore the 
territory of the Russian Empire of the Tsars and the USSR. This was to be accomplished
70through reincorporating the former republics into some new kind of “Russia” , by ending 
overseas aid, halting military conversion, continuing the sales of arms, and assisting Russians 
in the near abroad.71 Specifically he contended that the conflicts in the CIS states were a 
direct result of the lack of a forceful Russian military presence and the rise of Islamic 
extremism, both of which should be reversed. Aimed at the Russians in the near abroad he 
proposed “the defence of Russians throughout the territory of Russia and the former 
USSR”.72
Thus, a significant difference between Zhirinovsky and Zyuganov was that 
Zhirinovsky advocated Russian involvement by any means (including military force) in order 
to pacify the region. Also unlike Zyuganov, his ambition to reassert Russian power did not
Mitrofonov, Zhirinovsky’s number two, June 20, 1995. Mitrofonov was also the Chairman o f  the State Duma’s 
Committee on Geopolitics.
69 Besides their penchant for conspiracy theories, both men have proclaimed their nostalgia for Stalinism, their 
hostility to liberalism and parliamentarism and their fondness for xenophobic rhetoric. However, despite their 
common hostility to liberal capitalism the two parties have distinct positions and appeal to different sections o f  
the electorate. The LDPR stands for market economy, the CPRF for mixed economy. Zyuganov’s support tends 
to come from elderly pensioners and blue-collar workers, Zhirinovsky’s from unemployed urban youth. (In 
contrast “reformist” support has been strongest in Moscow and among entrepreneurs and intellectuals).
70 See A. Orlov interview with Zhirinovsky in Sovetskava Rossiva. October 2, 1991, p.2.
71 See the LDPR political programme in “Chto me predlagaem: Predvybomaia programma LDPR”, 
Iuridicheskava Gazeta. nos.40-41 (1993) pp.4-5. The LDPR had two newspapers, Pravda Zhirinovskoga 
(Zhirinovsky’s Truth) and Sokal Zhirinovskoga (Zhirinovsky’s Falcon)
72 Author’s Interview with Aleksei Mitrofonov, June 20, 1995.
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stop at the borders of the former Soviet Union but continued southward into Turkey, Iran, 
Afghanistan and beyond. In his 1993 book, The Last Thrust South, he audaciously wrote that
It [Russia] is the Eurasian continent... It is the Arctic Ocean 
washing our northern border, it is the Pacific Ocean in the Far 
East. It is the Atlantic by way of the Black and Baltic Seas.
And in the long run, it is the Indian Ocean, where we fulfil our 
final “southern dash.
Uniquely, Zhirinovsky tied Russian survival and prosperity to territorial expansion. He 
described Russia as a humiliated, poor and oppressed country and stated that his goal was to 
recreate Russia as a great power. He saw the reincorporation of Russia’s southern neighbours 
as necessary for Russia’s future peace and prosperity.
Of course, Zhirinovsky’s foreign policy proposals were often unrealistic and aimed 
mainly at gaining media attention. His strong showing in the 1993 parliamentary elections 
was more a vote against the government than for his Liberal Democratic Party of Russia 
(LDPR). However, the evident emotion behind his foreign policy proposals attracted wide 
support and helps to explain why other political parties copied, to a limited degree, his 
assertive style and more aggressive focus on foreign policy.
b) The Centrists: The Pragmatic Nationalist Orientation
The centrist political parties described themselves as a third way between Yeltsin’s 
regime and the communist-nationalist patriotic coalition. In terms of foreign policy, the most 
prominent and influential centrists were in the political movement Yabloko and the 
individual politician and General Aleksandr Lebed. Both adopted a pragmatic nationalist 
orientation. The political movement Yabloko was the main centrist group to advocate an 
alternative foreign policy. General Lebed was not the leader of a political group until after 
the period under study -  however his views are discussed here because of his popularity 
within the military, his key role in the near abroad conflicts and, later, his role in decision­
73 Zhirinovskii, Poslednii Brosok Na lug (Moskva: TOO “Pisatel”, 1993), pp.93-94.
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making positions in domestic politics and foreign policy. Most particularly, Lebed’s views 
significantly influenced Russian thinking about foreign policy towards the near abroad.74
i) Yabloko
Between 1991 and 1993, the key centrist political party was the political movement 
Civic Union (which consisted of many political groups such as Social Democratic 
organisations, Democratic Party of Russia, Renewal, and the People’s Party of Free Russia). 
After 1993, however, the parties within the Civic Union split and the new groups went in 
different directions. For example, former Vice President Alexander Rutskoi’s People’s Party
nc
of Free Russia became more conservative. Meanwhile, the Yabloko political movement 
(founded in 1993) moved closer to that of the increasingly centrist government.
Yabloko stood for radical marketisation and democratisation. Thus, unlike die old 
Civic Union, it was against state intervention in the economy. Vladimir Lukin (Chairman of 
the Duma’s Foreign Affairs Committee) wrote that the search for a “Russian Idea” was 
necessary for Russia to find a national purpose and sense of identity -  although he warned of
nr
the possibility of aggression that could develop from this search.
The members of the electoral block Yabloko have been termed “civilised patriots” for
77their alternative foreign policy position. Yabloko was the most foreign policy oriented of 
the centrist political groups and its reasonable, pragmatic policies may have helped it
no
convince the government to adopt some of its foreign policy positions. Yabloko called for a
74 For an analysis o f the military in parliament see Frangoise Dose, “The Military in Parliament, 1989-95”, 
Russian Politics and Law, vol.35, no.5 (September-October 1997), pp.77-88.
75 Yavlinsky, Boldyrev, Lukin (hence the acronym YABLOKO) were the leaders o f the 1993 and 1995 Yabloko 
electoral bloc.
76 See Lukin’s views on the West in Lukin and Anatoly Utlin, Rossiva i Zapad: Obshchnost ili Otchzhenive? 
(Russia and the West: Community or Estrangement?) (Moscow: SAMPO, 1995).
77 Duma deputy Konstantin Borovoi used this term. Author’s Interview with Borovoi, May 21,1999.
78 Yabloko member Aleksei Arbatov argued that “The revival o f Russia’s military political domination in post- 
Soviet space at any price, just as any policy o f revival in the past, is fraught with immense costs and setbacks”. 
He proposed “a comprehensive economic integration with Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan in the first place... 
that will ensure co-operation among ex-Soviet republics on a new basis... Thus, realism, the clearness o f  
purpose and predictability are urgently essential today for remedying the critical situation in the sphere o f  
security and in the foreign policy o f Russia”. Aleksei Arbatov, “Russia’s New Role in World Politics” New  
Times. November 1995, pp.46-49.
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balanced strategy based upon Russia’s geostrategic interests and criticized one-sided Western 
ties, arguing that Russia’s foreign policy should be conducted in terms of a strong defence of
70Russia’s national interests. Lukin envisaged Russia as a great power, with special interests 
in the near abroad and with ties to both the East and West. Lukin also argued for the need to 
settle and prevent armed conflicts in the CIS, to protect the Russian-speaking population, and 
to create (preferably by stimulating natural integrative processes) a confederal system
o/\
encompassing the former Soviet republics.
Yabloko’s foreign policy priorities consisted of the political settlement o f armed 
conflicts around Russia and the creation of a defence alliance among CIS states, although 
Yabloko members such as Anatoly Adamishin warned of the possibility of Russian isolation
O -I
as a result of such actions. Yabloko was the only key political party which was clearly and 
vocally against the use of force (as demonstrated by its unique stance against Russia’s early 
involvement in the first Chechen war). It also supported the development of relations with 
NATO, although it was against placing Russian troops under NATO control.
In early 1995, the Kremlin attempted to co-opt the popular policies of the centrist 
parties, and two new parties with executive links were created in time for the elections. Both 
of these parties, the centre-right Our Home is Russia led by the Prime Minister Viktor 
Chernomyrdin and (the less successful) centre-left party led by the speaker of the Duma, Ivan 
Rybkin, expressed pragmatic nationalist foreign policy views. Our Home is Russia, which
79 Nezavisimava Gazeta. September 10, 1992, p.2.
80 Vladimir Lukin, Segodnva. September 2, 1993, p.3.
81 Author’s Interview with Anatoly Adamishin, June 9 1999.
82 The election program o f the Ivan Rybkin block stated that “A Russian external policy must be weighted and 
unbiased: it must be neither Western nor Eastern -  it should be Russian”. It stated that “ .. .the major direction o f  
Russian foreign policy initiatives should be the Commonwealth o f  Independent States. The mutual interlacing 
o f destinies o f peoples who have lived together on the territory o f our common Motherland for hundred o f years 
is the major fact determining our position in respect to the near abroad. The peoples o f the former USSR enjoy 
sovereignty in choosing their historic destiny. No objections by the West may deprive them o f  their right to co­
operation and to voluntary unification”. The block’s policy proposals included the establishment o f military co­
operation in the CIS, the organisation o f common protection o f boundaries and collective security and 
“activities” to ensure “the destiny and well-being o f 25 million Russians residing beyond the Motherland”.
In comparison, the 1995 election platform o f Our Home is Russia made little reference to foreign policy but did 
call for increased economic integration with the CIS states, to “ensure the rights and freedoms o f  our 
compatriots in the former USSR countries, and to increase Russia’s credibility in international affairs”. See 
Election Platforms o f Political Parties Participating in Elections for State Duma (Moscow: International 
Republican Institute, December. 6, 1995).
76
was closely linked to the gas industry, argued particularly for economic integration with the 
former Soviet states within the framework of the CIS.
ii) Alexandr Lebed
A vocal and influential opponent of the government’s foreign policy, General 
Alexandr Lebed84 also premised his foreign policy thinking on the idea that Russia was a 
“great state”, deserving of respect and patriotism, but inexcusably weakened by ill-conceived 
policies of Gorbachev and Yeltsin. He used “statist” (gosudarstvennik) and “eurasianist” 
ideas to create a vision which John B. Dunlop has described as a harmonious union of
• • oc #Russians and non-Russians together “within a single political entity”. Lebed judged the 
break-up of the Soviet Union to be a geopolitical catastrophe, and predicted that future 
(gradual and voluntary) reintegration of many of the CIS states was inevitable.
Lebed envisioned Russia as a bridge between East and West and the leader of the 
post-Soviet space. He often argued that Russia should not act in any way to jeopardise peace
O /J
with the Muslim world. He wrote that:
Russia, and it alone, is able to organise anew this spiritual 
place... The peoples of the former USSR already understand 
that until recently they lived in a great country and now survive 
in petty states without any help or love from a prince beyond 
the ocean. Precisely together with Russia they will occupy a
on
worthy place in the world...
83 Economic and defence groupings backed various political parties but they are not explored here because they 
did not become well defined until after 1996. Parties with economic backing included Konstantin Borovoi’s 
1992 Economic Freedom Party, Arkady Volsky’s party and Grigory Yavlinsky’s Entrepreneurs for New Russia 
(before Yabloko was created in spring 1993).
84 Lebed was an officer in Afghanistan in 1981-82. In 1998 he was a commander o f  the Tula Paratroop 
Division. He was commander o f this elite division in Baku (Nov. 88), Tbilisi (April 1989), Baku (Jan. 90), and 
was commander o f Russia’s 14th Army from June 92-June 95 in Transdniestria. Lebed won 15% the first 
Russian presidential ballot in June 96 and was then co-opted by Yeltsin to join his cabinet. From June 18 to 
October 17 1996 he was Secretary o f Russian Security Council and aide to the President for national security 
affairs.
85 John B. Dunlop, “Alexandr Lebed and Russian Foreign Policy”, SAIS Review, vol. 17, no.l (Winter-Spring 
1997), pp.47-72, p.50.
86 Unlike many o f the present day Russian nationalists, Lebed has expressed respect for Muslims. He was 
against the Chechen war largely because he saw it as pitting Russian against the entire Muslim world.
87 In Jamestown Foundation Prism (jf-monitor@andrew.cais.com) no. 19, May 1995.
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As an army man, Lebed promoted the renewal of the military and the development of a new 
defensive doctrine which he believed to be both a positive and necessary link to Tsarist
OQ
Russian history. Until the Chechen war, Lebed was part of a powerful military clique which 
included fellow commanders Defence Minister Pavel Grachev, Deputy Defence Ministers
on
Boris Gromov and Georgy Kondratyev and Colonel-General Viktor Sorokin. In the early 
years after the break-up of the Soviet Union, these members of the Russian high command 
openly promoted an activist military role in the CIS states (some analysts believe that they 
continued this policy under the guise of “peacekeeping”) in order to settle ethnic conflicts on 
Russia’s terms and to support Russians in the near abroad.90
However, although Lebed advocated reintegration (especially military) among the 
former Soviet states, he stressed that this process should be voluntary and not “neo­
imperialist” and thus should be pursued through a mixture of “carrots and sticks”.91 He 
considered reintegration to be necessary for the economic development of Russia and the CIS 
states and also for the protection of the Russian minorities abroad -  made even more urgent,
• • Q 9in his opinion, by NATO’s aggressive expansionism.
88However, there were divisions in military thinking. The Chechen events brought out divisions at the top o f the 
Russian military command. Outright opposition by commanders such as Lebed created a precedent that military 
commanders could no longer be assumed to be in favour o f  the use of armed force. After that, it became more 
difficult to interpret Russian engagement in the CIS as being directed by Russian military commanders. 
Author’s Interview with Col. Gen. Nikolaev, Head o f Russia’s Border Guards, June 8, 1999.
89 Biographies o f these generals can be found in Moscow News, no. 14 (1993). Kondratyev was made 
responsible for Russian peacekeeping in the CIS until his dismissal early in 1995. Sorokin was head o f the task 
force o f Russian troops in Abkhazia during the period November 1992 - March 1993.
90 Col. General Nikolaev (Head o f Border Guards) at first supported a policy based on force to integrate the CIS 
into one military and economic unit and recreate the Soviet borders (minus the Baltic states). He later attempted 
to establish a unified CIS border command for guarding the external borders o f the CIS, while leaving open 
borders among the states.” Author’s Interview with Col. Gen. Nikolaev, June 8, 1999.
91 As will be seen in the Moldova case study chapter, when Lebed assumed command o f the 14th Army in 
Transdniestria initially he widely disseminated his views that Transdniestria was “part o f Russia”. However, he 
was soon at odds with the corrupt leadership o f Transdniestria (and thus was attacked by Russian nationalists). 
Once established in Transdniestria, he supported a rational, negotiated settlement to the conflict -  although he 
was not adverse to strong-arm tactics if necessary. “I understood that in such situations you have to take sudden 
and harsh measures. It is a guarantee that blood will not flow for long”. As an army commander, he could not 
exert formal influence on foreign policy beyond Moldova but gained great popularity among mid-ranking 
Russian officers and his views on policies in the CIS became widely known.
92 This was the focus o f his 1996 election statement. By 1996 Lebed was defining himself as a pragmatist with 
much “common sense” (zdraviy smysl). He viewed America as Russia’s key rival and NATO expansion as a 
new type o f war in which the US is trying to gain new spheres o f influence. Thus, he proposed that Russia 
should continue to concentrate on internal economic and military reforms and should slowly reconstruct its 
traditional alliances. See his 1996 Campaign Statement: Aleksandr Lebed, Mir i Poryadok (Moskva:
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Lebed argued for the rights of the Russians in the near abroad states , a stand which 
became a significant and uniting factor in Russian foreign policy thinking. In the 1995 
parliamentary elections, Lebed ran as the Vice Chairman of a new political organisation, the 
Congress of Russian Communities (KRO)94 which used a somewhat nebulous patriotism to 
emphasise the need to build a strong state, improve the welfare and quality of life, and defend 
the interests of Russians. The KRO platform promised to restore Russia’s prestige and status 
although it denounced aggressive nationalism:95
We would ensure the status of Russia as a great world power.
Foreign policy should be aimed at the implementation of vital 
national interests of Russia... economic and political 
integration is one of our priorities. We would build up the 
defence capability of the country. We would stop the 
tormenting of the Russian Army and its involvement in 
political disputes.96
Thus, at first, Lebed criticized the government for its lack of force in dealing with the 
conflicts and later he championed the rights of the Russian diaspora. Then in 1996, holding a 
more central role in government foreign policy making, and faced with the fact that force was 
not resolving the Chechen conflict, he pragmatically promoted the popular position of using 
negotiation rather than force to end the Chechen war. The evolution of Lebed’s foreign 
policy views (1991-1996) and those other members of the political elite is outlined and 
explained in detail in Chapter Four.
Moskovskogo in-ta stali i splavov, 1996).
93There are many references to this in his autobiography: Za Derzhavu obidno (Moskva: Gregori Peidzh, 1995).
94 The KRO was established by Yuri Skokov (who had uneasy relations with Lebed) and Dmitry Rogozin.
95 When the party failed to clear the 5% barrier, and before the 1996 presidential election approached, Lebed 
announced that he would form a “Third Force” with Grigory Yavlinsky and eye surgeon Svyatoslav Fedorov. 
When this failed, and he then won over 15% o f the popular vote in the first round o f the presidential elections, 
Lebed reached an agreement with Yeltsin in which he would pledge his support for Yeltsin and in return be 
made Security Council Chief. Lebed then worked on the Chechnya negotiations until he was fired from the 
position after negotiating an end to Chechen war. >,
6 “Congress o f Russian Communities 1995 Election Platform” in Election Platforms o f Political Parties 
Participating in the Elections for State Duma (Moscow: International Republican Institute, December. 6, 1995).
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c) Reformists: The Liberal Westemist Orientation
Reformist parties are only briefly mentioned here because their views are examined in 
great length in Chapter Four where we study the evolution of the political debates. The key 
reformist party, Democratic Russia, which became Russia’s Choice in 1993, comprised the 
reformist members of the government and, at least in the early years, generally supported the 
foreign policies of their member Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev. They advocated a liberal 
westemist orientation: close relations with the West and international institutions, respect for 
the sovereignty of the CIS states, and support for political negotiation of conflicts over the 
use of force. In terms of the CIS states, they generally supported minimal and gradual 
economic reintegration. For example, Sergei Glazyev, who helped to write the foreign policy 
program of the Democratic Party of Russia, called for the restoration of Russia’s political and 
economic influence in the world and also linked economic recovery with Russian interests
07and integration in the near abroad. In 1995, Russia’s Choice focused its priorities of on 
three well-known concentric circles -  the CIS, the West and the East. It supported 
cooperation with America and Western Europe; and neutrality over NATO expansion.
By 1993, the reformist parties split over the issue of whether or not to defend the 
Russian diaspora in the CIS states (whose cause was eventually adopted by Gaidar’s Russia’s
QQ
Choice) and over whether or not to support the use of force in Chechnya 1994-96.
4. The Rise and Fall o f Ideas or Underlying Preferences
In 1991 and 1992, there were different choices in terms of how to define Russia’s 
national identity, geography, mission, self-perception and domestic political and economic 
direction. By 1993 those choices narrowed as many of the pragmatic nationalist ideas came 
to structure the debate within which Russian foreign policy was made towards the near 
abroad. Russia became widely seen to have a unique, geopolitical mission, to be
97 Mikhail Berger, Izvestiva. April 3, 1993, p.2.
98 Konstantin Borovoi explains his falling out with Kozyrev as because he did not support his Chechen policy. 
Author’s Interview with Borovoi, May 21, 1999.
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geographically part of Eurasia, a great power with its own pragmatic interests. Gradually a 
consensus developed that Russia should move in the direction of liberal democratic and 
market economic reforms while taking Russian interests into account. In principle, if not 
practice, the Russian political elite believed that Russia should have the right to protect 
Russians in the near abroad.
During these years, the worldviews of the most of the political leaders remained 
relatively consistent, simplistic and wrapped in bombastic rhetoric. Pragmatic and 
fundamentalist nationalists mourned the loss of connections with the past and blamed their 
opponents for this loss. They also outlined simplified myths about the world which explained 
the main threats to Russian security. To varying degrees most of key leaders across the political 
spectrum adopted great power rhetoric and the concepts of a Russian idea and eurasianism to 
validate their own political agenda. This helps to explain the similarity in how they defined 
Russian interests concerning the CIS states even when they advocated different means of 
pursuit.
The political leaders generally agreed that relations with the former Soviet states 
should be restored, but were vague about the means and time frame which should be 
followed. Although they used similar assertive discourse, the rhetoric was never followed up 
with official policies demanding the immediate restoration of Russian sovereignty over the 
former Soviet republics. Instead, despite the overall strong assertion of Russian interests, 
there developed a widespread assumption that Russia had neither the economic means nor 
the political will to follow old Soviet policies or even new neo-imperial ones.
Because of the sudden disintegration of the Soviet Union, it is not surprising that the 
idea of Russia’s reunion with the former Soviet republics promised simple, if  unrealistic, 
solutions to Russia’s foreign policy questions and was, at least initially, rhetorically adopted 
(from its most extreme to most diluted versions) by many members of the Russian elite 
across the country’s political spectrum. Russia was still a multi-ethnic community -  which 
helps to explain its inherent interest in the near abroad. Moreover, the fact that Russia had
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been a contiguous land empire made it much more difficult for modem Russia to abandon 
ties to its ex-empire than had been the case, for example, with Britain in Asia or Africa."
The entrenchment of imperialist ideas (belief in the creation of empire100) in the 
Russian and Soviet past also helps somewhat to explain the popularity of slogans of national 
revival and other messianic components which were used by several political groupings to 
enhance their own legitimacy and expand their public support.101 The more moderate version 
of nationalism flourished across the Russian political spectrum and its appeal can be seen in 
the extent to which it informed both the debate and, to a lesser degree, policy towards the 
CIS states.102
A key reason for the success of pragmatic nationalist ideas was that buying into 
Western liberal policies and principles did not lead to the anticipated rapid economic 
recovery. If the Russian economy had strengthened, it would have bolstered the positions of 
those who argued that the way to ensure Russian power and prestige was through alliance 
with the West. Instead, the idea of Russia defining its own, unique interests and following 
reforms which would take Russian conditions into account became increasingly popular, along 
with a generally critical stance towards what was widely seen as an arrogant West. This was
99 See Dominic Lieven, Empires. Russia and her Neighbours (London: John Murray, 2000).
100 The term empire refers to a relationship o f dominance and subjugation between an imperial centre and its 
periphery. In an empire “one state controls the effective political sovereignty o f another political society”. The 
term imperialism also involves the exercise o f power as a means o f control. The difference is that the term 
‘imperialism’ describes a process, and ‘empire’ describes a product o f that process. An appreciation o f empire -  
both Russian and Soviet -  helps to understand contemporary nationalism in Russia. The definitions come from: 
Michael Doyle, Empires (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986), p.45.
101 It must be emphasised that extremist foreign policy views, such as recreating the Soviet Union, were just that 
-  extremist, and from 1991-96, a decreasing number actively supported them. See Yevgeny Kozhokin (Director 
o f the Institute o f Strategic Studies, Moscow), Obshchava Gazeta. no.52 (December 28,1995) p.3.
102 Many used moderate nationalist ideas in order to gain electoral support -  even though there was generally 
little or no intention o f acting upon them. Alexandr Motyl argues that “The discourses that sustained empire not 
only survived intact but also acquired enhanced plausibility as a result o f  the suddenness and 
comprehensiveness o f collapse. Above all, imperial discourses were a balm on the ravaged psyches and cultures 
o f metropolitan populations... Imperial discourses also offered a simple, if  perhaps simplistic, political solution 
to post-imperial disarray. Re-conquering lost territories, reacquiring lost resources, re-establishing lost bases, 
and reclaiming abandoned brethren did indeed make some economic, military, and national sense. Finally, neo­
imperialism served as a discursive substitute for absent or weak institutions. Members o f the elite could forge a 
consensus o f sorts by accepting an imperial language that established minimal rules o f the game for all political 
actors. Aleksandr Motyl, “After Empire: competing discourses and inter-state conflict in post-imperial Eastern 
Europe”, in Barnett Rubin and Jack Snyder (eds.), Post-Soviet Political Order (London: Routledge, 1998), 
pp. 14-33, p.24.
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encouraged by the general disenchantment with Western liberal ideology seen through the 
“grey-coloured glasses” of corruption and poverty, as well as disappointment with the lack of 
Western economic assistance. The role of Western powers in overseeing “marketisation” 
created a widespread belief that Russia was threatened by enemies inside and abroad. Moreover, 
the West’s actions were beginning to be seen as undermining Russia’s role in the near abroad 
states.
Thus, although Russian politicians generally remained aware that the well-being of 
Russia depended upon good relations with the West, from 1991-96 even former pro- 
Westemizers became progressively more in favour of state intervention and social justice, and 
more wary of Western economic and political models. At the same time, the perception of the 
West as a rival was rehabilitated into political and foreign policy discourse.
By the 1993 parliamentary elections, the perceptions of both threat from the West and 
fear of rejection by the West united various groups across the political spectrum. The result 
often seemed to be a schizophrenic foreign policy towards the West that was not always 
driven by clear-cut national interests. For example, Russia blamed the West for Russian 
failures while at the same time asking for increased aid. However, more significant to this 
thesis is the fact that Russia’s differentiation from the West had as its counterpart an increase 
in more aggressive rhetoric along with a strong assertion of (ill-defined) interests in CIS 
states.
Several of the pragmatic nationalist ideas were relatively vague and had little 
meaning. Although there developed a consensus that Russia must outline a “mission” for its 
future, there was no agreement on its content. Russian politician Sergei Baburin credited 
himself as the “patriot” who resurrected the term “Russian idea” to emphasise the unique 
nature of the Russian nation. Russia’s history and culture, he explained, should condition its 
future development. However the term was sufficiently vague that from 1991 to 1996 it
103 Baburin argued that he was responsible for making the concept o f a “Russian idea” acceptable and useful for 
the widely adopted “moderate nationalist”(eurasianist) view o f  Russia as a bridge between East and West. 
Author’s Interview with Duma Deputy Sergei Baburin, May 21, 1999. See also Sergei Baburin, Rossivski put. 
Stanovlenie rossiskoi geopolitiki kanuna XXI veka (Moscow: ANKO, 1995). He believed in a supraethnos o f  
Russian people in which other groups would politically, if  not culturally, merge. In other words, he described a 
Russia defined in more than ethnic terms.
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was widely adopted and used in many different ways. For example, extreme nationalists used 
the concept as a base from which to advocate a more isolationist policy and separate Russian 
development. The extreme communists used it early on to support their policy that Russia 
should be revived as an empire (paradoxically on the basis of consent). Even Yeltsin himself 
sponsored a search for a new “Russian idea”.104 By 1996 there had not yet developed any 
definitive elite (or popular) consensus over fundamental issues, from what Russia is and who 
Russians are to where they belong in the world.105 However, as Russians slowly came to 
terms with the recent past, a consensus did seem to be forming that Russia’s historical and 
cultural heritage, however controversial, should not be completely abandoned but that 
elements should be capitalized on in the search for the most efficient way to modernize the 
country.
The increasingly widespread use of the concept “the Russian idea” in political 
discourse, and the new search for its modem definition, worried those who feared that a 
belief in Russia’s exceptionalism could develop into a dangerous messianism. The danger 
they surmised was that the attraction of the idea that Russia has a divine mission could (given 
the right circumstances) legitimise many aggressive actions while soothing psychological and 
socio-economic wounds. What is remarkable is that this has not occurred.
Similarly, the idea of Russian “greatness” was broad enough that it became widely 
accepted and eventually a majority of the political elite adopted “great power” rhetoric to 
support policies which would strengthen Russia and re-balance its relationship with the 
United States. One of the few areas of agreement was that close relations with the CIS states 
was necessary, if not sufficient, to ensure Russia’s status as a great power.106 However, a
104See, Rossivskava Gazeta. July 30, 1996. This paper sponsored a search for a new “Russian national idea”. 
Previously, however, it had printed many articles about Russia’s historic search for this same “national idea”. 
See for example, September 10, 1993, p.3.
105 See Russian academic Konstantin Pleshakov’s (Institute o f USA and Canada) article which examines the 
history o f “Russia’s Mission” and the current search. Pleshakov, “Russia’s Mission: The Third Epoch”, in 
International Affairs. Moscow, vol.39, no.l (January, 1993) pp. 17-26. “Of course the empire is gone. But its 
space -  geopolitical, political, military, economic, cultural and intellectual -  is not... The common post-Soviet 
space is a reality, and Russia’s borders within it are relative”, p.20.
106 O f course, the idea o f Russia as a Great Power motivating foreign policy has historic roots. In Tsarist times it 
was widely believed that “Whatever their actual cost to the metropolis, the non-Russian territories could certify 
Russia’s status as a great power. Far from being an irrational factor, as Joseph Schumpeter suggested,
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minority of the members of the Russian elite continued to be adamantly against the use of
1H7“great power” rhetoric.
5. Conclusions
This chapter identified the dominant ideas that structured and set the parameters of 
the Russian foreign policy debate 1991-96. When the new post-Soviet era began, there were 
several different options concerning how to define Russia and shape its future development 
in terms of national identity, geography, mission, self-perception, and economic and political 
direction. As the political elite addressed these options, their general ideas, or underlying 
preferences, coalesced and helped to structure the debates about foreign policy.
In order to show how these ideas helped to guide foreign policy choice, we 
categorised three key foreign policy orientations of the political elite: fundamentalist 
nationalist, pragmatic nationalist and liberal westemist. The ideas underlying these three 
orientations (based on different categories of ideas), provided “road maps”, framed foreign 
policy issues and therefore helped to support policy proposals. They guided the three key 
foreign policy options and policies towards the near abroad states and the conflicts that arose 
there.
The specific foreign policy proposals of key political party leaders fit into the three 
foreign policy orientations -  with the nationalists and communists adhering to the 
fundamentalist nationalist views, the centrists to pragmatic nationalist views and the 
reformist or liberal democrats to liberal westemist views. However, by 1993, pragmatic 
nationalist ideas were becoming dominant and the rhetoric of Russian foreign policy was 
moving in a centrist direction.
imperialism -  in Russia at least -  endowed the state with an identity, a name, a place in the consort o f nations, 
and a raison d’etre that it would otherwise have lacked.” S. Frederick Starr, “Tsarist Government: The Imperial 
Dimension” in Jeremy Azrael (ed.), Soviet Nationality Policies and Practices (New York: Praeger, 1978), pp.3- 
38, p.30.
,07See Hannes Adomeit, “Russia as a ‘Great Power’ in world affairs: images and reality”, International Affairs. 
vol.71,no.l (January 1995), pp.35-68.
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To conclude, the simplified typologies examined above summarise the patterns of 
ideas or stated views which existed throughout the period. These patterns are crucial to 
understand the distinctive development and evolution of Russian foreign policy thinking in 
these years. The next chapter examines in detail the rise and fall of foreign policy 
orientations and their proponents and situates them in the domestic political context. It 
outlines nuanced shifts in debates in relation to the government’s position and foreign 
policies.
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Chapter Four: Russian Domestic Politics and the Evolution in Debates 
About Foreign and Military Policy Towards the CIS States, 1991-1996
The last chapter identified and analysed the key Russian ideas or stated views that 
made up the main tendencies of foreign policy thinking between 1991 and 1996. This chapter 
traces the evolution of these ideas through three stages of the policy debate during that 
period. It then examines the government’s key foreign and military policies towards the near 
abroad. The chapter searches for broad relations between the debates and policies in order to 
analyse whether the ideas may have impacted on policy choices.
The chapter begins with a brief overview of the domestic political context in which 
these foreign policy ideas were voiced. It then traces the evolution of debate and foreign 
policy choices among members of the political elite in three distinct phases: the Atlanticist 
period (August 1991-March 1992), the period in which there was a battle of ideas (March 
1992-November 1993) and the period in which a consensus was achieved (Nov 1993-June 
1996).
1. Overview of the Domestic Political Context
“I tell Yeltsin and I tell you, a Prime Minister must have elementary power, not just ideas 1
The key foreign policy ideas and orientations examined in the last chapter did not 
exist independently from the political context. In fact, the changing domestic political scene 
from 1991 to 1996 helps to explain the government’s adoption or dismissal of certain ideas. 
Boris Yeltsin’s political struggles, first with Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in 1991 and 
then with parliament culminating in its dissolution in 1993 laid the groundwork for the 
Russian government’s early adoption of a liberal westemist foreign policy orientation and its 
evolution towards pragmatic nationalism. During these times of crises, and specifically in the 
parliamentary elections in 1993 and 1995, members of the political elite and their foreign 
policy ideas significantly guided foreign policy choice.
’Arkady Volsky quoted in “Industrial Czar Puts Russia’s Leader on the Spot”, Financial Times. October 29, 
1992.
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a) The Break-Up of the USSR and the Rebirth of Russia
Boris Yeltsin’s struggle with Mikhail Gorbachev in 1991 gave impetus to Yeltsin’s 
early adoption of a radical liberal westemist foreign policy position. On 12 June 1991, 
Yeltsin became President of Russia when for the first time in history Russia chose its 
president in a popular vote. As head of the Russian Republic, Yeltsin declared Russian 
sovereignty on 21 June 1991 -  well before the Soviet Union officially came to an end on 31 
December 1991. During this half-year period the Soviet “centre” and the Russian Republic 
were essentially at odds as both claimed sovereignty over the same territory.
In mid-August 1991, conservative plotters attempted to take power in order to 
preserve the USSR and its political system. Although they were ready to accept some 
changes, they were worried that the Gorbachev reforms were going too far. The coup failed 
for many reasons: it was unorganised; Yeltsin and his Russian leadership immediately 
condemned the coup; and the army refused to attack the people who took to the streets to 
block the tanks. Subsequently, on 24 August, Gorbachev resigned as General Secretary of the 
Communist Party, but remained Soviet president. Thus, the goal of the August coup, which 
was to halt the disintegration of the Soviet Union, led instead to the collapse of the 
Communist Party and accelerated the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The failed coup 
prompted the leaders of the other Soviet republics to transform their declarations of 
sovereignty into declarations of independence and greatly increased the power of Yeltsin and 
the Russian government vis a vis the Soviet “centre.”3
This dramatic domestic political context meant that the period after Russia declared 
independence in June 1991 was one of great confusion and uncertainty as Russia’s interests 
and policies were in the process of being separated from those of the Soviet state. After the 
failed coup, Russian politicians hotly debated the course that their country should take.4
2 Since December 1991, newspapers had forecast a struggle for power. “Democratic Russia came into being 
aimed at destroying the Soviet state but has not been able to create a national statehood for the Russian 
Republic’s inhabitants”. Konstantin Medvedev, Nezavisimava Gazeta. December 7,1991, p.2.
3 A. Latynina, Literatumava Gazeta. no.34 (August 28), 1991, p.7.
4 In February 1992 talks began on the formation o f a new Union Treaty which would delimit the power between 
the Union and the republics. “On the Building o f a New Union Treaty”, Official Kremlin International News 
Broadcast. February 22, 1991. (Nexis-Lexis)
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Representatives of the Communist bureaucracy and the military-industrial complex joined 
USSR President Gorbachev in demanding that the Soviet Union be preserved as a federation 
of sovereign states. This point of view was also supported at the time by some of the leading 
Russian democrats such as Grigory Yavlinsky.
Yeltsin, however, in response to the August coup events, and partly in an effort to 
differentiate himself from Gorbachev, radicalised his economic, political and foreign policy 
goals. As opposed to his earlier and more moderate stance of pursuing change within the 
framework of the Soviet Union, Yeltsin began to support a policy of dismantling the old 
Soviet state and creating in its place the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). 
Supported by the Russian Republic’s first Deputy Chairman, Gennady Burbulis, and 
economist and Deputy Chairman Yegor Gaidar, Yeltsin believed that Russia should separate 
itself economically from the former Soviet republics in order to pursue its own radical market 
reforms 5 The idea of an economic union with former Soviet republics was rejected on the 
grounds that such an agreement would serve only the interests of the republics by allowing 
them to restructure their economies at the expense of Russia.6
The liberal westemist orientation contributed greatly to the death of the Soviet Union. 
On 7 and 8 December, the Russian, Belarussian and Ukrainian leaders (representatives of the 
original republics that signed the Union Treaty of December 1922 which had created the 
USSR) declared the end of the Soviet Union, announced the creation of the Commonwealth 
of Independent States (CIS) and invited the other republics to join. On 21 December the five 
Central Asian republics, along with Moldova, Armenia and Azerbaijan joined the CIS and 
were granted the status of co-founders. Of the former Soviet republics, this left just Georgia 
(which later joined) and the three Baltic states outside the organisation. Gorbachev resigned 
as President of the USSR on 25 December 1991. After having acted to end the Soviet Union, 
Yeltsin, now President of the Russian Federation, had little choice but to pursue a policy of
5 Interview with Burbulis, Izvestiva. October 26, 1991, p. 1. See also Aleksandr Rahr, “Power Struggle in the 
White House”, Report on the USSR. October 25. 1991, pp. 18-21.
6 Vladimir Batov, Nezavisimava Gazeta. December 24, 1991, p. 1; Agence France Press. December 24, 1991.
7 In 1992 Azerbaijan and Moldova withdrew and then re-joined the CIS in April 1994. Georgia joined the CIS 
in December 1993.
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non-involvement in the former republics and to forge close relations with the West. It is clear 
that this tumultuous domestic political context, and in particular Yeltsin’s power struggle 
with Gorbachev, contributed greatly to Yeltsin’s early adoption of a liberal westemist 
position.
b) The Struggle between President and Parliament and the Elections of 1993 and 1995
After 1991, the political groups which had been united against communism began to 
break apart. Conflicting views were aired even over whether or not the Soviet Union should 
or should not have been destroyed. However, almost immediately, the political process was 
dominated by Yeltsin’s power struggle with parliament. Russia was still operating under the 
old Soviet constitution (with many amendments) which did not mark a clear division in the 
balance of powers between the legislative and executive branches of government. 
Encouraged by its Chairman, Ruslan Khasbulatov and Vice-President Aleksandr Rutskoi, 
parliament consistently blocked presidential initiatives.8 Hostility mounted between the two 
institutions until a deadlock was reached and Yeltsin forcibly acted to end the impasse by 
disbanding parliament in August 1993.
In the hopes of muting dissent, Yeltsin called for new parliamentary elections and the 
acceptance of a new presidential constitution. However, although parliament’s power was 
significantly reduced by the new 1993 constitution it was not turned into a pro-Yeltsin 
institution. After the December 1993 election it remained dominated by those who opposed 
Yeltsin’s radical reforms and the government’s early liberal westemist foreign policy.9 
Although the new electoral rules marginalized many of the most extremist groups, a 
fundamentalist nationalist foreign policy orientation was well represented by the Liberal 
Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) and the Communist Party (CPRF). In the 1995 
parliamentary elections, the LDPR did less well than in 1993, however the CPRF made great
gains and once again the pro-reform parties remained divided.
8 BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts. September 20, 1993, SU/1798/B.
9 Wendy Slater, “Russia: The Return o f Authoritarian Government?”, in Special Issue “1993: The Year in
Review”, RFE/RL Research Report. January 7,1994, pp.22-31.
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Therefore, because of the new political scene after 1993 and despite its 
comparatively weak powers, parliament began to play a more constructively critical role. The 
Yeltsin government’s move away from a liberal westemist foreign policy was encouraged by 
the success of the communists and nationalists which made it necessary for the government 
to adopt many of the ideas supported by its increasingly powerful opponents -  for example, 
the rhetoric of coming to the defence of Russia’s diaspora in the near abroad. The weak 
regime was forced to make concessions to the opposition -  especially symbolic ones. 
Moreover, there were political profits to be gained by adopting popular foreign policy 
rhetoric at a time when attempts to repair the economy were not producing the miracles that 
had been hoped for.
The conservative success in the December 1993 parliamentary elections also lent 
momentum to a loose consensus on social and political stability among reformist, centrist and 
even some conservative elements. One outcome was the signing of the Civic Accord in April 
1994. This pact outlined various areas of responsibility and power sharing, including a 
commitment by the President and parliament to stimulate integration of the CIS and an 
agreement that allowed the opportunity for political parties to participate in the creation of a 
national security concept.10 In other words, Yeltsin’s government adopted a more 
conciliatory position towards parliament and the government developed a working 
relationship with its parliamentary leadership. With Yeltsin reacting to the waning popular 
support for the liberals and the continued attacks by the communists and nationalists, the 
government incorporated new members and became more centrist. This situation continued 
until 1996.
10 Rossiskive Vesti. April 29, 1994, p.2
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2. The Evolution o f Debates and Policies Towards the CIS States
a) Stage One: The Atlanticist Period (August 1991-March 1992)
Upon independence in December 1991, Russia’s foreign policy orientation was 
characterized by a one-sided domination of liberal westemist ideas as evidenced in official 
government statements and policy output. The dominant ideas in the foreign policy debates 
envisaged Russia as a Western, capitalist-oriented, non-expansionist (in fact, pro-national 
self-determination) state in a peaceful world mled by the equality o f states and diplomacy. 
The government’s position reflected these ideas, as did its policies, which were focused 
primarily on developing close relations with the West, including military withdrawal, the 
acceptance of the defeat of communism and neglect of the former Soviet states.
Stage one was a very short period in which liberal westemist ideas were not yet 
seriously challenged either by events or other ways of thinking. The political opposition had 
not yet had time to organize, to develop its ideas, or transform them into popular, publicly 
articulated foreign policy positions. As for the “reformers” who held complete political 
power in government, they had little opportunity to institutionalise the liberal westemist 
ideas. In other words, no new foreign policy doctrine was developed and few substantial 
changes were made to the old Soviet foreign policy institutions to force them to implement 
new radical ideas or policies. As Russian academic Tatiana Parkhalina maintained, having 
good ideas that are then poorly realized has often been the case in Russian history. For 
example, Stalin’s official policies were based on such “good” ideas such as democracy, 
equality and law, and Gorbachev’s policies were based upon ideas about the rule of law, the 
need to protect the environment etc.11 Of course, the institutionalisation of liberal westemism 
might have been impossible given the fact that the newly independent Russia had only a 
skeletal foreign policy staff with limited powers and its leadership was preoccupied with the 
repercussions of the dramatic events of the fall of the USSR.
11 Author Interview with Tatiana Parkhalina (Deputy Director Institute o f Scientific Information for Social 
Sciences (INION)), May 24,1999.
92
i)) The Liberal Westemist View and the Government’s Liberal Westemist Foreign Policy 
Position
Even before the collapse of the Soviet Union, reformist politicians dominated the
Russian Republic’s government and espoused the Western-oriented, pro-market principles
first elaborated under Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev’s “New Thinking”. They
considered military power, geopolitical expansionism and empire building to be outmoded
amd costly. Instead, at the time it was generally believed that status and power would be
determined by economic efficiency, the effectiveness of the political system and the state’s
ability to adapt to technological progress. Many speeches and articles were written giving
credence to non-interventionist views (rooted in the democratic principles of international
relations) which could guide the development of Russia’s nascent foreign policy.
This ideological tone in foreign policy was reflective of the new domestic political
context. After the August coup attempt, Yeltsin supported policies which were even more
radically opposed to the old tenets of the Soviet state. This applied to the actions that Yeltsin
took to end the Soviet Union as well as his support for radical economic reform. The liberal
capitalist model was espoused by politicians such as acting Prime Minister (and later leader
o f “Russia’s Choice” party) Yegor Gaidar and Anatoly Chubais who conceived of Russia’s
10economic interests as being centred on the West. Politicians such as these urged Russians to 
abandon the old Soviet belief of a hostile West, to reject the idea of Russian moral and 
cultural superiority, and instead to join the new global economy and benefit from Western
• •  13investors and international financial institutions.
After the Soviet Union collapsed in December 1991, Foreign Minister Andrei 
Kozyrev, the principal architect of Russia’s new foreign policy, advocated Western 
humanitarian, non-expansionist ideas alongside a distinct focus on relations with the United 
States. The newly independent states were not considered an immediate priority, although 
Kozyrev proposed that Russia establish long-term military and economic integration through
12 See Gaidar and Chubais’ views in: Lyubov Tsukanova, Rossiiskive Vesti. November 14, 1992, p .l. Marina 
Shakina, Novove Vremva. no.33 (August 1993), pp. 12-15; Vasily Kononenko, Izvestiva. November 30, 1993, 
p.l; Ivan Zasursky and Igor Nekrasov, Nezavisimava Gazeta. October 21, 1993, p.2.
13 See Gaidar’s autobiography, Days o f Defeat and Victory (Seattle: University o f  Washington Press, 2000).
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the institutions of the CIS.14 Others, sympathetic to the liberal westemist orientation, agreed 
that the focus should be on the CIS but argued that it should be more of a temporary 
institution which would allow the peaceful disintegration of the former USSR. These general 
ideas were backed by the media, which was largely in the hands of reformers who promoted 
similar policies. Russia’s liberal newspapers would later unanimously agree that “A policy of 
good will serves our interests far better than a policy based upon force.”15
The argument was that Russia should shed its imperial mentality and instead 
concentrate on the domestic economic reforms necessary for the development of beneficial 
future relations in the post-Soviet region. Yeltsin himself explained that “Russia is no longer 
the main power centre of an enormous communist empire. Thoughts of painting the planet 
red have been discarded. We have rejected the notion that we are surrounded by covert or 
overt enemies and that the most important thing in the word is the struggle to win”.16 Instead, 
he argued that “The influence of imperial thinking is strong. But I think that after a little 
while we will all understand that a policy of goodwill serves our interests far better than a
1 7policy based on force”.
Both Kozyrev and Yeltsin also consistently referred to international norms (such as 
the protection of human rights) when discussing how to deal with the post-Soviet republics -  
especially in the Western arena. This dramatic reversal of traditional Soviet thinking, much 
of it expressed for Western approval and financial aid, meant that even NATO membership 
was entertained as a long-term Russian goal, and that the (then popular) proposal to unite the
1 ftSlavic states of Belarus and Ukraine was summarily dismissed.
ii) Early Pragmatic Nationalist and Fundamentalist Nationalist Views
In the last few months that the Soviet Union existed, many members of the political 
elite understandably called for various measures to preserve the Soviet state. For example,
14 Gennady Shipitko, Izvestiva. January 2, 1992, p.2.
15 See for example, Dmitry Furman, Nezavisimava Gazeta. July 3,1992, p.2.
16 Nikolai Burbyga (interview with Boris Yeltsin), Izvestiva. February 22,1992, p .l .
17 Ibid.
18 Diplomaticheskv Vestnik. no.l (January 15, 1992) p. 13.
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member of the Presidential Council Andrannik Migranyan, whose views later changed, 
called for the restoration of the Romanov dynasty within the borders of the old Russian 
Republic (RSFSR).19 Faced with an extremely weak central Soviet state, Aleksandr 
Prokhanov, a leader of “Russian Patriotic Movement” and editor of the newspaper Den’. 
called for the renewal of Russian nationalism and a strong state system based upon a united
90USSR. “We are now free to form our own ideology...” and must ... “ban interethnic 
squabbling” by means of force if necessary and “preserve the USSR”. “If the choice is
91between freedom and the idea of the state, then we will renounce personal freedom”.
However, in the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, most of the 
opposition to the new government remained silent -  with the exception of a small minority 
which dissented over Russia’s one-sided emphasis upon the West and the creation of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States. Criticisms were voiced over the aims of the CIS and 
the lack of mechanisms for coordinating its actions. “It is not the successor of the USSR...
99What is it then -  complete independence?”
Nevertheless, alternative ideas about the direction of Russian foreign policy were 
expressed, even though they were not actively debated and did not dominate the thinking of 
the key decision-makers. For example, one of the most prominent of the early critics, 
presidential advisor Sergei Stankevich, was already at this stage advocating pragmatic 
nationalist views. Stankevich argued for a “modified eurasianism entailing a balance of
9^
Western and Eastern orientations”. He wrote that Russia had an historic mission in unifying 
Orthodoxy and Islam24 and that Russian policy towards the CIS states should be based upon 
how Russians living in those states are treated. Sergei Baburin, later a proponent of 
fundamentalist nationalist views, criticized the abandonment of force which had earlier 
allowed the loss of Soviet power in Europe and even, he argued, led to the end of the Soviet
19 Andrannik Migranyan, Nezavisimava Gazeta. November 14, 1991, p.5.
20 O. Pshenichny, Interview with Prokhanov, Komsomolskava Pravda. September 3, 1991, p.4.
21 These were Prokhanov’s party goals in August 91 and were preserved after the disintegration o f the Soviet 
Union in December 1991. Nezavisimava Gazeta. August 15, 1991.
22 Anatoly Karpychev, Pravda. January 3, 1992, p .l.
23 Sergei Stankevich, Nezavisimava Gazeta. March 28 1992, p.4.
24 Sergei Stankevich, Nezavisimava Gazeta. March 28,1992, p.4.
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Union itself. Of course, Gorbachev’s failure to use force to maintain the Soviet Union’s 
territorial integrity was remarkable by historic standards and was the rationale behind 
Baburin’s (and others’) early support of a policy to use strength to re-unite Russia with the 
former Soviet states.
From early 1992, the Communist Party emphasized the importance to Russia of 
retaining close relations with the former Soviet republics and the need to keep the West and
9£international organizations from encroaching on Russia’s interests. Central Asia was 
perceived as the new centre of the “Islamic world” and Solzhenitsyn’s idea of creating a
• 97Slavic Union was criticized. The communists also attacked the government for lacking a 
clear policy direction in its relations with the Moslem world, and for losing out to Turkey and 
Iran in Central Asia. “Since Belovezhkskaya Pushcha, the East has become an even more 
delicate and important matter for Russia”.28
However, during this very short and chaotic period, alternative foreign policy views 
were unpopular and their advocates lacked sufficient access to power to have the new 
government take their views seriously into account. Communism had been discredited and 
the growth of the Russian nationalist movement impeded. This stunted the early widespread 
proliferation of these ideas. At first, the growth of the Russian nationalist movement was 
impeded because many of the ideas that could have served as the basis for building a mass 
Russian national movement had been used within the framework of communist rhetoric, and 
therefore were compromised. This applied, for example, to the promotion of ideas such as 
Russia’s messianic role with respect to the rest of the world, the need for a special, unique 
path of socialist development, criticism of individualism, promotion of collective forms of 
life and economic activity and hostility to the West.
Another factor impeding the growth of Russian nationalism was that under the Soviet 
Union much of what had been special and unique in Russian culture and spiritual life had
25 Author’s Interview with Sergei Baburin, May 21, 1999.
26 Yury Glukhov, Pravda. February 24, 1992.
27 Aleksandr Frolov, Sovetskava Rossiva. January 14, 1992, p.2.
28 R. Zaripov, Komsomolskava Pravda. May 20, 1992, p.l.The Belovezhkskaya Accords were written by the 
leaders o f the three Slavic republics (Russia, Ukraine and Belarus) at the Belovezhkskaya Pushcha nature 
reserve in western Belarus. They declared the end o f the Soviet Union and announced the formation o f the CIS.
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been banished from Russian philosophy, history and culture. Perhaps the most significant 
explanation of all for why nationalist ideas were not widely adopted was simply that the 
Russian Federation was multiethnic, so that society was fragmented in a way that created a 
key obstacle to the development of a strong Russian nationalist movement.
Thus, initially liberal westemism seemed to provide the only clear alternative or path 
in Russia’s whole-hearted rejection of its Soviet past. It was, moreover, widely believed that 
Russians should adopt the ideas and model of the prosperous Western states in order to 
become rich and successful. In contrast, the pragmatic nationalist idea that Russia’s own 
interests and conditions should determine policy had not yet gained popularity in the wave of 
popular euphoria which accompanied the end of the Soviet Union.
iiO Russian Foreign Policy Towards the CIS States
Foreign policy during this period developed broadly in accordance with liberal 
westemist ideas and, in fact, constituted a continuation and broadening of Gorbachev’s “New 
Thinking”. Foreign policy was primarily focused towards the West with wide political 
cooperation pursued in the United Nations’ Security Council as well as full participation in 
international economic institutions. Yeltsin, who had supported the independence movements 
in the former Soviet republics and played a key role in the disintegration of the Soviet state , 
was left with no real choice but to allow the new states to “live and let live”.
There was no historical precedent for a Russian foreign policy towards the other 
successor states and little knowledge about them on which to base foreign policy. For 
example, there was not yet even a section in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) to deal 
with the CIS states. According to the First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs during this 
period, Shelov-Kovedyaev, in January 1991 there were only approximately ten people
o 1
(including himself) working in the MFA in charge of the near abroad. Thus, no explicit,
29 “Press Conference by Yegor Gaidar”, Official Kremlin International News Broadcast. June 2, 1993. Also, 
Anatoly Chubais during Talk and Questions at Moscow Institute o f  Social and Political Studies, May 3, 1995. 
(Lexis-Nexis)
30 Yeltsin instigated and signed the Belovezhskaya agreement which ended the Soviet Union.
31 Aleksandr Gagua interview with Shelov-Kovedyaev in Nezavisimava Gazeta. July 30, 1992, pp.1,5.
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coherent policy was pursued; the sovereignty of the newly independent states was respected 
but that was all. Russia itself joined international organizations which promoted peace and 
human rights.
Yeltsin began his presidency by continuing the policy of strategic retreat which had 
marked the end of the Gorbachev era. He supported the continuation of troop withdrawals 
from Eastern Europe and agreed to early troop withdrawals from the Baltic states and 
Azerbaijan. The new Russian government clearly believed that Gorbachev’s policy of 
military retreat from Afghanistan and Eastern Europe was advantageous after the Soviet 
“mistake” of overextension. Yegor Gaidar encouraged this policy by showing that Russia 
lacked the finances to be actively involved in foreign states, and argued against the adoption 
of a burden which would cripple Russia’s own modernization process.34 Consequently, in 
early 1992, with policy concentrated in the “far abroad”, little effort was made to restore old 
Soviet ties in the CIS states and many of the former Soviet republics’ leaders legitimately felt
i  e
abandoned. Russia’s leaders believed that the new states did not need to be courted and 
because they would not be able to survive on their own or to resist the gravitational pull of 
Russia’s economic and military influence. It was believe that this would be complemented by 
the development of democracy and economic reforms in the near abroad which would 
promote Russia’s economic interests and guarantee the rights of ethnic Russians and 
Russian-speakers.
b) Stage Two: The Battle of Ideas and The Ascent of Pragmatic Nationalism (March 
1992-November 1993)
The second stage in the evolution of the debates over foreign policy lasted from the 
outbreak of the Moldova conflict in March 1992 to the adoption of the Military Doctrine in
32 Stanislav Kondrashov, Izvestiva. January 15, 1992, p.2.
33 Under Gorbachev, the Soviet military began to retreat from Afghanistan and Eastern Europe.
34 “Press Conference by Yegor Gaidar”, Official Kremlin International Broadcast. June 2, 1993. (Lexis-Nexis)
35 Russian academic Irina Zviagelskaya said that she personally has talked to many o f members o f the political 
elite in the CIS states who commonly expressed the view that Russia neglected their states and therefore forced 
them to seek new ties elsewhere. She went on to say that only when the CIS states are economically dependent 
upon Russia does Russia attempt to pursue close relations with them. Author’s Interview with Zviagelskaya, 
June 8, 1999.
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November 1993. The debates became increasingly complex and divisive as a wider and more 
developed range of alternative ideas was expressed. Liberal westemist ideas gradually lost 
their monopoly and pragmatic nationalist ideas became ascendant.
For convenience, we divide this stage in Russian foreign policy into four sections. 
The first part examines the debate about foreign policy in general and the shift in government 
position during the spring and summer of 1992 (during the outbreak of conflicts in the CIS). 
The second section focuses on the debates about concepts and the development of the 
government’s official positions (mid 1992-November 1993). Section three provides a brief 
examination of policies enacted in this period, while section four looks specifically at policy 
toward the CIS states.
i) The Debates over Foreign Policy
By mid 1992, liberal westemist views were already beginning to lose their monopoly 
in political debates. The government’s former position that Russia should rapidly integrate 
into European/Atlantic political and economic values was being widely and severely 
questioned. Partly in order to distinguish themselves from each other, the members of the 
Russian political elite began to actively articulate distinct ideas about what Russia's role 
ought to be and grand strategies about how to achieve it. In April and May 1992 at the Sixth 
Congress of People’s Deputies the political opposition loudly attacked Yeltsin’s government 
over a whole range of issues. Almost unanimously, they rejected the one-sided Westemist 
foreign policy and proposed various measures to strengthen Russia’s position and forge 
relations in other directions. They adopted pragmatic nationalist ideas including those 
explored in Chapter Three - eurasianism, the “Russian idea”, “Russia as a Great Power”, a 
Russian linguistic national identity (in theory if not practice), and a pragmatic definition of 
Russian national interests. These ideas were developed, adopted or manipulated by 
politicians in order to legitimise their policies. This led to a broad consensus over the 
direction of Russian foreign policy, if not the means by which it could be pursued.
36 “Verbatim report o f April 6, 1992, Sixth Congress o f Russian People's Deputies”, in Rossivskava Gazeta. April 
8,1992, pp.3-6.
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The concepts of “national revival” and “Russia’s uniqueness” were repeatedly 
introduced into the political debate by deputies in the Russian parliament and parliamentary 
committees. Advocates of these ideas included disillusioned "democrats", former communists 
(who now advocated nationalism instead of a return of the Communist Party) and members of 
the military-industrial complex. The ideas provided a strong basis from which to attack Yeltsin 
and Kozyrev’s supposed “democratic” departure in Russian foreign policy.
The eruption of conflicts in the CIS states in the spring of 1992 focused discussions 
on Russia’s near abroad. Sergei Karaganov, Deputy Director of the Institute of Europe at the 
Russian Academy of Sciences, Chair of the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy and a 
prominent early exponent of pragmatic nationalism, argued that conflicts within Russia’s 
southern neighbours were Russia’s greatest threat. The country’s survival, he said, 
depended firstly upon stability in the south and only then upon a (limited) partnership with 
the West. Karaganov termed his alternative to the liberal westemist approach an “enlightened 
post-imperial integrationist course”. The liberal westemist orientation, in contrast, held that 
Russia should focus on relations with the West and then stability in the CIS would follow. Of 
course, in proposing liberal democracy and market reforms which would take Russia’s 
specific conditions into account, the pragmatic nationalists (similar to the fundamentalist 
nationalists) did not need to court the West as much as the liberal westemists did (either for 
aid or markets for Russian goods). They could afford to be less enthusiastic about the West 
and to concentrate instead on Russia’s more immediate neighbours. Pragmatic nationalists 
also did not believe that the liberal westemists’ more radical economic policy was viable.
By the spring of 1992, the standard pragmatic nationalist orientation was commonly 
being used to criticize the government. Deputy Yevgeny Ambartsumov, member of parliament 
and Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Committee on International Affairs and Foreign Economic 
Relations, succinctly expressed the general discontent with government policies: "We have a 
right to expect greater firmness from our foreign minister when defending Russia's interests in
37 Sergei Karaganov, Nezavisimava Gazeta. August 19, 1992, p.2.
38 Press Conference with Vladimir Lukin, Chairman o f  the Foreign Relations Committee o f the State Duma, 
Official Kremlin International News Broadcast. July 8, 1994.
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the CIS countries and the interests of Russians who have become foreigners against their will". 
Ambartsumov argued that Russia must base its foreign policy on a doctrine that declares the 
geopolitical space of the former Soviet Union to be a sphere of vital interests. Moreover, 
"Russia must also strive to secure from the international community the role of political and 
military guarantor of stability throughout the territory of the former USSR".40 Similarly, another 
vocal proponent of “pragmatic nationalist” views, Andrannik Migranyan, proposed that Russia 
establish a “natural sphere of influence” over the near abroad 41
Perhaps the most influential member of the political elite, due to his position as 
presidential adviser, was Sergei Stankevich who continued to introduce eurasianist ideas (the 
belief that Russia has a “special” place as a bridge between East and West) into the foreign 
policy debate.42 Stankevich argued that Russia must develop a sense of a mission while 
abandoning the messianism of the past. He specifically advocated the reconciliation of 
Orthodoxy with Islam and the development of Russian policy in the near abroad states based 
upon the treatment of their Russian minorities in those states.43
In July 1992, the Russian parliament conducted a heated three-day debate in which 
the MFA was criticized for not protecting the Russian diaspora in the near abroad, and 
discussions began over whether to create a separate ministry of CIS.44 Many in the political 
opposition were worried that in the absence of a concrete policy, Russian military units in the 
CIS states were being left without guidance and also (more controversially) warned that the 
spread of Islamic fundamentalism in the south would be unchecked. Ruslan Khasbulatov, 
Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, proposed the transformation of the CIS into a new “Euro- 
Asian Union” to bring the CIS states closer together.45
39 Vitaliy Buzuev (interview with Ambartsumov), Rossivskava Gazeta. April 13,1992, p.2.
40 Yevgeny Ambartsumov, Izvestiva. August 8,1992.
41 Andrannik Migranyan, Rossivskava Gazeta. August 4, 1992.
42 Sergei Stankevich, Nezavisimava Gazeta. March 28, 1992, p.4.
43 Ibid.
44 Author’s Interview with Anatoly Adamishin (Deputy Foreign Minister) June 9, 1999. Also Leszek 
Buszynski, “Russia and the West: Towards Renewed Geopolitical Rivalry?”, Survival, vol.37, no.3 (Autumn 
1995), pp. 104-126, p. 107.
45 “The consequences o f  the break-up o f  a single state, single economic and political space and a single human 
community, regardless o f  the causes, are tragic. The scale o f this catastrophe is enormous, from breaking the 
lives o f  millions o f peoples to upsetting the geopolitical balance o f forces in the world to a critically dangerous
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The fundamentalist nationalists, meanwhile, provided colour, rhetoric and often 
unrealistic policy proposals to “save Russia”. For example, extreme-right fascist group 
Russian National Unity (RNU) headed by Alexander Barkashov (which was created in 
September 1990 but did not have representation in parliament) argued that Russia must save 
civilization -  prevent the disintegration of Russia, unite under one ideology built on historical 
realities and develop a rigid organisation of the strongest and most active Russians. Another 
political party, the Russian Party led by Nikolai Bondareek also argued for an ethnic Russia 
state. Dimitry Vasiliev and the organisation Pamyat (begun in the 1980s and which lost out to 
other nationalist organisations in the 1990s but continued to hold demonstrations) argued for 
the recreation of the Russian Empire and for ethnic Russians to rule a Slavic nation.46
Between March 1992 and November 1993, many members of the political elite with 
liberal westemist ideas abandoned them and adopted more nuanced and moderately 
nationalist views.47 Pragmatic nationalist views, which were popular and more balanced than 
fundamentalist nationalist ideas, began to proliferate. They provided pragmatic direction (if 
not solutions) for dealing with Russia’s shifting external and internal realities.
Of course, many of the key ideas advocated by liberal westemists since 1991 (such as 
support for state sovereignty, equality of nations, human rights, international law and 
multilateral negotiations) were shared by pragmatic nationalists and became firmly accepted 
principles (if not always practices) in Russian foreign policy. However, Kozyrev’s team had 
had little time or opportunity to fully develop or institutionalise its original liberal westemist 
foreign policy agenda, and was unable to delineate an explicit definition of Russian national 
interests 48 With the end of the Soviet Union, the democrats had lost the enemy whose defeat
degree”. Ruslan Khasbulatov on Ostankino Channel 1 TV, September 17, 1993 as reported by BBC Summary 
o f  World Broadcasts. September 20,1993, SU/1798/B.
46 Alexander Barkashov, “Krizis mirovoi tsivilizatsii, rol Rossii i zadachi russkogo natsionalnogo dvizhenia” 
(The Crisis o f World Civilization, the Role o f Russia and the Russia National Movement), Russ kii Porvadok. 
no.1-2 (1995), pp.1,2.
47 This point is also made in Neil Malcolm et al., Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy -(Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1996).
48 In 1991 and 1992 Yeltsin failed to call parliamentary elections or to adopt a new constitution. This was a 
missed opportunity to build institutional support for his liberal ideas -  both domestically and in terms o f foreign 
policy. The absence o f  an agreed-upon legal framework to balance relations between the executive and the 
legislature led to a struggle for power which provoked the October 1993 confrontation between the president
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had been their chief rallying point and they did not manage to replace it. Unlike the various 
nationalist and communist groups, they failed to develop their own visions or myths which 
promised to alleviate the psychological and economic pain now prevalent across the country. 
Of course, those democrats in power were the architects of the strategies which caused the 
pain, and therefore myth-making was not easy for them. The liberal economic policy, 
strongly supported by the West, had failed to achieve its proclaimed goals in spite of its 
enormous expense to the population. Adhering to Western principles had devastated people’s 
lives, and Russia in many respects had become a Western dependency. The Russian 
government’s critics could plausibly have argued that the break-up of the USSR (and 
Yeltsin’s government) was partly responsible for the situation because it had destroyed a 
previously single “market” and integrated economic system.
There was also an increasing aversion at this time among the political elite to 
“universal values” and norms and to the requirements of international law.49 An anti-western 
mood surfaced among the public, and growing economic and social problems made the 
Russian leadership vulnerable to more aggressive tendencies in the parliament, military and 
security institutions. The fact that Russia’s new foreign policy and the current economic 
hardships were associated with Yeltsin’s government greatly discredited the liberal 
westemist orientation which -  especially after Yeltsin’s use of force against parliament in 
1993 -  also became associated with the loss of national power. The reformists had assumed 
that there would be an immediate and significant improvement of Russian living standards 
upon which they could capitalize.50 Instead, they faced an economic catastrophe.
It must be emphasized that this was a very short period of extraordinarily turbulent 
changes. The foreign policy debate had barely begun, the ideas were underdeveloped and 
untested, and thus it is even questionable how far Kozyrev himself had been prepared to 
embrace and act upon the early liberal westemist orientation. Meanwhile the liberal
and the parliament.
49 Author’s Interview with Grigory Yavlinsky, June 20, 1995. Also see Alexei Arbatov, “Russia’s New Role in 
World Politics”, New Times. November 1995. Arbatov was a State Duma member from Yabloko and an 
academic at the Institute o f World Economy and International Relations.
50 Stanislav Kondrashov, Izvestiva. January 15, 1992, p.2.
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westemist belief that democracy and markets would become easily rooted within the newly 
independent states was proved wrong. Also, trends towards military, economic and civil 
disintegration within the FSU continued.
ii) The Formation of the Foreign Policy Concent and the Military Doctrine
By mid-1992, the foreign policy debate centred on creating guidelines for Russian 
foreign policy. This conceptual debate led to various new proposals and eventually to the 
government’s 1993 adoption of the Foreign Policy Concept and the Military Doctrine.51 At 
this time, government documents provided only vague, defensive guidelines for Russian 
foreign and security policy. The major multilateral document, the 15 May 1992 Tashkent 
agreement on collective security, was significant in that it legalized Russian military 
presence within many CIS states and authorized the joint use of military force to repel
c'y
aggression. It was basically a defensive document, as was the 1992 law “On Defence” 
which declared Russia’s mission to be the repulsion of external aggression.54 Together with 
the more assertive 1993 documents examined below, they signalled the beginning of a new 
pragmatic nationalist policy and the institutionalisation of a more balanced foreign policy 
orientation taking into account Russia’s interests at the time.55 Whether or not actual foreign 
policy output followed these guidelines will be clarified below.
51 Another way to judge the shift in official foreign policy is to examine Yeltsin’s annual State o f Nation 
messages to the Russian parliament.
52 The original members were Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. In 1993, 
Azerbaijan, Moldova and Turkmenistan joined. The CIS Collective Security treaty did not enter into force until 
April 20 1994. On April 2, 1999, 6 countries (Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan, Russia and Tajikistan) 
signed a protocol to extend the treaty for another 5 years. Ivan Novikov, “Duma ratifies CIS Collective Security 
Treaty Protocol”, Itar Tass. November 5, 1999.
53 See Andrei Zagorsky analysis o f the Tashkent Treaty in “Regional structures o f security policy within the 
CIS”, in Roy Allison and Christoph Bluth (eds.), Security Dilemmas in Russia and Eurasia (London: RIIA, 
1998), pp.281-300
54 The text o f the law “On Defence” was published in Rossivskava Gazeta. October 9, 1992, p . l . This law was 
not replaced until mid 1996. (The 1996 law moved most o f the powers o f the defence o f the republic out o f the 
hands o f the parliament and into those o f the president) In 1992, a law “ On Security” was also passed. It 
vaguely outlined the official definition o f key interests as “the sum total o f necessities, the fulfilment o f which 
reliably secures the existence o f and the opportunities for a progressive development o f an individual person, o f  
the society and of the state”. See Rossivskava Gazeta. May 6,1992, p .l.
55 At the time, Russia did not even have a peacekeeping law. Even when one was acquired in June 1995, it only 
provided a general framework for the provision o f personnel for such operations. The bill on “he procedure for 
provision o f military and civilian personnel o f the Russian Federation for participation in operations to maintain
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From mid 1992 to mid 1993, members of the Russian political and foreign policy 
elite debated and drafted three main foreign policy Concepts -  one of which became official. 
The draft Concepts all attempted to broadly delineate Russia’s new interests within its post- 
1991 geopolitical and strategic situation. They were all premised on the rejection of former 
communist ideological goals and gave priority to domestic concerns (political, social and 
economic) over external goals. With priority firmly placed upon domestic development, the 
preservation of the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation was deemed essential. The 
abandonment of the old Soviet quest to be a global superpower meant that Russia’s most 
vital security interests were now widely understood to be stability, peace and the 
development of close relations with her neighbours and historical subjects -  in other words, 
the former Soviet states. Simply because the USSR had been a land empire, any disturbances 
or chaos in its former “colonies” would be a very serious threat.
During the debate, a wide-ranging consensus developed that Russia should have a 
strategic role in the near abroad states and that this role should be both officially 
acknowledged and encouraged. The first institution to officially propose this strategy was the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). In response to severe criticism for its earlier supposed 
lack of policy, the MFA issued a draft document in early 1992 outlining its “Concept of 
Foreign Policy”. Deputy Foreign Minister, Fyodor Shelov-Kovedyaev, one of the first to 
place priority on the issue of security on Russian borders and regional conflicts in the CIS, 
argued against the use of the “power approach”. Instead, he supported the maintenance of the 
status quo and advocated gradual and consistent diplomatic actions towards the CIS states.56 
This draft was then shuffled between the MFA and parliament’s foreign affairs committee, 
whose head Yevgeny Ambartsumov, along with his advisor Andrannik Migranyan, argued 
that the whole post-Soviet area should be included in Russia’s sphere of vital interests. The
or restore international peace and security and other peacekeeping activities” was only approved by the Federal 
Assembly and signed into law in June 1995. Sobranie Zakonodatelstva Rossivskoi Federatsii. no.26 (June 26, 
1995). When passed, the bill provided the general framework to allow “military and civilian personnel o f  the 
Russian Federation for participation in operations to maintain or restore international peace and security and 
other peacekeeping activities”.
56 “Shelov-Kovedyaev Comments on Policy Criticism”, Interview by Aleksandr Gagua, Nezavisimava Gazeta. 
July 30,1992, pp. 1,5.
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Concept, described below, was finally approved by parliament in October 1992, and was 
published in January 1993 but was never officially adopted.57
The final version of the MFA draft Concept was nevertheless the first concrete sign of 
a shift from the original official liberal westemist policy. It outlined various dimensions of 
Russia’s foreign and security policy but focused primarily on cooperation and integration 
with the CIS states. It stated that Russia should aim to develop relations on a bilateral level as 
the precondition for the emergence of a credible multilateral structure. Russia’s most 
important foreign policy tasks vis a vis the CIS states were listed as the need to curtail and 
regulate armed conflicts around Russia, to prevent them from spreading to Russian territory, 
and to protect the human and minority rights of Russians and the Russian-speaking 
population in the near abroad. The Concept also recognized the use of force as legitimate in 
“extreme cases”.58
The MFA draft Concept was strongly influenced by another Concept, which was 
being proposed at the same time by a group of members of the political, academic and 
military elite, headed by Sergei Karaganov. This Council of Foreign and Defence Policy 
included Karaganov, Vladimir Lukin (Russian Ambassador in Washington in 1992; 1993 co- 
Chair of Yabloko, and Chairman of the Foreign Policy Commission of the first Duma), 
Sergei Stankevich, Konstantin Zatulin (Chairman of Duma CIS Affairs Committee), Grigory 
Yavlinsky and Yevgeny Ambartsumov. Their “Strategy for Russia” Concept also stated that 
Russia’s main priority should be to preserve its territorial integrity, focus on the near abroad 
states and maintain the potential use of force.59
Meanwhile, Yeltsin gave up on waiting for the MFA and the parliament to come to an 
agreement concerning the MFA draft Concept. Instead, he turned to the more hard-line 
Russian Security Council. It produced its own version, “Basic Principles of a Foreign Policy
57 See Nezavisimava Gazeta , October 21, 1992 for a description o f the original Foreign Policy Concept. The 
final product was published in Diplomaticheskv Vestnik (an official publication o f the MFA) as a special 
supplement in January 1993.
58 Ibid.
59 This Concept was outlined in August 1992 by the Council on Foreign and Defence but was not adopted. The 
Council on Foreign and Defence Policy drafted the “Strategy for Russia” which was published in “Strategiya 
dlya Rossii”, Nezavisimava Gazeta. 19 August, 1992.
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Concept of the Russian Federation”.60 In April 1993, under the coordination of Yury Skokov 
(then the head of the Security Council), the Interdepartmental Foreign Policy Commission, a 
committee made up of representatives of the main foreign policy institutions, drafted the 
document. The members included Deputy Ambartsumov, Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev 
and Defence Minster Pavel Grachev. Not only were the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Ministry of Defence represented, but also in attendance were the intelligence services, 
defence council and parliamentary committees on foreign affairs, foreign economic relations, 
and defence and security. It was this Russian Security Council’s draft Concept which was 
finally endorsed by this wide range of experts and President Yeltsin.61
Compared to previous proposals, the Security Council’s Concept was explicit in 
terms of stating the means by which Russia would protect itself from potential threats. These 
threats included attempts to destroy the integrity of Russia, disintegration among CIS states, 
violation of human rights and freedoms of Russian-speakers, and military conflicts in 
neighbouring states. The proposed means to protect Russia from these threats included the 
creation of a collective system o f defence, the strengthening of the external borders of the 
CIS, the maintenance of Russia’s military bases in the CIS states, the creation of an integral 
system of military security, and the ability to retain Russia’s unique status as the sole nuclear 
power in the region. The document also clearly emphasized in a somewhat assertive language 
that Russia would remain a great power because of its ability to influence international
ff) •relations. The foreign policy results, as shall be seen, however, were only somewhat 
reflective of these proposed strategies.
Russia’s Military Doctrine was similar to the Foreign Policy Concept, and also drafted 
by the Security Council. It was not adopted until November 1993 -  even though Russia’s armed 
forces had been created in May 1992. The Military Doctrine, too, was written in a somewhat 
assertive tone portraying Russia as an emerging great power facing multiple threats and with a
60 A summary o f the draft (Osnovnve polozhenia kontzeptzii vneshnei politiki Rossiiskov Federatzii) was 
written by Vladislav Chernov, Nezavisimava Gazeta. April 29, 1993, pp. 1,3. (Chernov is head of the 
department for strategic security at the Russian Security Council).
61 Overview by Olga Lazebnikova, “The West and the Debates in the Political and Academic Circles o f Russia 
on its Foreign Policy in Europe”, Reports o f the Institute o f Europe, no. 16 (Moscow 1995).
62 O f course, rhetoric aside, Russia was a great power only in nuclear terms.
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special emphasis upon the importance of maintaining a sphere of influence in the former Soviet 
states (as opposed to the former emphasis on the West).
The Military Doctrine asserted Russia’s right to intervene in the CIS -  while stressing 
that this should only be done in accordance with appropriate international documents and on 
the basis of mutual agreement. Oleg Lobov, Secretary of the Russian Security Council 
explained that after the Security Council began to work on the Military Doctrine in April 
1993 “events in Moldova, Tajikistan and Georgia” ... “necessitated certain modifications in
fkXthe doctrine”. The final draft allowed for the legal use of armed forces in peacekeeping 
operations within the former Soviet republics and recognized that force was legitimate if 
used in response to the “suppression of the rights, freedoms and legitimate interests of 
Russian-speaking citizens in foreign states”.64 Moreover, under the new doctrine, Russian 
forces could be deployed outside the country to safeguard the security of either the Russian 
Federation or any of the other former Soviet republics. Thus, the doctrine indicated the desire 
to maintain a strong offensive capability given the fact that the borders between Russia and 
its highly unstable neighbouring former Soviet states were highly permeable. In 1994, 
Defence Minister Pavel Grachev confirmed this when he stated that the Russian military’s 
foremost task was to carry out peacekeeping operations.65
The new doctrine listed the main military threats to the Russian Federation and 
provided guidance for the use of force to counter those threats. The primary threats were seen 
as coming from existing and potential local wars and armed conflicts in other post-Soviet 
states, especially those in immediate proximity to the Russian Federation. The other threats 
included the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the oppression of Russian citizens 
abroad, separatist (i.e. non-Russian) nationalism within Russia, and the enlargement of 
military blocs and alliances which impinged upon Russian security interests. The latter were 
not specified and thus left open to interpretation. The formal draft also proposed the creation
63 See Vasily Kononenko’s interview with Oleg Lobov (Secretary o f the Russian Security Council) in Izvestiya, 
November 4,1993, pp. 1-2.
64A description o f this document was published in Rossiskive Vesti. November 18, 1993. See Charles J. Dick, 
“The Military Doctrine o f the Russian Federation”, Journal o f Slavic Military Studies, vol.7, no.3 (September
1994), pp.481-506.
65 Pavel Grachev, Nezavisimava Gazeta. June 9, 1994, pp.l, 5.
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of Russian mobile and peacekeeping forces rather than the maintenance of a large-scale 
standing forces.
When it was first adopted, the 1993 Military Doctrine was generally viewed as highly 
aggressive because it potentially justified future military dominance over the CIS states. 
However, in fact, rather than setting a new plan of action, the doctrine formally legitimised 
and justified the role that the Russian armed forces had already played in the former Soviet 
region while implying that the government would continue to support such actions. Over 
time, many Russian politicians and academics have come to understand the doctrine more as 
a political statement than a concrete set of guidelines for the Russian military.66 In interviews 
with the author, Russian academics Dimitry Trenin and Andrei Zagorsky maintained that 
foreign policy Concepts are always strictly theoretical and have no application. Irina 
Zviagelskaya also stated that the Concepts had no actual impact but were important steps 
towards defining Russia’s national interests. In other words, since context and threats 
continually change, it is not surprising that the official articulation of a Concept often does 
not keep up.67
Officially, however, the military assigned great significance to the Military Doctrine. 
According to Russian Col. Rimarchuk, for example, “the 1993 Military Doctrine was crucial 
to military policy. We followed its provisions explicitly. The military never acts and never 
has acted on its own”. A contrasting, and likely more realistic, appraisal from the military 
was that the doctrine’s premises were false and that the consequences were extremely 
negative for Russia. Col. General Andrei Nikolaev (Head of Russia’s Border Guards) told the 
author in an interview that the
66 Sergei Karaganov, “New Military Doctrine Guarantees Russian Security”, RIA Novostia. February 21, 2000. 
At the time of the first doctrine in 1993, Izvestiya’s military commentator Victor Litovkin wrote that the 
doctrine was “devoid o f declarative political statements”. Izvestiva. November 3, 1993, pp. 1-2.
67 Tatiana Parkhalina, for example, argued in 1999 that “Today Russia is defined in geopolitical terms and 
should be defined in socio-economic dimensions first”. This shows, however, that she does believe the 
articulation o f a concept to be important. Author’s Interviews with Trenin, Zagorsky, Zviagelskaya and 
Parkhalina: May 24, May 25, May 28, June 8, 1999.
68 Col. Rimarchuk also denied that there have been any independent initiatives by the Russian army in the CIS 
states. Author’s Interview with Rimarchuk, June 2, 1999.
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... consequences of the 1993 Military Doctrine so far are that 
Russia’s military powers have decreased by ten times from the 
Soviet period while the level of security threats have by no 
means decreased, but maybe increased. The war doctrine was 
built on false premises such as ‘peaceloving NATO’ and the 
absence of enemies of Russia.69
In other words, retrospectively, the doctrine was perceived as not being sufficiently realistic
about Russia’s role in the world because it was based on key liberal westemist ideas which
were unrealistically optimistic.
Despite controversies over the effect of the Military Doctrine, from its inception it
was envisaged as a developing document and its significance here lies in its indication of a
shift away from dominance of liberal westemist views. Subsequent to its adoption, the
doctrine was cited by politicians in debates about what to do in the CIS and to justify
Russia’s use of force to maintain control both within its borders (in Chechnya) and in the
FSU. The case-study chapters address the question of how great the gap was between the
conceptual framework and Russia’s military actions.
iii) The Abandonment of the Government’s Early Liberal Westemist Foreign Policy Position
Foreign Minister Kozyrev signalled a shift in foreign policy intentions in October 
1992 when he was forced to defend his ministry's policies in a speech to the Russian 
Supreme Soviet.70 While continuing to oppose the adoption of what he termed a one-sided 
eurasianist foreign policy in the speech, he agreed with his opponents that Russia should 
focus on the near abroad and develop a "peacekeeping" role in the former Soviet republics. 
Kozyrev emphasized that Russia did not have the moral right to remain indifferent to 
requests for help and advocated force in special circumstances. "Unless we find the political 
will and real resources -  troops and hardware, to put it bluntly -  for peacekeeping in the
71former Soviet zone, this vacuum will be filled by others...". Moreover, he argued (in 
contrast to earlier statements) that this was a reasonable policy since Russian troops were
69 Author’s Interview with Col. Gen. Andrei Nikolaev, June 8, 1999.
70 Address by Andrei Kozyrev Before the Russian Supreme Soviet, Russian Television Network. October 22, 
1992.
71 Andrei Kozyrev on Russia's Peacekeeping Role in the CIS, Nezavisimava Gazeta. September 1993, p .l.
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already stationed in the near abroad, and since Russia was already being drawn into these 
conflicts.72
The point to be emphasized here is that Kozyrev now openly interpreted the use of 
military force in the near abroad as a positive strategy. It is also possible that Kozyrev moved 
towards this “harder” position for pragmatic reasons and to maintain close relations with 
Yeltsin. In an interview with the author, Duma deputy Konstantin Borovoi reasoned that 
Kozyrev tried but failed to make Yeltsin’s position “softer, more realistic”. Thus, “Kozyrev’s 
increasingly hard-line position was not his own real position but was based on his wish to
• • 7*3 t
have influence over Yeltsin’s policy in the future”. This is an interesting conjecture, but this 
thesis, however, is concerned only with Kozyrev’s publicly stated views and not with 
discerning his private or “real intentions”.
Under pressure from sections of the political elite and aware that it had few options, 
the government adopted pragmatic nationalist ideas. These ideas suggested responses (at 
least rhetorically) to problems emerging from the developing military conflicts: they included 
the reality of the 25 million Russian-speaking diaspora; the difficulty of Russian military 
withdrawal from the former Soviet republics; economic dependency in the region; the 
dangers and consequences of the lack of frontier controls; and political instability in the 
region. The government was under pressure to take urgent action to centralise policy because 
local Russian commanders were making their own policy to deal with the conflicts. Yeltsin 
and the MFA therefore advocated the defence of Russian interests in the former Soviet Union 
in order to outline Russia’s interests and acknowledge the need to reassert Russian primacy 
in the area.74
The emerging conflicts in the CIS states demonstrated that the government’s early 
policy of strategic retreat from the near abroad was not as simple or logical as had first been 
surmised. When stranded Russian troops came under fire, it became obvious that a more defined 
and realistic policy had to be outlined by the government. The half-hearted adoption of liberal
72 Ibid.
73 Author’s Interview with Borovoi, May 21, 1999. Other Russian scholars and Duma deputies are sceptical 
over whether Kozyrev’s early liberal westemist intentions were genuine.
74“Speech by Yuri Yarov”, Official Kremlin International News Broadcast. December 11, 1992. (Lexis-Nexis)
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westemist principles was not useful. It was not surprising therefore that new and more 
pragmatic foreign policy ideas which took Russia’s specific interests into account were adopted. 
Pragmatic nationalist and fundamentalist nationalist policy positions were validated by the 
continual development of conflicts along Russia’s periphery - problems which the liberal 
westemists had neglected. These new government ideas paralleled those of the Russian military
* j c
commanders who did not subscribe to a policy of disengagement. The result was that the 
pragmatic nationalist foreign policy orientation was institutionalised in the adoption of the 
Foreign Policy Concept and Military Doctrine as described above.
iv) Russian Foreign Policy Towards the CIS States
While members of the elite debated the contents of the Russian foreign policy 
concept and military doctrine, Russian foreign policy output generally developed without 
structured guidelines. The government had verbally begun to adopt the pragmatic nationalist 
orientation but its policies were being carried out in a piecemeal and ad hoc fashion. 
Seemingly paradoxical policies were adopted, some of which made Russia’s separation from 
the former Soviet states official, while others reasserted Russian interests in the region. This 
was reflective of the general confusion in foreign policy thinking, the uncertainty about 
external events, and the fact that much of the policy was being carried out “on the ground” by 
Russian military commanders. The specific policies and ad hoc nature of policy-making also 
reflected the fact that Russia had divergent interests in different regions of the former Soviet 
Union -  interests which had not yet even been defined. However, the general policy contours 
were broadly in line with the prescriptions of pragmatic nationalism that had been made 
official in the April 1993 Foreign Policy Concept. The Military Doctrine was not signed until 
November 1993 -  the end of this stage -  and thus its results could not yet be perceived.
The policies which signalled Russia’s retreat from empire included Yeltsin’s May 1992 
decree to create the armed forces of the Russian Federation, establish a Russian Defence 
Ministry and the National Security Council, and the abandonment of policies to establish
75 Author’s Interview with Col. General Andrei Nikolaev (Commander o f the Border Troops and Deputy 
Minister o f Security) June 8, 1999.
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collective CIS armed forces. The CIS collective security agreement was signed in May 1992, 
but Russia’s attempt to develop a form of collective security in the CIS was blocked by the 
diverging interests of its members -  which helps to explain the growing support over the period 
for Russia’s new Military Doctrine. Another multilateral initiative, to retain a ruble zone among 
some of the CIS states, was abandoned in 1993. Thus, the Russian leadership was not willing to 
pay the price of reintegration -  even when in principle the preservation of a common currency 
made considerable sense.
c) Stage Three: Achieving Consensus (November 1993 - June 1996)
i) Foreign Policy Debates
The third stage in Russian foreign policy, from the adoption of the November 1993 
Military Doctrine to the June 1996 Presidential elections, was characterised by the almost 
complete disappearance of liberal westemist ideas from the foreign policy debates and the 
(now not as widespread or influential) continuation of fundamentalist nationalist ideas. 
Nostalgia for the past and yearning for great power status were exploited by members of the 
elite across the political spectrum. At this stage, the previously general and then conceptual 
debate became increasingly concerned with the more practical and specific issues arising 
from Russia’s involvement in the near abroad.
During this period, the few remaining liberal westemizers abandoned their one-sided 
emphasis on relations with the West. Instead, they called for long-term voluntary re-integration 
with particular CIS states, increased involvement in settling CIS conflicts, and were generally 
more openly nostalgic about the end of the Soviet Union. For example, Duma deputy, Mikhail 
Mitiokov from Democratic Choice of Russia, argued for integration in the CIS which “must be 
the result of natural economic and political integration. I like General De Gaulle’s idea of a
76 “Press Conference given by Vice Premier Alexander Shokhin, on developments in the CIS”, Official Kremlin 
International News Broadcast December 21, 1993. Yevgeny Yasin explained the government’s position: “if  the 
republics introduce national currencies, this will help to restore cooperation more quickly. Such an arrangement 
for the CIS financial space would be a better idea than attempts to preserve both the ruble zone and economic 
stability in Russia”. Interview by Marina Shakina, Novove Vremva. no.33, August 1993, pp. 12-15.
113
77Single Europe”. Even Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin admitted to feeling nostalgic for 
the USSR and expressed hope that the Union would be resurrected on the basis of “normal,
70
civilized, market principles” but “without encroaching on anyone else’s sovereignty”. Anatoly 
Chubais, too, backed up this sentiment arguing that reintegration with some of the former Soviet
70states “should proceed voluntarily but the costs for Russia will be considerable”. Similarly, 
Gavril Popov, former mayor for Moscow and leader of the political organization “Russia’s 
Movement for Democratic Reforms” stated that “The division of the republics of the FSU is a 
temporary situation, a temporary internal division. We must stop subsidizing the other states 
where Russian minorities are oppressed”.
According to one of the few remaining “extreme Westemizers”, Russian academic 
Tatiana Parkhalina, by mid-1993 all political groups agreed that Russia had special interests 
in the near abroad but each defined them in a unique way. The only consensus was that 
Russia should maintain both the ability to influence the CIS political elite and the ability of
o 1
Russian economic and industrial groups to “manipulate” resources in the FSU. There also 
seems to have been a consensus in terms of military practice in that it was agreed that 
“special interests” meant the right to deploy or maintain troops and to use force when
89necessary in any part of the CIS considered necessary to Russian interests.
However near the end of this period, in early 1996, some liberal westemist ideas were 
again at the forefront of the political debate. For example, there was a gradual acceptance of 
a civic definition of Russia, and also of a geographical definition of Russia as the Russian 
Federation. Support for isolationism and the abandonment of force were frequently 
vocalized. However, anti-western rhetoric was still strong and foreign policy debate
77 Author’s Interview with Mikhail Mitiokov, former professor o f law and at the time member o f Democratic 
Choice o f Russia (Gaidar’s party) and head o f the constitutional assembly, June 28, 1995.
78 Viktor Chernomyrdin quoted in Vladimir Abarinov, Segodnva. May 30, 1995, p.3.
79 Author’s Interview with Anatoly Chubais, July 11, 1995. Chubais discussed the problem o f non-payments o f  
debts from the former republics and the proposal to use inter-republic credits and strict controls over exports 
from CIS countries and shipments from Russia as leverage in dealing with this problem. Ivan Zasursky and Igor 
Nekrasov, Nezavisimava Gazeta. October 21, 1993, p.2.
80 Author’s Interview with Gavril Popov, July 15, 1995.
81 Author’s Interview with Tatiana Parkhalina, May 24,1999.
82Aleksandr Krylovich and Georgiy Shemelev, "Andrei Kozyrev Addresses Russian Ambassadors to CIS 
states", Itar-Tass. January 20, 1994.
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continued to centre on the near abroad. The government position reflected these ideas and 
aimed to define and limit Russian interests in the CIS, to solve conflicts on her borders and to 
follow a unique pro-Russia policy in a multipolar world.
Extreme fundamentalist nationalist ideas continued to exist in this stage, but they were 
generally less strident and not as commonly expressed. Several political groups, including the 
Communist Party and the Liberal Democratic Party, whose views were outlined in Chapter 
Three, continued to state that Russia should, and eventually would, re-unite with the “artificial 
and generally ungrateful” former Soviet states and thereby secure Russia’s deserved status as a 
great power. They argued that force was necessary in order to protect Russian interests, that 
their view was validated by the conflicts in the CIS states, and they also continued to blame the 
West for all of Russia’s problems (as did many other politicians by this stage).
Communist Duma deputy Mikhail Astafiyev’s comments were typical of the extreme 
(and implausible) fundamentalist nationalist views: “The Russian people were divided and their 
country disintegrated. Therefore they have the right to re-unite like Germany. Our position is 
first to re-unite all ethnic Russians, then other countries can join voluntarily. We believe in 
peaceful coexistence with other countries but also in the need to protect the historical rights of 
Russia”. Astafiyev shared the commonly held view that Russia was being unjustly treated and 
that its “help” was not being reciprocated: “Those states who do not join us should not be 
protected by our military bases. They can join a military alliance with NATO instead”. 
Astafiyev’s boss, Aleksandr Rutskoi, blamed the West for not “helping Russia in its quest for 
peace” and argued that “The hesitation of the UN to take peacemaking action in the areas of the 
FSU shows that it is not ready for the mandate. This is a cruel lesson for Russia.”84
During these years, several other fundamentalist nationalist political organizations, with 
very little or no political power but active in the political debate over foreign policy, also called 
for the re-creation of some type of “Union”. For example, the “All-Army Officers Assembly”
83 Mikhail Grigoriyevich Astafiyev was then Rutskoi’s deputy in change o f international relations and foreign 
policy. He was a member o f “All Russia’s Right Center” which was part o f the “Motherland Political 
Movement” and one o f the founders o f the movement joining the left and right opposition force (the Red Brown 
alliance). Author’s Interview with Astafiyev, June 25, 1995.
84 Alexandr Rutskoi also emphasized the increase o f terrorism, import and export o f weapons, illegal trade and 
its implication on foreign policy. Author’s Interview with Rutskoi, June 28, 1995.
115
held meetings for 400 officers (from Army circles as well as the Federal Counterintelligence 
Service and the Ministry for Internal Affairs) to fight Yeltsin’s “anti-popular regime” which 
“brought down the great power and is now breaking down the Armed Forces and the military- 
industrial complex”. It claimed to support “Great-power patriotic education” and “social 
protection”, with a maximalist goal of the revival of the Soviet Union.85 These organizations 
participated vigorously in public debates but their following had greatly diminished and their 
influence on policy was negligible.
A general isolationist mood also crept into the debate across the entire political 
spectrum as the costs and difficulties of Russia’s involvement in the CIS states were 
seriously calculated. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, increasingly vocal during these years, 
advocated complete military withdrawal from the Transcaucasus and Central Asia. His ideas 
typified one version of nationalist isolationist thinking. “The Muslim world is growing. This 
will be the great phenomenon of the 21st century. We must not meddle with it”. However, he 
went on to advocate the creation of a “single state alliance” with the Slavic states of Belarus, 
Ukraine and Kazakhstan: “ ...our supreme and paramount goal is to preserve our people... to 
preserve their physical existence, their culture and their territory”. In terms of the 
Ukrainians and Belarussians, Solzhenitsyn wrote, “We are kindred peoples that should be 
together”. “As for Kazakhstan, on no account must we flee. In Kazakhstan, Kazakhs make up
07
barely 40% of the population. The other 60% are non Kazakhs”.
Similarly, military opinion, though divided, became increasingly wary of increasing
00
Russian commitments in the CIS States. To quote Russia’s First Deputy Chief of Staff, Col.
85 Participating in the founding o f the All-Army Assembly were Aleksandr Sterligov, leader o f the Russian 
National Assembly; Pyotr Romanov, Deputy to the Council o f the Federation and Viktor Ilyukhin, head o f  the 
Duma’s defence committee. Lt. Colonel Stanislav Terekhov was vice chairman of the newly created 
organization. Viktor Khamrayev, Segodnva. February 21, 1995, p.3.
86 Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, “Give the People Power”, Pravda. November 2, 1995 (an article promoting local 
self- government as the solution to Russia’s problems), pp.l, 4. See also Alexandr Solzhenitsyn, Translated by 
Yermolai Solzhenitsyn, The Russian Question in the Late 20th Century (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux,
1995).
87 Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, “Give the People Power”, Ibid.
88 See Pavel Baev’s analysis Russian military thinking in Baev, “Russian Military Thinking and the Near 
Abroad”, Jane’s Intelligence Review, vol. 6, no. 12 (December 1994), pp.531-533. See also Andreas 
Heinemann-Grueder, “The Russian Military and the Crisis o f the State”, Aussenpolitik. vol.45, no.l (1994), 
pp.79-89.
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General Boris Pyankov “We are certainly not prepared to unite our armed forces today -  that 
would mean to scare the world and our present NATO partners”. He also berated the other 
CIS states for not sharing the peacekeeping burden. “The fact is that we aren’t trampling
O Qanyone under our boots, but mainly putting Russian heads in the line of fire....”. He called 
the Staff for Coordinating Military Cooperation Among the Commonwealth States an 
“institution of hope” of becoming the centre of a new politico-military bloc, perhaps parallel 
to NATO.90
Meanwhile, once the pragmatic nationalist ideas had become more influential, their 
earlier centrist proponents began to slightly change their tone. Many now emphasized their 
reservations and warnings about the costs of pursuing unification or developing closer 
involvement with the post-Soviet states -  although all the while continuing to advocate 
Russian commitment to peace in the region. Russian academic and foreign policy expert 
Aleksei Arbatov, for example, warned that an imperial idealism was replacing the pro- 
Western idealism and the communist idealism of the past. He interpreted this trend as 
dangerous and argued that Russian troops should be withdrawn from areas where mutual 
interests did not exist.91 He and Vladimir Lukin, Chairman of State Duma’s Committee on 
International Affairs, agreed that these interests lay in the prevention of conflicts and border 
protection (because of narcotics, arms dealing, and poorly paid border guards) both in
Q 9Central Asia and the Transcaucasus.
Pragmatic nationalist Andrannik Migranyan blamed Yeltsin’s pursuit of a market- 
based economy as the main objective factor hindering post-Soviet unification because he 
believed that integration would put those reforms at risk. He warned that it was dangerous to 
refuse “our neighbours’ desire for unification” because it will strengthen the position of 
extremist political groups in Russia.93 In Migranyan’s 1994 report “Russia and the near
89 Boris Pyankov, First Deputy Chief o f Staff, “Military Cooperation From the Viewpoint o f the Coordinating 
Staff”, Nezavisimava Gazeta. June 4, 1995, p.3.
90 Ibid.
91 Aleksei Arbatov, “Imperial Infantilism and Russia’s National Interests”, Nezavisimava Gazeta. June 24, 
1995, pp. 1-2.
92 Mikhail Karopov interview with Vladimir Lukin, Nezavisimava Gazeta. March 14, 1995, pp. 1-2.
93 Andrannik Migranyan, “Who is Getting Aside Integration”, Moskovskive novosti. no.30 (July 24-31, 1995) 
p.5.
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abroad”94 he credited himself with having developed the main idea in the 1993 Foreign 
Policy Concept -  that Russia’s vital interests are located in the former republics of the Soviet 
Union. He also argued that Russian intervention to secure its special interests in the region -  
by military means if necessary -  should be legitimised.
A pragmatic nationalist political group which influenced the debate, if not the actual 
policy, was led by Arkady Volsky (a founder of the club “Forum for New Accord”) and united 
moderate communists and socialist parties from all the former Soviet republics. In June 1995, at 
a Forum meeting they argued that it was time to stop talking about “clever ideas” and to put 
them into action. Volsky suggested that Russian abandon the phrase “former Soviet Union” and 
speak only of the “future Union”.95 Unsuccessfully, the Forum argued for the creation of a 
“Eurasian Community” and appealed for nation-wide referendums on the subject. Forum 
member Nikolai Ryzhkov favoured the creation of an administrative structure which could 
organize and unite the supporters of the new community.96
Generally, however, pragmatic nationalists now advocated policies based on a
07“moderate national idea and isolationism”. Russia’s borders were typically accepted as 
those of the Russian Federation although differences in visions still existed. Vitaly 
Tretyakov, editor-in-chief of Nezavisimava Gazeta. for example, continued to argue as late 
as 1996 that “It is obvious to me that the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union and present-day
QO
Russia are one and the same... For me this signifies one state”.
During these years another of the key ideas of the pragmatic nationalist orientation, 
the defence of the Russian and Russian-speaking diasporas, became widely accepted in
94 Andrannik Migranyan, “Russia and the Near Abroad” Nezavisimava Gazeta. January 12, and January 18, 
1994. Yevgeny Ambartsumov, Chair o f the International Affairs Committee, also claimed responsibility for the 
same ideas.
95 Other members o f the club included Nikolai Ryzhkov and Igor Smirnov “Eurasianism: Arkady Volsky 
Proposes that the Former USSR Be Considered the Future One”, Segodnva. June 21,1995, p.2.
96 Ibid. Later Volsky came to lead a coalition which favoured an independent Russian policy to preserve the 
industrial potential o f the state and the international influence of Russia as a great power. Arkady Volsky headed 
the All-Russian Renewal Union, which represented industrial interests in the Civic Union. It exercised considerable 
influence until the spring o f 1993. In the spring o f 1995 Volsky helped to establish the United Industrial Party
97 Dmitry Baluev, “Moderation in the National Idea”, International Affairs. Moscow, vol.42, no.5/6 (1996), 
pp. 103-115.
8 Tretyakov in a roundtable discussion “Growing Support for New Foreign Policy in Russia”, International 
Affairs. Moscow, vol. 42, no. 5/6 (1996), pp. 15-31, p. 26
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rhetoric if not practice. The Congress of Russian Communities (KRO), for example, was 
formed in order to protect the rights of, and to reinforce ties with, the Russian-speaking 
diasporas in the CIS. KRO was established by Dmitry Rogozin in 1993 and then led by Yury 
Skokov. Besides their vocal defence of the diasporas, the Congress’s concrete actions 
consisted of applying political influence. For example, on 18 May 1995, the KRO 
successfully sent an appeal to Kazakhstan’s President Nursultan Nazarbayev in defence of 
Boris Suprunyuk, head of Northern Kazakhstan’s Russian community who was arrested in 
what they called a “policy of genocide against the non-Kazakhs and of general disdain for 
human rights”. 99 Outside the Congress, various means were debated about how the Russian 
government could provide various forms of aid for Russian-speakers wishing to return to 
Russia. Aleksei Arbatov, for example, proposed a state-sponsored re-immigration program 
for Russian-speakers. The expense, he argued, was certain to be great but it was absolutely 
necessary. According to him, such a program would immediately reduce tensions both in the 
attitudes of Russian-speakers abroad and in Russia’s relations with its neighbouring states. 
Arbatov argued that the Russian military presence could not solve this problem but “by 
demonstrating that concern for Russian-speakers is a genuine motive for Russia’s policy, not 
a pretext to exert pressure and interfere, Moscow would have the right to call to account the 
regimes that violate their rights. For that purpose, there are international organizations, 
political and economic sanctions, and a wide array of instruments of international law”. 100
The widespread expression of various means to protect the diaspora succeeded in 
changing the rhetoric of the debate and contributed to an increasingly assertive foreign policy 
tone and political context. This developed on the basis of an increasing media focus that 
raised general awareness about the geopolitical reality of a 25 million plus diaspora, whose 
rights in several incidents were being challenged. The Russian political elite used this reality 
to develop and attempt to popularise the perception or myth that these Russian communities 
longed to secede and to return to their “homeland”. Although this issue of abandoned
99 Viktor Khamrayev, “For now, Kazakhstan Political Prisoner is Free”, Segodnya. May 31, 1995, p.2.
100 Aleksei Arbatov, “Imperial Infantilism and Russia’s National Interests”, Nezavisimava Gazeta. June 24, 
1995, pp. 1-2.
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brethren failed to spawn concrete policies or policy outcomes it did influence a more 
assertive foreign policy thinking.101
ii) The Russian Government’s Foreign Policy Position
After the adoption of the Foreign Policy Concept and Military Doctrine in mid-1993, 
Foreign Minister Kozyrev attempted to give credit to the government by introducing the 
term “Yeltsin’s Doctrine” to describe what he now called Russia’s “special” security interests
I
in the near abroad. In a speech in 1994, Kozyrev claimed that the “states of the CIS and 
Baltics constitute the area of concentration of Russia’s vital interests. This is also the area 
from which the main threats to these interests emanate... I think that raising the question 
about complete withdrawal and removal of any Russian military presence in the countries of 
the near abroad is just an extreme, if not extremist, suggestion comparable to the idea of 
sending (Russian) tanks to all the former republics to establish there some imperial 
order...”.103 The government’s commitment to force as a realistic option to secure goals also 
seemed to be strengthened by Yeltsin’s decision in mid-1993 to use the military in his stand 
off with the parliament and later in the Chechen war of 1994-96. In terms of the issue of the 
protection of the Russian diaspora, generally government documents ignored this specific 
issue. The government position was that Russia had the right to protect Russians abroad but 
the basic premise was that the diasporas should be integrated into their countries of 
residence.
In 1995, Kozyrev adopted his opponents’ language and pragmatic nationalist ideas to 
criticize the State Duma for failing to pass a law on peacekeeping operations.104 Later,
101 Neil Melvin and Charles King (eds.), Nations Abroad. Diaspora Politics and International Relations in the 
Former Soviet Union (Oxford: Westview Press, 1998); Neil Melvin, Russians Beyond Russia: The Politics o f  
National Identity (London: RJIA, 1995).
102 Izvestiva. March 4 1993, p.4. Also see V. Portnikov, “Andrei Kozyrev defines priorities”, Nezavisimava 
Gazeta. February 23,1994, p.4.
103 Kozyrev’s 1994 speech to the CIS and Baltic ambassadors. In A. Pushkov, “Kozyrev has started the game at 
the alien field”, Moskovskive Novosti. no.4., January 23-30, 1994, p. A 13.
104Andrei Kozyrev's speech to the summer meeting o f the Russian Foreign Policy Council was titled "Ways to 
Further Integration in the CIS and Russian Interests", in "Russian Interests in the CIS", International Affairs. 
Moscow, vol.40, no.5 (October 11, 1994), pp. 11-30, p. 15.
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speaking to the Federation Council, he forcefully emphasized that Russia had no imperial
ambitions but hoped to “gather together the former Soviet republics.” He asked politicians to
support Russia’s peacekeeping actions and the establishment of military bases. He also said
that Russia is “making every effort to combat the drive for some CIS states to join NATO.105
At the time, the official Russian attitude towards NATO was becoming increasingly negative.
NATO was accused of being wedded to the “stereotypes of bloc thinking” and Russia was
indecisive about the extent to which it would participate in the Partnership for Peace (PFP) 
106program.
When asked to explain the shift in his position, Kozyrev said that he was conducting 
the “President’s policy” and it was evolving along the “general line”.107 As he himself 
explained, “That line is hardening and becoming tougher and less flexible -  and with it, so is
10RKozyrev”. This statement is significant because it clearly shows that Kozyrev 
acknowledged that his policy position was changing because of a shift in the political 
debate.109
Yevgeny Primakov, then the Director of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (FIS), 
admitted that Russia’s foreign policy had “undergone a change in the direction of a more 
independent course that assigns primary importance to its own vitally important national 
interests.” He emphasized that these changes in policy should not be interpreted as a 
“challenge to the United States”. However, he recognized the “vitally irreversible” 
sovereignty o f the new states and denied that Russia was using economic and other 
advantages to “lay its hands on” them.110 He cited favourable economic realities as conducive 
to the creation of a common economic space in the CIS. These included the former
105 Yelena Tregubova, “Andrei Kozyrev: Russia has no Imperial Ambitions but...”, Segodnva. July 7, 1995, 
p.l.
106 Russia had signed the Partnership Framework Document on 22 June 1994 but delayed in signing the 
associated Individual Partnership Programme. Andrei Kozyrev, “A Strategy for Partnership”, International 
Affairs, vol.40, no.l (July 5, 1994), pp. 1-11.
107 Leonid Velekhov, Segodnva. April 3, 1995, p.3.
108 Ibid.
109 Krasnaya Zvezda. April 15, 1995, p.2.
1,0 Primakov presented a non-classified report “Russia and the CIS: Does the West’s Position Need 
Adjustment?” at the MFA press center. It was published in Rossivskava Gazeta. September 22, 1995, pp. 1,6.
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cooperation in production and technological spheres, the need for reciprocal trade, the lack of 
foreign financial and industrial capital due to high instability and commercial risk, the 
worldwide tendency to expand economic integration (e.g. NAFTA or European Union) and 
finally, the need to lessen inter-state tensions with regard to the 25 million Russian 
diaspora.111
Primakov argued that the geopolitical realities of the region (including the increase in 
number of states possessing or capable of possessing nuclear weapons) were impelling the 
CIS states to create a common defence space to ensure their security. “The conflict zone 
embracing central Europe and part of the “periphery” of the former USSR is expanding”.112 
Primakov maintained that the causes of these conflicts were: the CIS states border highly- 
armed states; the desire of Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey to extend their influence into the 
region; “Islamic extremism” and finally, the conflict situations result in “disproportionate 
reactions”.
Yeltsin was worried about the decrease in trade with the CIS states. In 1995, in a 
speech to the parliament, he noted that “At present, the CIS countries account for only 20 
percent of Russia’s total foreign trade turnover, as against 56 percent in 1991. The 
Commonwealth states’ growing insolvency with respect to Russia, especially when it comes
i 17
to paying for energy deliveries, is cause for concern”.
In May 1996, the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy published a paper on 
Russia’s relations with die CIS states which reaffirmed Russia’s strategic priority to be first, 
domestic stability and second, the near abroad.114 The official search to define Russia and its 
interests based on pragmatic nationalist ideas continued even after Yeltsin’s re-election in 
June 1996 with his officially sponsored campaign to search for a new “Russian national idea”
1 1 c
which could encourage the development of state patriotism.
111 Ibid.
112 Ibid.
113 Yeltsin’s message to the Federal Assembly, Rossiskive Vesti. February 17, 1995, pp.l, 3-7.
114 Sergei Karaganov and Vitaly Tretiakov, Nezavisimava Gazeta. May 23, 1996.
115 Rossivskava Gazeta. July 30, 1996. This paper sponsored a search for a new “Russian national idea”. 
However previously it also had printed many articles about Russia’s historic search for this same “national 
idea”. See for example, September 10, 1993, p.3.
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The newly re-elected Yeltsin brought with him a new government of young reformers 
primarily concerned with solving Russia’s economic problems. As a consequence of these 
new priorities, Russia’s foreign policy became more pragmatic -  for example in its search for 
political as opposed to military solutions for CIS conflicts. In 1996, the appointment of 
Primakov as Russia’s new Foreign Minister seemed to have both reflected and encouraged 
the consolidation of the foreign policy consensus among the political elite. After Primakov’s 
appointment, Russian interests were confidently acknowledged to be tied to its security, 
economic and psychological relations with the FSU. Primakov consistently argued that 
Russia was the dominant state in the region and that therefore Russia must be acknowledged 
as a necessary partner for political, economic and military activity in Eurasia.116
The worldview expounded (if not actually believed) by the new Russian government 
was that of an unstable, multi-polar world with Russia being America’s equal partner. 
Government officials defined Russia’s objective foreign policy interests as -  a need to 
develop close relations with the CIS states seen as vital to Russian interests; to promote 
peace in the region; to continue to develop relations with the US; and to create new links in 
Asia and the Middle East. Apparently, Primakov argued, in a closed Duma session on foreign 
policy in 1996, that the West would respect Russia only if it developed its own separate 
position on foreign policy issues -  otherwise, he claimed, the West would not pay 
attention.117
iii) Russian Foreign Policy Towards the CIS States
Russian foreign policies toward the CIS states during the period from late 1993 to 
1996 paralleled the general conceptual shift in the foreign policy guidelines of 1993. 
Although the government’s statements were often much more aggressive than its actual 
decisions, policies generally followed the contours of pragmatic nationalism. Russia actively 
attempted to consolidate its status as regional “great power”. Interests were defined 
geopolitically; the military was used to safeguard Russia’s integrity and keep peace in the
116 Yevgeny Primakov, Izvestiva. March 6, 1996, p.3.
117 Author’s Interview with Borovoi, May 29, 1999.
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CIS; and steps were taken to discourage CIS disintegration (even though few successful 
actions were taken to increase integration). There were also attempts to develop the policies 
proposed in the Military Doctrine of 1993, though not all were successful. Russian troops 
continued to patrol the borders of the CIS (although their numbers were not increased); 
military bases were maintained; and Russia retained its unique status of sole nuclear power in
• i  i  o
the region. Unsuccessful efforts were made to create a collective system of defence.
In spite of these policy initiatives, there was no single, comprehensive or coherent 
policy towards the near abroad as a whole over this three-year period, and Russian policies 
varied by region and issue.119 The result was a foreign policy of “selective engagement”. 
Over these years, the increasingly isolationist mood of the political elite and public, and the 
growing awareness that Russia lacked adequate resources, spawned policies which, in many 
cases, were calculated to avoid costly commitments. Thus, despite policy statements claiming 
that CIS military and economic integration and diaspora protection would be vigorously 
pursued, they had limited results. The one area where Russia did forcefully pursue its
1 90interests was in military involvement in former Soviet republics conflicts. However, as 
will be seen in the thesis case-studies, the results were mixed.
During this period, Russia was keen to reassure the successor states that it had broken 
with its older, imperial traditions. However, the government also came to view the CIS as an 
institutional structure that could secure Russia’s interests in the former Soviet space. Yeltsin
191called for increased integration. Several policies to that effect were signed. Russia initiated 
the development of the CIS Economic Union, promoted military co-operation through the 
CIS Collective Security Treaty, and in 1994 for the first time created a Ministry for Co­
operation with the CIS States. However, Russia’s attempts to develop the CIS into a coherent
118 For an excellent overview o f Russia’s foreign policies see: Margot Light, “Post-Soviet Russian Foreign 
Policy: The First Decade”, in Archie Brown (ed.), Contemporary Russian Politics: A Reader (Oxford: OUP, 
2001), pp.419-428.
1,9 The Transcaucasus, for example, were seen as a foothold in an area o f  strategic importance whereas the 
Central Asian states (except for Tajikistan) were deemed to be less strategically important. These distinctions 
will be seen in the following case study chapters.
120 Russia’s peacekeeping role in Moldova, Georgia and Abkhazia is examined at great length in Dov Lynch, 
Russian Peacekeeping Strategies in the CIS (London: Macmillan Press and RIIA, 2000).
121 Yeltsin’s speech to the Federal Assembly, Rossivskive Vesti. February 17,1995, pp.1,3-5.
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and viable multilateral organisation, which could regulate the relations in the former Soviet 
space around a Russian centre, largely failed. CIS integration was hampered by many 
circumstances: a differentiated membership in which each state signed various agreements; 
the lack of any enforcement mechanism; and the sensitivities of the states concerning any 
action that might infringe upon their national sovereignty.
By mid-1994, CIS membership had increased to encompass all the former Soviet 
republics except the Baltic states. There was, however, no consensus with respect to its form
1 99or powers. On the other hand, bilateral links increased and bilateralism allowed Russia to 
pursue a differentiated approach to the CIS states based on Russia’s interests and the interests 
of each specific state.
The theoretical concepts of 1993 identified peace in the CIS states as one of Russia’s 
greatest interests. Russian policies adhered to this principle as Russia was politically and 
militarily involved in helping the CIS states where conflicts arose. However, Russia 
withdrew from the Baltic states where there were no conflicts. Russian troops left Lithuania 
in September 1993, and Latvia and Estonia by the end of August 1994. Russian policies 
during this stage also continued to be oriented towards preserving friendly relations with the
tWest (which is consistent with pragmatic nationalist ideas).
Throughout the period, Russian actions to protect the Russian-speaking diasporas in 
CIS countries were less aggressive than its rhetoric. No concrete actions were taken towards 
those regions that held the largest percentages of Russian-speakers: the Baltic states, northern
122 In January 1993, a CIS Charter was adopted which set out the basic aims o f  the CIS and outlined the basic 
mechanisms o f interaction. After that, attempts at political and economic integration were taken, but with 
varying levels o f success. For example, in May 1993 the CIS Heads o f State set up a CIS Executive Secretariat 
and CIS Coordinating Consultative Committee. There were also various CIS councils which met regularly. In 
September 1993, nine CIS members signed a treaty to create an Economic Union and in October 1994 an 
Interstate Economic Commission was created to oversee the creation o f  the Economic Union. In January 1995, 
Belarus, Russia and Kazakhstan signed an agreement to create a customs union. Kyrgystan joined in 1996. See 
Mark Webber, The International Politics o f Russia and the Successor States. (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1996).
123 For example, Russia acted to prevent the proliferation o f the Soviet Union’s huge arsenal o f nuclear 
weapons. In January 1994, it signed the Trilateral Agreement allowing the transfer o f Ukrainian strategic 
warheads to Russia and thus opened the way to the ratification and implementation o f the severe cuts in 
strategic nuclear weapons that would begin in the START II Agreement. Cuts were also made in the size o f  the 
Russian armed forces. Rossivskive Vesti. May 19, 1993, p.7.
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Kazakhstan and the Crimea. There was general political pressure (and threats of stronger 
tactics) to give special treatment to the Russian-speaking diasporas, but the only concrete 
results were that Turkmenistan granted its tiny Russia population the right to dual citizenship, 
and Kyrgystan and Kazakhstan made Russian the official language of the state. Similarly, 
despite the rhetoric and declarations about re-imposing Russian control over the Black Sea 
Fleet in the Crimea, no action was taken. In fact, the Russian government neither encouraged 
nor helped the Russian diaspora of Crimean separatists in Ukraine -  even though the loss of 
this territory was the most bitter of the many it endured in 1991.
In terms of economic integration, a proliferation of bilateral policies was put in place 
outside the framework of the CIS. Across the entire region Russia’s trade with CIS states 
declined in the years immediately after the break up of the USSR, however exports to the 
CIS states slowly began to increase after 1994. In 1994, Russia’s exported $14.5 billion to 
the CIS states which rose to 17.6 billion in 1996. Russia’s trade with the far abroad also 
continued to grow -  from $53 billion in 1994 to $71 billion in 1996.124 Some analysts have 
argued that Russia’s finance and economic ministers were responsible for the decline in 
economic relations with the near abroad because of their continuous interventions. Henry 
Hale, for example, argued that Russian ministers were not prepared to give the subsidies 
necessary for reintegration. “Indeed they have operated from behind the scenes to stymie 
every major Russian effort to reunify the near abroad”.
Nevertheless, despite inconsistencies and failures, and despite the differences among 
its issue and area-specific policies, Russia did develop a kind of sphere of influence 
throughout the former Soviet Union. The most pro-Moscow of these states was Belarus, and 
the two states signed an agreement on monetary union in April 1994 -  although it was not 
put into place at this stage. Ukraine, on the other hand, continually frustrated Russian 
aspirations to create a Slavic core within the FSU, and refused to help develop or join a
,24“Russia in Figures”, Handbook (Moscow: State Committee o f the Russian Federation on Statistics 
(Goskomstat)), 1999. (www.gks.ru)
125 Henry E. Hale, “The Rise o f Russian Anti-Imperialism”, Orbis. vol.43, no.l {Winter 1999), pp.l 11-126, 
p . l13.
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security system. Other CIS states were also reluctant to share any financial or peacekeeping 
burdens.126
When Primakov became Foreign Minister in 1996, Russian foreign policy became 
increasingly centred on pragmatic concerns such as oil and financial interests. Many policies 
were initiated which seemed to signal further attempts to use the multilateral CIS to develop 
Russian re-integration in the near abroad. Collective security was once more at the top of the 
agenda, and in January, at the CIS Heads of State summit, plans for a united air defence 
system were approved as well as rules for dealing with conflicts in the CIS. In October 1996, 
the Council of CIS Foreign Ministers agreed to draft documents protecting CIS external 
borders that had failed to pass at the Council of CIS Heads of State in February 1995.127 Then 
in April 1996, a bilateral agreement was signed between Russia and Belarus creating a 
Community of Sovereign States. The success of these particular policies was unknown by the 
end of the period under study. However, on the whole, Russia’s policies followed broad 
pragmatic nationalist lines even though specific outputs were varied.
3, Conclusions
The evolution from liberal westemism to pragmatic nationalism between 1991 and 
1996 needs to be understood in the context of Yeltsin's struggles first with Gorbachev and 
then with parliament. During these years, pragmatic nationalist ideas became influential 
because they were adopted by key elements within the foreign policy making institutions 
such as parliament, the MFA, the MoD and the military.
Our examination of the evolution of the Russian political debate and foreign policy 
towards the CIS shows that by 1993 the articulated foreign policy views of members of the 
political elite were converging as a result of the widespread adoption of similar pragmatic 
nationalist ideas. Pragmatic nationalism acted as a "road map" to help frame or structure 
foreign policy options. From 1991 to 1996, the narrowing of stated views towards a
126 Col. Gennady Miranovich, Krasnaya Zvezda. July 20, 1995, p .l.
127 Sergei Parkomenko and Natalya Gorodetskaya, Segodnya. February 11, 1995, p .l.
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geopolitical emphasis upon traditional ties and close relations with the near abroad and the 
endorsement of the use of military force if necessary to protect Russian interests led to a 
narrowing range of acceptable policy choices. Consequently members of the political elite 
began to advocate similar foreign policies. The government responded to this broad 
consensus over foreign policy principles (which was in line with changes in Russia's internal 
and external context) by outlining a new Foreign policy Concept and Military Doctrine. The 
formal adoption of these principles represented a conceptual shift in foreign policy thinking. 
While there had been no official or coherent overall policy towards the CIS states, 
government policies towards the near abroad began to be designed to retain Russian 
influence in the region.
Nevertheless, despite agreement on broad principles, vigorous disputes remained in 
terms of specific policy options and how those positions should be translated into action. The 
consensus was over ends not means. Moreover, the actual policy outputs did not always 
reflect the government’s positions. Thus, Russian foreign policy was more consistent in its 
overall conceptual framework or ideas than it was in its specific economic, military and 
political policies -  which is typical of most states.
In summary, this chapter has shown which foreign policy ideas were being discussed 
during the period 1991-1996 and which ones were incorporated into policy. Three key stages 
were identified in which the general debate and policy orientations shifted. In the Atlanticist 
Period (August 1991-March 1992) debate and policy was characterized by the domination of 
liberal westemist ideas. Alternatives for action were seen in stark black and white terms, with 
foreign policy framed as either having to follow the old Soviet ways or to copy the West. In 
the second period (March 1992-November 1993) multiple ideas were entertained with 
pragmatic nationalism becoming more prominent in the foreign policy debate. By the end of 
this period, pragmatic nationalist ideas were institutionalised in the Foreign Policy Concept 
and Military Doctrine which together provided a broad and flexible framework for actual 
policy.
128
It must be emphasized that the Foreign Policy Concept and the Military Doctrine 
were officially adopted after Russia’ s military involvement in the conflicts had already 
begun. However, as was made clear above, a broad consensus over the main terms, such as 
the use of military force to keep peace in the FSU, was achieved well before the official 
adoption of these ideas. Thus debate and the policies influenced each other and were 
mutually reinforcing. Both moreover predated the official articulation of the government 
position. Retrospectively, it seems that the early liberal westemist foreign policy orientation 
was dropped by the spring of 1992 both because of the domestic political context (political 
elite debate and pressure, wounds to the national psyche, failure of economic reforms etc) 
and because it was failing to provide a direction for appropriate policies.
During the third period, (November 1993-June 1996), debate and government rhetoric 
were dominated by pragmatic nationalism while the policy output was mixed. Members of 
the political elite continued to agree that Russia should remain involved in its "natural sphere 
of influence", the near abroad, and that doing so would help Russia secure its role as a "great 
power". However, these views were also tempered by isolationist thinking and warnings 
about the negative consequences and costs should Russia become aggressively involved in a 
search for dominance in the CIS states. Scepticism about the use of military force in conflicts 
was also widely aired. Policies were developed which fit both the consensus of ideas and the 
broader external context. However, although the near abroad was widely proclaimed to be an 
area of great importance, different visions of Russia's territory remained and disagreements
1 OScontinued. In analyst Ilya Prizel's term, a state of "continued paralysis" developed. Despite 
the apparent consensus on the foreign and military policy guidelines adopted in 1993, the 
questions of what Russia is, and what its specific policies should be, had not been settled. 
Perhaps as significant, was the elite recognition of a gap between self-image and reality - in 
other words between Russia's past role as a great power and its present powerlessness.
During this period, government officials stated that special interests in the CIS states 
were to be pursued -  using military force if necessary -  especially to end conflicts and
128 Ilya Prizel, National Identity and Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) p.299.
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defend the rights of Russians in the near abroad. Official policy statements announced that 
Russia would retain or even increase its military bases abroad and would defend the external 
borders of the CIS. However, actual policy output continued to be mixed and specific policy 
outputs did not always follow the new guidelines. Once again what Russia did not do was at 
least as important as what it did. Nevertheless, very generally, the broad contours of foreign 
policy continued to follow pragmatic nationalist prescriptions. Policies were focused upon 
particular interests in the near abroad, and specific actions and their success varied depending 
on the particular case.
Foreign policy throughout the three stages was not based on a unifying idea like 
socialism, but rather on how the political elite conceived Russia and its role in the world, the 
actions of a government seeking political legitimacy, and external events in international 
relations, particularly in the near abroad. Pragmatic nationalist ideas affected foreign policy 
choices in the domestic political process by creating conceptual "road maps" which helped to 
dictate foreign policy and through their institutionalisation in government statements, official 
doctrine, and sometimes action. We now turn to our three case-studies to find out whether in 
these three key areas of the near abroad there was a similar relationship between ideas and 
policy that would confirm the importance of studying ideas and debate as one of the 
important factors in understanding foreign policy. The case studies examine whether or not 
the debates and policies about Russia’s political and military involvement in these specific 
conflicts in the near abroad followed the same general contours and were dominated by the 
same foreign policy orientations as debates and policies over foreign policy in general as 
seen in this chapter.
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C hapter Five: The R ussian Political D ebates C oncerning R ussian Political 
and M ilitary Involvem ent in the M oldova-Transdniestria C onflict
Moldova’s separatist war with its Transdniestria region was the first conflict in the 
former Soviet space in which Russia became militarily active. The Moldova-Transdniestria 
war began in March 1992, and Russia played a leading role in the dispute from its inception 
through the cease-fire in July 1992 and on to the search for a final political settlement in 
1996. This chapter examines the evolution of the Russian political debates concerning 
Russia’s policy towards the Moldova-Transdniestria conflict. Very broadly, the debates over 
specific policy followed the same general contours as the debates over foreign policy as a 
whole. Shifts in the general thinking about foreign policy influenced Russia’s policy towards 
the conflict and, vice versa, the development of the conflict and Russia’s role in it influenced 
the overall debates concerning foreign policy. This chapter provides a chronological analysis 
of three stages in Russia’s debates and policies towards the conflict. Within each stage, we 
identify the dominant foreign policy ideas in the debates and examine whether they were 
reflected in Russia’s policies and military action.
To set the overall context of the debates this chapter begins with a brief historical 
overview of the transition from separatism to war in Transdniestria with particular attention 
to Soviet and then Russian involvement. It next identifies and examines Russia’s key 
interests in the conflict, carefully specifying the material incentives facing Russia’s decision­
makers and explaining the extent to which the interests were legacies of Tsarist Russian and 
Soviet history. The purpose of examining the facts about Russia’s material interests is to 
discover how much room there was for the debates to influence the various policy options. 
Did Russian policy-makers have concrete foreign policy alternatives? In this regard it is 
helpful to distinguish where possible between Russia’s “material” and “perceived” interests. 
Of course, interests are never completely objective, but instead are defined and defended by 
political leaders. Therefore, the chapter attempts to gauge whether or not there was a gap 
between real interests and how these interests were perceived (or manipulated) -  that is, 
whether the declared interests of the members of the political elite were based upon objective
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reality or whether they were simply slogans manipulated by Russian politicians for domestic 
or even international purposes.
1. From Separatism to W ar in Transdniestria
The growth of separatism in the Transdniestrian region of Moldova (Transdniestria), 
partly in response to Moldova’s threat of unification with Romania, led to the Moldova- 
Transdniestria war. The political status of Transdniestria was therefore an integral part of the 
Russian political debate concerning Moldova 1991-1996. The background and evolution of 
the separatist movement, the ensuing war and the evolution of Soviet and then Russian 
involvement in the conflict after 1991 will be clarified briefly before proceeding to a detailed 
examination of Russian interests, debates and policies.
Even before it declared independence in August 1991, Moldova faced challenges 
from Transdniestrian separatists.1 The movement began in 1989 as a  spontaneous reaction to 
Moldovan policy. On 31 August of that year, Moldova passed a law that made Romanian the 
state language and replaced Cyrillic with Latin letters for the transcription of Romanian. 
Many of the Russians and other ethnic groups in Moldova felt threatened and feared that the
pan-Romanian movement led by the Moldovan Popular Front might eventually achieve
0 •  •  •  •  •  •unification with Romania. As a protest against this possibility, Russian and Ukrainian
workers went on strike. On 3 September 1990, leaders of Transdniestria proclaimed the 
"Trans-Dniester Soviet Socialist Republic" to be a separate part of the USSR. What had
1 There was also a Gagauz separatist movement. The Gagauz are Orthodox Turkic peoples who live in Southern 
Moldova.
2 However, the language requirement was only imposed on those in leadership positions or in regular contact 
with the public. Moreover, with independence, Moldova was generally accommodating towards its ethnic 
minorities. It did not impose stricter language laws on them and, most significantly, it adopted a citizenship law 
in which all people currently resident in Moldova could become citizens if they wished. Jeff Chinn and Steven 
D. Roper, "Ethnic Mobilization and Reactive Nationalism: The Case o f Moldova", in Nationalities Papers, vol. 23, 
no.2 (1995), pp.291-325, p.298.
3 On the left bank o f the Dniester river, the “Trans-Dniester Soviet Socialist Republic” included the Kamen, 
Dubossar, Rybnitsa, Grigoropol and Slabodzey districts and the towns o f Tiraspol, Rybnitsa and Dubossary, and 
on the right bank the town of Bendeiy.
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begun as a protest in 1989 led to a revolt in 1990, and subsequently developed into a full 
fledged separatist movement by 1991.
Earlier, in the spring parliamentary elections of 1990, the Moldovan Communists lost 
to the Popular Front, a largely Romanian dominated coalition. The Communist party retained 
solid support only in the Transdniestrian and Gagauz areas where voters considered that 
Gorbachev and his reforms were encouraging Romanian ethnic revival in Moldova. On 23 
June 1990, the Moldovan Supreme Soviet adopted a declaration of sovereignty decreeing that 
Moldovan law superseded Soviet law. The following year, on 27 August 1991, Moldova 
declared its independence. Transdniestria rejected Moldovan sovereignty and declared its 
own independence on 2 September 1991.
For its part, the Soviet government first ignored the divisive situation in Moldova, 
and then sided with the breakaway territory. In late 1990, when the Transdniestrian congress 
was considering declaring its independence, the Soviet Ministry of Interior sent troops to 
guarantee the region’s security.4 The Soviet government also helped to establish a 
Transdniestrian bank which provided finances for the coming war.5 It is even likely that the 
Soviet civil defence organisation and the official Soviet paramilitary organisation were at this 
time supplying the Transdniestrian volunteers with weapons.6 Following the failed August
n fi_
1991 coup in Moscow the commander of the 14 Army, Major General Gennady Yakovlev, 
accepted bribes in exchange for supplying arms to Transdniestria's "Republic Guard" and 
even accepted a short term position as the Transdniestrian defence minister.9
The aborted coup of August 1991 further widened the existing differences between 
Moldova and Transdniestria. Moldovan President Mircea Snegur organised active protests 
against the coup-makers, whereas the Transdniestrian Russians and the Gagauzi sided with
4 Eduard Kondratev, Izvestiva. September 3,1990, p.2.
5 FBIS April 29, 1991. Quoted in Stuart J. Kaufman and Stephen R. Bowers, “Transnational Dimensions o f the 
Transdniestian Conflict” in Nationalities Papers, vol.26, no. 1 (1998), pp.129-146, p.130
6Stuart J. Kaufman, "Spiralling to Ethnic War: Elites, Masses, and Moscow in Moldova's Civil War", in 
International Security, vol.21, no.2 (fall 1996), pp. 108-138, p.130.
7 See Chapter Four.
8 Colonel Mikhail Bergman, Tiraspol garrison commandant o f the 14th Russian Army, confirmed the fact that the 
14th Army provided the Transdniestrians with weapons at this time. Interfax. March 18, 1992.
9 Itar-Tass. September 24,1991.
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them. These incidents set a precedent of limited Soviet involvement on the side of the 
separatists. They also revealed a complex web of personal contacts that had been established 
during the Soviet period among members of the elite in Moscow, Transdniestria and the
tfiSoviet 14 Army based in the region. To a much lesser extent, some of these ties continued 
into the post-Soviet period.
The simmering tension and sporadic fighting between the separatists and the 
Moldovan government erupted into three months of armed conflict from March to June 1992, 
known as the Moldova-Transdniestria War. At the beginning of 1992, Transdniestrian 
communist and military leaders expanded their control over Moldovan villages on the left 
bank of the Dniester river and some cities on the right bank -  actions which Romanians 
described as a "creeping putsch".10 With the support of the (at this stage, Russian) 14th Army, 
Transdniestrian loyalists were organized into paramilitary units and dispatched into the rural 
areas to take over administrative buildings and police stations, replacing ethnic Romanians 
with ethnic Russians.11 After months of these raids, full military action started on 24 March
th1992 when the 14 Army crossed to the right bank of the Dniester river. By 20 June 1992, 
the fighting reached its height in the town of Bendery (Transdniestria’s largest industrial
centre located on the “right bank”) when Russian troops helped to force Moldovan troops and
•  •  10 •police from the city. A cease-fire was instated on 7 April 1992, but sporadic fighting
10Chinn and Roper, "Ethnic Mobilization and Reactive Nationalism: The Case o f Moldova" in Nationalities 
Papers, vol. 23, no.2 (1995), pp.291-325, p.306.
11 Vladimir Dumov, Izvestiva. June 12, 1992, p.5.
12 Most analysts have described the war as an ethnic conflict (because Transdniestria is more russified than the rest 
of Moldova). However, neither “ethnicity” (because the region is o f mixed ethnic and linguistic characteristics and 
generally home to harmonious ethnic relations) nor “ideology” adequately describe the conflict. As in Tajik civil 
war, ideology was used to cover power struggle among various clans. In struggles with Moscow during 
perestroika opposition forces in Moldova, as in most other former Soviet republics, portrayed themselves as 
radically anti- communist -  although many were from nomenklatura backgrounds. The Transdniestrian 
leadership wanted to contrast itself with the rest o f Moldova -  which was one reason that they described 
themselves as communists. Transdniestria retained several features from the Soviet period including the red flag 
with a green horizontal stripe and did not destroy its statues o f Lenin. Kolsto and Malgin suggest that the 
Transdniestrian desire for independence was based upon “a vague, but nevertheless tangible common identity of 
most o f its population”. This identity, they say, cuts across ethnic divisions and is due more to history and 
geography than to ideology. In this interpretation, the conflict is primarily seen as an example o f “regional 
separatism”. Pal Kolsto and Andrei Malgin, “The Transdniestrian Republic: A Case o f Politicized Regionalism”, 
in Nationalities Papers, vol. 26, no.l (1998), pp. 103-127, p.104. This was a special issue o f Nationalities Papers, 
edited by Michael Hamm and titled “Moldova: The Forgotten Republic”.
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continued. Another cease-fire in July led to the creation and involvement of a multilateral 
peacekeeping force. The July agreement in effect gave Transdniestria de facto independence.
2. Russia’s Key Interests in Moldova
Tsarist and Soviet relations with the territory now known as Moldova did not 
predetermine Russia’s actions towards that new state after 1991. However, they did very 
broadly set the tone for the Russian debates and policies on this topic. Many members of the 
Russian political elite held basic notions about the region based upon their understanding of 
Tsarist and Soviet historical relations with the territory. In the 1991-1996 period of chaos and 
uncertainty, knowledge of these former relations provided basic reference points with which 
to define Russia’s interests in the region. The practical issues that Russia confronted required 
solutions and therefore became foreign policy interests.
The Russian debate over Moldova after 1991 therefore addressed the remnants of 
Imperial Russian and Soviet historical policies in the newly independent states. The debate 
focused on four historically intertwined Russian interests: the need to prevent Moldova’s 
reunification with Romania; the protection of Moldova’s ethnic Russians and Russian-speaking 
peoples; the continuation of Russia’s military presence in the region; and the preservation or 
renewal of Russia’s economic ties with the region. These interests were related to Moldova’s 
historic ties to Russia and Russian culture (particularly in Transdniestria), its ethnic Russian and 
Russian-speaking diaspora, its large Russian military presence, and its weak economy that was 
still partly dependent on Russia. We examine each of these four interests in turn.
a) The Threat of Moldovan Reunification with Romania
Russia’s close historical relations with Moldova, and especially Transdniestria, help 
to explain why Russian politicians and decision-makers were concerned with the future of 
this region. In particular, Tsarist Russian and Soviet struggles to retain control of the territory 
indicate why, at the beginning of the Moldova-Transdniestria, war Russia tried to prevent 
Moldova from reuniting with Romania.
135
The area now known as Moldova has had a complex history. Along with Wallachia to 
its west, historic Moldova was one of the two main regions in south-eastern Europe 
populated by Romanian-speaking people. Historically, the area comprising today's 
independent Republic of Moldova was geographically positioned between the Russian, 
Ottoman and Austrian Empires. Bessarabia, the territory located between the Prut and 
Dniester rivers, which comprises most of modem Moldova, was the eastern region of the 
traditional principality, most of which is now part of Romania.
11Moldova’s borders changed many times over the centuries. During the past two 
centuries, it was shuffled between and divided among the Russian Empire, Romania and the 
Soviet Union. In 1812, Russia acquired the bulk of modem Moldova by annexing 
Bessarabia.14 With the end of the Russian Empire in 1918, Russia lost Bessarabia to 
Romania.15 In 1940, as a result of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, the Soviet Union reacquired 
Bessarabia, and on 2 August 1940 the Soviet Socialist Republic of Moldova was formed. The 
Moldovan Republic remained part of the Soviet Union until 1991 -  apart from the period of 
the Nazi invasion, when it was occupied by Romanian troops from 1941-44.
Thus, from its 1812 annexation by Russia until the Soviet Union’s disintegration in 
1991, most of Moldova’s territory was under almost continual Russian or Soviet domination. 
This historical legacy underlies Russia’s early interest in preventing Moldovan re-unification 
with Romania. The tumultuous past also helps to explain the inherent sensitivities of both 
Russia and Romania towards the new state.
13 For the most recent and comprehensive history o f Moldova see Charles King, The Moldovans: Romania. Russia 
and the Politics o f Culture (Palo Alto: Hoover Institute Press, 2000). Also used to develop the general history o f  
Moldova in this chapter are: Alain Ruze, La Moldova entre la Roumanie et la Russie: de Pierre le Grand a Boris 
Eltsin (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1997); George Cioranesco, Bessarabia: Disputed Land Between East and West 
(Bucharest: Editura Fundatiei Culturale Romane, 1993); Andrei Stoiciu, Fiction et Realite Identitaire: Le cas de 
la Bessarabie (Montreal: Humanitas, 1995).
14 Western Moldova was united with Wallachia in 1859, forming the basis o f modem Romania. Therefore, the 
present Romanian province immediately to the west of the Prut River is also called Moldova. Fisher-Galati 
explains this incorporation as primarily the Russian Empire’s “need for a safe border and territorial base for the 
pursuit o f the anti-Ottoman policies.” Stephen Fisher-Galati, “The Moldavian Soviet Republic in Soviet 
Domestic and Foreign Policy”, in Roman Szporluk (ed.), The Influence o f East Europe and the Soviet West on 
the USSR (New York: Praeger, 1976), pp.229-250, p.230.
15 Bessarabia declared itself an autonomous republic on 2 December 1917 and was independent for four months 
before the Bessarabian State Council voted to reunite with Romania on 27 March 1918.
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Although Russia has had long historic ties with most of what is now Moldova, it has 
had even longer historical relations with the separatist region of Transdniestria. Many 
political organisations in Russia after 1991 therefore favoured Transdniestria in the Moldova- 
Transdniestria conflict. However, while the ties influenced the debate, they by no means 
determined official Russian policy.
Understanding the differentiation between western Moldova (The Republic of 
Moldova) and eastern Moldova (Transdniestria) is fundamental. The current conflict dates to 
1792 when the territory on the left bank of the Dniester River was ceded by the Ottoman 
Empire to Russia. In 1792 the Dniester river became the western border of the Russian Empire 
prior to the annexation of Bessarabia in 1812, and was again the border after the Romanian 
annexation in 1918. In October 1924, the new communist regime declared the Transdniester 
area to be the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR) of Moldavia. By 1991, like the 
rest of Moldova's territory, Transdniestria had not known independence. However, neither 
had it ever been under Romanian rule. It had, however been well exposed to Slavic culture.16
Although Transdniestrians have never been completely independent, they can appeal to 
a period of autonomous existence from 1924 to 1944. The Moldavian ASSR encompassed 
fourteen raions (districts) on the left bank of the Dniester. Its capital was Tiraspol, and it was 
administered as part of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. However, its short-lived status 
as "autonomous republic" was ended in 1944, when eight of the fourteen raions that made up 
the Moldovan ASSR were removed from the Ukrainian Republic and joined with the newly 
reincorporated Soviet Socialist Republic of Moldova to its west. The remaining raions were 
incorporated into the Ukrainian Republic. Thus, the post-1991 Republic of Moldova 
(incorporating both Western and Eastern regions) was originally formed in 1944, a fact which 
helps to explain why many Russians thought of Transdniestria as a separate entity from 
Moldova.
16 See Donald L. Dyer (ed.), Studies in Moldovan: The History. Culture. Language and Contemporary Politics 
o f the People o f Moldova (Boulder, Co.: East European Monographs, 1996) and Ion Alexandrescu, A Short 
History of Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina (Iasi: The Romanian Cultural Foundation, 1994).
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In light of this history, at the beginning of the 1992 Moldova-Transdniestria conflict 
Russia felt threatened by the possibility of Moldova’s reunification with Romania.17 This fear 
was heightened by the fact that Moldova was the only successor state in which the 
indigenous population could identify with an adjacent nation outside the former Soviet 
Union. At first, Russia’s interest in preventing Moldova’s reunification with Romania can be 
seen as legitimate. Many Moldovans did agitate for reunification with Romania, and 
Romania assisted Moldova during its clashes with separatists in 1992. Many members of the 
Russian political elite regarded this action as evidence of Romanian desire for unification. 
Their views were reinforced by Romanian nationalist propaganda about “recovering” 
Moldova and “saving it from the Russians”. In June 1992 Moldovan President Mircea Snegur 
argued:
Today it is very difficult to determine the prospects for 
unification with Romania... The border with Romania must be 
open -  every one of us has relatives on the other side of the 
Prut. Eventually we will take the border under our own control 
and get rid of the barriers. At the same time, I repeat, I would 
not venture to talk about unification... But one must know the 
wishes of the people, who were separated for so long from the 
“non-Soviet” part of Romania.18
However, Russia’s fear of Moldova’s reunification with Romania proved exaggerated 
and disappeared over time. After the initial discovery of their Romanian heritage, the 
Moldovan government repeatedly asserted its disinterest in reunion with Romania. 
Moldovans became suspicions of and hostile towards what they saw as Romanian 
interference in their affairs. Firstly, economically Romania had little to offer Moldova whose 
ties with the former Soviet Union had been more significant. Secondly, reunification 
threatened ethnic tensions in Moldova and went against new state-building initiatives. Lastly, 
the idea of reunification became less fashionable because it was clear that democratisation in 
Romania was moving very slowly and could eventually jeopardise Moldova’s own political
17 This is examined in detail below in the section on Russian debates and policies.
18 Interview by Sergei Mitin, Izvestiva. June 9, 1992, p.2.
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and cultural freedoms. Moldovans therefore rejected the nationalist and pro-Romanian 
candidates in its first free, post-communist parliamentary elections in February 1994. 
Subsequently, they decisively rejected reunification with Romania in a March 6 
referendum.19
To conclude, the initial concern of members of the Russian political elite with the 
pro-unification propaganda from Romania and Moldova was legitimate. At the very 
beginning, preventing Moldova from joining Romania was both a real and perceived interest. 
However, as Moldova’s interest in reunification diminished, so did Russia’s concerns. In 
spite of this, several Russian politicians -  such as Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoi -  
continued to perceive the situation to be serious enough for Russia to remain involved.20 The 
threat of Moldova’s reunification with Romania did not, therefore, point to an obvious 
solution which was accepted by all. Instead, a gap developed between Russia’s real and 
perceived interests. There was much uncertainty and considerable room for debate among 
members of Russia’s political elite about what steps should be taken.
b) The Russian-Speaking Diaspora
The existence of a Russian-speaking diaspora in Moldova, especially in 
Transdniestria, also helps to explain one of Russia’s key interests in the conflict. However 
the question is -  was this interest significant and did it dictate Russia’s actions?
Historically, both Tsarist and Soviet governments tried to bring or retain Moldova 
under Russian or Soviet control through their nationality policies. Massive emigration of
19 Romania was the first state to recognize Moldova when it declared its independence on August 27 1991 and 
initially provided it with substantial material support. Especially in the early 1990s, the Romanian government 
assumed that Moldova would eventually reunite with Romania. Initial close cooperation was fostered by the 
Moldovans' early enthusiasm for "Romanianism". This was largely in response to years o f denial o f this 
heritage by the Soviet regime. Most Romanian political forces listed reunification as part o f their platforms. 
However, domestic economic and political problems countered their taking any action to this end. Nevertheless, 
Romania remained involved in discussions to resolve the Moldova-Transdniestria conflict. While domestically, the 
opposition parties and the press made emotional calls for reunification, officially Romania supported Moldovan 
territorial integrity and a peaceful resolution to the conflict. Officially, reunification was seen only as a very long­
term possibility -  and one based more upon historical relations than ethnicity. See Tom Gallagher, “Nationalism and 
the Romanian Opposition”, Transition, vol.2, no.l (January 12,1996), pp.30-32.
20 The evolution o f Rutskoi’s views is carefully examined below. See Rutskoi’s comments in Eduard 
Kondratev, Izvestiva. April 6, 1992, p .l.
139
ethnic Russians into Moldova during these periods created a large Russian diaspora there. 
This emigration to Moldova was part of a large-scale process that had included Russian 
emigration towards the newly annexed territories in the Baltic Sea region of Russia. Tsarist 
policies towards Bessarabia in particular encouraged non-Romanian ethnic groups (Russians, 
Ukrainians, Germans, Jews, Bulgarians and Gagauz) to settle in the territory in order to dilute 
the Romanian population and thus differentiate Bessarabia from the developing Romanian 
state to the west. As a result, Romanians, who had constituted 86% of the population of 
Bessarabia in 1817, were reduced to 48% of the population by 1897.21 The Soviet 
government continued these aggressive Tsarist migration policies, and initiated, as part of its 
larger nationalisation program carried out throughout the former Soviet Union, other harsh
O')policies to assimilate the Romanian population.
After the Second World War, thousands more Russians and Ukrainians were 
encouraged to migrate to Moldova, creating large Slavic enclaves. Russians and Russian 
speakers settled mainly in the urban areas, largely working in technical jobs. The Romanians 
were overwhelmingly left in rural areas working in the agricultural sectors or in less highly 
skilled and less highly paid urban occupations. Russian became the language of public life, 
and the Latin alphabet of the Romanian language was replaced with Cyrillic. Although 
Moldova did not suffer from the deportation of whole peoples as in the Transcaucasus or 
Caucasus in the 1940s-50s, the government did force the relocation of certain social groups 
in Moldova (the official justification was an increase in criminal activities). As a result of 
these policies and history, by 1989 Romanians made up 65% of the population of Moldova 
with the other major ethnic groups being Ukrainians (14%), Russians (13%), Gagauz (3.5%), 
Bulgarians (2.5%) and others (2%).24
21The Republic of Moldova (Chisinau: Foreign Relations Committee o f the Parliament o f the Republic of Moldova,
1992), p. 16.
22 George Cioranescu, Bessarabia: Disputed Land Between East and West (Munich: Editura Fundatiei Culturale 
Romane, 1985). See chapter 13: The Policy o f Russification, pp. 196-231.
23 Nikolai Bougai, “The 1940s-1950s: the Fortunes o f  the Moldovian People”, Political History o f  Russia, vol.8, 
no.l (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 1997) pp. 17-28.
24 All-Union population census 1989 [Vsesoyuznaya perepis' naseleniya 1989] (Moskva: Gosudarstvennyi 
Komitet SSSR po Statistike, 1990).
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Tsarist and Soviet policies towards the population of Moldova were typical of Soviet
*ye
treatment of other republics. They were partly designed to differentiate Moldovans from 
their fellow Romanians to the west. Together they resulted in an increased hostility of ethnic 
Moldovans towards Russia and helped to forge elements of a new, though somewhat 
ambiguous, Moldovan identity. After 1991 there was, therefore, a strong desire on the part of 
many Moldovans to become part of a “greater Romania” while maintaining a unique 
“Moldovan” national consciousness. In other words, many Moldovans were still tied to 
Romania by the historical bonds of language and culture, but Slav influence (especially to the 
east) had, over time, produced a cultural identity distinct from that of the Romanian state.
The argument put forward here is that these nationality policies set an historical 
precedent for Moscow’s close involvement in the area immediately after 1991. They also 
help to explain why some members of the political elite in Russia had ties with the region. 
The cultural ties with Russia conditioned “natural” Russian interest in the new state. Most 
significantly, the existence of a Russian-speaking diaspora in Moldova provided one of 
Russia’s key declared interests in the war -  the protection of its Russian-speaking brethren.
25 Soviet officials and historians nurtured the idea that Moldova's national identity was separate and distinct 
from that o f Romania. Some current analysts have gone so far as to assert controversially that, from its 
inception in 1924, the Moldavian Republic was a Soviet instrument for political action against Romania. See 
Wilhelmus Van Meurs, The Bessarabian Question in Communist Historiography: Nationalist and Communist 
Polities and History-Writing (New York: East European Monographs, 1994), especially pp. 106-144. For an 
overtly sympathetic account towards Romania, highly critical o f Soviet policies see Nicholas Dima, Bessarabia 
and Bukhovina: The Soviet-Romanian Territorial Dispute (New York: Columbia Press, 1982). There were also 
other means o f “russification” than forced or encouraged migration. Moldova was isolated from Romania by 
completely severing communications between them and by administratively dividing Moldova’s territory. Also, 
Moldova’s government and administration were put in the hands o f Russian and Ukrainian functionaries; mixed 
marriages and military duties abroad were encouraged; and “substituting the Russian language, culture, and 
living style for the culture, customs, and civilization o f  the colonized peoples” was common. Finally, the 
predominantly Romanian rural population was at times treated ruthlessly. A massive famine occurred during the 
1946-47 drought when Soviet officials failed to reduce compulsory grain collections, and immediately after,
30,000 peasants were deported during collectivisation. For details see, Ronald J. Hill, Soviet Political Elites. 
The Case o f Tiraspol (London: Martin Robertson, 1977). Also see Fisher-Galati, “The Moldavian Soviet 
Republic in Soviet Domestic and Foreign Policy”, in Roman Szporluk (ed.), The Influence o f East Europe and 
the Soviet West on the USSR (New York: Praeger, 1976), pp.229-250, p.222. Already beginning in 1843, the 
Romanian language was forbidden in administration and banned from all schools in 1871. In 1936, Russian 
became a compulsory subject in all secondary schools o f the Soviet Union. On the famine and collectivisation 
see: William Crowther, “Moldova: caught between nation and empire”, Ian Bremmer and Ray Taras (eds.), 
New States. New Politics: Building the Post-Soviet Nations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 
pp.316-349, p.319
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However, although Russia had a real interest in the fate of this diaspora, the issue was 
not as significant as it was made out to be by Russian politicians. The diaspora was relatively 
small in number and not particularly threatened. Moreover, the presence of the diaspora does 
not completely explain why many members of Russia’s political elite, such as presidential 
advisor Sergei Stankevich, favoured Transdniestria over the Moldovan government.26 
Although Transdniestria was home to a large enclave of ethnic Russians, there were also 
significant numbers in the rest of Moldova including some who occupied senior positions in 
the Moldovan government. Clearly, the mere existence of this diaspora does not explain why 
it should be protected while other Russian diasporas across the FSU were being largely 
ignored.
In 1989, out of a total population of approximately 4.3 million in Moldova, ethnic
77Russians constituted the third largest population group after Romanians and Ukrainians. 
Just over 500,000 ethnic Russians (13 % of the total population) lived in Moldova. In 
addition, about 400,000 members of other nationalities considered Russian to be their native 
language. The Transdniestria area housed a much greater proportional percentage o f ethnic 
Russians, but still only 27% of Moldova’s total Russians (153,400 Russians) lived there. 
Therefore, siding with Transdniestria did not really mean siding with ethnic Russians as
70claimed by Aleksandr Prokhanov.
However, the presence of the Russian diaspora does illustrate Transdniestria’s ties with 
members of the political elite in Russia, and it also explains why elements of the Russian 
political elite and the Russian public cared about the region. The diaspora was not seriously 
discriminated against as claimed by many Russian politicians, but it was threatened by the 
war. Accustomed to being the elite, dominant group in Transdniestria, many ethnic 
Russians there were alarmed at the possibility of suddenly becoming a minority in an
26 See for example, Sergei Stankevich, Izvestiva. July 7, 1992, p.3. This is explored in detail below in the 
section on debate and policy.
27 All-Union population census 1989 [Vsesoyuznaya perepis' naseleniya 1989] (Moskva: Gosudarstvennyi 
Komitet SSSR po Statistike, 1990).
28 Ibid. Of the ethnic Russians in Moldova, 52% were bom in Moldova and 36% in Russia.
29 The views o f extreme-right editor o f Den’ Aleksandr Prokhanov are examined below. Den, no.18 (1992), p.3.
30 Itar-Tass. March 20, 1992.
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enlarged Romania. They therefore used the “Romanian card” to mobilise support for the
11
independence of Transdniestria and gain the attention and sympathy of the Russian public. 
Uniquely among the diasporas, the Russians in Transdniestria mobilised themselves and 
fought for independence from Moldova. The Transdniestrian leadership repeatedly requested 
unification with Russia.
Over time, the Russian diaspora itself eventually lost hope that Russia would accept 
Transdniestria’s unification request, or that the Soviet Union would ever be recreated. The 
Transdniestria-Moldova war was therefore not a purely ethnic war as described by some 
Russian politicians. However, as we shall see, the presence of a diaspora was used to gain 
public support for Russian involvement in the region. In this way the diaspora issue was part 
of both the debate and policy, even though no specific actions ever were taken to “save” the 
diaspora. To conclude, the diaspora was an ongoing Russian interest. How Russia should 
react in light of the existence of this diaspora was a topic of significant concern and debate.
c) Russian Strategic Interests
Russia’s most significant interest in Moldova -  both declared and objective -  was 
strategic. As we have seen, Soviet policies left the new Russia with a large military presence 
in Moldova and particularly Transdniestria. It was through this presence that Russia initially 
became militarily involved in Moldova’s internal conflict in 1992 and, to a great extent, it 
explains why Russia remained a leading player until in its resolution in 1996.
it.
Russia's 14 Army, stationed in Transdniestria’s capital, Tiraspol, was an active and 
partisan participant in the separatist conflict. The army had been positioned there by the 
Soviet Union in 1945 for possible action in the Balkan peninsula, and was the largest 
component of the USSR’s forces based in Moldova. It was a formidable force composed of
31 Russian analyst, Skvortsova argues that the real goal o f the Moldovan nationalist leadership was to reconfirm 
the common identity o f the Moldovan and Romanian language, culture and people, and to prepare for the 
political unification of Moldova with Romania. She describes anti-Russian campaigns in the 1980s and their 
impact on the Russian-speaking diaspora. Alla Skvortsova, “The Russians in Moldova, Political Orientations”, 
in Ray Taras (ed), National Identities and Ethnic Minorities in Eastern Europe (London: Macmillan Press, 
1998), pp. 159-178, p. 162.
32 Under the Soviet Union's command, the 14th Army was stationed partly in Ukraine and partly in Moldova 
(mostly on the left bank), as a component o f the Odessa Military District. In the case o f a Balkans war, its
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armoured, infantry, artillery, tactical missile, air defence, Spetsnaz (special forces), chemical, 
air reconnaissance, and engineering units.
After 1991, the Russian elite as a whole continued to accept the need to retain a military 
presence in Moldova in order to prevent war and protect its strategic position vis-a-vis Ukraine 
and the Balkans. A military base in Moldova was considered necessary in case Russian 
peacekeepers were required to solve or prevent conflicts in the area. Retrospectively, Yeltsin 
wrote in his autobiography that “It was my deliberate policy to keep conflicts in check. I tried to 
put a break on them”.34 According to General Alexander Lebed, Commander of the 14th 
Army, it would have been detrimental to conflict management in the area of the former 
Soviet Union for Russia to lose control over its military presence. There was also the danger 
of who would get hold of the Russian army’s weapons if it withdrew. A permanent base for 
Russian troops in the Transdniester area (which Moldova was initially adamantly against) was 
generally regarded to be a useful means to retain regional influence.37 Thus, from the point of 
view of the Russian elite, especially in the first few years of the break-up of the Soviet Union, 
the need to retain a military presence in Moldova seemed to be reasonable and based on a 
continuation of its historical presence in the area.
A final reason for Russia to keep a military base in the region was to secure a close 
relationship with Moldova. With the end of the Soviet Union, Russia was geopolitically 
vulnerable. At the beginning of its rule in Moldova, the Popular Front was actively pro- 
Romanian and anti-Russian, and refused to join in CIS agreements. The military bases 
functioned as a counter-threat to Moldovan aspirations to unite with Romania. Russia’s military 
presence (and even involvement) during the separatist dispute provided leverage to persuade
mission was to take control o f the Turkish straits.
33Vladimir Socor, "Russia's Army in Moldova: There to Stay?", RFE-RL Research Report, vol.2, no.25 (June 18,
1993), pp.42-9, p.43.
34 Boris Yeltsin, Midnight Diaries (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2000), p.248.
35 L. Krutakov, Moskovskive Novosti. no.44 (June 25-July 2, 1995), p.6.
36 Leonid Bershidsky, Moscow Times. June 8, 1995. (Lexis-Nexis)
37 Of course, the desire to retain bases in the Baltic region was even greater but with time it was obvious that the 
Baltic states were more independent and economically strong.
38 A. Pasechnik, Pravda. December 11, 1992, p.2
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Moldova to take a more pro-Russia stance and to ensure Russia's continued political and 
economic (if not military) influence in the region.
From the Moldovan point of view, Russia’s intentions and actions were often seen to be 
imperialistic. Many suspected that Russia was using the 14th Army to control some of the former 
territory of the Soviet Union in an experiment to see if the “old means” might work to continue 
Russia's military presence in the near abroad and to keep the Transdniestrian leaders in power. 
The Moldovan President wrote to the Secretary General of the United Nations: “We are 
seriously concerned about the repeated official declarations of late made by the leadership of the 
Russian Federation which clearly witness the lack of desire to give up the “rights” on territory 
not belonging to it”.40 Thus, it is difficult to judge whether Russia’s interests in retaining 
military presence were “legitimate” or “imperialistic”. Russian troops in Moldova actually 
decreased from 9,200 in 1992-93 to 4,900 in 1996-97 41 The only way to make a judgement is to 
consider the actions advocated to achieve military presence and their results, and we do this later 
in the chapter.
tD Russian Economic Interests
Historically, Russia had strong economic ties with Moldova, particularly the 
Transdniestria region. This legacy, too, conditioned Russian interest in the area and the 
relations between specific political groups in Russia and Transdniestria. Moldova had 
benefited from economic development during the Soviet period -  especially during the 
Khrushchev era 42 Along with traditional strengths in food growing and processing, Moldova 
became a leading manufacturer of high-technology goods within the Soviet Union. Despite
39 Responding to Russian Defence Minister Grachev’s comments that Russia would send troops wherever the 
Russian population needs protection, Moldovan President Mircea Snegur said “That is a Nazi approach: to 
dispatch the military to the Dnestr region for the sake o f 100,000 Russians...”. Snegur continually called for the 
withdrawal o f the 14th Army. Sergei Mitin, Izvestiva. June 9, 1992, p.2.
40 “Letter dated June 22, 1992 from the President o f  the Republic o f Moldova addressed to the Secretary- 
General”, UN document. S/24138, p.3.
41 Russia had 1,600 peacekeeping troops in Abkhazia in 1996/97. The Military Balance 1997/98. (London: IISS, 
Oxford University Press, 1997), p.l 10.
42 75% o f Moldova's territory is covered by rich black "chernozem" soil, and it has a temperate climate making it a 
naturally productive agricultural region. Agricultural crops such as cereals, sunflowers, sugar beets and grapes were 
produced. IMF Economic Reviews: Moldova (Washington, D.C.: IMF, 1993), p.2.
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this technological progress, however, by 1987 Moldova remained the fourth least urbanised 
of the Soviet republics and was the lowest place in the USSR with respect to education.43 
This legacy left Moldova economically very weak and partially dependent upon Russia.
However, more significant to the development of Russia’s policies after 1991 was the 
fact that Transdniestria had fared somewhat better than the rest of Moldova during the Soviet 
era. During that time, Transdniestria became renowned for its industrial activity and 
relatively high standard of living. In particular, during the 1960s and 1970s, Soviet policies 
incorporated Transdniestria into the Soviet military-industrial complex44 Transdniestria 
became closely tied to the rest of the Soviet Union through its all-Union defence factories 
and was therefore drawn more into the Soviet economy than into the local Moldovan 
market.45 This preferential treatment was resented in the rest of the Moldovan Republic 
where the lagging economy remained based largely on agriculture.
After 1991, Russia did not publicly declare economic relations with Moldova to be a 
significant interest. In fact, Moldova lacked the ability to develop products to sell in western 
markets and was unable to export into the distressed economies of Russia and Ukraine. 
Between 1989 and 1997 its GDP fell by around 60%, providing an average monthly income 
of only US$33.46 Separatist conflict in Transdniestria deterred foreign investment in Moldova 
and further worsened its economic plight.
These negative factors did not override the fact that Moldova’s industry was 
concentrated in the Transdniestria and also that the major oil and natural gas pipelines into 
Moldova passed through it. Moldova was dependent on Russia (and Ukraine) for energy 
imports. Clearly, Russia and Transdniestria had mutual interests in continuing the former
43 Michael Ryan and Richard Prentice, Social Trends in the Soviet Union From 1950 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
1987), p.74.
44 Dan Ionescu, “Life in the Dniester ‘Black Hole’”, Transition, vol.2, no.20 (October 4, 1996), pp.12-14, p. 12.
45 To quote Aleksandr Karaman, Vice-President o f Transdniestria, “...Eighty percent o f our economy is geared 
to Russia. We have quite a few one-of-a-kind production facilities that Russian industry has a stake in... We are 
signing agreements on economic cooperation with cities and provinces o f  Russia”. Timur Abadiyev, 
Rossivskive Vesti. May 6, 1993, p.2.
46 Ronald J. Hill, “Moldova”, The CIS Handbook (London: Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers, 1999), pp. 112-122, 
p.l 19; also World Bank Development Indicators Database. July 2000, from http://devdata.worldbank.org/data- 
query.
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economic ties, but it could be argued that Transdniestria had significantly more to gain from 
the relationship than Russia did. In an interview, the leader of Transdniestria, Igor Smirnov, 
admitted that Transdniestria needed Russia to survive economically more than Moldova did. 
“As before, our major trading partner is Russia, to which we send machinery, machine tools, 
agricultural products and products of the processing industry”.47 Given its minute size and 
strategic vulnerability, Transdniestria needed some type of support from Russia (or Ukraine) 
in order to survive. Transdniestrian enterprises were dependent on raw materials from Russia 
and access to Russian markets for its products. During the Moldova-Transdniestria war, 
Transdniestria became economically separated from the rest of Moldova, and Russia 
(initially) provided the region with access to Russian markets and raw materials48 
Nevertheless, Russia’s interest in securing economic ties with Moldova was real, if 
comparatively insignificant -  especially its desire to secure relations with Transdniestria and 
persuade Moldova to join the Economic Union of the CIS. These economic issues, unlike the 
others seen above (the threat of reunification with Romania, the Russian diaspora, Russian 
strategic interests) provoked little controversy or debate in Russia.
3. The Debates and The Policies: Russian Military and Political Involvement in 
Moldova. 1991-1996
As we have seen above, the environment did not completely constrain Russia’s 
foreign policy choices. There was much uncertainty about Russia’s real interests and 
therefore plenty of room for debate about policy options. Within the parameters set by 
Russia’s history (e.g. the facts that Russia did have a diaspora, military presence and 
economic ties in Moldova) the Russian government had policy options in the Moldova- 
Transdniestria conflict. We will now examine the debates in Russia over these foreign policy 
choices in order to discover which ideas were dominant, what the official policies were, and
47 Interview with Smirnov by Valery Reshnetnikov, Izvestiva. June 16, 1992, p.2.
48 O f the US $439 million owed by Moldova to Gasprom by 1999, $US 364 million has been incurred by 
Transdniestria. Ronald J. Hill, “Moldova”, The CIS Handbook (London: Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers, 1999), 
pp. 112-122, p. 117.
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whether there were any “pathways” from which ideas might have affected the choices made 
among policy options.
In analysing the Russian political debates about Moldova during 1991-1996, three 
periods in the debates and foreign policy development can be distinguished. The first, from 
August 1991 to March 1992 -  the “Atlanticist period”-  was characterised by the dominance 
of liberal westemist ideas. The second, from March 1992 to October 1992, was dominated by 
a battle of ideas and the growth of pragmatic nationalist ideas. The third, from October 1992 
to December 1996 was characterised by the dominance of pragmatic nationalist ideas and the 
formation of a consensus. We now explore, in each of these stages, the Russian political 
debate and the foreign policies.
a) Stage One: The Atlanticist Period (August 1991 - March 1992)
i) The Debates
During this first stage, there was as yet little debate over how Russia should react 
towards events in Moldova. As shown in Chapter Four, there was far too much internal 
confusion within Russia and the other former Soviet states, as well as a lack of knowledge 
about the specifics of the situation, for any clear-cut policy decisions to be made. Moreover, 
with the Soviet Union still in existence until December 1991, and no quick agreement 
thereafter over the general principles of Russian-Moldovan relations, it not surprising that 
there were no well developed ideas towards a conflict which had not yet turned to war.
Nevertheless, the Russian media evinced a dominant sympathy for the 
Transdniestrian separatists -  with whom many Russian political organisations had 
connections -  just as it had during the preceding Soviet years. Generally the Russian public 
was inundated with media coverage which strongly favoured the separatists. Consistent with 
its fundamentalist nationalist foreign policy sympathies, for example, the newspaper Den 
argued that Russia should give military support to the Transdniester separatists as a step to 
restoring the Soviet Union.49 Igor Smirnov, the head of Transdniestria’s separatist
49 Den’, no.21 (1991), p.4.
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government, attempted to use the favourable media coverage and political connections to 
recruit volunteers for his militia and to influence other Russian political and military 
leaders.50 The most significant of these were members of the Communist Party and the 
Liberal Democratic Party.51
Most of the Russian political groups with links to Transdniestria subscribed to 
fundamentalist nationalist ideas and were highly critical of the Russian government’s foreign 
policy. The National Salvation Front was the first such local organisation to form in the 
Russian-speaking community in Transdniestria. Another, the Russian Party in St. Petersburg, 
acted as a conduit to send Cossacks and others to fight in Moldova as well in Abkhazia, 
Tajikistan and the former Yugoslavia. The well-funded Congress of Russian Communities 
also gave aid to Transdniestria (and other Russian communities) with the aim of reunifying 
the "Divided Russian Nation".52 Finally, individual Russian politicians subscribed to 
fundamentalist nationalist ideas and wanted the restoration of Soviet power supported 
Transdniestria. Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR) member Andrei Mitrofonov, for example, 
praised Transdniestria for being “one of the first territories liberated from the democrats”.53 
Good relations with Transdniestria were also seen as a means of Russian control in Moldova.
The Transdniestrian leadership was more pro-Russia than the Moldovan government 
was and, like many Russian fundamentalist nationalists, wanted to recreate the Soviet Union. 
Transdniestria’s leaders defined themselves as communist, however this was done to contrast 
themselves to the Moldovan government which was anti-communist (in reaction to the old 
Soviet regime). The Transdniestrian government therefore would be more accurately defined 
as “anti-anti-communist”. There was a desire to rebuild the territory of the former Soviet
50 Interview with Igor Smirnov by Valery Reshetnikov, Izvestiva. June 16, 1992, p.2. Also see Vladimir Socur, 
“Dnestr Involvement in the Moscow Rebellion”, RFE/RL Research Report, vol.2, no.46 (November 19, 1993) 
pp.25-32.
Leonid Mlechin, Izvestiva. December 28,1993, p.3.
52 See the Congress o f Russian Communities (KRO) platform in Election Platforms o f Political Parties 
Participating in the Elections for State Duma (Moscow: International Republican Institute, December 6, 1995), 
pp.3-8.
Author’s Interview with Andrei Mitrofonov, who was in charge o f foreign policy o f the Liberal Democratic 
Party o f  Russia (LDPR), June 20, 1995.
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Union but not to re-adopt Soviet ideology. Russian was the dominant language in 
Transdniestria.54
The links between a minority of extremists in Russia and Transdniestria, as well as 
the support for Transdniestria by prominent Russian centrists led by Chairman of the 
Supreme Soviet Ruslan Khasbulatov, would later put pressure on President Yeltsin to take 
Transdniestria’s cause into account at a time when the Russian government was vulnerable 
(as seen in Chapters Three and Four).55 Domestic political gain, therefore, was a prime 
motivation for the government's later rhetorical sympathy for the Transdniestrian cause -  
even though it did not spawn official action. The Russian government did nothing to break 
the links between political organisations and individuals in Russia with the “hard-line” 
movements abroad -  including Transdniestria. Primarily this was because they had little 
ability to do so but also because the links could potentially be manipulated to gain domestic 
political support and perhaps to help secure fundamental interests abroad. In other words, at 
first, the Russian government allowed Transdniestria some favoured status even though many 
Transdniestrians had close ties with extremist elements within Russia and supported other 
causes that were (or may have become) harmful to the Russian state. For example, 
Transdniestria later played an influential role in the October 1993 coup attempt -  as will be 
examined below. It was home to many criminal organisations who profited from and thus 
supported the continuation of the Moldova-Transdniestria conflict.56 Transdniestria also 
signed pacts with secessionist movements, including the Abkhaz, to express solidarity with 
other separatist movements.57
Of course, not all who supported the Transdniestrians were outside the government. 
Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoi, for example, initially led the pro-Transdniestrian cause, as
54 Interview with Smirnov by Valery Reshnetnikov, Izvestiva. June 16, 1992, p.2.
55 Andrannik Migranyan, Nezavisimaya Gazeta. January 21, 1994, pp.l, 4.
56 Apparently, two o f Tiraspol’s security chiefs were involved in both criminal activities and political repression and 
thus had both personal and political reasons for continuing the dispute. One of these men, General Vadim Shevtsov 
retained his links with the extremist Russian National Unity part o f Alexandr Barkashkov. Both General Vadim 
Shevtsov and General Nikolai Matveev were former Soviet OMON special political officers. Stuart J. Kaufman 
and Stephen R. Bowers, “Transnational Dimensions of the Transdniestian Conflict” in Nationalities Papers, vol.26, 
no. 1 (1998), pp.129-146, p.136.
57 The Economist. November 13, 1993, pp. 51-2.
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is shown below. Also, “centrists” such as Nikolai Travkin, Chairman of the Democratic Party 
of Russia, were sympathetic to if not supportive of the Transdniestrian desire for independence
f  o
-  although for very different reasons. Travkin had been a member of the parliamentary 
delegation sent to Moldova in September 1991 that had concluded “there can be no question of 
state division of Moldova and recognition by Russia of the self-created Transdniestrian 
Republic”.59Travkin argued, similar to Nationalities Minister Galina Staravoiteva, that force 
should not be used to bring the region under Moscow’s power, but rather that Russia should 
peacefully support the Transdniestrians in making their own decision about their future.60 Later, 
as the situation in Moldova deteriorated in the spring of 1992, the Russian Supreme Soviet 
adopted an appeal to both sides to settle the conflict peacefully, to withdraw armed units from 
the combat zones and to start a political dialogue. The Appeal of 22 March stated that 
Transdniestria should have the right to self-determination if Moldova re-united with Romania.61
iil The Official Position
Initially, the Russian government generally ignored the separatist conflict brewing in 
Moldova. Immediately after the disintegration of the Soviet Union in December 1991, 
Yeltsin signed a statement with the CIS heads of states agreeing to the inviolability of 
Moldovan borders. This action was termed "a corner-stone of its policies towards the 
Moldovan state, the most important factor of stability in the Commonwealth and the
•  f\*y • •  * * •region". Government officials were indecisive, but officially frowned upon the earlier 
Soviet practice of limited support to the Transdniestrians.
58 Nikolai Travkin, Izvestiva. September 25, 1991, p.3. In this article Travkin argues that Transdniestrians are 
not “rightists” but “people who ache for their countrymen” -  i.e. who want to re-unite with Russia and Russian- 
speaking peoples.
5 Eduard Kondratev, Izvestiva. September 19, 1991, p.2.
60 Staravoiteva commented on the views she held in early 1991-92, Author’s Interview with the late Galina 
Staravoiteva, August 17, 1995, Moscow. Staravoiteva, who was murdered in November 1998, was one o f  
Yeltsin’s early advisors on nationality affairs and Duma deputy. “As democrats, we must work to ensure the 
protection o f all peoples and the provision o f equal rights to all, regardless o f  ethnicity or place o f national 
origin.”
61 BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts. March 23, 1992, SU/1336/C4/1.
62 Kiev Statement o f the Heads o f States Members CIS. 1992.
63 Author’s Interview with Staravoiteva, August 17,1995.
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As the growing importance of the simmering Transdniestria-Moldova dispute became 
more evident, Yeltsin chose to support Moldova’s new “democratic” government and the 
principle of territorial integrity over the separatist cause of the pro-Communist 
Transdniestrians. The reasoning behind this was based upon a liberal westernizing idea: 
Russia could not maintain preferential ties with Transdniestria (or other regions) if that meant 
jeopardising its newly favourable relationship with the West. At the time, it was widely 
believed that the West would frown upon Russia’s support for a pro-communist, separatist 
region.64 However, perhaps most significantly, Transdniestrian separatism in Moldova (and 
elsewhere) was not to be encouraged because of the possibility that encouraging separatist 
movements might become a dangerous precedent in the CIS states, provoking numerous 
border disputes, and potentially even leading to the dismemberment of the multinational 
Russian Federation itself.
iii) The Policy
During this first stage, the only “Russian action” in Moldova was taken independently
tli • *by Russia’s 14 Army. It armed and trained the 8000 men in Transdniestria’s "Republican 
Guard" which later fought against the Moldovan government’s forces. The "Republican 
Guard" was a regular corps of full-time salaried soldiers who were experienced veterans of 
the USSR's armed forces. Most of its officers came through formal transfers or informal
tliloans from Russia’s 14 Army. This helps to explain how difficult it was at this time -(and
tlilater) to arrange a genuine withdrawal of Russia’s 14 Army when the soldiers could easily 
transfer into the “Transdniestria Republican Guard”. Technically, in September 1992, the 
“Republican Guard” was reorganised into Transdniestria’s regular army and much of its 
weapons were bought or stolen from the 14th Army.66
Russian military presence was further reinforced by a Spetsnaz (special forces) unit, 
internal security troops, and "border troops" in eastern Moldova. These included many
64 Interview with Fyodor Shelov-Kovedyaev, Nezavisimava Gazeta. July 30, 1992, pp.l, 5.
65 There was general conscription and recruits could serve in either 14th Army or Transdniestrian army.
66 Vladimir Socttr, “Russian Forces in Moldova”, RFE/RL Research Report, vol.l, no.34 (28 August, 1992), pp. 
38-43.
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officers who had served with the KGB and the Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs. Moreover, 
several thousand Russian Cossacks and other soldiers of fortune arrived from Russia in early 
1992 to oppose the Moldovan government. The Cossacks were more interested in restoring 
the Tsanst Empire, rather than in defending Transdniestrian independence. These new, paid 
volunteers, many of whom joined the "Republican Guard", were granted resident permits and 
apartments, and termed "local inhabitants" by Transdniestrian authorities.
The fact that 80% of the 14th Army's personnel, including its officers, were local 
inhabitants also greatly complicated the Army’s involvement in the conflict and the 
negotiation of its continued presence or withdrawal. According to General Alexander Lebed,
tliCommander of the 14 Army, "more than half the officers are ethnic Slavs, bom and raised 
in Moldova. They have apartments here and jobs, but back in Russia they have nothing. 
There is fear as well that if they pull out, their families will fall victim to a new round of 
inter-ethnic fighting".69 Army reservists employed in the area’s defence industry, and 
military veterans, formed privileged groups with common interests and political attitudes -  
including support for a “Greater Russia”. This explains their close bonds with those members 
of the Russian political elite discussed above who subscribed to fundamentalist nationalist 
ideas. Moreover, in 1990 when the Moldovan government threatened to abolish the housing 
and employment privileges of the veterans and soldiers, the local Transdniestrian authorities 
guaranteed their continuation. Thus, the 14th Army’s early position o f support for the 
Transdniestrian separatists can be explained by its long presence and close ties with the local 
populace as well as by the fact that Tiraspol (capital of Transdniestria) had supported its 
residence and privileges.
thHowever, despite the independent actions of the 14 Army on the ground in 
Transdniestria, officially all indications were that the 14th Army was about to be withdrawn. 
And, although Russian troops in Moldova may have been helping to arm certain groups as
67 Moskovskive Novosti. July 1, 1992, p.2.
68 “Press Briefing by Georgy Marakutsa, Chairman o f the Dniester Supreme Soviet”, Official Kremlin 
International News Broadcast. June 23, 1992. There were also thousands o f available and experienced reservists, 
many of which were veterans from Afghanistan, and previously employed in the area's defence-related industries.
69 Moscow Times. October 25,1994, p. 4.
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they did elsewhere in other former Soviet states, these occurrences were conducted quietly 
and on a relatively small scale. The Russian government itself indicated that it was prepared 
to drop the old Soviet tradition of maintaining dominant military influence in the region. If 
anything, only the possibility of peaceful, step-by-step future re-integration was officially 
envisioned.
b) Stage Two: The Battle of Ideas (March 1992 - October 1992)
i) The Debates
Fighting in Moldova broke out on 24 March 1992. This crisis (along with other 
factors discussed in Chapter Four) provoked Russian debates over how the country should 
act towards other potential “hot spots” in the near abroad. During the spring and summer of 
1992, the Moldova-Transdniestria conflict helped bring to an end the initial relatively 
uninformed stage in Russian foreign policy and precipitated the rise of pragmatic nationalist
iL
ideas in the official articulation of Russian policy. During this stage the 14 Army at first 
surreptitiously, and then openly, involved Russia in the Moldova conflict forcing Moscow to 
make decisions about its own actions in a CIS conflict for the first time. Consequently, 
Russian politicians and policy-makers both attacked the government for its lack of policies
7 nand outlined an array of proposals. These ranged from the application of international 
pressure, the dispatch of "peacekeeping" troops, the imposition of economic sanctions and
71military action, to outright annexation of the territory.
Two weeks after the fighting began, discussions were convened at the Sixth Congress 
of People's Deputies (6-21 April 1992) over what Russia’s reaction ought to be towards the
77outbreak of the war. Almost unanimously, the deputies attacked the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MFA) for "lacking minimal virility" in its policy toward the conflict in Moldova. 
They argued that "Russia, as the largest state (in the CIS), naturally is obliged to play first
70 Aleksandr Pilat, Nezavisimava Gazeta. April 7, 1992, p.l
71 Maksim Yusin, Izvestiva, April 14, 1992, p.6.
72 Verbatim report o f 6 April 1992, Sixth Congress o f Russian People's Deputies, in Rossivskaya Gazeta. April 8, 
1992, pp.3-6.
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fiddle in guaranteeing human rights across the border, in the republics of the former
71Union". This was the first major debate in which disagreements between most of the 
members of parliament and some members of the executive became glaringly apparent over 
the issue of using force in CIS conflicts.
Not all key members of the Russian executive advocated a peaceful means to support 
the Moldovan government. Most significantly, Vice-President Aleksandr Rutskoi, an early 
proponent of fundamentalist nationalist foreign policy ideas, whose views were now shifting 
towards pragmatic nationalism, led parliament’s attack on the MFA and Kozyrev.74 Rutskoi’s 
political party criticized the government’s supposed neglect of the issue: "Until recently, the 
Foreign Ministry in effect failed to notice the war in Transdniestria, into which Russia was
nc
drawn long ago, whether we like it or not...".
In his comments at the Sixth Congress, Rutskoi argued that Russians abroad needed 
to be protected from the discrimination being inflicted upon them and proposed the direct use 
of Russian military force to guard against abuses.76 At Rutskoi’s urging, parliament passed a 
resolution in support of the population of Transdniestria entitled "On assistance to ensure
thhuman rights in the Dniester area", which recommended the use of the 14 Army as a
77peacekeeping force. That resolution increased tensions and hostility between Russia and 
Moldova and was met in Moldova by protests and demonstrations. The Moldovan 
government interpreted Rutskoi’s speech as an aggressive signal of Russia's intentions to
70
rebuild its former empire. The Russian MFA attempted to reprimand Rutskoi for his
73 Comments by Deputy Aleksei Surkov during a question and answer session with Kozyrev, Radio Rossiva. April 
18,1992.
74 Author’s Interview with Mikhail Astafiyev, Rutskoi’s deputy in charge o f international relations and foreign 
policy, April 25, 1995.
5 Vasiliy Lipitskiy, Rossivskava Gazeta. June 26, 1992. Lipitskiy was the chairman o f Rutskoi’s “Free Russia 
Party”.
76 Verbatim report o f 6 April 1992, Sixth Congress o f Russian People’s Deputies, in Rossivskava Gazeta. April 8, 
1992, pp.3-6.
77 The proposition was passed on April 6,1992.
78 The Moldovan complaints were made to the United Nations. Resolution o f the Parliament o f the Republic o f  
Moldova, Annex 1, p.2 in “Letter dated June 24, 1992 From The Permanent Representative O f Moldova to the 
United Nations Addressed to The Secretary-Genera”, UN Document S/24185, June 25,1992, pp. 1-2.
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remarks but, undeterred, he continued to make inflammatory remarks, famously declaring, at
70a rally in Bendery, that Transdniestria "existed, exists, and must exist".
Members of Russia’s political elite visited Transdniestria that spring. For example, 
one of the more vocal advocates of fundamentalist nationalist ideas, Aleksandr Prokhanov, 
editor of the newspaper Den, toured the region and used even stronger language than Rutskoi 
in support of the separatists. Although his views reflected those of an extremist minority, 
they received wide press coverage in Russia -  especially in his own paper. Prokhanov 
praised the 14 Army for assisting the Transdniestrians -  although this assistance had not yet 
even been officially acknowledged. As he put it, the use of force was a noteworthy example 
of “how Russia should act” and a first step towards the eventual restoration of the Soviet 
Union.80
aL
In June 1992, serious fighting broke out once again. This time, Russia’s 14 Army 
openly intervened on the side of the Transdniestrians in the battle of Bendery from 19-22 
June. This was the first case of clear Russian military intervention in a new state formed from 
the former Soviet Union. The failure of the MFA’s peaceful negotiation tactics compared to 
the immediate success of Russia’s military actions in the capture of Bendery helped to 
reinforce the pragmatic nationalist view that force might at times be necessary to protect 
Russian interests in the CIS states. After the battle of Bendery, even the Russian MFA 
switched towards a more interventionist foreign policy which was, at least rhetorically, more 
sympathetic to the Transdniestrians. As for parliament as a whole, it supported Russian 
military involvement in Bendery and its only criticisms were that Russia’s actions were too late
Q 1
and too weak, and it blamed the MFA for negotiating an unsatisfactory cease-fire.
Why did Russia’s military actions help form a kind of political consensus over 
general pragmatic nationalist foreign policy ideas? A process of “learning” occurred which
79 It must be emphasized that like many o f the fundamentalist nationalists, Rutskoi used strong rhetoric in an effort 
to gain attention and to increase his personal popularity. It did not always mean that he was prepared to act on his 
words. And, as shall be shown below, once he was given a position in which he could implement policy towards the 
region, Rutskoi’s actions were more moderate than his previous rhetoric. Eduard Kondratev, Izvestiva. April 6, 
1992, p .l.
80 Den’, no. 18 (1992). p.3.
81 Author’s Interview with Dr. Andrei Zagorsky (Vice Rector, MGIMO) May 28, 1999.
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suggested “road maps” for Russia’s future policies. First, Russia’s military involvement 
proved that the West would not criticize or intervene in response to Russia’s actions in the 
CIS states. The 14th Army’s success at the battle of Bendery also seemed to confirm (at least 
to many in the media) that military force might actually prove effective in solving conflicts. 
Continuing tensions followed by the outbreak of conflicts elsewhere demonstrated that it was 
necessary to preserve the presence of military bases in crucial areas abroad in order to solve, 
or at least prevent, the spread of conflicts. After Russia’s military actions in June 1992, the 
foreign policy debate about Moldova centred on two interests whose historic origins were 
outlined in the first section of this chapter: the protection of the Russian diaspora (including 
defining the status of Transdniestria) and the continuation of Russian military presence. 
Moreover, many Russian politicians began to believe that the emotional issue of Russian- 
speakers in the near abroad could be used to score points domestically, and this was 
combined with a growing current of dislike for Yeltsin and his overall policies.
a) Political Attitudes and the Defence of the Russian Diaspora
After the battle of Bendery, deputies in the Duma began to argue for a policy which 
would require Moldova to recognise Transdniestria -  beginning with allowing Transdniestria 
to take part in peace negotiations. Parliamentarians continued to push for the implementation 
of the resolution they had passed earlier requesting the Russian government to mediate talks 
on the legal status of Transdniestria "in keeping with the principles and norms of the UN 
Charter".83 The inclusion of Romania (along with Russia, the Ukraine, and Moldova) in the 
negotiations was criticized as the de facto recognition of Romania's special responsibility in 
Moldova, and thus as playing into the hands of those who supported Moldova's absorption 
into Romania.
Sergei Stankevich, for example, criticized the Russian government for giving in to 
Moldova's unilateral demands for the withdrawal of troops, agreeing to disarm the
82 Timur Abadiev, Rossivskive Vesti. May 6 ,1993, p.2.
83 The resolution o f the Congress of People's Deputies o f the Russian Federation: "On the Assistance in Furthering 
Human Rights in the Dniester Region", no. 2680-1 (April 8,1992).
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Transdniestrian guards and restoring legitimate bodies of power in Moldova. He argued that 
the agreement did not provide any protection or guarantees for the residents of Transdniestria 
other than the "stability of the graveyard".84 He blamed the "obvious indecisiveness and 
inconsistency" of Russia's official “representatives” as the cause for the outbreak of fighting 
in Bendery and Moldova's use of "brute force".85 Stankevich further proposed the creation of 
a federal system in Moldova, recognizing the special status of the Dniester region.
A more extreme position towards protecting the Russian diaspora in Transdniestria also 
attracted rhetorical support. Russian Vice President Alexander Rutskoi used especially 
inflammatory rhetoric when he stated that Russia was willing to come to the forceful aid of
or
Russians abroad, and suggested that Transdniestria could perhaps join Russia. Also acting 
provocatively, Russia’s parliament recommended a proposal (later rejected as being too strong) 
that if Moldova did not agree to Transdniestrian demands such as the creation of a safety 
corridor, the Russian parliament would begin serious discussions about the question of
0*7
Transdniestrian independence -  including how it could be absorbed into Russia. The
oo
parliament even sent a complaint to the CSCE that Moldova had committed “genocide”.
Izvestiva journalist Vladimir Dubnov was one of the very few who argued that “an 
incorrect picture of events in Moldova is forming in Russia” and called on Russian journalists 
and politicians to be less sympathetic to the Transdniestrians. In his opinion, the conflict was
thMoldova’s internal affair and he thought that the 14 Army should immediately withdraw. He 
blamed parliamentarians in Russia for making Moldova Russia’s enemy. “Rutskoi and 
Stankevich have greatly complicated matters. Not having grasped the situation themselves, they
OQ
have deceived their country”.
84 Sergei Stankevich, Izvestiva. July 7, 1992, p.3.
85 Sergei Stankevich, Izvestiva. July 7, 1992, p.3.
86 Eduard Kondratev, Izvestiva. April 6, 1992, p.l
87 Ibid.. p. 1.
88 Fyodor Lukyanov, Izvestiva. July 7,1992, p.5.
89 Vladimir Dumov, Izvestiva. June 12, 1992, p.5.
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bf Political Attitudes on Military Action and the Continuation of Military Presence
The debate over the status of Transdniestria and how to protect the Russian-speaking 
diaspora therefore was intrinsically tied to the debate over what to do with Russia’s military. 
In general, a growing number of members of the political elite defended Russian military 
action in Bendery as a necessity without which Transdniestria would have been destroyed 
and believed that the 14th Army should be used to separate the opponents.90 With the help of 
some Moldovan deputies, a document outlining these views was developed by members of 
Russia’s Supreme Soviet, such as Yevgeny Ambartsumov, but it was later rejected.91
At the end of June 1992, the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Transdniestria, 
Georgy Marakutsa, arrived in Moscow to ask for Russian military assistance and to express 
Transdniestria’s desire for political union with Russia. Soon after, Russia’s parliament 
specifically proposed that the stationing of troops in Moldova (and other areas of the FSU) 
should be a long-term option and that a special provision regarding the status of Russian 
troops abroad should be adopted. Foreign Minister Kozyrev agreed and hoped that this would 
prevent a precedent of the Russian military being involved in other CIS states without legal 
basis -  which had been the case with the 14th Army in Moldova 93 Meanwhile, the Russian 
media began portraying Moldova as the aggressor, unable to act in a peaceful and civilised 
manner, and thus deserving of punitive action by Russia.94
tliThe June 1992 appointment of General Alexander Lebed to command the 14 Army 
also significantly influenced both the Russian debate over military involvement in Moldova 
(as well as towards the near abroad in general) and the specific actions of the 14th Army. 
During his time as commander of the 14 Army (1992-95), General Lebed was committed to 
maintaining a military presence in Moldova. At the beginning of his command he spoke 
openly about the need to recreate the former Soviet or Russian empire. This aggressive
90 Sergei Chugaev, Izvestiva. July 9,1992, pp. 1,2. This article details the positions o f many parliamentarians.
91 This document was rejected when Mosnau, chairman o f the Moldovan parliament in Chisinau, sent a telegram to 
the Moldovan deputies to the effect that they did not have the authority to sign such a document. Vitaliy Buzuev, 
interview with Ambartsumov, Rossivskava Gazeta. April 13, 1992, p .l.
92“Press Briefing by Georgy Marakutsa”, Official Kremlin International News Broadcast. June 23, 1992. (Lexis- 
Nexis). The Transdniestria delegation was headed by Transport Minister Yefimov.
93Andrei Kozyrev, Izvestiva. June 30,1992, p. 3.
94 Ibid.
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rhetoric quickly subsided but Lebed himself described his appointment as marking a shift 
towards a more assertive Russian foreign policy in which Moldova would be a testing 
ground.95 As we shall see below, his tremendous popularity within the army and the local 
population later won him a political role in Transdniestria.
ii) The Official Position
Initially, the Russian government did not respond to the Moldova crisis in March 
1992 except to state that it would support Moldova’s sovereignty through peaceful means. 
The MFA (then primarily in charge of foreign policy making) was not prepared to support 
the separatists or to condone the use of military force. Instead, its declared aims were to 
support the Moldovan government on the basis of democratic international norms and to 
encourage the involvement of international organisations in negotiating the dispute. 
According to Deputy Foreign Minister Anatoly Adamishin, these implicit aims were not 
specifically targeted towards Moldova but made in other broad contexts.96 Unilateral military 
actions were not justifiable even to defend the human rights of the Russian-speaking 
diaspora. Fyodor Shelov-Kovedyaev, Kozyrev's principle deputy in 1992, argued against 
Russia's use of armed forces specifically in Moldova The difference between Kozyrev’s 
views and the more aggressive ones expressed by Rutskoi and many of the parliamentary 
deputies were recognised and appreciated by the Moldovan government. Moldovan President 
Snegur eventually termed Rutskoi a “Nazi” but he acknowledged that “I have been told that 
Boris Nikolaevich was offended. I am counting very much on the clear-headed thinking of 
Andrei Kozyrev”.98
Initially, Yeltsin remained silent. He may have felt that he owed a certain allegiance 
to Moldovan President Snegur for being one of the few CIS leaders who supported him 
during the August 1991 coup. Then, according to Russia’s Minister of Defence Pavel
95 See Lebed’s comments in Moscow News, no.27 (July 5, 1992), p.2.
96 Personal Interview with Anatoly Adamishin, June 9, 1999. Also see Chapter Four.
97 Shelov-Kovedyaev in Aleksandr Gagua (interview with Shelov-Kovedyaev), Nezavisimava Gazeta. July 30, 
1992, pp. 1,5.
98 Snegur interviewed by Sergei Mitin, Izvestiva. June 9, 1992, p.2.
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Grachev, immediately before the battle of Bendery Yeltsin advocated the withdrawal of the 
14th Army." Yeltsin envisioned that this withdrawal would be determined by talks between 
Russia and Moldova that would take into account the costs, the ability to re-house the troops, 
and the stability of the political situation in Moldova. However, the primary goal of Russia’s 
policy was to retain its army in Transdniestria in order to prevent the development of a civil 
war.
After Bendery, the Russian government’s rhetoric became similar to that of the 
parliament. It was increasingly sympathetic towards the separatists, and officially raised the 
issue of discrimination against the Russian population in Moldova.100 The Russian 
government began specifically both to support the separatists in their parliamentary boycott 
and their rejection of the Moldovan government’s offer to form a “government of national 
consensus”. Yeltsin himself became more active in making foreign policy towards Moldova. 
He met with the Presidents of Moldova, Romania and the Ukraine and argued for the need 
for Russia to play a humanitarian role and he promised the neutrality of the 14th Army.101 
Later, reminiscing about the burden of Russia’s involvement in Moldova, Yeltsin wrote that
i no“Moldova can hardly resolve this problem without us”. However, Yeltsin’s primary 
objectives continued to be to "secure Russia's entry into the civilised community" and to
1 m"enlist maximum support of (Russia's) efforts towards transformation." "Concerning the 
general international activities of the government, the central goals are... to ensure external 
conditions favourable to the political and economic reforms that have been started".104 It was 
evident that not all liberal westemist ideas would be discarded in the government’s 
development of a more “pragmatic” foreign policy.
Meanwhile, Foreign Minister Kozyrev was on the defensive for not being able to 
prevent the war. In an address to the Congress of People's Deputies, he argued that his
99 Pavel Felgenhauer (interview with Russian Defence Minister Grachev) Nezavisimava Gazeta. June 9, 1992,
pp. 1-2.
100 Author’s Interview with Dr Andrei Zagorsky, May 28, 1999.
101 “Communique o f the meeting o f the Presidents o f the Republic o f Moldova, Romania, the Russian 
Federation and Ukraine”, UN Document. Annex, S/24230, July 2, 1992.
102 Boris Yeltsin, Midnight Diaries (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2000), p.250.
103 Yeltsin's speech at the Congress o f People's Deputies, Rossivskava Gazeta. April 8,1992, pp.l, 3-4.
104 Ibid.
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negotiation policies had not been cowardly: "Megaphone diplomacy and heroic poses by me or 
by anyone else, lead nowhere, absolutely nowhere. We cannot send a military helicopter for 
every Russian-speaking boy or girl in a school in Moldova... M.105 Kozyrev also countered the 
accusation that his foreign ministry had neglected CIS members, labelling it "pure political 
rivalry" on the part of the "same forces attempting to stage a battle over the question of 
preserving the Union, this time in the form of the CIS".106 However at the same time, Kozyrev 
now also argued that,"... if systematic murders are committed and the diplomatic brakes do not 
work, Russia has the right -  pending intervention by an international court of arbitration -  to
1 (VI • • •apply unilateral sanctions". As the liberal newspaper Nezavisimava Gazeta surmised: "It is 
very difficult not to intervene, not to pound the table with one's fist (or pound Kishinev (now 
Chisinau) with aircraft), when one sees what is happening in Moldova". But "...the 
democratically minded people of Russia will have to struggle with all their might against 
attempts to forcibly change borders, even if they are justified by the loftiest and most obvious 
principles of reason".108
iii) The Policy
After the first round of fighting broke out in March 1992, Foreign Minister Kozyrev 
attempted to reach a solution by means of negotiations and initiated an OSCE sponsored 
summit with the foreign ministers of the Ukraine, Moldova and Romania. He hoped to secure 
economic autonomy for the Russian minority in Transdniestria while, at the same time, 
stressing the importance of preserving the territorial integrity of all CIS countries including 
Moldova. The summit culminated with a statement that “Russia, Ukraine, and Romania 
intend from now on to build relations with Moldova, based on respect for the territorial 
integrity and independence of this state”.109 A multilateral commission was created to allow 
political consultations and monitor a cease-fire and a disengagement of forces. Transdniestria
105 Radio Rossiva. April 18,1992.
106 Andrei Kozyrev, Nezavisimava Gazeta. April 1,1992, pp.l, 3.
107 Andrei Kozyrev, Izvestiva. June 30,1992, p.3.
108 Dimitry Furman, Nezavisimava Gazeta. July 3,1992, p.3.
109 Eduard Kondratev, Izvestiva. March 25, 1992, p .l.
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was declared a free economic zone. However, although the negotiations did eventually lead
to a first cease-fire on 7 April, sporadic fighting continued throughout the area.110
Thus, Kozyrev responded to the outbreak of fighting in Moldova and to criticism that
he had earlier neglected the FSU by pursuing a more engaged policy. Besides initiating a
leading role for the Russian government in the negotiations, Kozyrev became more
personally involved. He went on a series of trips to Moldova during which he repeatedly
promised Russian support for Moldova’s territorial integrity. He visited Moldova during his
first official tour of the former Soviet states from 2 to 10 April. His trip coincided with the
second round of quadripartite negotiations among the foreign ministers of Ukraine, Moldova
and Romania on 6 April. However, despite these activities, Kozyrev had little success in his
aim of guaranteeing the territorial integrity of Moldova. The idea was deemed redundant by
the Ukraine, and his suggestion of using Russia's 14th Army as a peacekeeping force was
rejected by all parties on the basis of its questionable neutrality. Kozyrev also visited the
Transdniester region where he denied that Rutskoi’s comments were government policy and
instead encouraged the separatists to support the cease-fire.
On 28 March 1992, Transdniestria appealed to Russia for protection as fighting spread
for the first time to Bendery. Officially this request was ignored but, unofficially, Russian troops
in the region helped to arm, and even to fight alongside, the separatists. Izvestiva reported that
Russia had sent financial aid to Tiraspol in March, and that on April 14th Army troops were
arming and fighting alongside the Transdniestrians.111 There is also some evidence that as
112early as March 1992 the Bank of Russia was sending money in support of the separatists.
On 1 April 1992, Yeltsin removed the 14th Army from CIS control and placed it under
1 1  ' l
the command of the Russian Federation. From then on, the army stationed in Transdniestria’s
110 Eduard Kondratev, Izvestiva. April 7,1992, pp.l, 5.
111 Eduard Kondratev, Izvestiva. April 20,1992, p. 1.
112 Radio Odin. March 25, 1992.
113 With the disintegration o f the Soviet Union, Ukraine took over the 14th Army forces on her territory. Moldova 
demanded the 14th Army’s removal from its territory while Transdniestrian leaders attempted to gain hold o f it. 
However, after a brief period of CIS control, on April 2, 1992 Yeltsin passed a decree placing the army under 
Russian control. Thus, minus the right-bank units due to be transferred to Moldova, the 14th Army was incorporated 
in Russia’s armed forces. At the same time, Russia also appropriated from CIS command the paratroop units on the 
right bank of the Dniester. As well, large amounts o f equipment belonging to right-bank forces and scheduled to be
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capital Tiraspol was widely accused of being an active participant in the separatist conflict. In 
May, both Russian Defence Minister Pavel Grachev and CIS Commander-in Chief Yevgeny 
Shaposhnikov threatened to intervene on the side of the Transdniestrians.114 Although the
thprecise role that the 14 Army played in the dispute remains contentious, it has been generally
thaccepted that the 14 Army provided the separatist militia forces with weapons and intervened 
on their behalf during the crucial battle of Bendery.115 Approximately 5000 men from the 14th 
Army crossed to the right bank of the Dniester and became involved in fighting around 
Bendery, helping the Transdniestrians to force the Moldovan troops from the city. There is now
tfi"overwhelming evidence" that in this battle the 14 Army was taking its orders from superiors 
in the Russian army.116 Valery Manilov, the military spokesman for the CIS command, is
thquoted as having said in early 1993 that the 14 Army did not take a “single step” without
117explicit approval from Moscow.
After the breakdown of the first cease-fire and Russia’s military involvement in June 
in Bendery, Kozyrev and the MFA lost their previously dominant position in the negotiation 
process. Instead, for the first time, Yeltsin and Rutskoi agreed with each other on how to 
solve the conflict and they both took on higher profiles in the negotiating process. At the 
same time, Yeltsin’s foreign policy towards the near abroad became more assertive while 
Rutskoi’s became less extreme and more “pragmatic”. Similar to other advocates of 
fundamentalist nationalist ideas, when given the chance to actually implement decisions, 
Rutskoi’s actions were much more moderate than his words had been. This was not
handed over to Moldova were transferred to left bank units by Russian and CIS military authorities. By 1992, on 
the right bank Russian forces included the 14th Army garrison in Bendery, the 300th Paratroop Regiment in 
central Chisinau and the Lower Dniester Border Guards on the Moldovan-Romania border -  under CIS 
command. See, Vladimir Socur, “Russian Forces in Moldova”, RFE/RL Research Report, vol.l, no.34 (28 
August, 1992), pp. 38-43.
114 Valery Vyzhutovich, Izvestiva. May 27, 1992, p .l.
115 The city o f Bendery, located on the right bank of the Dniester river, had voted in a local referendum to join 
the Transdniester Republic. By June 1992, political power in the city was divided between the municipal 
government and the militia subordinated to Tiraspol and the Moldovan municipal police. On June 19th, the 
Moldovan government moved its military into the city. General Lebed assumed operational command o f the 
14th Army, and with the help o f the Transdniestria militia, defeated the Moldovan offensive and captured 
Bendery by June 21.
116 Bruce D. Porter and Carol R. Saivetz, “The Once and Future Empire: Russia and the near abroad”, The 
Washington Quarterly, vol. 17, no.3 (Summer 1994), pp.75-90, p.84.
117 Ibid.
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surprising as it is usually easier to espouse emotional, anti-government rhetoric than to take 
responsibility for coping with conflicts.
On 3 June 1992, Yeltsin and Moldova’s President Snegur met and agreed to create a 
“safety corridor” controlled by peacekeeping forces between the two warring parties. Rutskoi 
was sent in place of the “softer” Kozyrev to negotiate another cease-fire -  which took effect 
on 25 June. The Moldovan side was now much more accommodating. For the first time, 
Moldova agreed to Transdniestria’s participation as an observer. In return for Moldova’s 
newly co-operative stance, Rutskoi abandoned his previous one-sided support of the
1 to
separatists and increased political pressure on Transdniestria to come to an agreement.
In early July that year, Yeltsin and Snegur met again and agreed upon a cease-fire and 
the need to separate the combatants.119 This process resulted in a bilateral agreement signed 
on 21 July which included the withdrawal of all combat forces, the creation of a multilateral 
peacekeeping force, a provision for the gradual withdrawal of the 14th Army, and the 
commitment that the territorial integrity of Moldova would be ensured. However, the 
agreement also specified that if Moldova opted to reunify with Romania, Transdniestria 
would be allowed to secede. The provision for Russian withdrawal, however, soon became 
conditional on an agreement for a political settlement.
Subsequently, a security zone 225 km long and between 4-12 km wide was 
established and a tripartite peacekeeping force was set up with a joint headquarters. Rather 
than an international or neutral force, a ten-battalion peacekeeping force was made up of the 
combatants themselves (five Russian, three Moldovan, and two Dniester battalions). Russia 
was named guarantor of the truce and dominated the peacekeeping organisation. The 21 July 
cease-fire agreement in effect granted Transdniestria de facto independence and, soon after, 
Rutskoi was again invited to Transdniestria to help form a coalition government. In a 
subsequent round of negotiations in September 1992, Moldova agreed that Bendery would 
become a free economic zone (similar to the rest of Transdniestria).
1,8 Author’s Interview with Mikhail Astafiyev, Rutskoi’s deputy in charge o f international relations and foreign 
policy, June 25, 1995.
119 Mircea Snegur, Letter dated 31 July 1992 from the President o f the Republic o f Moldova addressed to the 
Secretary General, UN Document S/24360, p.3.
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c) Stage Three: Achieving Consensus (October 1992-June 1996)
i) The Debates
During the third stage, from late 1992 to 1996, the relations between certain specific 
members of the Russian political elite, especially the pro-communist and Greater-Russia 
oriented movements and the Transdniestrian separatists, remained strong. The Russian 
government made no effort to diminish these ties and continued to tolerate them even when
Transdniestria supported the communist-nationalist rebels (as it had in the August 1991
1 0(\putsch) in Russia’s failed coup in October 1993. During the October coup, fighters from 
Transdniestria made up the largest and most active of the former USSR groups in the 
rebellion.121
After the coup, the new Russian State Duma elected in December of that year 
continued to support the Transdniestrians. For example, it recommended the creation of a 
Russian consulate in Tiraspol, and agreed to send observers to an illegal referendum on 
Transdniestria’s status.122 Many of the newly elected deputies -  especially Zhirinovsky and 
the Communist faction -  called for Transdniestria’s separation.123 In terms of military 
involvement, however, the previously forceful rhetoric was becoming more cautious. For 
example, in 1993, Sergei Karaganov warned that “In case the armed conflict recommences, 
the unification of Moldova and Romania will emerge as the only alternative. Annexation by 
Russia (of Transdniestria) will be a questionable acquisition and will set a dangerous
120 The dispute between the Russian parliament and president came to a head in the fall o f 1993, when Yeltsin 
disbanded the parliament. Subsequently on December 12 1993, there was an election for a new parliament and 
plebiscite held for a new constitution. See Chapter Three for details.
121 Vladimir Socur, “Dniester Involvement in the Moscow Rebellion”, RFE/RL Research Report, vol.2, no.46 
(November 19, 1993), p.25. This was a small force that included members o f their Republican Guard (irregular 
army) and Transdniester Battalion (special purpose force) and Black Sea Cossacks (composed o f  Russians 
claiming Cossack ancestry and linked to Don Cossack factions in Russia). There were also officers o f  the 
former USSR Ministry o f Internal Affairs OMON units (from Riga and Tallinn who were transferred to 
Dniester Republic after the collapse o f Soviet rule in the Baltics). Also involved were Transdniestrian irregulars 
who fought with Serbs against Croatia after the 1992 cease-fire in Moldova as were members o f Transdniestrian 
units which had supported Abkhazia against Georgia. Tiraspol officially denied the involvement o f  
Transdniestrians but many observations by officials and the media confirmed the presence o f  Transdniestrians 
and their participation in attacks and protection o f top rebel leaders including Rutskoi.
122 “Declaration of the Ministry o f Foreign Affairs of the Republic o f Moldova to the United Nations on November 
18,1995”, UN Document. S/1995/971, November 20,1995, Annex, p.2.
123 Leonid Mlechin, Izvestiva. December 28, 1993, p.3.
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precedent posing a threat to the territorial integrity of Russia itself. In the meanwhile, the
separation of Pridnestrovye [Transdniestria] and the possibility to use it as an instrument of
pressure on Ukraine, Moldova, and Romania might appear tempting for the Russian “state
minded” politicians. However, Russia has little legal rationale for such action”.124
Meanwhile, Lebed was elected to the Transdniestrian Supreme Soviet in September
1993, winning 88 percent of the vote on a platform openly advocating that Transdniestria be
transferred to Russian control. The decision of a foreign citizen, a commander of a foreign
army located in Moldova, to take part in unconstitutional elections was seen by the
Moldovan Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a “brutal and unspeakable interference” in
Moldova’s internal affairs. Moreover, it was interpreted as a “new attempt by certain forces
106in Russia for a de facto recognition of the pseudo Dniester Republic”.
With strong popular support in Transdniestria, General Lebed had great power over 
the decisions that affected the status of the 14th Army. Lebed repeatedly referred to 
Transdniestria as a part of Russia and the right bank city of Bendery as “an inalienable part 
of the Dniester republic” -  thereby undermining previous agreements signed by President 
Yeltsin. Although his views were independent of those of the Russian government, however,
1 07the Russian MoD seems to have generally supported them.
By 1994, Lebed was not only criticising the Moldovan government but was also
1 “ORextremely vocal in his denunciation of the Transdniestrian government. He attacked the 
Transdniester leadership for its corruption, including criminal activities such as illegal arm 
sales -  especially implicating Transdniestria’s security organizations. Lebed also became 
highly critical of the Russian government. His position was most sympathetic towards the 
difficult situation in which many local Transdniestrians found themselves -  stuck in the 
middle of a conflict and abandoned by Russia. Consistently he argued against the withdrawal
124 Sergei Karaganov, Russia-the State o f Reforms (Guttersloh: Bertelsmann Foundation Publishers, 1993),
p.62.
125 “Statement o f the Ministry of Foreign Affairs o f  the Republic o f Moldova”, UN Document S/26452, 
Annex, September 14, 1993. p.2.
126 “Statement o f the Ministry for Foreign Affairs o f the Republic o f Moldova”, UN Document. S/26452, 
Annex, September 14, 1993, p.2.
127 Author’s Interview with Dr. Andrei Zagorsky, May 28, 1999.
128 Natalya Prikhodka, Nezavisimava Gazeta. April 9, 1994, p .l.
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of his army from Transdniestria. “Until the status of this area is defined and until it is 
guaranteed at an international level that peace will be preserved here, we will not leave...
190The politicians can take this into account or ignore it”.
Lebed’s earlier victory at Bendery and his rising popularity as spokesman for 
Russian-speakers in the near abroad would later help him in his political career in Russia. 
Before that however, Lebed’s actions in Transdniestria helped to popularise many of the 
pragmatic nationalist ideas: the need for Russia to remain involved in the near abroad, to be 
more assertive in protecting its interests, and to protect the rights of Russian-speakers there. 
(See Chapter Three for the details of the evolution of Lebed’s views and their influence on 
policy).
The 14 Army remained in Transdniestria. Later in 1995, when Russian Defence
Minister Grachev proposed its reduction, Lebed and the Russian Duma led by Konstantin
Zatulin, Chair of the Committee on CIS Affairs and Relations with Compatriots, protested.
They argued that the financial and technical difficulties of the withdrawal of the army would
110be too great, and they were concerned about what would happen to the military weapons. 
Zatulin, also at the time the head of the Duma delegation to Transdniestria held views
tlisimilar to those of Lebed. In his opinion, the 14 Army was “the guarantee of peace and 
tranquillity in Transdniestria” -  otherwise, he proffered, there would be another war such as 
in Chechnya.132 Other Duma deputies repeated Lebed’s arguments that any reduction in the 
army command would be a “crime”. Then, on 24 May 1995, the Duma passed the first
tlireading of the federation resolution that imposed a ban on changing the structure of the 14 
Army’s command and forbade any reduction of either the 14th Army or its equipment.133 On 
February 9 1996, the Duma voted 310-4 that Russian troops should remain in Transdniestria
129 Sveltlana Gamova, Izvestiva, February 26, 1993, p.5.
130 Leonid Bershidsky, Moscow Times, June 8, 1995.
131 Itar-Tass. May 22, 1995.
132 Itar-Tass. February 11, 1995.
133 Irina Selivanova, “Trans-Dniestria”, in Jeremy Azrael and Emil Payin (eds.), US and Russian Policymaking 
with Respect to the Use o f Force (Santa Monica: RAND, 1996). On line at www.rand.orq. Selivanova is 
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and that a Russian consulate should be opened there.134 However, as will be seen below, 
despite Duma support Lebed was fired. Therefore, notwithstanding Lebed’s widespread 
popularity inside and outside Russia, and his influence on events in Moldova and more 
generally on Russian foreign policy thinking, he was dependant upon Yeltsin’s support.
ii) The Official Position
The Moldovan government wrongly assumed that its steadfast support for 
“democracy” and Yeltsin would eventually win Russia’s support against the “traitors” and 
“communists” from Transdniestria. Russian policy after 1992 did continue to support 
Moldova’s territorial integrity but it became more openly sympathetic to the separatists both 
in terms of military support and in its negotiations. It appears that supporting democracy in 
the former Soviet republics was not a significant factor in the development of Russia’s 
policy. While acting to bring peace to the region, Russia sided primarily with whichever side 
could help retain her primary interests, and secondly with whichever side had more influence 
in Russia’s domestic politics. From mid 1992-94, supporting Transdniestria was useful in
th • •maintaining a base for Russia’s 14 Army and in providing a means to remain involved in 
the region. It was also useful as a popular and emotional issue with which to galvanise public 
support inside Russia.
Using Moldova as an example, in 1992 Kozyrev emphasized that Russia did not have a 
moral right to remain indifferent to requests for help to ensure peace, and even went so far as to 
advocate military force in special circumstances. In direct opposition to his earlier statements, 
Kozyrev argued that this “hard-line” approach had already been developed, used, and proved 
effective in the Trans-Dniester conflict. Not surprisingly, Kozyrev’s thinking greatly 
concerned the Moldovan government which now interpreted his rhetoric as provocative and was 
suddenly concerned that Moldova might be threatened by the "application of force” if the 
conditions imposed by the 14 Army were not met. The Moldovan Ministry of Foreign Affairs
134 Don Ionescu, “Playing the Dniester Card in and After the Russian Election”, Transition, vol.2, no. 17 (August 
23, 1996), pp.26-28.
135 "Address by Andrei Kozyrev Before the Russian Supreme Soviet", Russian Television Network October 22, 
1992.
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fL
accused the Russian 14 Army of violating the Moldovan-Russian Convention of 21 July
1992, and bringing "total disaster and despair" to the population of the left bank of the Dniester
river through "excessive militarization..., persecution of those who share different views,
restrictions on travelling and prohibition of participation in the elections to the Parliament of
1the Republic of Moldova...". Russia’s MFA claimed that Russia was involved politically 
and militarily in the conflict primarily in order to defend the human rights of Russians in 
Moldova. However this was not substantiated, either by Russians in Moldova or by UN
1 77reports which found no evidence that their rights had been infringed. 
iifi The Policy
By the fall of 1992, the military conflict had ended and the situation stabilised. From 
August 1992 until 1 December 1994, with the tacit consent of the Russian peacekeeping 
forces, Transdniestrian authorities moved three motorised brigades into the security zone, as 
well as a border guard detachment and several Cossack detachments totalling 3,500 men. 
These actions caused the Moldovan members of the joint Russian-Moldovan commission 
supervising the cease-fire to complain about Russia’s biased role and her interference in internal
1 *\QMoldovan affairs. On many other occasions, the Moldovan government expressed dismay 
about Russia's support for maximum Transdniestrian autonomy.140 According to Moldovan 
authorities, Russia acted as a “protective shield” behind which Tiraspol was able to consolidate 
its state structures, including its own constitution and currency, form its own army and border 
guard units, and take control of a large section of the security zone. They worried that when the
136 Quoted in "Statement issued by the Ministry o f Foreign Affairs o f the Republic o f Moldova on 10 February 
1994", United Nations, Security Council, UN Document S/1994/195, Annex, p.2.
137 Charles King, Post-Soviet Moldova. A Borderland in Transition (London: RIIA, Post-Soviet Business 
Forum, 1995), ppl4-15.
138 Mihai Grubincea, “Rejecting a New Role for the Former 14th Russian Army”, Transition, vol.2, no.6 (March 
22, 1996), pp.38-40, p.38.
139 In Februaiy 1993, the Moldovan government complained o f "large scale military manoeuvres" by the 14th 
Army. Nicolae Tau (Moldovan Minister o f Foreign Affairs), “Letter dated 18th February to the Secretary General, 
United Nations, Security Council”, UN Document S/25321, Annex, 1993, p.2.
140 Natalya Prikhodka, Nezavisimava Gazeta November 25,1993, p.3.
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14th Army eventually left Transdniestria would still have its own pro-Russian army -  which 
could then be manipulated by Russia in order to keep Moldova within its sphere of influence.141
In a sudden and short-lived policy reversal in June 1993, Russia did demand permanent 
military bases in both Transdniestria and the right-bank.142 This harsh demand was quickly 
withdrawn but was followed on 1 August by the imposition of high tariffs on goods imported 
from Moldova -  further damaging the already distressed Moldovan economy. In October 1993, 
under severe economic pressure, Moldova gave in to Russian demands and agreed to join the 
CIS Economic Union as well as several other political structures.143 The reason President 
Snegur gave to justify this new position was that without CIS membership Moldova would have 
reduced possibilities of co-operation with other CIS members. As well, he said, Moldova’s 
possibilities of buying energy sources, fuel and raw materials would be gravely damaged and 
her chances for selling products on the Russian market would suffer.144 In response to 
Moldova’s entering into the CIS agreements in December 1994 Russia lifted the punitive tariffs 
on Moldovan goods.
Under great economic, political and military pressure from Russia, the Moldovan 
government -  believing that there was little choice but to cooperate with Russia -  also became 
more flexible in its negotiations over Russian troop withdrawal. Talks between the two states
thover the withdrawal of the 14 Army had begun in the fall of 1992. However, they had quickly 
become deadlocked when the Russian government suddenly decided to link the terms of the 
withdrawal to the "satisfactory" resolution of the Transdniestria conflict.
141 "Memorandum on the maintenance of peace and stability in the CIS, signed by the Heads o f State o f the CIS in 
Alma Ata on 10 February 1995", United Nations, General Assembly, UN Document A/50/120 (April 10, 1995), 
pp.2-3.
142 At a meeting with senior officials o f the Russian MoD, the Moldova's Minister o f Foreign Affairs, loudly 
objected to Yeltsin's proposals o f the creation of military bases on Moldovan territory and reiterated Moldova's 
official position o f insisting on "complete, unconditional and immediate withdrawal o f all foreign military forces 
from Moldovan territory". “Declaration o f the Ministry o f Foreign Affairs o f the Republic o f Moldova, United 
Nations, Security Council”, UN Document S/25962 (June 16,1993), p.2.
143 In December 1991, Moldova had joined the CIS but had restricted its participation to economic matters. In 
mid 1993, Moldova joined the CIS Economic Union and signed several political conventions. Then in April 8 
1994, Moldova ratified its entry into the CIS economic structures but not the military alliance. This is examined 
further below. Natalya Prikhodka, Nezavisimava Gazeta. December 4, 1994, p.3.
144 Ibid.
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After Moldova increased her level of co-operation with Russia, Yeltsin 
recommended in February 1994 that the OSCE be used to find a final political settlement to 
the conflict. A bilateral commission was created to work out the details of special status to be 
conferred upon Transdniestria. By the end of July, Moldova had adopted a new constitution 
which asserted its sovereignty but also gave substantial autonomy to Transdniestria and 
Gagauzia. As a result of this compromise, representatives of Russia’s MoD finally agreed to
tfibegin talks on the withdrawal of the 14 Army and in August 1994, the MoD declared that 
Russia was ready to withdraw troops.145 However, now that Russia had for the first time 
agreed to withdrawal, it was both Moldova and Transdniestria hesitated. Moldovans believed 
that the presence of Russian troops was necessary in order to curb the separatists, but 
Transdniestrians wanted the Russian troops to remain in order to safeguard their interests. 
The commander of the 14th Army, Lebed, also continued to resist the withdrawal of Russian 
troops which he deemed necessary in order to “keep the peace”.
In October 1994 the Moldovan government finally agreed to the three year phased 
withdrawal of the 14th Army dependent upon the political settlement of the conflict. 
However, no political settlement was forthcoming. Analysts Kaufman and Bowers may have 
been correct to argue that the negotiations had stalled largely because Transdniestria no 
longer had any incentive to make concessions as long as the Russian army remained.146 
However, less persuasive is the analysts’ argument that Russian officials anticipated that this 
would be Transdniestria’s reaction and considered it to be part of a grand Russian plan to 
secure its military presence in the region.147 Instead, it seems that with no political agreement 
forthcoming, at this stage Moscow continued its policy of keeping troops deployed until all 
conditions for a withdrawal were present and until an agreement could be ratified by 
parliament. Both the MoD and Yeltsin made clear their increasing reluctance to continue to 
accept the political and economic costs of maintaining the troops.
145 “Press Briefing by the Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Grigory Karasin”, Official Kremlin 
International News Broadcast. October 25, 1994. (Lexis-Nexis)
146 Stuart J. Kaufman and Stephen R. Bowers, “Transnational Dimensions o f the Transdniestian Conflict” in 
Nationalities Papers, vol.26, no. 1 (1998), pp.129-146, p. 133.
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In the final analysis, Russian troops did not withdraw but they were downsized. In
thApril 1995, despite protests in the Duma, the 14 Army was transformed into an “operational 
military group” -  prompting Lebed’s resignation. Subsequently, in June 1995 Grachev 
proposed the retention of a military base in Transdniestria, and by December 1995, Russia 
suggested that the 14th Army take over the duties of the Russian peacekeeping forces in 
Moldova because of the “huge burden of expenses”. This may be interpreted as a step 
towards withdrawal. The immediate result, however, was the continuation of a Russian 
military presence in the region.148
Meanwhile, negotiations over the political status of Transdniestria continued to be 
stalled even though both sides were now, at least rhetorically, more accommodating towards 
each other and no longer threatening the use of force.149 The Transdniestrian separatist 
leadership hoped that the 1996 Russian presidential elections would bring to power a new 
president, such as Zyuganov150 or Zhirinovsky -  both of whom were more vocally 
sympathetic to Transdniestria cause.151 Yeltsin, meanwhile, attempted to broker a political 
resolution before the elections, obviously partly because it may have increased his popularity. 
Thanks to his effort, Snegur and Smirnov initialled a peace memorandum on 17 June and 
outlined an agreement that Transdniestria would function as a separate state. However, this 
was a short-lived victory as immediately thereafter Snegur refused to sign the agreement and 
once again the peace process stalled. The signing ceremony, due to take place on 27 June,
1 ^ 7was cancelled.
148 Mihai Grubincea, “Rejecting a New Role for the Former 14th Russian Army”, Transition, vol.2, no.6 (March 
22, 1996), pp.38-40, p.38.
149 Joe Camplisson and Michael Hall, Hidden Frontiers (Newtownabbey: Island Publications, 1996). (This book 
is the result o f  a series o f “learning exchanges” between those involved in conflict resolution in Moldova and 
Northern Ireland.)
150 Zyuganov explained his views on foreign policy at this time in Intercon Daily Report on Russia. March 26, 
1996. (Lexis-Nexis)
151 See “Appeal by the Creative Intelligentsia of Russia in support o f Gennady Zyuganov as Candidate for 
President o f Russia”, Pravda Rossi i. Marcy 28, 1996, p .l. In this appeal there is a call to save “our people dying 
in Transdniestria”.
152Kommersant-Dailv. August 14, 1996, p.4. On November 13, 1996, the Russian Duma declared Transdniestria 
a “zone o f special interest for Russia” and asked that Yeltsin consider installing permanent bases there.
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4. Conclusions
Russia’s interests in the Moldova-Transdniestria conflict were conditioned by the fact 
that both Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union had earlier adopted policies to assert their 
influence over the territory. Russia’s historical inheritance from these relations included: the
ththreat that Moldova might join Romania; the presence of the 14 Army in Moldova; a large 
Russian-speaking diaspora located particularly in the Transdniestria region; and weak 
economic ties with the region. This combined inheritance ensured Russia’s general interest in 
the war.
Within the parameters of these four long-standing interests Russian foreign policy­
makers faced many policy options. The significance of the material environment in each case 
was controversial and did not dictate one specific policy path. There were gaps between 
Russia’s real and perceived interests and therefore debates about policy choices mattered.
Russia was militarily, and then politically, involved in the Moldova-Transdniestria
thconflict from 1992 through to the 1996 negotiations. Previous relations facilitated the 14 
Army’s unofficial support of the separatists after 1991 -  the transfer and sale of weapons, 
training of troops and even fighting on their behalf. The earlier relations also help to explain 
why Russian policy towards the conflict has been interpreted as favouring the 
Transdniestrians. This conclusion, however, was misleading because early on in the conflict 
the 14th Army acted without an official, publicly acknowledged government policy -  
although it had the tacit support of the military leadership in Moscow.
thThe actions of the 14 Army greatly affected the first results “on the ground” and 
they, in turn, influenced both the Russian debates about the conflict and official government
t hpolicy towards the new events. The 14 Army’s support of Transdniestria, vocally backed 
by an array of domestic forces in Russia, helped ensure that Transdniestria would win the 
war, consolidate new state structures and avoid further major outbreaks of fighting. Later on, 
Russian peacekeepers also played a significant role in assuring peace in Moldova.
In stage one, from August 1991 to March 1992, Russia’s foreign policy debates on 
the topic were limited. Generally the Russian political elite was sympathetic to the
174
Transdniestrians because of their long-standing personal, political and economic ties as well 
as ethnic connections with the region. Because of these former ties, as well as the fact that 
the Soviet Union had only broken up in December of 1991 and everyone was still adjusting 
to that reality, early debate was dominated by the fundamentalist nationalist idea of reuniting 
Transdniestria with Russia.
The debates appear to have had little impact on official Russian foreign policies at 
this time. Rather, these policies were based upon the liberal westemist ideas of supporting 
Moldova’s new “democratic” government and territorial integrity. Supporting the pro­
communist and separatists from Transdniestria was not a viable option for the government 
because it considered that to do so would jeopardise Russia’s relations with the West and 
perhaps even encourage separatism within Russia itself. Nevertheless, “on the ground” in 
Moldova, Russia’s 14th Army acted independently, on a relatively small scale, to arm and 
train the local Transdniestrian population.
In stage two, from March 1992 to October 1992, Russia became militarily involved in 
the conflict -  the first such involvement in a new state form from the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. When fighting broke out in March, it created an opportunity for the Russian political 
elite to express their concerns and in an open debate to propose various options for how 
Russia should react and what Russia’s future in Moldova (and elsewhere in the FSU) ought 
to be. The parliament, led by Rutskoi, strongly supported the Transdniestrian side, while the 
MFA supported neutral negotiations to bring about peace. No official policy was drawn and 
the 14th Army continued to support the Transdniestrians.
The outbreak of violence in March and the ensuing foreign policy debates led to the 
formation of a consensus among the Russian political elite that Russia should be more 
actively involved in preventing war and in protecting its diasporas -  particularly those 
threatened by war. Thus, a process of “learning” occurred in reaction to the event towards 
which Russia’s policy was seen as hesitant and floundering. Pragmatic nationalist ideas 
increased in popularity.
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thSubsequently, in June 1992 when the 14 Army helped to capture Bendery following 
the second outbreak of violence in Moldova, pragmatic nationalist ideas became even more 
widely adopted. After that military success, the government’s rhetoric (now dominated by 
Yeltsin and the MoD) became more sympathetic towards the separatists and advocated more 
forcefully the protection of the diaspora. Before the war, generally only the right wing groups 
and press were active in their vocal support of the diaspora communities which were trying 
to achieve autonomy. Now this cause was taken up by the broader political spectrum.
Meanwhile, both Yeltsin and Rutskoi took on more active roles while the MFA was 
sidelined. A new round of negotiations brought about the 21 July cease-fire agreement: a 
tripartite peacekeeping force, a commitment to the territorial integrity of Moldova which in 
effect gave Transdniestria de facto independence and a provision (later reneged on) for the
•  thgradual withdrawal of the 14 Army. The fact that a Russian diaspora in Moldova was 
achieving what amounted to political separation from a successor state was noticed by other 
diaspora groups -  many of which hoped to emulate it -  and by other newly independent 
states which saw it as a dangerous precedent.
During stage three, from October 1992 to June 1996, the debates were characterised 
by vocal support for the Transdniestrian cause in both parliament and the media. Lebed and 
Zatulin popularised the idea that Russia’s military should remain in Transdniestria to prevent 
further fighting and protect the local population. Even the MFA switched its position and 
now argued for Russia’s military involvement. However, by the end of this period their 
support for the use of force if necessary was now tempered by concerns about the financial, 
humanitarian and legal costs of such a policy.
In terms of concrete policies, despite Russia’s official efforts peace negotiations 
stalled. Nevertheless, Russia achieved closer and more favourable relations with Moldova 
after it imposed Russia tariffs on Moldovan goods. Moldova subsequently entered the CIS 
Economic Union, became more flexible at the negotiation table, and agreed that 
Transdniestria would retain considerable autonomy within Moldova. Finally, in 1995, Russia
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agreed to downsize the 14th Army and start a phased withdrawal. However, negotiations over 
Transdniestria’s political status stalled and so did the withdrawal.
To conclude, the Moldova-Transdniestria war was one of several factors that 
encouraged the Russian government to broaden its foreign policy focus from economic issues 
and the West to include the former Soviet states. The debates in Russia over this conflict 
highlighted Russia’s practical interests -  protection of the Russian-speaking diaspora in the 
near abroad, the presence of the 14th Army, and the continuation of economic ties -  which 
urgently needed to be addressed.
A very broad consensus over what to do in Moldova developed in mid 1992. This was 
not primarily because the West failed to challenge Russian intervention in mid 1992. Such 
casual attribution would be far too simplistic. The key point about the West is that at first 
Russia’s liberal westemist government believed that Western attitude and actions mattered. 
However, key government officials soon changed their minds. In other words, the 
government’s foreign policy thinking evolved -  and the West’s apparent complacency, was 
only a minor reason for this transformation.
Instead, as it was shown here, pragmatic nationalist ideas became dominant in 
Russia’s foreign policy debates concerning Moldova and suggested a “road map” which 
guided Russian policies towards remaining involved in obtaining peace in the region, 
establishing military presence, and securing general economic interests. These foreign policy 
ideas were of considerable importance because at the time there were few objective criteria to 
dictate that a particular policy should be chosen. The pragmatic nationalist foreign policy 
orientation was adopted from the debates as a result of many factors including domestic 
political events and events on the ground in Moldova. Despite agreement over very broad 
foreign policy ideas after 1992, differences remained over how to protect key interests and 
debates about Russia’s political and military involvement in Moldova continued until 1996.
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Chapter Six: The Russian Political Debates and Military Involvement in The 
Georgia-Abkhazia Conflict
The second conflict within the former Soviet Union in which Russia became 
militarily involved was between Georgia and its separatist region of Abkhazia, a few months 
after the beginning of the Moldova-Transdniestria civil war. War broke out in Georgia in 
August 1992. Russia once again played a leading role, both politically in the conflict 
negotiations and militarily with its troops fighting first (unofficially) with one side and then 
(officially) the other. Eventually it acted as a neutral “peacekeeper”.
This chapter examines the evolution of the Russian political debates concerning 
policy towards the Georgia-Abkhazia conflict. As in the Moldova case study, the specific 
debate followed and was part of the general contours of concurrent debates over foreign 
policy as a whole. To clarify the context of the debates, the first section briefly outlines the 
events leading up to the war, its evolution and the role of Russia’s military in the conflict. 
The second section then identifies and examines Russia’s key strategic, political and 
economic interests, carefully specifying and assessing the extent to which these material 
interests were legacies of Tsarist and Soviet history. As in the Moldova case, discrepancies 
between real and perceived interests are clarified in order to discover once again how much 
room there was for the influence of debate given this material setting.
Turning to an analysis of the dominant ideas within the debates themselves, the third 
section identifies and provides a chronological analysis of three stages of policy and debate 
towards the Georgia-Abkhazia conflict. These were the same stages as in die Moldova case 
study. Within each stage dominant ideas are examined in relation to the official positions, 
policy outputs and military actions.
1. From Separatism to War in Abkhazia
The roots of conflict in Abkhazia go back for centuries. However, in a brief period of 
peaceful independence from 1921 to 1931 the region of Abkhazia existed as the Abkhaz
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Soviet Republic. Then, under the Soviet Union it was forced into the Georgian Soviet 
Republic. Abkhazians did not accept their diminished status as a part of Georgia. A latent 
secessionist movement gained impetus in 1978 when the Abkhaz lost their bid to secede from 
the Republic of Georgia and join the Russian republic. This loss prompted many more such 
campaigns, all of which the Soviet government rejected, but which gained for Abkhazia 
special economic aid and cultural concessions. In March 1989, Abkhaz leaders requested that 
their region’s status as an autonomous republic within Georgia be upgraded to that of an 
equal republic. This proposal resulted in demonstrations and ethnic clashes in Abkhazia in 
the spring of 1989, but the issue went unresolved.1 Abkhazia’s anti-Georgia, pro-Russian 
sentiment was expressed again in the all-Union referendum of 17 March 1991. The Abkhaz 
population, led by Vladislav Ardzinba, voted overwhelmingly in favour of preserving the 
Soviet Union.
On 9 April 1991, however, Georgia declared its independence from the Soviet Union 
and reinstated its 1921 Constitution in which there was no mention of Abkhazia. This act, 
plus the election in May 1991 of a leading Georgian nationalist demagogue, Zviad 
Gamsakhurdia, as president increased tensions between Abkhazia and Georgia. 
Gamsakhurdia ignored Abkhazia’s calls for local home rule (and those of South Ossetia, 
Georgia’s other separatist region). Instead, he introduced an unpopular system of republic 
prefects to monitor the political activities of local officials, and fuelled demands for secession 
with his inflammatory rhetoric. His actions were based on the premise that the Georgian
'Russian politicians debated who bore responsibility for the violence perpetrated, specifically for the 
involvement o f Soviet troops in the most violent o f clashes on April 9th 1989. At the first Congress o f the USSR 
People’s Deputies Gorbachev blamed the Soviet army. General Igor Rodionov denied any involvement. Later, 
Deputy Anatoly Sobchak led an investigation which clearly implicated the army. See the debates in Perwi 
s’ezd narodnvkh deputatov SSSR. Stenograficheskv otchet vol.l (Moscow, 1989), pp.517-549. Also see 
Anatoly Sobchak, Tbilisskii izlom (Moscow: Paleia, 1993).
2 When Gorbachev allowed elections in 1989, Georgian nationalists (“Round Table-Free Georgia”) won the 
October 1990 republic elections and elected the national dissident and anti-communist Zviad Gamsakhurdia as 
head o f state. After Georgia became independent, Gamsakhurdia was elected President in May 1991.
3 As shall be shown, even Gamsakhurdia’s departure in December 1992 and exile in January failed to ease the 
mounting tension which his policies had fuelled. Georgian academic Ghia Nodia describes Gamsakhurdia’s 
ethnic policies and argues that it was conflicting territorial claims rather than the alleged mistreatment of 
minorities by the majorities which were at the heart o f conflicts in Abkhazia, Transdniestria, Ossetia and 
Nargomo-Karabakh. See Ghia Nodia, “Political Turmoil in Georgia and the Ethnic Policies o f  Zviad 
Gamsakhurdia” in Bruno Coppieters (ed.), Contested Borders in the Caucasus (Brussels: VUB Press, 1996), pp.
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people had long been victimized and persecuted in their own land and that the time had come 
to right this injustice. Thus, upon his election Gamsakhurdia took away South Ossetia’s 
autonomy and dismissed Abkhaz demands for sovereignty.
Abkhazia was left with no effective constitution or legal ties to Georgia. As a result, 
while war was raging in South Ossetia4, the Abkhazian parliament decreed a return to the 
constitution of 1925 which had been instituted when Abkhazia was a sovereign republic 
within the Soviet Union.5 Abkhaz leaders then proposed negotiations to re-establish relations 
with Georgia on an equal footing as a new federal state. Upon hearing this idea the Georgian 
deputies of the Abkhaz parliament walked out in protest. The Georgian parliament, in the 
throes of its own civil war, responded by annulling the declaration, and on 14 August 1992 
sent detachments from the Georgian National Guard to Abkhazia with the official authority 
to protect rail routes from Russia and search for hostages taken by supporters of newly 
ousted President Gamsakhurdia. However, apparently against the orders of the new Georgian 
President Eduard Shevardnadze, Georgia's Defence Minister Kitovani ordered the troops to 
enter the Abkhaz capital of Sukhumi and to take over the local government buildings.6 This 
act began a military conflict which lasted throughout most of 1993, and for which the leaders 
are still seeking a political solution. After Georgia’s initial advances, the Abkhazians 
launched a counteroffensive and gradually re-established control of their territory -  in a 
process similar to the Transdniestrians who established defacto independence in Moldova. 
Thus, a low intensity conflict from 1991-92 was followed by a major outbreak of violence in
73-9.
4 The Ossetian war is briefly explored below.
5Some analysts argue that this action was misinterpreted by the Western media as a declaration of 
independence. For example, Pauline Overeem, "Report o f a UNPO coordinated human rights mission to 
Abkhazia and Georgia", in Central Asian Survey, vol. 14, no.l (1995), pp. 127-154, p. 134.
6 See John F. R. Wright, “The Geopolitics of Georgia” in John F. R. Wright, Suzanne Goldenberg and Richard 
Schofield (eds.), Transcaucasian Boundaries (London: UCL Press, 1996), pp.134-150, p.143.
7 The development o f the conflict was influenced by many factors including: Gamsakhurdia’s chauvinism, the 
movement for autonomy in the North Caucausus, the instability with the break-up o f the USSR, the relations 
between the Abkhaz leadership and Russia’s “hard-line” forces, and the fall o f Gamsakhurdia. For analysis o f 
the immediate origins o f the war see: Elizabeth Fuller, "Abkhazia on the Brink o f  Civil War", RFE-RL 
Research Report, vol. 1, no.35 (September 4,1992), p .l.
180
August-September 1992, and then more low intensity fighting ensued until the final and
o
largest outbreak of violence began in September 1993 with the Abkhaz assault on Sukhumi.
Almost immediately after Georgian detachments had entered into Abkhazia, 
Abkhazian leaders called for Russian protection. As in the case of Transdniestria, the close ties 
between Russia’s army on the ground and the local population encouraged the army’s early 
unofficial support of the separatists -  who were once again also supported by some domestic 
political constituencies in Russia. However, in the case of Abkhazia, the ties between the 
Russian troops and the separatists were not as strong as in Transdniestria. Nevertheless, parallel 
to the Moldova-Transdniestria conflict, the Russian troops in Georgia initially acted 
independently on the side of the separatists with local commanders ignoring the orders of their 
military superiors in Moscow.9 Then, as Russian policies developed, the troops fell in line with 
government policy. Almost immediately, Georgia began to make allegations about Russian 
intervention in favour of the Abkhazians. Some intervention did take place but it was greatly 
exaggerated by the Georgians. This is examined in detail below.
As well as being militarily involved in the Georgia-Abkhazia conflict, Russia was 
simultaneously involved in Georgia’s civil war and in its conflicts with its other separatist 
region, South Ossetia.10 It was of great importance to Russia not to let Georgia slip into total 
anarchy. And, because of Russia’s substantial involvement in Georgia’s various conflicts, 
Russia could apply pressure to convince Georgia’s leaders to acquiesce to Russian demands.
Very briefly, a civil war was taking place in Georgia during 1992 and 1993, and 
these tumultuous events were closely intertwined with Russia’s involvement in Abkhazia. 
Georgia’s President Zviad Gamsakhurdia fled into exile in January 1992 after a coup by what
8 Among recent research on the Georgia-Abkhazia conflict are the following: Bruno Coppieters, David 
Darchiashvili and Natella Akaba (eds.), Federal Practice: Exploring Alternative for Georgia and Abkhazia 
(Brussels: VUB University Press, 2000) and Dov Lynch, The Conflict in Abkhazia: Dilemmas in Russian 
“Peacekeeping Policy”. Discussion Paper 77 (London: RIIA, 1998).
9 Author’s Interview with Dr. Andrei Zagorsky (Vice Rector, MGIMO -  Moscow State Institute for 
International Relations), May 28 1999.
10Itar-Tass. May 30, 1992. Ruslan Khasbulatov, chairman o f  the Supreme Soviet, accused Georgia o f genocide 
against the Ossetians. Ivan Yelistratov and Sergei Chugaev, Izvestiva. June 15, 1992, p .l. For a discussion o f a 
USSR Supreme Soviet Discussion on South Ossetia see Vestnik Gruzii. February 26, 1991 in BBC Summary o f  
World Broadcasts. SU/1006C1/7.
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many analysts have termed a “Moscow-backed faction”.11 Two months later, former Soviet
foreign minister (and former Georgian Communist Party chief) Eduard Shevardnadze gained 
1 0power. Gamsakhurdia and his followers took over a western zone of Georgia (Mingrelia) 
bordering Abkhazia. When the Georgian government’s army was defeated in Abkhazia in 
September 1993, Gamsakhurdia’s oppositionist forces began a drive eastward from 
Mingrelia into Georgia’s heartland. At this stage, in response to cries of help from 
Shevardnadze, Russia intervened and pushed out Gamsakhurdia’s troops. Gamsakhurdia
1 3eventually died in obscure circumstances in December 1993.
2. Russia’s Key Interests in Georgia
Russia had major objective interests in Georgia. These included: the desire to retain 
military influence in the area (this was more significant than in Moldova), to protect the 
small Russian diaspora, (this was less significant than in Moldova), and to develop economic 
ties with the region (more significant than in Moldova). However, what mattered in the 
development of Russian foreign policy was which interests the political elite perceived to be 
most significant and how they believed that these interests could best be achieved. The gaps 
and interconnections between the “objective” interests, those proclaimed in the debate and 
those declared as official policy are examined below.
As in the case of Moldova, aspects of Tsarist and Soviet relations with Georgia very 
broadly influenced but did not determine Russia’s involvement after 1991 in the Georgia-
11 Nodia argues that the “coup” was more complicated than the common assertions that it was a simple military 
plot by the old bureaucratic and intellectual elite, deprived o f former privileges and eager to replace the leader 
of the Georgian independence movement with a former communist with ties to Moscow. He also disagrees that 
Gamsakhurdia’s fall was the result o f a struggle between democracy and dictatorship - because Gamsakhurdia’s 
anti-democratic leanings were known from the beginning. Instead he argues that Gamsakhurdia was not a good 
leader and that his “paranoid suspiciousness made him unable to keep his supporters on his side”. Ghia Nodia 
“Political Turmoil in Georgia and the Ethnic Policies o f Zviad Gamsakhurdia” in Bruno Coppieters (ed.), 
Contested Borders in the Caucasus (Brussels: VUB Press, 1996), pp. 73-89, p.87.
12 Gamsakhurdia was ousted in December 1992 and fled into exile in January 1992. Shevardnadze (who 
resigned as Foreign Minister o f the Soviet Union in December 1990) was invited back to Georgia and was 
elected Chairman of the State Council in March. Shevardnadze then won the presidential elections in October 
1992. Between January and March 1992, Georgia was ruled by a Military Council.
13 Galina Kovalskaya, “The End o f A Legendary Leader”, New Times. Moscow, no.2 (January 1994), pp. 10-11.
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Abkhazia conflict. Once again, the historical legacy of Tsarist and Soviet policies in the region 
left particular dilemmas for Russia. The new Russian political elite had to quickly devise foreign 
policies towards a region with which Russia had had very close historical ties, a region which 
had undergone “russification” policies but retained a strong sense of national identity and was 
geographically connected to Russia. The roots of the Georgia-Abkhazia conflict itself extend to 
Tsarist and Soviet domination of the territory. The historical ties Russia inherited with Georgia 
and Abkhazia were different, which may help to explain Russia’s involvement in the conflict. 
Most significantly, in 1991 Russia inherited a Russian-speaking diaspora in Georgia, a Russian 
military presence and a legacy of economic ties, all of which became an intrinsic part of the 
debate about Russia’s involvement in the Georgia-Abkhazia conflict.
a) The Threat of Destabilizing the Caucasus
Unlike Moldova, which has no ties to a particular region, Georgia is linked to both 
the Transcaucasus (which includes Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan) and the wider 
Caucasus (which includes the three Transcaucasian states as well as the North Caucasian 
republics within the Russian Federation itself). The region’s closely intertwined history and 
geographical proximity to Russia encouraged Russia to promote stability in the region. This 
interest in stability was greatly strengthened by the fact that a part of the region (the North 
Caucasus) remained within Russia after the break-up of the Soviet Union.14
Tsarist and Soviet struggles to retain control of the Caucasus reveal a long history of 
interest in the region. The Caucasus was divided and shuffled between the Persian and 
Ottoman empires in the 16th and 17th centuries. In 1783, Russia acquired the Christian areas 
of Georgia in her role as protector of eastern Christians against the Muslim empires. Many 
Russians perceived early Russian domination of Georgia as progressive, mutually beneficial
14 George Hewitt objects to Russian academic Dimitry Danilov’s assertion that “the Northern Caucasus is 
actually an inalienable part o f Russian territory” as being “dangerous and deceptive”. However, the fact remains 
that the North Caucasian states are part o f the Russian Federation. Russia’s desire to keep them within Russia 
goes a long way towards explaining their interest in the entire Caucasus region. See, Dimitry Danilov, “Russia’s 
Search for an International Mandate in Transcaucasia”, in Bruno Coppieters (ed.), Contested Borders in the 
Caucasus (Brussels: VUB Press, 1996), pp. 137-152, p. 137 and George Hewitt, “Abkhazia, Georgia and the 
Circassians (NW Causasus), Central Asia Survey, vol. 18, no.4 (1999), pp.463-499, p.472.
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and voluntary, largely because the initial protectorate was created at the Georgians’ request. 
Then, in 1801, Russia annexed this region and by 1878 took control over the entire 
Caucasus.15 It had taken the Russian Tsars over two centuries to consolidate their hold on this 
region.
Most of the wars fought by Russia during its penetration into the Caucasus were 
against the Persian and Ottoman empires. These wars set a precedent for subsequent rivalries 
over this region between Russia, Iran and Turkey. The Caucasus became perceived as both a 
“buffer zone” and “battlefield” between the predominantly Orthodox Christian empire in the 
north and the largely Muslim powers in the Middle East.16
Tsarist Russia collapsed in 1917, allowing Georgia a brief period of independence 
before being unwillingly incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1921. There followed a period 
of Georgian federation with Armenia and Azerbaijan as part of the Soviet Union’s 
Transcaucasian federal republic (which obviously reinforced the perception of Georgia’s 
association with the Transcaucasian region). Then, in 1936, Georgia emerged as a fully- 
fledged union republic within the Soviet Union.
Russian perceptions of Georgia are therefore based on the fact that when Georgia 
became independent in 1991 it had been under almost continual Russian and Soviet 
domination since 1801. Unlike Moldova, which was ruled by Romania from 1812 to 1940, 
no other foreign power had dominated Georgia after its incorporation into the Russian 
Empire. Thus, immediately after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, when the Russian 
political elite had still not yet fully accepted the fact that former Soviet republics had 
achieved independence, this was particularly true of Georgia. Of course, the independence of 
Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan were greater shocks.
15 By 1878, the newly acquired territories included Daghestan, Chechen-lngushia, Ossetia, Karachay-Balkaria, 
Abkhazia, Kabarda, and Adyghea. Georgia was annexed in 1801, Mingrelia in 1803 and the western province o f  
Imereti in 1804. George Hewitt, "Abkhazia: a problem o f identity and ownership", Central Asian Survey. 
vol.12, no.3 (1993) pp.267-323. p.271. See also Mariam Lordkipanidze, Essays on Georgian History (Tbilisi: 
Metsniereba, 1994).
16 See Sergei Panarin, “Political Dynamics of the “New” East (1985-1993)” in Vitaly V. Naumkin (ed.), Central 
Asia and Transcaucasia: Ethnicity and Conflict (London: Greenwood Press, 1994), pp.69-107. Panarin is head 
of the Sector for Studies o f  Relations between Russia and Peoples o f the East, at the Institute o f Oriental 
Studies, Russian Academy o f Sciences.
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The region of Abkhazia17 has a somewhat different history than the rest of Georgia.18 
In its very early history it was dominated at various times by the Greeks, Romans, 
Byzantines and Turks. Before 1810, Abkhazian rulers formed many nominal or effective 
unions with various Georgian kingdoms or princedoms.19 Thus, both Abkhaz unity with 
Georgia and Abkhaz autonomy have been argued on historical grounds. In the first half of the 
nineteenth century the Abkhazians (and other North-West Caucasian peoples) became 
independent when Russia defeated the Ottoman Empire. Abkhazia came under the 
protection of Tsarist Russia in 1810 but continued to administer its own province. Unlike 
Georgia, but similar to the rest of the Muslim North Caucasus, it put up fierce resistance but 
despite this effort was taken under complete Russian control in 1864.
A major Abkhaz grievance in the conflict with Georgia after 1991 concerned the loss of 
political status that Abkhazia has undergone in the 20th century. Soon after the Russian 
Revolution of 1917, Abkhazia proclaimed its independence and entered into the short-lived 
North Caucasian Republic.21 It was annexed by Communist Russia in 1919-20 and from 1921 to 
1931 it held republic status as the Soviet Socialist Republic of Abkhazia. In 1931, Stalin further 
demoted Abkhazia's status from that of a treaty-republic associated with Georgia to a mere 
autonomous republic within the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic. This demotion meant 
effective incorporation of Abkhazia into Georgia and was the cause of considerable lingering 
Abkhaz resentment towards both Russia and Georgia.
As a result of this turbulent history of shared fierce resistance to Russian conquest, 
repression and expulsion, strong ties exist between Abkhazia and Russia's North Caucasian
17 Throughout the rest o f the text the word region is not used. That term is greatly objected to by Abkhazians. 
Dr. Gyorgi Otyerba, Deputy Foreign Minister o f Abkhazia, November 22, 1999, LSE Talk.
18 The most recent and most comprehensive book in English about the Abkhazians’ history, language, economy, 
geography, war etc is George Hewitt, The Abkhazians (Surrey: Curzon Press, 1999).
19 There are references in Abkhaz literature to the Abkhazian kingdom o f the 9th and 10th centuries. The 
Abkhazians use this history to claim sovereignty over the region although the same kingdom could also be 
described as a common Georgia-Abkhazian kingdom. Alexei Zverev, “Ethnic Conflicts in the Caucasus 1988- 
1994”, in Bruno Coppieters (ed.), Contested Borders in the Caucasus (Brussels: VUB University Press, 1996), 
pp.13-71, p. 15.
0 Givi V. Tsulaia, Abkhazia and Abkhazians in the context o f Georgian History (Moscow: Russian Academy o f  
Sciences, 1995).
21 The North Caucasian Republic included Daghestan, Chechen-Ingushia, Ossetia, Karachay-Balkaria, Kabarda, 
Adyghea and Abkhazia.
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republics. The strong historical, ethnic and religious links explain why Russian citizens from 
these republics have independently aided and fought for Abkhaz independence in the post-1991 
conflict. They also explain the existence of strong pro-Abkhazia lobbies in Russia.
An important legacy of Soviet rule in Georgia was the establishment of sub-republican 
autonomous political units. This policy gave the Abkhaz their own autonomous area bearing the 
Abkhaz name within Georgia and allowed them to have a political significance out of 
proportion to their numbers. Thus, as in the previously examined case of Transdniestria, 
Abkhazia's status after 1991 as a secessionist zone within a newly independent state can be 
interpreted partly as a consequence of Soviet era nationality policies which, to a certain extent, 
encouraged the flourishing of various cultural and ethnic groups. Within the Georgian Soviet 
Socialist Republic (SSR), Abkhaz culture managed to flourish. Significantly, however, this 
occurred, as in Transdniestria, under the influence of, and mostly on the basis of, the Russian 
language. After 1945, the Abkhazians looked to Russia for protection from Georgia which was 
seen as the more immediate threat and the least attractive culture. Abkhaz authorities (similar to 
the Transdniestrians) often appealed directly to Moscow over the republican authorities, setting
•  •  •  91the historical precedent for Abkhaz petitions for Russian aid after 1991.
This tumultuous history underlines Russia’s key interest in promoting peace in this 
region. The Russian empire had been accused of fomenting hostility among the various 
peoples of the Caucasus by adopting a policy of “divide and rule” in order to consolidate its
22 There was an Abkhaz university as well as theatre, television and radio services, magazines and newspapers. 
Parents preferred to send their children to Abkhaz schools. According to Georgian academics, the Bolsheviks 
formed the Abkhazian ASSR in order to create permanent sources o f tension and thus enable Georgia to be 
more easily controlled. Thus, historically, the Georgians perceived Abkhazia as a threat to Georgian national 
interests - which partly explains their current efforts to suppress any aspirations for independence from these 
regions. Darrell Slider, “Crisis and Response in Soviet Nationalist Policy: The case o f Abkhazia”, Central Asian 
Survey, vol.4, no.4 (December 1985), pp.51-68.
23 In turn, Georgian republican authorities, like their counterparts in Moldova, adopted many policy initiatives 
to integrate Abkhazia into the rest o f the republic: they restricted local prerogatives, exploited their rights to 
control appointments, and used demographic and cultural policies to protect their interests. Many discriminatory 
policies such as the closure o f Abkhaz schools from 1944 to 1952 by Stalin, were put in place centrally by 
Moscow and carried out by Georgians. Evidence o f Abkhaz persecution can now be found in KGB top-secret 
documents from the 1940s detailing the "counter-revolutionary nationalist movements in Abkhazia". These are 
translated by Rachel Clogj»"Documents from the KGB archives in Sachem. Abkhazia in the Stalin years", in 
Central Asian Survey, vol. 14, no.l (1995), pp. 155-189, pp. 181-188. These policies were part o f  the general 
Stalinist persecution but carried out by Georgians. O f course, the fact that Stalin and Beria were Georgians was 
bound to influence Abkhaz perceptions o f the crackdown.
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hold on the region.24 However the Russian empire, and later the Soviet Union, also often 
acted as arbiter and peacemaker between the various groups. With the demise of the Soviet 
Union, some elements of this legacy survived. Regional rivalry and internal strife returned to 
the region and Russia once again became involved in trying to resolve the conflicts. Most 
significantly, however, this abbreviated history demonstrates why Russia after 1991 was 
especially sensitive to the disunity and the multiethnic nature of the Caucasian region which 
made any conflict in the area inherently dangerous. The stabilization of conflicts in 
Transcaucasia was perceived as necessary in order to stop any “spill-over” effects (or 
encouragement of separatist elements) which could threaten the unity of the Russian 
Federation.
Since 1991, there have been two main zones of interethnic conflicts in the 
Transcaucasus: the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nargomo-Karabakh (in 
which Russia’s military was indirectly involved) and separatist disputes in Georgia (in which 
Russia’s military was directly involved). Within its own North Caucasus, Russia has been 
involved in a war with Chechnya. However, although there has been a broad consensus 
over the need for peace in the region, die means and extent of Russian involvement in the 
conflict were very controversial and thus a subject of vigorous political debate.
b) The Russian-Speaking Diaspora
As in the case of Moldova, Tsarist and Soviet history left Georgia with a Russian- 
speaking diaspora and specific political ties with Moscow. It also meant that Abkhazia, 
similar to Transdniestria, inherited its own separate, close relations with other political 
elements in Moscow. Imperial Russia’s attempts to russify Georgian society began in the 
1890s. However, in spite of major demographic changes these attempts generally failed and
24 Paul B. Henze, "Russia and the Caucasus", Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, vol. 19, no. 4 (Oct.-Dec.1996), 
pp. 389-402, p.391.
2 This war is not examined directly in this thesis but it did have major repercussions for Russia’s security and 
military policies. The thesis will touch upon its indirect impact on Russia’s policies -  especially towards the 
Caucasus. See Roy Allison, “The Chechnia conflict: military and security policy implications”, in Roy Allison 
and Christoph Bluth. Security Dilemmas in Russia and Eurasia (London: RIIA, 1998), pp.241-280.
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instead stimulated a new Georgian awareness. Later, Soviet nationality policies in Georgia, 
in many ways similar to those carried out in the other republics, had the contradictory effect 
of simultaneously fostering both nationalism and repression.27 Ethnic cleavages were 
manipulated by Moscow in order to maintain Soviet power and discourage dissent along 
ethnic lines. At the same time, Georgia continued to develop many of the characteristics of 
an independent state. Compared to Moldova, Georgia emerged from the Soviet Union with a 
much stronger sense of national identity.
Abkhazia underwent many changes in ethnic composition over the last two centuries 
which generated related historical memories of Abkhaz persecution. In the 19th century, 
there had been a mass exodus of Abkhaz as they fled or were expelled to the Ottoman 
Empire following the Russian conquest of the Caucasus and in the wake of the Russo- 
Turkish war in 1877-78. During this period, most of the Muslim Abkhaz emigrated. The
•  •  ' l Omajority of those who remained were nominally Christians. The Tsarist officials distributed 
the land left by the emigrants among high-ranking military and civil officials, and large-scale 
colonization of Russians, Greeks, Armenians, Germans, Estonians and Bulgarians was 
encouraged in the 1880s and 1890s.
Demographic changes continued throughout the 1930s and 1940s under the Communist 
Party Secretary for Transcaucasia, Lavrentii Beria. Some Abkhazians were forced to leave,
26 For a comprehensive account o f Russian influence and policies in Georgia during both Imperial and Soviet 
times see Ronald Grigor Suny, The Making o f the Georgian Nation (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1994). “Although the thrust o f Marxism had seemed opposed to the creation o f a coherent and separate 
Georgian nation, the actual evolution o f Soviet Georgia resulted in the emergence o f a compact and conscious 
nation prepared to act in its own interest, either on its own or in concert with the current government”. Suny, 
p.318.
27 See Margot Light, "Russia and Transcaucasia" in John F. R. Wright, Suzanne Goldenberg and Richard 
Schofield (eds.) Transcaucasian Boundaries (London: UCL Press, 1996), pp.34-54.
28 The Abkhazians first adopted Christianity in the fourth century. Then, when Abkhazia was under Turkish rule 
from the 15th to the early 19th century, part o f Abkhazia was converted to Islam. In 1886, 14.6% o f Abkhazians 
were Sunni Muslim. The Abkhaz population was then Christianised in the late 19th century, under Russian rule. 
Today, Abkhazians in Abkhazia are mostly Orthodox Christians whereas their half a million diaspora in 
Turkey, the Middle-East countries, Western Europe and North America are largely Sunni Moslems. It is often 
cited today that there is not a single mosque in modem Abkhazia. See Shirin Akiner, Islamic Peoples o f the 
Soviet Union (London: Kegan Paul, 1986).
29 A whole range o f peoples were deported from the Transcaucasus. See Nikolai Bougai, “1940s -  The 
Deportation o f Peoples from Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan”, Political History o f  Russia, vol.8, no.l 
(Commack, N.Y.: Nova Science Publishers 1997), pp. 1-16.
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and Mingrelians, Georgians, Russians and Armenians were again encouraged to move into the 
vacated territory. As a result, the ethnic Abkhazians soon constituted a distinct minority in their 
own autonomous republic, and they have remained a minority. In 1989, the population of the 
Soviet republic of Georgia was approximately 5 million with 75% ethnic Georgian, 8% 
ethnic Armenian, 6% Russian, 3% Ossetian, 2% Abkhazian, and 6% others.30 The same year, 
Abkhazians constituted only 17.8% of their autonomous republic, and the Georgians 45.7% of
o 1
the Abkhaz republic.
The ethnic Russians who lived in Georgia had arrived at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century. The Russian population particularly increased in the 1930’s when industrialization 
required skilled workers, and when many Russians escaped to the Transcaucasus during the 
period of forced collectivisation and the famine of 1932-33. However, neither Georgia nor the 
other Transcaucasian states had significant ethnic Russian diasporas. The diaspora was much 
more of an issue in Moldova where ethnic Russians made up a larger proportion of the 
population. In 1989, ethnic Russians in Georgia were the second largest minority at 6.3 
percent (or 341,000) -  just behind the Armenians (8.1%). Also, unlike Moldova’s 
separatist region of Transdniestria, the diaspora in Georgia’s separatist region of Abkhazia 
was not the dominant group. Neither was it the target of any anti-Russian policy. In fact, the 
Georgian government feared a Russian exodus -  which was already occurring due to the 
Abkhazia conflict and the economic crisis -  because it would create further economic 
problems.33
Russia’s primary concern was therefore not so much the protection of the Russian 
diaspora in Georgia but the more complicated question of how Georgia’s independence, and 
civil and separatist wars would affect Russia’s citizens in Russia’s North Caucasus. Thus in the
30 All-Union population census 1989 [Vsesoyuznaya perepis' naseleniya 1989] (Moskva: Gosudarstvennyi 
Komitet SSSR po Statistike, 1990).
31 There are problems about how to determine who it is correct to describe as a "Georgian”. See George Hewitt, 
“Abkhazia -  A Problem o f Identity and Ownership”, Central Asian Survey, vol.12, no.3 (1993), pp.267-323.
p.268.
The data is from the last Soviet census in 1989. Vestnik statistiki. no.l, 1991. Also see All-Union population 
census 1989 [Vsesoyuznaya perepis' naseleniya 1989] (Moskva: Gosudarstvennyi Komitet SSSR po Statistike, 
1990). This number has since been reduced by emigration.
33 About 1000 Russians were killed and 30,000 fled. Moskovskive Novosti. no.25 (June 19-26 1994), p. A4.
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case of Georgia, the “Russian Question” had mainly to do with Russia’ internal problems and 
the need to stabilize any situation in Georgia which could worsen the inter-ethnic disputes 
within Russia’s own borders. Nevertheless, although the Russian population was relatively 
small some Russian politicians, as well shall see, used the diaspora to justify Russian 
involvement in the area. Even if the Russian diaspora in Georgia was not a significant interest, 
we will see that this issue affected policy in that the diaspora was used as a justification for the 
continuation and strengthening of Russian presence in the region.
c) Russian Strategic Interests
One of Russia’s most significant interests in Georgia was strategic. With the break-up 
of the Soviet Union, Russia inherited a significant military presence in Georgia. The former 
Soviet Transcaucasian Military District had been based across Georgia, Armenia and 
Azerbaijan. In Georgia, at the time of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, this included 
approximately 20,000 former Soviet ground troops as well as the vessels and bases of the 
Black Sea Fleet and Border Guards.34 The Soviet troops in Georgia were there to protect the 
southern flank of the USSR and especially the 300 km Black Sea coast -  particularly from 
the threat of Turkish military superiority in the region. The role of the Soviet Transcaucasus 
Border District guards was to both “create a border” in order to effectively control the 
southern approaches to the Russian Federation and to help maintain order and protect those 
living alongside the border. After 1991, Russia assumed direct control of all the former 
Soviet forces in Georgia.
One of the key issues to be debated about Georgia after the break-up of the Soviet 
Union was what to do with these troops and bases in Georgia: should they be withdrawn, 
remain, or be transferred to Georgian control? Many of the former Soviet troops in the 
Transcaucasus were in fact withdrawn or disbanded relatively quickly. However, Russia
34 In December 1992, Russian forces in the Transcaucasus included the 24th Army Corps, the Transcaucasian 
Military District and the Group o f Forces in the Transcaucasus. For details see Svobodnava Gruziva. December 
16, 1992, quoted in Elizabeth Fuller, “Paramilitary Forces Dominate Fighting in Transcaucasus”, RFE/RL 
Research Report. Special Issue on Post-Soviet Armies, vol.2, no.25 (June 18, 1993), pp.74-82, pp.75, 82.
35 Richard Woff, “The Border Troops o f the Russian Federation”, Jane’s Intelligence Review, vol.7, no.2 
(February 1995), pp.70-73, p.71.
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inherited five former military bases in Georgia, a military installation at Eshera for 
monitoring seismic activity, as well as strategically significant ports along the Black Sea 
coast. Meanwhile, similar to most other post-Soviet states (and especially in the short-term), 
Georgia was dependent upon Russia in that it was left with no regular army of its own (it had 
difficulty controlling its many paramilitary factions) and lacked the experience of frontier 
defence. The government of Moldova was similarly dependent on Russia for the stability its 
military presence could provide, and for help to create their own forces and to protect their 
borders.
Security was the overriding “real” and perceived Russian interest in Georgia because 
Russians had both memories and perceptions of past threats which they had historically 
encountered from this region. Russia also had an immediate external geopolitical interest in 
the region including a desire to surround itself with “friendly” and peaceful neighbours and 
to prevent a security vacuum which other regional (Turkey, Iran) or international (United
7^States) powers could fill. The need to stabilize conflicts in Transcaucasia was perceived as 
necessary in order to stop any “spill-over” effects (or encouragement of separatist elements) 
which could threaten the unity of the Russian Federation. Migration, arms sales and illegally 
armed groups on Russia’s territories were other related concerns. Finally, there was the 
primary need to end the violence, and prevent the disintegration of Georgia itself.
Russian military forces remained in Georgia, therefore, in order to prevent a “security 
vacuum”, to solve actual and potential conflicts, and because it was too costly to withdraw.
36 By 1990, the Georgian coastal waters had been controlled by the Poti-based 184th Coast Guard Brigade of the 
former Soviet Black Sea Navy (which was made up o f various 48 combat and support warships and boats). In 
1992 the brigade was completely withdrawn from Georgia, having left behind only six vessels - two small 
landing ships and four boats o f various classes. Besides, there were naval bases o f the 6th Ochamchire Coast 
Guard Brigade o f the Transcaucasian Frontier District deployed nearby Poti, Batumi, Anaklia, Ochamchire and 
Sukhumi. Since 1996, Russian frontier guards have pulled almost all their vessels out o f Georgia and eliminated 
coastal checkpoints. Irakli Aladashvili, “Marine Borders Need Immediate Defence”, Army and Society in 
Georgia (Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development (CIPDD), July 1998). (www.cipd.org)
37 Turkey, for example, was a major player in the bid for oil interests in the region and became (in a very limited 
fashion) involved in the conflict on the Abkhaz side. Turkish volunteers fought in Abkhazia and gave Abkhazia 
financial help. An analysis o f Russia’s economic interests and relations with Turkey can be found in Stephen 
Blank, “Russia’s Real Drive to the South”, Orbis. vol.39, no.3 (Summer 1995), pp.369-386.
38An estimated 43,000 Russians left Georgia in 1992 and another 53,000 in the first months o f 1993. “Russians 
Abroad in the Former Soviet Union”, The Economist. May 21, 1994.
191
While there, Russian troops also acted to protect Russia’s strategic interests, taking 
advantage of opportunities to do so within the conflict. Also, as in the case of Moldova 
Russia had an interest in securing and maintaining the former external Soviet borders. 
Throughout all of Georgia, Russian military presence decreased from 20,000 in 1992-94 to 
8,500 in 1996-97. In Abkhazia in particular, the overall strength of both the regular Russian 
troops (the bulk of which was inherited from Soviet times) and peacekeeping battalions 
(introduced in 1994) continued to rise from 1000 in October 1992 to 3000 by October 1996.39 
Regular troops in Abkhazia began to decrease in 1994 when peacekeeping troops were 
introduced (some regular troops simply switched functions). Nevertheless, Russian military 
interest in Georgia (as in the other former Soviet states) gradually receded in comparison to 
Tsarist or Soviet times. It became mostly defensive in nature and excluded any large-scale 
military operations.
d) Economic Relations
Historically, Russia and Georgia had had strong economic ties. After 1991 Russian 
economic interest in Georgia continued even as the Georgian state began to diversify its 
trade. Georgia’s economy had developed greatly during the Soviet period so that by 1991 
Georgia was one of the wealthiest republics. Like Moldova, it was developed primarily as an 
agricultural region with some mineral wealth. Its subtropical climate favoured the cultivation 
of grapes, citrus fruit, vegetables, spices and tea. Food processing and wine production 
became the main industries and Georgia’s spas made it a popular tourist destination.40 
However, because Georgia’s economy had been highly integrated with the other former 
republics, upon independence it remained greatly dependent on Russia.41 This dependency, 
as well as the potential to renew trading ties, also affected the understanding and interest of 
the Russian political elite in the Georgia-Abkhazia conflict after 1991.
39 The Military Balance 1997/98 (London: IISS, Oxford University Press, 1997) p.l 10.
40 World Bank Development Indicators Database. July 2000, from http://devdata.worldbank.org/data-query.
41 The Soviet era terms o f  trade for Georgian goods tended to be much more favourable than the global 
capitalist ones -  for example in food to fuel ratios.
192
After 1991, Russia’s economic interests in Abkhazia in particular included rich 
agricultural lands, the Tkvarcheli coalmines, the port of Sukhumi, a direct railway link between 
Russia and Georgia, and a resort area (with an attractive coastline and climate). Of even greater 
interest for Russia was the location of Georgia (as a whole) and access to the lucrative 
development and transportation of oil and gas from the Caspian Sea and Central Asia which this 
location provided.42 This particular interest eventually united many members of the Russian 
elite over the need for Russia to maintain a foothold in the region. However, this issue of 
Caspian oil in particular did not affect Russian policies directly until around 1995-96 43
Thus, Russia’s economic interests in Georgia were greater than those in Moldova and 
helped motivate Russian politicians and decision-makers to pursue peace in the region in order 
to quell anarchy and to support Georgia’s territorial integrity. However, they were not the most 
significant factors in defining Russian perceptions or policy towards the Abkhazia conflict. As 
with the other former Soviet states, trade with Georgia soon collapsed, and despite Russia’s 
attempts to renew it, it made little progress.44 Georgia’s GDP dropped nearly 73 percent 
between 1991 and 1994. The economy stabilized only in 199545 Moreover, the severe 
economic crisis in the Transcaucasus and the interruption of industrial production and 
cooperation in the region led to a sharp decline in many elements of Russia’s traditional 
economic interests. Civil war, ethnic conflicts, natural disasters, shortage of fuel and energy 
resources, and the dramatic increase of internally displaced persons (IDPs) all contributed to 
Georgia’s economic problems 46
42 Russia unsuccessfully invested substantial diplomatic efforts to undermine the legal grounds for developing 
new oil fields in the Caspian Sea. Russia also tried to ensure that the oil would be transported via Russian 
territory and shipped from Novorossisk. The Caspian region has oil reserves estimated to be as high as 200 
billion barrels. Thus, there has been a consensus that Russia should be involved in any lucrative oil deals and 
the main debate in Russia has been whether or not to welcome Western participation in the development o f  
Caspian oil. Rosemarie Forsythe, “The Politics o f Oil in the Caucasus and Central Asia”, Adelphi Paper, no.300 
(London: IISS, 1996).
43 Elaine Holoboff, “Russia: Oil, Guns and Pipes”, War Report, no. 50 (London: Institute for War and Peace 
Reporting, April 1997), pp.25-6.
44 Michael J. Bradshaw, “Foreign trade and inter-republican relations”, Denis J. B. Shaw (ed.), The Post-Soviet 
Republics: A Systematic Geography (London: Longmann Group Limited, 1995), pp.133-150, p.149.
45 In 1993 Georgia’s GDP (both real growth and per capita) was -25; by 1996, 11. World Bank Development 
Indicators Database. July 2000, from http://devdata.worldbank.org/data-query.
46 Avtandil Sulaberidze, “Towards Poverty Eradication in Georgia”, pp. 130-176 in Yogesh Atal (ed.), Poverty 
Transition and Transition in Poverty (Paris: UNESCO, 1999).
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3. The Debates and the Policies: Russia’s Military and Political Involvement in 
Georgia, 1991-1996
Above it was seen that Russia inherited the unstable and fractious region of the 
Caucasus on her border, as well as a small Russian diaspora, a large military presence and 
economic ties with Georgia. After 1991 these inheritances did not dictate specific Russian 
policies towards the conflict between Georgia and Abkhazia. Instead, there was controversy 
over how Russia should react and considerable room for debate over policy choices.
The following analysis of the Russian debates about its policy options from 1991 to 
1996 is divided into three stages. In each stage, we seek to clarify the dominant foreign 
policy ideas of the key members of the political elite in the debate and to identify Russia’s 
official policy and military action. Pathways by which ideas and debate may have affected 
policy choices are highlighted.
a) Stage One: The Atlanticist Period (August 1991-March 1992)
During this first very short stage, there was no Russian political debate specifically 
about relations with Georgia or how Russia should deal with the Georgia-Abkhazia conflict. 
Fighting had not yet broken out between the two sides. While some members of the Russian 
political elite initially tended to favour the Abkhaz, the ties were not as strong as those with 
the Transdniestrians (who were mostly ethnic Russians). However, the Abkhazians opposed 
the division of the Soviet Union and thus received the vocal support of individuals in Russia 
(generally outside the executive) who had the same goal. In contrast, the government of 
Georgia (similar to the government of Moldova) was asserting its independence and trying to 
distance itself from its former ties. It was supported by many Russian politicians who espoused 
liberal westemism. Nevertheless, it is unlikely, as Georgian analyst Revaz Gachechiladze and 
Russian analyst Svetlana Chervonnaya argue, that the Abkhaz had special relations with the 
Russian elite that were strong enough to explain Russia’s actions in the war.47 The Abkhaz
47 To quote Gachechiladze, “In no other autonomous republic were its leaders so close to the governing 
Politburo members o f the CPSU and Soviet (Russian) generals as in Abkhazia”. Revaz Gachechiladze, The 
New Georgia (London: UCL Press, 1995) p. 177. Svetlana Chervonnya goes so far as say the conflict was “part
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did have close relations with elements of the Russian political and military elite from Soviet 
times, but so too did the Georgians. Many Russian diplomats, including Foreign Minister
JO
Andrei Kozyrev, worked under Shevardnadze while he was Soviet Foreign Minister. The 
Abkhazians were especially active in their attempts to influence Russian policy in their 
favour (often by exaggerating the links between Russia and Abkhazia), but again so too were 
the Georgians. The point here is that the specific ties that both sides -  Abkhazian and 
Georgian -  had in Moscow did, of course, affect the content and emotion of the Russian 
political debate about the conflict, even if they did not specifically influence a particular 
policy or action.
As in the case of Moldova and the other former Soviet states, after the break-up of 
the Soviet Union the Russian government officially supported Georgia’s independence and 
territorial integrity. However, as yet, it had taken no position towards the growing Abkhaz 
dispute and was content to leave Georgia to its own devices. Russia’s foreign policy in 
general was articulated by the government in terms of liberal westemist ideas, and the 
debates and policies neglected the specific Abkhaz issue. Also at this early stage, the Russian 
government was negotiating a settlement for the South Ossetia conflict -  a role which the 
former Soviet government had also played. Thus, the Russian government was already 
demonstrating its interest and sensitivity to conflicts along its borders with the North 
Caucasus by its negotiations and military presence. Nevertheless, most of the military forces 
under Russian control in the Transcaucasus were in the process of being withdrawn back to 
Russia.
o f a deeply calculated and premeditated programme by certain elements within the Russian and Abkhazian 
political and military hierarchy”. She argues that Russia attempted to destabilize the regime to retain its 
influence there. “The hard-liners o f the old regime are still at work within the lands o f the former Soviet Union” 
(p. xvii, xviii). She stresses the “infiltration” o f the KGB in Abkhazia (p.89) and describes in detail aid 
Abkhazia received from various peoples in the North Caucasus (p. 128-131). She terms the Abkhazians agents 
o f Soviet Union sent there to protect Soviet interest, (p. 134). Svetlana Chervonnaya, Conflict in the Caucasus: 
Georgia. Abkhazia and the Russian Shadow (Glastonbury UK: Gothic Images Publications, 1994).
48 For example, Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov knew the Abkhaz leader Vladislav Ardzinba from their 
years working together at the Institute o f Oriental Studies; Deputy Foreign Minister Boris Pastukhov knew 
Eduard Shevardnadze from his years as first secretary o f the Soviet Komsomol. Grachev apparently had 
“special relations” with Tenghiz Kitovani (Georgia’s defence minister and Shevardnadze’s rival). Author’s 
Interviews with Dr. Dimitry Trenin (Carnegie Institute) May 25, 1999; and Col. Gen. Andrei Nikolaev 
(Commander o f Russia’s Border Troops), June 8, 1999.
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In August 1992, the former Soviet Transcaucasian Military District was renamed the 
"Russian troops in Transcaucasia" and a division of assets took place which left the 
Georgians with a considerable quantity of advanced weapons.49 As in the other former Soviet 
republics, old Soviet military equipment was plundered by local paramilitary and criminal 
elements, often with the help of corrupt members of the former Soviet military.50 The 
Russian Border Troops also needed to help Georgia with training and financial assistance to 
protect its borders. To protect Russian security on the new frontier with Azerbaijan and 
Georgia, the North Caucasus Border Troops District was set up in late 1992.51
b) Stage Two: The Battle of Ideas (March 1992-October 1992)
i) The Debates
The start of the war between Moldova-Transdniestria in March 1992 had initiated a 
debate in Russia over its involvement in CIS conflicts. The debates intensified when war 
broke out between Georgia and Abkhazia in August. Thus, before the war began, during the 
spring and summer of 1992, members of the Russian political elite discussed how Russia 
should react to the developing crisis. The debates represented an array of foreign policy ideas 
-  the most strident and vocal of which were fundamentalist nationalist. As we shall see, 
proponents of these ideas loudly, and often provocatively, advocated the use of military force 
against the Georgian government supporting the Abkhaz separatists and in the Russian press, 
in parliament and during organized trips to Abkhazia.
Support for the Abkhaz was only to a limited extent the result of the traditionally close 
historical ties between Russia and Abkhazia. Members of the political elite, who espoused 
fundamentalist nationalist ideas and supported the Transdniestrians, such as Gennady
49 Mark Smith, Pax Russica: Russia's Monroe Doctrine (London: RUSI, 1993), pp.52-3.
50 By 1993, Russian military presence in the region was less than 10 percent o f what it had been in the former 
Transcaucasian Military District. This is according to Valery Simonov, the former Chief o f Intelligence o f  the 
19th Independent Air 0fta*«Army, stationed in Georgia until 1991.Valery Simonov, “Kavkaz: krov’, slyozy i 
dengi” Sovershenno sekretno. Moscow, no.8 (1994), p.3.
51 In 1994 it became the Caucasus Special Border District. According to its deputy commander its area o f  
responsibility extends from the shores o f the Black Sea in the west to the Caspian Sea in the east. See Richard 
Woff, “The Border Troops of the Russian Federation”, Jane’s Intelligence Review, vol.7, no.2 (February 1995), 
pp.70-73, p.71.
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Zyuganov, also tended to support the Abkhazians. However, Abkhazia had other influential 
supporters in Moscow including the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Ruslan Khasbulatov and 
right-wing fundamentalist nationalist deputy Sergei Baburin, who led discussions in the 
parliament about the conflict. These men wanted Russia to regain an influential role in the 
region (or at least the future possibility of such a role). For them, siding with Abkhazia was a 
means of restoring influence in Georgia at a time when Georgia’s political leaders were loudly 
proclaiming its independence. They also had learnt from the Moldova crisis that this issue of 
Russian involvement in the CIS states could allow them to score political points against the 
government. Moreover, these and other more moderate, members of the political elite worried 
that Russia’s traditional security interests in the region seemed to be threatened. Specifically, 
Georgia was refusing to enter the CIS, Armenia and Azerbaijan were fighting over Nargomo- 
Karabakh, and, further affield, Russia was losing naval ports with the division of the Black Sea 
Fleet with the Ukraine.
Russian academic Emil Pain attributed the vocal Russian support for the Abkhaz to 
“the revenge of Russia national-patriots” who believed that because “Shevardnadze 
destroyed the Soviet Union, let his Georgia be destroyed now”. Certainly, Shevardnadze 
had many enemies in elite Russian circles -  especially in Russia’s military and among those 
holding fundamentalist nationalist ideas. However, he also had many influential friends from 
when he was Soviet Foreign Minister. The Russian high command disliked Shevardnadze 
whom it held responsible for the break-up of the Soviet Union and the end of Warsaw Pact, 
but it was even less enamoured with Gamsakhurdia.54 Gamsakhurdia’s strong nationalist 
rhetoric throughout 1991-92 about independence and the desire to build a "Caucasian Home" 
was perceived as threatening.
Other Russian politicians blamed not Shevardnadze but the Russian government for 
allowing the Georgia-Abkhazia crisis to develop in the first place, and called for immediate 
government action. According to Baburin, “Georgia is conducting this war with the
52 Khasbulatov was chairman o f the Supreme Soviet until he joined the unsuccessful October 1993 coup against 
Yeltsin.
53 Emil Pain, Izvestiva. October 9, 1992, p.2.
54 "Russian Foreign Policy, Your Policy or Mine?", Economist. October 30, 1993, p.50.
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Abkhazians with the... most barbarous arms... All these were transferred to the military 
formations of the illegitimate State Council of Georgia that came to power as a result of a 
coup... The blood o f Abkhazia is on the Kremlin”.55 Members of the Russian military elite 
agreed that Russia had created the conditions for war by allowing the Georgian state to have 
these weapons. As former KGB Colonel Aleksandr Sterligov explained, because of this 
transfer of weapons “Russia personified by Shevardnadze is conducting an undeclared war 
against the peoples of Abkhazia”.56 These weapons had been legally transferred in 
accordance with the CIS Tashkent agreements; however there had been the stipulation that 
they would not be used in domestic disputes. There were, of course, many other channels for 
acquiring Russian military supplies in the region, for example through illegal arms sales and 
looting.
As in the Transdniestria conflict, specific Russian politicians promoted their pro-Abkhaz 
stance in the press. The fundamentalist nationalist newspaper Den’ published articles which 
demanded Russia to re-establish control over Georgia, relentlessly attacked Yeltsin for failing to 
assist the Abkhazians, and called for the return of the empire.57 Pravda printed an appeal by the
f  o
Abkhaz for Russia to intervene on their behalf. Members of the Communist faction, such as 
Gennady Saenko, harshly criticized the government and called for substantial Russian 
involvement.59 There is also evidence that certain Russian politicians met with Abkhaz leaders 
to make secret arms deals. If genuine, this evidence indicates a direct relationship between 
specific individual Russian politicians and unofficial Russian involvement in the conflict. 
Catherine Dale, for example, writes that Baburin met with Ardzinba several times at the town of 
Zelennaya Roshcha to discuss arms deals.60 However, when questioned by the author, Baburin
55 Sergei Baburin, Den’, no.35 (August 30-September 5,1992), p .l.
56 Alexandr Sterligov (former KGB colonel) “Russia, in the personal o f the citizen, E.A. Shevardnadze, is 
conducting an undeclared war against the peoples of Abkhazia”, Den’, no. 35 (August 30-September 5, 1992), 
pp.1,3.
5 See the extreme right-wing paper Den’ in mid to late 1992. For example, no.30 (August 23-29, 1992), p.l; 
no.34 (September13-19,1992), p .l; no.36 (October 11-17, 1992), p .l; no. 39(October 8-14,1992), p .l.
58 Pravda. August 15, 1992, p .l.
59 Itar-Tass. October 30, 1992.
60 See Catherine Dale, “The Case of Abkhazia (Georgia)” in Lena Jonson and Clive Archer (eds.), Peacekeeping 
and the Role o f Russia in Eurasia (Oxford: Westview Press, 1996), pp. 121-137, p.127.
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would only confirm that arms trading had taken place both by Russian troops in the area and by 
individuals generally from the North Caucausus. He said that he had met with Ardzinba but 
denied any personal involvement in the sale of arms.61
Despite the fact that it was not official Russian policy, support for the Abkhaz by a vocal 
minority in the press and the rumours of Russian involvement on behalf of Abkhazia 
intimidated the Georgian government and encouraged the Abkhaz separatists. This was 
demonstrated in Shevardnadze’s response to the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Khasbulatov 
in a phone call on 15 June 1992 in which Khasbulatov apparently threatened to involve Russia 
in any developing conflict. Shevardnadze denounced the warnings as “political and ideological 
preparatory fire for the infringement of our republic’s territorial integrity and sovereignty" and 
said that this intimidation reduced "the room of our peacemaking efforts... while excessively 
expanding the bounds of distrust, aggressiveness, and extremism".62 Although likely overstated 
for domestic political consumption, these comments capture the outrage expressed in the early 
stages of the conflict by the Georgian government towards the rhetorical interference of Russian 
politicians in Georgia’s internal affairs.
When fighting did break out in Georgia on 14 August 1992, it provided, as in the case 
of the Moldova-Transdniestria conflict, yet another specific issue with which the government 
could be attacked. Almost immediately, the nationalist Russian Unity bloc called for a 
parliamentary session to examine the crisis. Baburin, then leader of the Russian All-People’s 
Union, led a group of deputies on a (supposedly biased in favour of the separatists) fact- 
finding mission to Abkhazia. In an interview with the author, Baburin said that Yeltsin had 
provoked the conflict in order to destabilize the region so that he could declare a state of 
emergency and consolidate his political control64 As for Baburin’s foreign policy views, he
61 Author’s Interview with Baburin, May 21,1999.
62 Shevardnadze Interviewed by Leon Onikova, Izvestiva. June 22,1992, p .l.
63 The Russian Unity bloc was headed by Victor Aksyuchits (former head o f the Russian Christian Democratic 
Movement and later a key player on the central council o f former Vice-President Aleksandr Rutskoi's Derzhava 
movement) and Mikhail Astaev (who later formed the All-Russian National Right Center). Sergei Baburin was 
then the founder o f the Rossiya deputies' group and leader of the Russian All-People's Union. See, Itar-Tass. 
August 27, 1992.
64 Author’s Interview with Baburin May 21,1999. The corridor leading to Baburin’s Duma office was covered 
with pictures o f  Baburin, standing among with soldiers among ruins in Abkhazia and the former Yugoslavia,
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said that he believed at the time that Abkhazia should be part of Russia, and still believed that 
had Russia used force, the conflict would have been stopped early on and Abkhazia would 
likely have re-united with Russia.65 A second delegation including Sergei Filatov, First 
Deputy Chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet, and Yevgeny Kozhokin, Deputy Chairman 
of the Security Affairs Committee of the Russian Supreme Soviet, was sent to Georgia. This 
time, in order to avoid any controversy, it visited both parties to the conflict. However the 
delegation also ended up siding with the Abkhaz and was therefore criticized by the 
Georgians.66
By now, political parties across the spectrum -  and not only the fundamentalist 
nationalists -  criticized the government for not having “learned a lesson” from the Moldova 
crisis and for failing once more to react quickly to a mounting crisis. On 24 August 1992, ten 
days after Georgian troops entered Abkhazia, the Russian political coalition, Civic Union, 
denounced the Russian government for its "unjustified passivity" and demanded they protect 
the Abkhazians. Other “centrists”, for example Ramazan Abdulatipov, Chairman of the 
Supreme Soviet Council of Nationalities and de facto leader of the centrist faction 
Sovereignty and Equality, which was formed to advocate sovereignty for autonomous 
territories, expressed sympathy with the Abkhaz but were not as provocative nor as
• • zopredisposed to using force as the more vocal extremists. Instead, they called for more fact­
finding missions to be sent to Abkhazia and vocally supported the Abkhaz cause in speeches 
and articles.
Just over a month after the fighting had begun on 25 September 1992, as the pro- 
Abkhazia stance became more popular among the political elite, and before any official 
policy had been outlined, the Russian Supreme Soviet put forth its own assessment and 
agenda. Its resolution “On the Situation in the North Caucasus and Events in Abkhazia”
underlined with statements denouncing Georgian and NATO “enemies”.
65 Ibid.
66 Evegeny Kozhokin is currently director o f the Russian Institute o f  Strategic Studies, Moscow. See Evegeny 
Kozhokin “Georgia-Abkhazia”, in Jeremy Azrael and Emil Payin (eds.), US and Russian Policymaking with 
Respect to the Use o f Force (Santa Monica: RAND, 1996). On line at www.rand.org
67 Itar-Tass. August 26, 1992.
68 Ibid.
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denounced Georgia’s actions, declared Georgian troops to be responsible for the bloodshed, 
and stated that Russian military equipment should no longer be given to the Georgians. The 
Russian parliament also criticized both the Russian government and the West for their pro- 
Georgia position towards the conflict.69
As for Russia’s military leadership, it tended to view the Caucasus (the 
Transcaucasian states and Russia’s northern Caucasus) as a single strategic region.70 The 
Abkhaz bases along the Black Sea were believed to be essential for Russian control of a 
region which could provide a buffer for Russia against Turkey and Iran. Thus members of the 
Russian armed forces urged the Russian government to defend the Abkhaz.71 Although 
elements in the military may have been naturally inclined towards using force, that 
possibility was limited by serious financial constraints which prevented any future large- 
scale intervention.
ii) The Official Position
In the spring of 1992, while lacking a policy towards Georgia as a whole, Russia’s 
policy at first focused upon the Georgian republic of South Ossetia. Very briefly, when South 
Ossetia (across the border from Russia’s republic of North Ossetia) began to agitate for - 
independence, Russia helped to bring order to the region and an agreement for a cease-fire 
was reached on 24 June 1992 in which all armed units would be withdrawn from the conflict 
zone. A tripartite Russian-Georgian-Ossetian peacekeeping force was deployed to the region 
that July. Only one battalion (800 paratroopers) was deployed at approximately the same 
time that Russian troops were sent to Transdniestria. The cease-fire has been maintained 
although to date no political resolution has been reached. The South Ossetians have been in 
de facto control of the area since 1992 and isolated acts of political terrorism have continued 
to spark tension. Although Khasbulatov accused Georgia of genocide against the Ossetians, 
and advocated the admission of South Ossetia into Russia, officially their pleas for
69 The resolution "On the Situation in the North Caucasus and Events in Abkhazia" is discussed in Rossiyskava 
Gazeta, September 30, 1992, pp.1-2.
70 Author’s Interview. Russian Col. Rimarchuk, June 2, 1999.
71 Ibid.
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TO  •incorporation into the Russian Federation were rejected. The conflict in South Ossetia had 
repercussions in Russia’s republic of North Ossetia which also began to agitate for 
independence. This process highlighted the fact that the Caucasus was an interconnected 
region and that it was in Russia’s interest to help maintain peace there.
On 28 August 1992 Yeltsin issued an “Appeal from the Russian President to the 
Leadership of Georgia and Abkhazia” in which he proclaimed Russian support for Georgian
TOterritorial integrity and promised to prevent the Georgian army from entering Abkhazia. 
Thus, officially, peaceful involvement was proposed to resolve the conflict. As it was stated 
at the time in the liberal newspaper, Nezavisimava Gazeta. "If we ourselves set such an 
example we will have the moral right to exert pressure (but not through violence or the threat 
of violence) on behalf of Russian minorities and peoples like the Gagauz, the Ossetians and 
the Abkhaz1'.74 Deputy Prime Minister Georgy Khizha called the North Caucasus an area of 
“special interest” for Russia. He said that Russia should be especially concerned about 
Abkhazia because of the looting, crime and economic hardship which also affected ethnic
Tc
Russians living there. The division in foreign policy thinking about how to respond to the 
Moldova-Transdniestria conflict which existed between the Russian MoD and the MFA was 
reflected in the policy rhetoric towards Georgia. The Russian MoD was once more in favour 
of using military force to solve the conflict. The MFA, meanwhile espoused a comparatively 
“soft-line” approach by which it supported negotiations as the best means to resolve the 
conflict.76
iii) The Policy
Soon after fighting began on 14 August, Russia, as in the case of Moldova- 
Transdniestria conflict, played an important mediatory role between the two parties. Yeltsin 
himself (rather than the MFA which was already being sidelined for its lack of action in
72 Itar-Tass. May 30, 1992. Ivan Yelistratov and Sergei Chugaev, Izvestiva, June 15, 1992, p .l.
73 The appeal was printed in Krasnaya Zvezda. August 28, 1992, p . l .
74Dmitry Furman, Nezavisimava Gazeta July 3,1992, p.3.
75Georgy Khizha quoted in Rossivskive Vesti. September 3, 1992, p.2.
76 Author’s Interview with Dr. Andrei Zagorsky (Vice Rector, MGIMO -  Moscow State Institute for 
International Relations) May 28, 1999.
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Moldova) called for the resolution of the conflict and was from the beginning active in
77foreign policy-making. Yeltsin did follow a clear, if cautious, policy of conflict negotiation. 
Negotiations began in Moscow between Georgia and Abkhazia. They resulted in the first of 
many temporary cease-fire agreements on 3 September 1992. Under pressure from Russia, 
Ardzinba signed a (short-lived) document allowing the presence of Georgian troops on
70
Abkhazian territory and calling for the involvement of UN observers. Thus, relatively 
immediate action was taken to localize the conflict, to prevent potential spill over in the 
region and to discourage the involvement of other powers. Unfortunately, the Abkhaz
70resumed fighting in October and the agreement was abandoned.
At this time, no official action was taken to support a particular side in the conflict 
and Yeltsin denied responsibility for his army’s supposed actions in favour of the Abkhaz. 
However, an article in Pravda claimed that the then secretary of the Russian Security 
Council, Yuri Skokov, persuaded Yeltsin in the first few weeks of the war to sanction 
Russian support for the Abkhaz. Allegedly, Skokov argued that if Russia did not do so,
OA
Russian military influence in Georgia would be replaced by that of NATO. This suggests 
that Russia’s unofficial support of the Abkhaz was understood, at least by some, as a means 
to retain Russia’s influence in the region. Another of Russia’s chief officially stated concerns 
was the geographical proximity of Abkhazia to the North Caucasian republics and the danger 
it would pose to the unity of the Russian Federation if they were dragged into the conflict. 
Yeltsin cautioned the peoples of the North Caucasus to refrain from destabilizing the 
situation, but at this time no action (for example, closing the border -  which would not have 
been easy and would have required financial expenditure, but was later attempted) was taken
•  01to prevent them from helping the Abkhaz.
77 Valery Vyzhotovich, Izvestiva. September 4,1992, p.2.
78 Valery Vyzhotovich, Izvestiva. September 4,1992, p.2.
79 Georgian analyst Khostaria-Brosset argues that Abkhazia ignored the September 3 peace agreement because 
its leadership believed many Russian politicians as well as the Confederation o f  Mountain Peoples would 
support the Abkhaz cause. He controversially describes the entire war as mainly the consequence o f the Abkhaz 
acting in a senseless and irresponsible fashion. Khostaria Brosset, Inter-Ethnic Relations in Georgia: Causes o f  
Conflicts and Wavs o f their Settlement (Tbilisi: Metsniereba, 1993). (in Russian)
80 Pravda, August 17, 1992, p.3.
81 Yeltsin’s address to the peoples o f the North Caucasus was printed in Krasnaya Zvezda. August 28, 1992,
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When war broke out, the immediate Russian interest concerned the fate of the ethnic 
Russian minority and Russian citizens on holiday in Abkhazia. On 15 August 1992, the day 
after the Georgian army entered the territory of Abkhazia, a Russian airborne regiment was 
flown to Abkhazia to evacuate ethnic Russians and protect strategic military installations. 
This regiment and other Russian troops which remained on Abkhazian territory were soon 
caught between Georgian and Abkhazian forces and subjected to attacks (mainly to steal 
weapons) by both sides -  each of which wanted to drag Russia into the conflict. This was 
broadly the same situation as in Moldova. Reports that Russian troops were forced to 
retaliate in self-defence ring true. In this context, the Transcaucasian Military District 
Commander General Valery Patrikeev, spoke of the necessity to return fire long before the 
official order came from the Chief of the General Staff of the Russia Armed Forces, Viktor 
Dubynin.83
Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev admitted in 1993 that the Russian troops in 
Georgia actually assisted the Abkhaz armed forces throughout 1992 and 1993.84 However, 
this support seems to have come voluntarily and for cash from a dispirited and poorly paid 
Russian military. It is also extremely difficult to determine whether the support was from 
regular Russian units or from various groups of volunteers from Russia. The fact that the 
Abkhazians were more dependant than the Georgians on buying weapons from Russia helps 
to explain why some Russian troops favoured them over the Georgians. The money used by 
the Abkhazians to buy weapons seems to have come from Abkhazia’s large diaspora in 
Turkey, Syria, Jordan, Europe and the USA, and this reinforces the idea that “Russian action”
Of
was largely a matter of individuals seeking profit. There is little evidence that the Russian 
government was following a pro-Abkhazia policy and even less that this was the result of an
P ' 1 '2 Natalya Groznaya, Nezavisimava Gazeta. August 21, 1992, p.3.
83 Several articles in Krasnava Zvezda state that the Russian military acted in self-protection and in support o f  
the Abkhaz from the beginning o f the conflict. See September 15, 1992, p.l; October 7, 1992, p .l.
84 See interview with Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev conducted by Igor Rotar, Nezavisimava Gazeta. 
November 24, 1993, pp.l, 3.
85 Dodge Billingsey, “Georgian-Abkhazian Security Issues”, Jane’s Intelligence Review, vol.8, no.2 (February
1996) pp.65-68, p.67. Billingsey’s detailed examination o f Russian involvement in terms o f weapons transfers, 
air and naval assets and regular units supports this argument.
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explicit directive from Yeltsin. In fact, much more than in the case of Moldova, Russian
Oi'
units on the ground were probably supplying weapons to both sides.
However, while Russian troops were returning fire in self-protection, volunteers from 
Russia’s North Caucasus were supporting the Abkhazians. As in Transdniestria, “Russian 
military actions” on behalf of the separatist side were taken by soldiers of fortune from Russia.87 
In the case of Abkhazia, Russian citizens from the so-called "Confederation of the Peoples of 
the Caucasus" and the "Grand United Circle of Cossacks" fought on the separatist side and
oo
patrolled the Russia-Georgia border. These were Russian citizens but most of them had little
Q Q
or no allegiance to Russia.
As early as 1989, the smaller nations of the North Caucasus had debated the idea of 
recreating the large "North Caucasian Mountain Republic" (which had existed from 1921-1924) 
including the Abkhaz Republic, Checheno-Ingushetia, North Ossetia, Kabardino-Balkar, and 
Karachai-Cherkess. In August 1989 steps were taken towards this goal with the formation of an 
Assembly composed of representatives from the different republics. Under the leadership of 
Yuri Shanibov, it provided verbal support to the Abkhaz who were already threatened by 
Georgian nationalism. The Assembly was transformed into the Confederation in November 
1991 and provided psychological and material support to the Abkhazians -  thanks largely to 
Chechen and Circassian volunteers. Eventually, Shanibov declared his ultimate goal to re­
establish North Caucasian independence. However, with the Chechen war the Confederation’s 
activities decreased practically to the point of non-existence. The subsequent leader, the 
Chechen Yusup Soslambekov, told the author that the Assembly had failed to create a real
86 Ibid.
87 As seen in Chapter Five, several thousand Russian Cossacks and other soldiers o f fortune from Russia fought 
on the Transdniestrian side.
88 Author’s Interview with Yusup Soslambekov (President o f the North Caucasus Assembly) June 8, 1996. Also 
see, Nezavisimava Gazeta. October 12, 1993, p.2.
89 Author’s Interview with Yusup Soslambekov June 8, 1996. Soslambekov described the common “mountain” 
and “militant” cultures o f the Caucasians and said that there was no need to resurrect a national identity among 
these peoples, as it was already active. He noted that the “fighting history” o f the Caucasians had “begun with 
uprisings in 1864 against the Slavic colonizers” and that the struggle would continue. He described the area as a 
“volcano ready to erupt”. He said that the Assembly gave military aid to the Abkhazians but that Chechnya had 
received little more than humanitarian aid from any outside sources. (Note: Despite their united front, there 
were many controversies among the original members o f the “Confederation” which partly explains their 
inconsistencies in terms o f providing aid to Abkhazia).
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republic partly because the Abkhaz and fellow North Caucasians had not supported Chechnya in 
its war against Russia.90
There were also close links between the Abkhazian and Transdniestrian separatists. 
According to Helsinki Watch, Transdniestrian officials paid many Russian mercenaries to 
fight in Abkhazia.91 Transdniestria supported Abkhaz independence as a gesture of support 
for fellow separatists and fellow supporters of the re-creation of the territory of the Soviet 
Union (at least in the early 1990s). The same small Transdniestrian force that had been 
involved in the attempted coup in Moscow in October 1993 was apparently also involved in
09
Abkhazia. Yusup Soslambekov told the author that approximately 90 percent of the dead 
and wounded in Abkhazia were not Abkhaz but Russians from the North Caucasus.93 
However, the early involvement of volunteers from the North Caucasus was independent of 
Russian policy and was unwelcome by the Russian government. The Russian MoD denied 
having any knowledge about them and took no responsibility. Defence Minister Pavel 
Grachev officially supported Yeltsin's line of non-interference and warned only that Russian 
troops would retaliate against any attacks or attempts to appropriate equipment94 In an 
example of their displeasure about both the attempt to create the Confederation of the 
Peoples of the Caucausus and its involvement in Abkhazia, Russian authorities arrested its 
leader, Musa Shanibov, who later escaped and went to fight in Abkhazia.95
Of course, as in the case of Moldova, early action taken on the ground narrowed the 
policy options available to the Russian government and, in this case, the early unofficial 
military assistance for the Abkhazians initially steered policy towards supporting the Abkhaz.
90 Ibid.
91 See The Economist. November 13, 1993, pp.51-2. Shamil Basayev, a leader o f the Chechen struggle against 
Moscow, fought as a hired mercenary in Abkhazia in 1992-3.
92 See Chapter Five.
93 Author’s Interview with Yusup Soslambekov, June 8, 1996.
94 Pavel Felgenhauer, Segodnva. September 21,1993, p .l.
95 According to Alexei Zverev, snipers from the Baltic states and members o f an extreme nationalist Ukrainian 
organization (UNA-UNSO) were mercenaries and volunteers on the Georgian side supposedly sent to struggle 
against Russian imperialism. Rossivskive Vesti. August 27, 1992, p .l.
c) Stage Three: Achieving Consensus (October 1992- June 1996)
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i) The Debates
As in the case of Moldova-Transdniestria, a specific event in late 1992 helped bring 
the Georgia-Abkhazia conflict to the Russian public’s attention and to focus the debate over 
the specifics of what Russia's role in the conflict should be. On 14 December 1992, a Russian 
helicopter was shot down while evacuating ethnic Russians from the conflict area. This was 
one of several attacks upon Russian troops which were repeatedly discussed in the Russian 
media. The event initiated a debate over the precise path that Russian policy should take in 
order to maintain influence in Georgia.96
Of course, those Russian newspapers which typically expressed fundamentalist 
nationalist ideas continued to strongly attack government policy. Den’, for example, was 
equally as supportive of the possibility of a merger of Abkhazia with Russia as it had been
07with Transdniestria. The main military paper, Krasnaya Zvezda. denounced Russia's 
sacrifice in becoming involved in the conflict, but at the same time applauded actions taken 
to protect Russian interests and criticized the West for its lack of action. It wrote:
What humiliation and outrages Russian servicemen and 
members of their families suffered and indeed continue to 
suffer in Georgia! One terrible figure in the past two years, 
seventy Russian servicemen -  think on it, reader -  have been 
killed in Georgia!... And Russia, vilified, slandered, unlike 
Georgia's beloved West, which fobbed Georgia off with 
supplies of humanitarian aid... took on the entire burden of 
peacemaking in the region.98
The right-wing movement National Republican Party of Russia, led by Nikolai Lysenko, and 
the National Salvation Front were the most enthusiastically in favour of Russia defence of the 
Abkhaz cause. Using highly inflammatory rhetoric, and exaggerating the common thinking 
between its members and the Abkhazian people, the National Salvation Front attacked the
96 Around this time there was a general increase in the number o f  attacks on Russian troops and installations. 
Victor Litovkin, Izvestiva. December 15, 1992, p .l.
97 See for example, Z. Achba, Den’, no. 48 (November 29-December 5, 1992), p.2.
98 Petr Karapteyan, Krasnaya Zvezda. October 22, 1993, p .l.
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official policy towards the conflict." Other politicians, such as Vice President Aleksandr 
Rutskoi (who played a significant role in the debate and policy making towards 
Transdniestria) used the same arguments that they had offered in the case of Transdniestria -  
that Russia should defend the Abkhaz in order to protect the “Russian-speakers”.100 This 
argument was made despite the fact that in the case of Abkhazia “Russia’s brothers” were 
significantly fewer in number than in Transdniestria.
Georgian President Shevardnadze himself highlighted the significance of the rifts 
among the Russian political elite and once again blamed the deterioration of Russian- 
Georgian relations directly on Russia’s "reactionary forces". Controversially, he accused 
"nationalist" forces of providing arms, training and finances to the Abkhazians. 
Shevardnadze complained:
On the one hand is the side headed by Yeltsin, and on the other 
-  I would even use rather crude words -  there are the bastards 
who did everything they could to raise Abkhaz separatism to 
the level of fascism... We have been the victims of these 
games, of this confrontation within Russia...Unfortunately, I 
could not do anything to prevent this. There were huge forces, 
which Georgia had no chance of countering. This is why 
Sukhumi and Abkhazia have been lost and why there is a civil 
war in Georgia... The events in Abkhazia and Georgia are 
typical examples of what a totalitarian regime and supporters 
of totalitarian regimes can do.101
These comments came from a man with an interest in stressing Russian wickedness 
and they greatly exaggerated the situation. However they were also made in reaction to a 
vocal minority within Russia that was whipping up emotions on the side of the Abkhazians.
In contrast to the fundamentalist nationalists, pragmatic nationalists credited themselves, 
and not the government, for their “positive and practical impact” on the making of Russia's
99 Den’, no.2 (January 7-13, 1993), p.2.
100 Alexander Rutskoi interviewed on Radio Rossiva. June 21, 1993; and Author’s Interview with Mikhail 
Astafiyev (Rutskoi’s deputy in charge o f international relations and foreign policy, member o f the “All Russia’s 
Right Center”, part o f the Motherland Movement) June 25, 1995. For the evolution o f Rutskoi’s views about 
Transdniestria, see Chapter Five.
101 "Shevardnadze Interview by Daniel Lecomte, ARTE Television Network (Strasbourg), October 8, 1993. 
Also see Shevardnadze’s statement in Segodnva. September 28, 1993, p .l.
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foreign policy and congratulated themselves for providing the solution to the Abkhaz conflict. 
To quote Konstantin Borovoi:
Georgia's request for the presence of Blue Helmets got it 
nowhere. The situation went on deteriorating and was settled 
thanks to Russia's efforts... difficult problems will not be 
solved by one president calling up another but by using various 
channels... political parties, and the initiative of politicians.102
In other words, individual politicians (not extremists) and parliament did influence the 
making of policy towards the Georgia-Abkhazia conflict, and Russia pursued the same policy 
that any other state would have done in such a situation: it became actively involved in the 
pursuit of peace and the protection of Russian interests. As Konstantin Borovoi further 
explained: “The United States, for one, never hesitates to move its fleet to forward positions, 
never shrinks from announcing bomb raids. That’s an active foreign policy that may even be 
called aggressive. Why should we refuse to do that”?
Throughout this period, members across the political spectrum in the lower house of 
the Russian parliament continued to be sympathetic to the Abkhazian cause. Parliament 
considered requests from the Abkhaz Supreme Council to allow Abkhazia to merge with 
Russia, and even demanded that Georgia consider the Abkhaz request to unify with 
Russia.104 The Duma protested against the government’s signing of the February 1994 Treaty 
of Friendship and Cooperation. On 3 February 1994, all factions in the Duma, including 
Russia’s Choice, signed a statement that objected to the treaty for being too supportive of 
Georgia. Specifically, the statement denounced Georgian aggression against Abkhazia and 
criticized Georgia’s unilateral infringement of earlier agreements. It warned that the treaty 
would provoke negative reactions in the North Caucasus, and argued that Russia should not 
assist in forming Georgia’s armed forces.105
102 Borovoi, speaking at a forum on Russian foreign policy transcribed in “Russia’s foreign policy should be 
multidimensional”, International Affairs. Moscow, vol.40, no.2 (March 21,1994), pp.79-92, p.85.
103 Ibid., p.82-3.
104 Leonid Mlechin, Izvestiva. December 28,1993, p.3.
105 M. Razorenova, “Gruziya v fevrale 1993”, Politicheskii monitoring, no.2 (Moscow: IGPI, 1994), p.2.
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After Yeltsin ignored parliament and signed the treaty, a group of Russian 
parliamentary deputies led by Konstantin Zatulin, the Chair of the Duma’s Committee on 
CIS Affairs and Relations with Compatriots, cautioned Yeltsin that the treaty was premature 
and could destabilize the entire Transcaucasus. Zatulin, who was a key participant in the 
Duma debates about Transdniestria, argued that the treaty was “an attempt to unilaterally arm 
the Georgian government”.106 He believed that there was no reason to trust that the Georgian 
side would hand over its weapons or fulfil its treaty obligations. Instead, Zatulin emphasized 
the need to first define the political status of Abkhazia and to prevent volunteers from the 
North Caucasus from crossing into Abkhazia. On 2 June 1994, the Federal Council rejected a 
presidential request to deploy Russian troops to Abkhazia as part of a joint CIS peacekeeping 
force because it did not want troops to be sent outside a legal framework. However, as is 
shown below, Yeltsin ignored the parliament which was forced post facto to back the 
proposals. Thus, although parliament may often have been unsuccessful in countering 
executive-led policies, it did set a new cautionary tone.
Despite such setbacks, parliament continued to criticize government policy, support the 
Abkhaz and search for a final solution to the conflict. In July 1994, in an effort to strengthen
107Russian ties with Abkhazia, Zatulin led a fact-finding mission to the separatist region. From 
1994 to 1996, the Russian Duma continued to host delegations from Abkhazia, most of which 
had been invited to participate in the sessions of the Congress of the Compatriots in Moscow. 
During these sessions, the Abkhazians followed the lead of the separatist Transdniestrians and
1 ORcalled for referendums to reunite their territories with Russia. However, it is significant that 
troop withdrawal from Georgia was not considered seriously during these years.
In January 1996, the Russian parliament challenged the CIS decision to impose 
sanctions on Abkhazia.109 In April 1996, a Duma delegation visited Abkhazia following 
several outbreaks of violence which were assumed at the time to be tied to the upcoming 
Russian presidential elections in June with both sides attempting to gain the attention or
106 See his committee’s statement in Nezavisimava Gazeta. February 5, 1994, p.3.
107 Russian Information Agency. July 1,1994.
108 Georgy Kobaladze and Aleksandr Koretsky, Kommersant Daily. September 16, 1994, pp.l, 3.
109 BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts. SU/D2519/B, January 26, 1996.
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sympathy of the Russian public and the presidential candidates. The Communists continued 
to take a pro-Abkhaz line and expressed support for what they termed their “kith and kin” in 
Abkhazia (although they condemned the involvement of the Chechen rebels).110 The 
Communists considered the Abkhaz their “brothers” primarily because of their nostalgia for 
the Soviet Union. As mentioned above, the Abkhaz had continually expressed their wish to 
re-unite with Russia and re-create the Soviet Union, and Abkhazia was home to a Russian 
diaspora (whose significance was exaggerated in order to criticize government policy). 
However, at this stage the Duma as a whole believed that the Abkhaz problem could be 
solved within the boundaries of Georgia. Duma Speaker Gennady Seleznyov stated that 
Russia should continue to be involved in the negotiations and to support the territorial 
integrity of Georgia.111
if) The Shift in Official Position
After his initial involvement, Yeltsin retreated somewhat from policy-making towards 
the Georgia-Abkhazia conflict. A government decree in August 1993 meant that the MoD
• i nmonitored the ceasefire while the MFA coordinated the negotiations with the UN. Neither 
a weakened Georgia nor an independent Abkhazia were seen to be in Russia’s interest. By 
October 1993, the MFA and MoD also agreed that Russia should use its military influence 
(and take advantage of events in the conflict) in order to persuade Georgia to join the CIS 
and its collective security system and to retain Russian military troops and bases in the area. 
By late 1993, when the Georgian government became more accommodative due to its weak 
position from the internal conflicts and its economic crisis, Russian policy began to support 
Tbilisi and to isolate Abkhazia.
110 Appeal by the Creative Intelligentsia o f  Russian in Support o f Zyuganov as a Candidate for President o f the 
Russian Federation, Pravda Rossii. March 26, 1996, p .l. “We, the heirs and continuers of the great Russian 
culture, cannot look on indifferently as our Russia perishes and our people die out. Many of us have lost near 
and dear ones -  some in the Transdniestria war....”
111 Pavel Kuznetsov. Itar-Tass. February 16, 1996.
112 “Decree o f August 5, 1993”, Federatsiva (August 14,1993).
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In 1994, Kozyrev defended Russia’s role in the conflict and criticized the West and 
specifically the United Nations for its failure to send peacekeeping troops to Abkhazia.113 
Most significantly, and directly counter to his earlier liberal westernizing stance, Kozyrev 
openly and frequently advocated the use of military means to protect Russia's strategic 
interests there.114 Kozyrev repeatedly defended the idea of sending Russian troops to Georgia 
on peacekeeping missions: "...if we refuse to live up to our geopolitical role, someone else 
will try and clean up the mess in our home".115
The Russian MoD now openly advocated the defence of Russia’s security interests in 
Georgia. In February 1993, Minister of Defence Grachev stated that Russia had strategic 
interests on the Black Sea Coast and that every measure would be taken to ensure that Russian 
troops remain there.116 He also proposed that Georgia retain its territorial integrity, but 
guarantee effective autonomy to the Abkhazian, South Ossetia and Adzharian regions. Then, in 
mid-September 1993, Grachev openly linked the removal of the Russian troops in Georgia with 
peace in Abkhazia, but refused to grant Georgia military aid until it joined the CIS.117 This 
policy was similar to the one which linked support for the Moldovan government against the 
Transdniestrian separatists to Moldova’s entrance into the CIS. It is fairly clear that once again 
the MoD was attempting to take advantage of a separatist conflict to secure Russia’s interests.
While earlier Russian forces had acted independently, the MoD now had regained strong 
operational control over Russian military action and peacekeeping operations in Abkhazia.118
113 In 1994, Mr. Vorontsov, Russian ambassador to the UN, argued that Russia and the other CIS states were 
forced into a peacekeeping role because o f the lack o f  action on the part o f the UN. See “Provisional verbatim 
record o f the 3398th meeting o f the Security Council”, UN Document . S/PV.3398 1994, p.3. Also, “Press 
Briefing by the Ministry o f Foreign Affairs”, Official Kremlin International News Broadcast April 19, 1994 
(Lexis-Nexis).
114 "Andrei Kozyrev on Russia's Peacekeeping Role in the CIS", Nezavisimava Gazeta. September 22, 1993, 
p .l.
11 Leonid Bershidsky, "Georgia Peaceforce Riles Duma", The Moscow Times. June 18, 1994, p.3.
116 BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts. February 22, 1993, SU/1622.
117 Fiona Hill and Pamela Jewett, “Back in the USSR”: Russia’s Intervention in the Internal Affairs o f the 
Former Soviet Republics and the Implications for the United States Policy Towards Russia (Harvard: Harvard 
Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project, January 1994).
118 Pavel Baev argues that Russia’s military presence in Georgia was negotiated primarily through military 
channels and that it was Deputy Defence Minister Georgy Kondratyev who finalized the details o f the June 
1994 launch o f Russia’s peacekeeping operation in Abkhazia. Pavel Baev, Russia’s Policies in the Caucasus 
(London: RIIA, Former Soviet South Project, 1997), p.27.
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However, minor incidents of inconsistent policy-making still occurred. For example, on 13 
September 1994, Russian Deputy Defence and General Georgy Kondratyev, on his own 
initiative, announced to a gathering of Georgian refugees that Russian peacekeepers would 
support their mass repatriation to Gali the very next day. Yeltsin himself then had to counter this 
announcement and managed to delay the return of the refugees.119 This is a minor example of 
the MoD attempting to independently manoeuvre Russian policy. It is also an example of the 
difficulties in creating consistent policies when there was an urgent need to act in a complex 
conflict which involved many different actors and institutions.
While it was focusing on creating a settlement to the conflict, the Russian government 
was influenced by a growing perception among the MFA and parliament that the Transcaucasus 
was an area of great economic importance to Russia.120 Georgia, in particular, held a promising 
position at the Eurasian transit crossroads of transportation, oil and gas pipelines, and this 
became more significant as normalization of economic ties and the unblocking of transportation 
and other lines of communication became a Russian priority. It was also generally considered 
that Russia could use Georgia to exert influence over the entire Transcaucasus. For example, 
through Georgia’s port of Batumi, oil and other goods could reach Armenia and via Armenia 
pressure could be kept on Azerbaijan. And, as a director within the Russian MFA responsible 
for the CIS States admitted in 1997, "The oil factor, the problem of security of states, and the 
settlement of conflicts prove to be interconnected in one way or another” . .. [Russia] “... cannot 
remain indifferent there because at stake are our vital, long-term interests rather than sky-high
191ambitions, or a desire to follow an imperial policy".
Finally, at the All-Caucasian summit of 3 June 1996, Vladimir Priakhin, from the
1 99MFA, outlined a “new Russian policy on the Caucasus”. It was agreed that from that point
1,9 See Nodar Broladze, Nezavisimava Gazeta. September 16, 1994, p.l and Nodar Broladze, Nezavisimava 
Gazeta. September 17, 1994,p .l.
120 A. Zaitsev, Director o f the 4th Department o f the CIS Countries o f the Ministry o f  Foreign Affairs o f Russia, 
in "Russia and Transcaucasia", International Affairs. Moscow: vol. 43, no.5 (1997), pp. 180-187, p i82.
121 Russian trade with Georgia in 1996 was 4.3% of its 1991 level. The quote is from A. Zaitsev, Director o f the 
4th Department o f the CIS Countries o f the Ministry o f Foreign Affairs o f Russia, in "Russia and 
Transcaucasia", International Affairs. Moscow, vol. 43, no.5 (1997), pp. 180-187, pp. 184-5.
122 The summit included the presidents o f Russia, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia, as well as the participation 
of leaders from the North Caucasian republics and regions.
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on Russia would follow a policy which regarded the Caucasus as a single political,
geographical and economic region. This would allow “a single composite strategy of
regulating the conflicts in the region”, with the participation of Middle Eastern neighbours
such as Turkey and Iran, and in which Russia would play a leading role. According to
Priakhin, within the new framework “The component of force remains unconditionally
1necessary for supporting the balance of interests in the region”. He concluded that “all the 
peoples of the Caucausus and Transcaucasus are interested in consolidating Russia and the 
Russian presence there”.124
iii) The Policy
Russian policy and military action at this time was in line with the dominant 
pragmatic nationalist foreign policy ideas (both within the debate and official government 
position) that Russia should retain influence, end the war, continue military ties and protect 
its interests. In the short term, Russian policy successfully followed this “road map”: the 
fighting subsided and, only six months after Grachev’s statements were made, a strong 
Russian-Georgian military relationship had been forged. The first round of negotiations to 
resolve the conflict began under the auspices of the United Nations (and with the 
participation of the CSCE) in May 1993, and resulted in a temporary cease-fire. Russia 
negotiated a tentative peace in Abkhazia, and achieved two other important (at least in the 
short term) gains: close military relations with Georgia and Georgia’s entry into the CIS. 
Georgia was encouraged to abandon the use of military force against Abkhazia and the 
Abkhaz to allow a return of Georgian refugees. Georgia, however, continued to refuse to 
discuss the political status of Abkhazia.
The second round of negotiations, the so-called "Sochi Talks", led to the an Agreement 
signed on 27 July 1993 which included a cease-fire, the creation of a trilateral Georgia- 
Abkhazian-Russian control group to monitor and enforce the cease-fire, and the stationing of
123 Vladimir Priakhin, “Russia: Peace Efforts in the Transcaucasus”, International Affairs. Moscow, vol.42, no.4 
(1996), pp.64-70, p.65. Priakhin was the deputy director o f the Fourth Department o f the CIS Countries o f the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
124 Ibid, p.68.
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international observers and peacekeeping forces to separate the two sides. It also promised the 
withdrawal of the Georgian army from Abkhazia, the demilitarisation of Georgia and Abkhazia 
and the creation of a “legal government” in Abkhazia.
Within a matter of weeks, however, on 15 September 1993, Abkhazian forces took 
advantage of the brewing civil war and launched a massive and successful offensive to capture 
Sukhumi and drive the Georgians out of Abkhazia. There is considerable evidence that the 
Abkhazian offensive in July 1993 had the support of Russian troops which also provided arms
1 OAto the supporters of Georgia's ousted President Gamsakhurdia. However, it is difficult to 
know whether this was part of official Russian policy or was simply profiteering on the 
occasion. Certainly, it seems that (as in the other CIS states) the incentive to earn money 
through the sale of weapons was significant. Officially the Russian government responded by 
condemning the Abkhaz’ actions and then refusing to send in troops to disengage the parties.
Georgian President Shevardnadze was forced to ask for Russia’s help due to the 
deteriorating military situation on the ground. It was at this point that Russia began to 
officially support Shevardnadze’s side. Then Russian troops switched to officially supporting 
the Georgian government’s attempts to end the offensive. They went to the rescue of the 
Georgian government and by mid-November with their help the Georgian government troops 
had regained control. The result was that Georgia, which had been unable to resolve the 
separatist conflict by its own military means, was forced to enter into a relatively close 
partnership with Russia which, in the short run, imposed specific limits upon its sovereignty.
125 The UN at this point refused to intervene.
126 There are indications and evidence o f such collusion, especially during the Abkhaz offensives in the autumn 
o f 1993. "It is highly unlikely that ethnic Abkhaz, who number some 100,000 locally, and who have no formal 
army or weapons, could maintain sustained military superiority over the Georgian forces, drawn from an ethnic 
population o f about 4 million, without military assistance from Russia". Human RightsWatch also argues that 
owing to their location, Russian troops could not have been oblivious to the extensive movement o f troops and 
artillery in the days leading to the offensive. George Hewitt calls this analysis simplistic and stresses that the 
Russian support was not as great as normally contended, that any which existed did so unofficially and that the 
Abkhazian forces were stronger than they have been given credit for. See Erika Dailey, "Human rights and the 
Russian Armed Forces in the Near Abroad", Helsinki Monitor, vol.5, no.2 (1994), p. 14; and George Hewitt, 
“Abkhazia, Georgia and the Circassians (NW Causasus), Central Asia Survey, vol. 18, no.4 (1999), pp.463-499, 
footnote 3, p.498.
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On 3 February 1994, Georgia signed a Treaty of Friendship, Neighbourliness and 
Cooperation with Russia, as well as 24 other agreements which included provisions for the right 
to establish five Russian military bases, the stationing of Russian border guards along Georgia’s
1 77borders with Turkey and trade and cultural cooperation agreements. All of these documents 
reiterated Russia’s recognition of Georgian territorial integrity. On 4 April 1994 in Moscow, the 
parties to the conflict signed the "Declaration on Measures for a Political Settlement of the
i no
Georgian-Abkhaz Conflict". This declaration drew the lines for a future common state which 
would include Georgia and Abkhazia and established a 3-kilometer demilitarised zone between 
Georgia and the Abkhazian forces. Shevardnadze, who had originally wanted the peacekeepers 
deployed on the border between Russia and Abkhazia as opposed to the internal border between 
Georgia and Abkhazia, acquiesced. On 10 May, Shevardnadze and Ardzinba formally requested 
the CIS to deploy peacekeeping troops on those terms.129
In return for Georgia’s concessions, Russia began to help it create a new army, 
transferred military equipment to the Georgian side, and reinforced links between the two states’ 
security establishments. Russia also increased political and economic pressure upon Abkhazia, 
allowed the return of Georgian refugees and urged Abkhazia to agree to some type of federation 
with Georgia. Unsurprisingly, these pressures led to a gradual worsening of relations between 
Russia and Abkhazia.
However, in September 1994, Russia's special envoy to Georgia, Feliks Kovalev, 
admitted that Russia had “no intention of considering ratification" of the Russia-Georgia 
friendship treaty of 1994 -  i.e. of withdrawing its military until the final resolution of the 
Abkhaz conflict. In this context, Georgian Ambassador to Russia Valerian Avdadze’s response 
does not seem to have been unjustly exaggerated: "Georgia's independence depends to a great
1 1 A
extent on Russia's position. Georgia will be independent if Russia wants it [to be]". On 22
,27The Russian-Georgian Treaty o f Friendship, Neighbourly Relations and Cooperation was reprinted in 
Moskovskive Novosti. no.5 (January 30- February 6, 1994), pp.2-3.
l28The agreements signed in Moscow can be found in George Hewitt, Post-war Developments in the Georgia- 
Abkhazia Dispute (London: Parliamentary Human Right Group, June 1996) Appendix 3 and Annex 2.
129Georgian-Russian military ties are examined in “The Armed Forces o f Georgia -  an update”, in Jane’s 
Intelligence Review, vol.8, no.2 (February 1996), pp.69-70.
130 Valerian Advadze, Obshchava Gazeta. no. 10 (September 24, 1993), p.6.
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October, 1994 Georgia signed the CIS agreements. The very next day, Yeltsin ordered the 
deployment of Russian troops to the region in order to guard Georgian railways. Thus, Russia 
succeeded in persuading Georgia to join the CIS membership and Russia retained its military 
influence in the region. Subsequent peace negotiations ensured that peace in Abkhazia would be
guaranteed by the presence of Russian peacekeepers and that Russia would continue to play a
• • •  • *1^1  decisive role in forging a political agreement between Georgia and Abkhazia.
By 1996, Russian foreign policy in Georgia was attacked for being both too much
involved and too little involved. Yeltsin, however, continued his policy of guarding Russian
interests in the region by retaining strong ties with Georgia. On 19 January, Shevardnadze
persuaded the other CIS leaders to enforce economic sanctions and impose a full blockade on
1 ^ 9Abkhazia, and diplomacy between Russia and Georgia became more active.
Only after mid 1993 did Russian troops play a more neutral role. Although Russian 
troops were stationed in Georgia throughout the entire period, and had monitored a series of 
abortive cease-fires, they first appeared as official peacekeeping forces (in accordance with
1 T3the Russian mediated agreement) on 14 May 1994. By June 1994, Russian peacekeeping 
troops were taking up positions along the security zone between the two parties with Russian 
troops from the “Group of Russian Forces in Transcaucasus” forming the backbone of the 
peacekeeping force. Nevertheless, despite the relative peace since 1994, Russian
131 Dov Lynch explains Russian relations with Georgia since 1994 as the result o f a “misconstrued bargain” 
made that year. He argues that the Georgian government acceded to Russian demands by joining the CIS and 
the collective security arrangement only because it believed that this would guarantee the cessation o f Russian 
assistance to Abkhaz forces. Also, it understood that Russia would help in the long term to restore Georgian 
territorial integrity. However, in the Russian perception o f the bargain, Russia only agreed to stop assisting the 
Abkhaz forces in exchange for Georgia agreeing to Russian security demands -  and Russia had taken no 
responsibility for the restoration o f Georgia territorial integrity. Dov Lynch, The Conflict in Abkhazia: 
Dilemmas in Russian “Peacekeeping Policy”. Discussion Paper 77, (London: RIIA, 1998).
132 In January 1996, the Sukhumi port was closed to all foreign ships coming and going. Also, Abkhaz passports 
were no longer recognized by Russia’s border and customs services and thus Abkhaz citizens were not able to 
leave the republic. The Abkhazian border with Russia over the river Psou had been closed for males o f fighting 
age since the beginning o f the Chechen war in 1994. Abkhazia had been under a Russian blockade since 
December 1994. Electricity was shut off periodically, the Sukhumi airport closed and deliveries o f  fuel, food 
products and medical supplies limited. In October 1995 on instructions from the Russian MFA Abkhaz ships 
were prohibited from going out to sea. Alla Barakhova, Nezavisimava Gazeta. January 11, 1996, p.3.
133 These troops were to serve on a voluntary contractual basis at an estimated cost to Russia o f 2 billion rubles 
a year. Operational arrangements were confirmed in negotiations by Russian Defence Minister Grachev, 
Shevardnadze and Ardzinba. Other CIS members were supposed to have contributed troops to the peacekeeping 
force but the overwhelming majority has been Russian.
217
peacekeepers were accused of being partial to the Abkhaz because they did not facilitate the 
repatriation of refugees. In response to criticisms that Russian peacekeeping had not created 
conditions of security in the conflict zone and allowed the safe return of refugees, the 
commander of the peacekeeping forces, Lieutenant General Vasiliy Yakushev laid the blame 
on the political leaders and argued that a political solution was necessary before this could be 
done.134 However, by 1996, the Abkhaz were criticising the CIS plans for ending the conflict 
as too favourable to Georgia. Ardzinba continued to call for Georgia’s recognition of 
Abkhazia’s independence which Shevardnadze declared unacceptable.
4. Conclusions
Russia's key interests in the Georgia-Abkhazia conflict were conditioned somewhat 
by Tsarist and Soviet historical relations with the region. After 1991, Russia bordered the 
unstable and fractious area of the Caucasus, and inherited in Georgia a relatively small 
Russian diaspora and close economic ties. However, although this inheritance indicated why 
Russian foreign policy decision-makers were interested in reviewing Russian involvement, it 
clearly did not dictate a particular policy agenda towards it.
Russia's paramount interest in the Georgia-Abkhazia conflict was strategic - to stop 
the violence and prevent the dissolution of the Georgian state. The threat of anarchy in the 
Caucasus was real. The proximity and close relations of Abkhazia with Russia’s Northern 
Caucasus made the threat urgent. However, the extent of the threat to Russia itself was 
controversial and how to deal with it was not obvious. A small Russian diaspora existed in 
Georgia - but what it meant for policy development was contentious. Unlike in Moldova, the 
diaspora was not primarily located in the separatist region. Moreover, economic interests
134 For Lieutenant General Yakushev defence o f the Russian peacekeepers, see "Russian commander: 
"Peacekeepers are not police", Tbilisi Contact Information Agency. January 25, 1995.
135 To quote Abkhazia’s Foreign Minister, Leonid Lakerbai, “The plan calls for giving police functions to the 
CIS peacekeeping forces and drawing Russia into a new broad-scale war in the Caucasus” -  i.e. the Russian 
peacekeepers would not only assist in the return o f refugees but also disarm the Abkhaz armed forces. Lakerbai 
quoted in Temuri Kadzhaya, Nezavisimava Gazeta. January 11, 1996, p.3.
136 Natalya Gorodestsksya, Segodnva. February 21, 1996, p.2.
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were less significant than either security or the diaspora, and Georgia’s economic benefit to 
Russia was decreasing and little debated.
From 1991-1996, perceptions of these three main interests differed among Russian 
political groups, and ideas about what to do about them evolved over time. When war broke 
out in Georgia in August 1992, there was no elite consensus over how Russia should react. 
The environment conditioned but did not constrain Russia's actions. As in the case of 
Moldova, there were significant gaps between Russia's real and perceived interests and there 
was, therefore, the potential for foreign policy debates to impact on foreign policy in a 
significant way.
When we examine Russia’s debates and policies in the same chronological stages in 
both the Georgia and the Moldova case studies, we see that the dominant foreign policy ideas 
were similar in each stage. In stage one, from August 1991 to March 1992, there was very 
little debate about either Georgia or Moldova as neither of the conflicts had yet become 
violent and during this very short and tumultuous stage there was little public knowledge 
about events in those states. The dominant foreign policy ideas expressed both in the debate 
and in official statements by the government were liberal westemist. Russian policies 
meanwhile showed a general neglect of the area as Russian troops were being withdrawn 
from the Transcaucasus. At the same time, however, Russia continued the former Soviet 
policy of actively pursuing peace in South Ossetia.
In stage two, the beginning of the Moldova-Transdniestria war in March 1992 
instigated discussions about Russia's relations with other former republics including Georgia. 
These debates gave voice to an array of foreign policy ideas - the most strident of which 
came from the fundamentalist nationalists. Both communists and nationalists were quick to 
vocally support the separatist Abkhaz over the Georgian government just as they had 
supported the Transdniestrians over the Moldova government. Despite the fact that 
Abkhazia had a significantly smaller Russian diaspora than Transdniestria, calls were made 
in Russia to "save our diaspora". Undeterred, the government promised to support Georgia's
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territorial integrity. Thus, when the Georgia-Abkhazia war began in August, a whole 
spectrum of foreign policy ideas was already being expressed.
This second conflict continued to generate a significant controversy about Russian 
foreign policy and urgency about what Russia’s response should be. The Russian government 
responded reasonably quickly, having abandoned its liberal westemist orientation with the 
beginning of the Moldova war, and having "learnt” that neglecting to take an active stance 
would bring domestic criticism. As in the case of Moldova, the official policy was one of 
active negotiation to bring about peace. On the ground meanwhile, the Russian troops in the 
region and Russian citizens in the North Caucasus were drawn into the conflict on the side of 
the separatists.
In stage three (October 1993-June 1996) Russian policy and military action in 
Georgia were in line with the dominant foreign policy mix of ideas that Russia should retain 
influence, end the war, and continue its military ties. Officially the government began to 
actively support Georgia (and unofficial support for the Abkhaz ended) after Georgia was 
pressured into making concessions which gave Russia greater military and political influence 
in the state.
To conclude, sympathy for the Abkhaz was subject to lobbying from different 
political groups and the debates were politically motivated. But factors other than ethnicity 
and raw politics also played significantly into the arguments. While the debates were not 
very complex because the period examined was relatively tumultuous and politicians had 
little time to develop coherent approaches to the subject, strategic factors were considered of 
utmost urgency by most members of the elite. The initial Russian military involvement in 
Georgia occurred during a period of great confusion when Russian policy was not centralized 
or coherent and was being carried out by various actors with disparate goals. However, over
a.c>A
time, Russia’s fell in line with the development of an official policy which supported ending 
the conflict and upholding the territorial integrity of Georgia. Uncertainty during this time of 
crisis increased the importance of broad, general foreign policy ideas in the determination of 
government policy. Pragmatic nationalism helped to define Russia’s foreign policy goals and
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became a significant force driving Russian foreign policy. Thus, one can argue that the 
evolution of ideas and debates was consequential.
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Chapter Seven: The Russian Political Debates and Military Involvement in 
the Tajik Conflict
Following the pattern of examination of Russian foreign policy changes towards the 
separatist conflicts in Moldova and Abkhazia, this chapter analyses the evolution of political 
debate and policy towards the third conflict in the former Soviet space in which Russia 
became active militarily: the civil war in Tajikistan. Russia was politically and militarily 
involved in the Tajik civil war from its inception in May 1992 and throughout the 
negotiations that followed.
The first section of the chapter begins with a brief historical overview of the origins 
and evolution of the Tajik civil war and outlines the involvement of Russia, Uzbekistan and 
Afghanistan. It then identifies and examines Russia’s key interests in the conflict, specifying 
the material incentives facing Russia’s decision-makers and the extent to which the interests 
were legacies of Tsarist and Soviet history. In the case of Tajikistan, there was considerable 
consensus about what Russia’s practical interests were and therefore a close relationship 
between ideas in the debates, policies and military action on the ground. The second section 
of the chapter identifies and provides a chronological analysis of the two stages in Russia’s 
debates and policies toward the conflict. Within each stage, the dominant ideas, policy 
positions and military actions are examined in order to establish a comprehensive analysis of 
the various factors at work in the crisis.
1. Civil War in Tajikistan
A new wave of Russian political debates and policy-making took place within the 
context of the Tajik civil war, and the involvement of other states in the conflict, during the 
period under investigation. Similar to events in many other republics within the former 
Soviet Union in the late 1980s, a power struggle emerged in Tajikistan over who would rule 
and how much of the old communist system would be preserved.1 The initial struggle began
1 For a history o f the civil war see Muriel Atkin, “Tajikistan’s Civil War”, Current History, no. 612 (October
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as a reaction against the old establishment and its political elite who were blamed for Soviet 
dominance. However, ethnic, regional, religious and political issues all soon became 
involved and a civil war ensued. The outside involvement of Russia and Uzbekistan, as well 
as the unresolved political situation in Afghanistan fuelled the conflict.
When the Soviet Union collapsed, Tajikistan was less prepared than any other 
republic for dealing with the new realities. The ruling Communist party had little power as it 
had never really managed to replace the country’s regional clan political structure, and only a 
feeble Tajik intelligentsia had emerged to support democracy. At the same time, a Muslim 
awakening, in the form of the Islamic Renaissance Party, was occurring in the countryside. 
The leadership of this party favoured a secular state. It cooperated with the much smaller 
Democratic Party composed of the Tajik secular intelligentsia as well as with the Tajik 
nationalist movement (the Rastokhez). Together these parties formed the bulk of the 
political opposition which was united in the pursuit of a democratic and anti-communist 
political agenda, but divided (as was the Communist Party itself) by many inter-clan feuds.
In November 1991, Rakhmon Nabiev, the former Communist Party leader (of the 
Leninabad-based Khojand clan) won the presidential election. In the spring of 1992, the 
opposition responded by initiating two months of anti-communist demonstrations and violent 
clashes in Dushanbe. Nabiev was forced to create a coalition government on 6 May 1992. 
This solution satisfied neither side and led to the violence which escalated into a civil war in 
late May 1992.3
In September 1992, a coup led by opposition units forced Nabiev from the capital 
and by November the coalition government had crumbled, leading to a counter-offensive by 
the communist “Popular Front”.4 In December 1992, a precarious stability returned when the 
communist forces, now supported by Russia and Uzbekistan, pushed the fighters of the 
“Islamic-democratic” opposition and tens of thousands of refugees into Afghanistan. They
1997), pp.336-340.
2 Timur Kadyr, Megapolis-Express. September 16, 1992, p.20.
3 Alexandr Karpov, Izvestiva. September 8, 1992, p .l. Also see James Wyllie, “Tadjikistan -  A Strategic Threat 
to Regional Harmony”, Jane’s Intelligence Review, vol.5, no.3 (March 1993), p.133.
4 Nabiev at the time explained “ My residence has been seized by armed people and I am not allowed to work in 
the Supreme Soviet”. Interview with Nabiev by Aleksandra Lugovskaya, Izvestiva. September 4, 1992, p .l.
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installed a government dominated by Kulabis and the old guard of the former Communist 
Party, headed by Emomali Rakhmonov. Most remaining leaders and active members of the 
various opposition movements fled the country in response to the government’s intensive 
crackdown against the opposition and the people associated with it.5 Guerrilla campaigns 
continued, with armed opponents of the communist regime operating from the rugged 
mountains in the east and southeast of the country and across the border in Afghanistan.6 
These events added to the Russian perception that the Tajik-Afghan border was dangerously 
vulnerable.
Attempts to resolve the power struggle in Tajikistan by negotiation with Russia’s help 
took place from 1992 through to 1996. UN sponsored peace negotiations began in April 
1994, and an agreement on cessation of hostilities was signed on 17 September 1994 in 
Tehran. Elections followed and on 6 November 1994, Rakhmonov was elected president of 
the republic. The conflict reached a temporary status quo and peace was imposed but 
“without real reconciliation” -  that is, without a unification of the regions and populations of
o
Tajikistan. The result was a weak, authoritarian state dependent on Russian troops and 
financial subsidies.
Russia was militarily involved in the Tajik civil war from its inception in May 1992. 
As indicated in the previous case studies, Russian troops began unofficially supporting one 
side in the conflict -  this time the former communists. However, in this case, as the situation
s See, "Tajik Refugees in Northern Afghanistan -  Obstacles to Repatriation”, UNHCR REFWORLD Country 
Information, vol.8, no.6, May 1996.
6 Within the regime, the northern Khojand (from Leninabad) lost to their junior Communist party partners the 
Kulyabi (based in Dushanbe and protected by the Russian 201st Motor Rifle Division) from the south by the fall 
o f 1992. The clans in the east (the Pamiri, Garmi) and south-east (Gomo-Badakshan) became involved in efforts 
against the regime. Timur Kadyr, Megapolis-Express. September 16, 1992, p.20.
7 On December 16, 1994, the UNMOT (United Nations Mission o f Observers to Tajikistan) was created to 
monitor adherence to the Tehran agreement. “International Support to Peace and Reconciliation in Tajikistan”, 
UNHCR, September 1997, p.4.
8 An estimated 50,000 people lost their lives during the hostilities. Hundreds o f thousands fled the turmoil with 
an estimated 500,000 economic emigres and 600,000 internally displaced persons. As many as 70,000 Tajiks 
took refuge across the border in Afghanistan. By the end o f 1996, 43,000 refugees had been repatriated to their 
homes, leaving an estimated 20,000 in Afghanistan and many more in other neighbouring states and the Russian 
Federation. “Request for Allocation from the Voluntary Repatriation Fund for the Return o f Tajik Refugees in 
Northern Afghanistan”, UNHCR Memorandum. June 12, 1997 (PRL 19/97/MA04/M/026). Also, UNHCR 
Report on Tajikistan. January 1993 - March 1996. UNHCR. 1996, pp.10-15.
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progressed, Russia troops continued to support the same side officially. In fact, there was 
little controversy over their role in the conflict. Russian troops played a significant role in the 
outcome of the Tajikistan war and helped to bring stability to the region. Their presence 
ensured Tajikistan’s territorial integrity and the protection of its borders.
In Tajikistan, much more than in the military conflicts in Moldova and Georgia, states 
other than Russia also played key roles and influenced Russian perceptions of the conflict.9 
Most significantly, the involvement of Afghanistan and Uzbekistan highlighted the 
vulnerability of borders in the area and contributed to a Russian fear that any future 
withdrawal of troops would lead to a dangerous security vacuum which might be exploited 
by other states. Russians feared the possibility that there would be a spread of political 
instability or Islamic fundamentalism across the region and right up to Russia’s borders.
Russian perception of the vulnerability of the Tajik-Afghan border was enhanced by 
the Tajik opposition hiding in Afghanistan as well as the highly unstable political order in 
Afghanistan itself. The Tajik opposition formed refugee and training camps, as well as 
support bases and liaisons with local warlords, on Afghan territory. The leader of the Afghan 
Islam Party, Gulbeddin Hekmatyar, provided training camps for Tajik guerrillas.10 In April 
1992, soon after Tajikistan gained independence, a military force led by the Afghan Tajik 
mujahidin took control of Afghanistan’s capital, Kabul. This event, as well as the large 
number of refugees fleeing to Afghanistan, ensured the Afghan mujahidin a role in the Tajik 
conflict. According to the text of a FIS Report presented by Primakov in September 1994, 
Afghanistan’s destabilizing effect on the Central Asian states was intensifying and 
threatening the state security of a number of countries, in particular Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan. “Russia’s FIS has information to the effect that there are forces in Afghanistan 
that want to break the north away and that are striving to create on that basis a Farsi-speaking 
state incorporating Tajikistan”.11 Russian fears increased even further when it became more
9 As seen in Chapter Five, Romania’s history with Moldova influenced Russian perceptions and even policy in 
the first years after the collapse of the Soviet Union. With time Romania became less o f  a factor in the 
development o f Russian policy. However, Romania was never directly militarily involved in the Moldova- 
Transdniestria conflict -  as Uzbekistan was in the Tajik Civil War.
10 Igor Rotar, Nezavisimava Gazeta. September 23, 1992, p. 1.
11 The report continued on to state that Islamic extremism has had a “highly negative effect” on the crisis
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clearly understood that the Tajik opposition was supported by the Afghan mujahidin as well 
as other mujahidin from different radical Islamic groups in countries such as Egypt and 
Algeria.12
Uzbekistan’s involvement in the Tajik conflict also demanded Russian attention and 
vigilance in the area. The Uzbek military backed the coup which led the communist leader 
Rakhmonov to power in December 1992. Tashkent had been the headquarters of the old 
Soviet Central Asian Military District and inherited much of the military equipment. Later, 
Uzbek troops both helped to train Tajik troops and fought alongside the Tajik government 
irregular militias. Uzbekistan also took a lead in orchestrating CIS reaction to the Tajik civil 
war. However, while it supported Russian involvement in the conflict, Uzbek officials also 
complained that Moscow used its political and military control over Tajikistan to apply
1 "Xpressure upon Uzbekistan.
It was not in Russia’s interest to allow the political instability and Islamic extremism 
threatening Tajikistan to flow into Uzbekistan. It was also in Russia’s interest to curtail 
Uzbekistan’s regional ambitions in Tajikistan -  for example by opposing the traditionally 
pro-Uzbek elite in Khojand.14 Uzbekistan was home to 700,000 Tajiks15 and had an 
economic interest in keeping stability along the rich arable lands of the Feragana valley 
which crosses both states.16
situation on CIS territory. “Text o f FIS Report Presented by Primakov”, in Rossivskava Gazeta. September 22, 
1994, pp.l, 6.
12 Semyon Bagdasarov (Chief expert at the Asian Strategic Studies foundation), “The Military-Political 
Situation in Tajikistan”, in Nezavisimove vovennove obozrenive (independent military review) supplement to 
Nezavisimava Gazeta. April 22, 1995, pp. 1-2.
l3Russia’s relations with Uzbekistan increased and both became guarantors o f the existence o f  the current Tajik 
regime. Vitaly Partnikov, Nezavisimava Gazeta. March 3, 1994, p.2.
14 Lerman Usmanov, Nezavisimava Gazeta. January 6, 1994, p.3.
15 Although depending on how Uzbeks are distinguished from Tajiks this number may be extended to 3 million.
16 For centuries, Tajiks and Uzbeks lived together in Turkestan (made up o f present-day Uzbekistan and 
Tajikistan). Both ethnic groups were bilingual and shared a common history and culture. The historical Tajik 
cultural centres o f Samarkand and Bukhara were given to Uzbekistan after Soviet power took control o f the 
independent khanates, and the Tajiks continue to harbour strong resentment for this act. During Tajikistan’s 
civil war, there was great tension and numerous attacks carried out between Tajiks and Uzbeks -  with Uzbeks 
attacking Tajik refugees and the Tajik government attacking Uzbeks in Tajikistan.
“Return to Tajikistan -  Continued Regional and Ethnic Tensions”, vol. 7, no.9 (May 1995), UNHCR 
REFWORLD - Country Information. (Geneva: UNHCR, 1998, pp. 1-27, pp. 14-17.
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2. Russia’s Key Interests in Tajikistan
As in Moldova and Georgia, Russia’s political debates and relations with Tajikistan 
after 1991 were based upon the many perceptions and assets which it inherited from the 
period of Tsarist and Soviet domination of the area. Once again Tsarist and Soviet policies 
had left Russia with a history of involvement and thus a context in which Russia’s foreign 
policy decisions had to be made. As in the cases o f Moldova and Georgia, Russia inherited a 
Russian diaspora and strong military presence in the area. However, Tajikistan was more 
politically unstable and economically dependent on Russia. It had an especially fragile and 
fractured national identity. Uniquely, Tajikistan also bordered a highly precarious state which 
until very recently had been at war with the Soviet Union and had a history of vulnerability 
to Islamic fundamentalism.
The focus of the next section is to discover whether Russian security, political and 
economic interests were “real” or “perceived” and whether the combination of interests and 
historical legacies left room for conflicting ideas and debate among the political elite about 
how to react to the Tajik Civil War after 1991. Each of the key interests is examined in turn. 
However, first Russia’s interests in Tajikistan must be placed within the larger focus of the 
region of Central Asia.
Historically, Central Asia17 was considered to be within the “sphere of influence” of 
both the Russian and Soviet empires. However, at the same time, the area’s little understood 
Islamic traditions were the object of widespread ignorance and fear. There was also a general
• 19ambivalence among Russians towards the region in comparison to other parts of the empire.
17 The Central Asia states are Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgystan and Tajikistan.
18 See Seymour Becker, “The Russian Conquest o f Central Asia and Kazakhstan: Motives, Methods and 
Consequences”, in Hafeez Malik (ed.), Central Asia: Its Strategic Importance and Future Prospects (London: 
Macmillan, 1994), pp. 21-38. Books on Post-Soviet Central Asia have obviously only recently begun to appear. 
The most recent and comprehensive book focusing on Russia’s relations with the Central Asian and Asian states 
after 1991 is Gennady Chufrin (ed), Russia and Asia: The Emerging Security Agenda (Sweden: SIPRI/Oxford 
University Press, 1999). Another edited collection focusing specifically on the Central Asian states is Touraj 
Atabaki and John O’Kane (eds.), Post-Soviet Central Asia (London: I. B. Tauris, 1998). Also, Edward Allworth 
(ed.), Central Asia: 130 Years o f Russian Dominance. A Historical Overview (Durham and London: Duke 
University Press, 1994), and Yury Kulchik, Andrey Fadin and Victor Sergeev (eds), Central Asia After the 
Empire (London: Pluto Press, 1996).
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These paradoxical perceptions of Central Asia continued to resonate in post-Soviet Russia, 
and, as shall be shown below, broadly informed the search for Russia’s policy towards the 
Tajik civil war.
During the years 1991 to 1996, Central Asia was generally of lesser concern to 
Russian foreign and security policy than the Transcaucasian region. Recall that the greater 
interest in the Transcaucasus was largely because of its proximity to Russia’s Northern 
Caucasus republics, as well as the fact that all three Transcaucasian states were involved in 
armed conflicts after 1991. Georgia’s economic outlet to the Black Sea gave the 
Transcaucasian states an economic and geostrategic advantage over the Central Asian states 
which depended entirely on overland routes for transport and communications. However, the 
larger Russian diaspora in Central Asia (although it is relatively small in Tajikistan), the 
great oil and gas resources of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, its position at the crossroads of 
historically strategic routes, as well the civil conflict in Tajikistan and the vulnerability of 
their external borders meant that the region continued to be of long-term importance to 
Russia. Nevertheless, from 1991 to 1996 Russia partly withdrew from its involvement in the 
Central Asian states. The significant exception was in Tajikistan where the outbreak of civil 
war helps to explain Russia’s major involvement.
a) The Threat of Islamic Fundamentalism
Russian politicians and decision-makers were concerned with the overall future of 
Central Asia at least partly because of Russia’s close historical relations with Tajikistan. In 
order to understand Russian perceptions of the “Islamic threat” and Russian interests in 
limiting it, it is necessary to examine Russian history. The history of Tajikistan is one of 
continually shifting cultural and political boundaries.19 The Tajiks differ from their Central
19 The most recent and comprehensive book specifically on Tajikistan is Mohammad-Reza Djalili, Frederic 
Grare and Shirin Akiner (eds.), Tajikistan (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 1998). The original inhabitants of 
most o f Central Asia were Persian speakers (present-day Tajiks), however they became a minority with the 
successive waves o f Turkic immigrants into the region. The population o f Tajikistan is 5.4 million. More than 4 
million Tajiks live in northern Afghanistan (over 1.5 million more than in Tajikistan itself). Another million live 
in Uzbekistan. It is thus unsurprising that the main foreign actors deeply involved in the civil war in Tajikistan 
have been Russia, Uzbekistan and Afghanistan.
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Asian neighbours because of their predominantly Persian as opposed to Turkic heritage. The 
area was once part of the Persian empire and the Tajik people speak a language similar to 
Persian or Farsi. They are also unique among the Central Asian states in their predominantly
90Sunni Muslim faith.
Imperial Russia conquered what is present-day Central Asia between 1865 and
911884. The area of the current Republic of Tajikistan came under Russian control in
99approximately 1868. When Tajikistan declared its independence in September 1991, it had 
therefore been dominated by imperial Russia and then the Soviet Union for 123 years. As a 
result, many Russians in the early post-Soviet period were predisposed to think of Tajikistan 
as a natural part of their territory -  although the emotional identification with Tajikistan was 
significantly weaker than towards the Great Russian heartland of the Slavic states and 
Kazakhstan.23
Under Soviet domination, present-day Tajikistan became part of Soviet Turkestan. 
Tajikistan achieved the status of an autonomous republic within the Uzbekistan Soviet 
Socialist Republic in 1924. Five years later, in 1929, it became the Tajik Soviet Socialist 
Republic. Stalin’s decision to turn Tajikistan into a fully-fledged Union Republic was partly
20 The main identity is that o f territorially based regions, sometimes referred to as “clans”. The six main 
“identity regions” are Kulyab, Gharm, Gorno-Badakhshan (or Pamir), Kurgan-Tyube, Leninabad and Hissar. 
However, there are several other traditional divisions among Tajik society: north vs. south, mountainous vs. 
valley Tajiks, Tajiks vs. non-Tajiks, and town vs. village. Timur Kadyr, Megapolis-Express. September 16, 
1992, p.20.
21 Tajik historians believe that the Tajiks formed as a unique national group under the Samanid dynasty (909- 
993 AD). The Samanid dynasty was centred in Bukhara and ruled some o f the region o f present-day Tajikistan. 
After the period o f Samanid rule, were the Mongol invasions in the 13th century, the conquest by Tamerlane, 
and a series of rule by the Turkic khans. Subsequently, the Emirate o f Bukhara ruled the Tajiks.
22 Russia annexed the northern part o f Tajikistan in 1868. Fears o f British incursions from India led Russia to 
annex the entire Pamirs region that then came under control o f the governor-general o f Turkestan. The border 
between Tajikistan and present day Afghanistan and Pakistan was drawn in March 1884 when an Anglo- 
Russian Boundary Commission was set up with the aim o f preventing the new Russian frontier from being 
contiguous to India. In 1894, the border o f the Khanate o f Bukhara with Afghanistan was guarded by Russian 
soldiers who set up customs posts. The border was never watertight. See Ahmed Rashid, The Resurgence of  
Central Asia: Islam ofNationalism (London: Pluto Press, 1994), p. 166.
23 The Russian subjugation o f the Kazakh steppes occurred a whole century earlier than Russia’s domination o f  
the other Central Asian states. The theory o f “Heartland” refers to the envisioned Russian control over the 
Eurasian landmass as the “pivot of world politics”. Sir Halford Mackinder introduced the term in 1904. See 
Mackinder, “The Geographical Pivot o f History”, Geographical Journal, vol.20, no.4 (April 1903), reprinted in 
The Scope and Methods o f Geography and the Geographical Pivot o f History (London: The Royal 
Geographical Society, 1951), pp.30-44, p38.
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based upon an interest which continues to inform post-Soviet Russian policy towards 
Tajikistan today: he wanted a Persian-speaking Republic to help influence the large region of 
Persian cultural influence which extended from Iran to India.24 It will be shown that later in 
post-Soviet Russia, there also continued to be a widespread belief that Russia ought to retain 
influence in the region by protecting the Tajik-Afghan border.
The reaction of the Russian political elite to the Tajik civil war was significantly 
conditioned by how the “Islamic factor” had been regarded and dealt with in the Tsarist and 
Soviet periods. Under these earlier regimes the Central Asian region was generally perceived 
as a potential threat, largely due to its little understood Islamic traditions. Of all the Central 
Asian states, Tajikistan was perceived as the most vulnerable to Islamic extremism. Despite 
Soviet efforts, Islam remained, and remains, central to the lives of the Tajiks.
With the break up of the Soviet Union, the idea of the “Islamic threat” continued to 
inform Russian policy, and the impact of the “re-emergence” of Islam in the former Soviet 
Union was debated by the academic and policy elite in Russia, as well as by the rest of the 
Western and Muslim world. Russian fears increased with the victories of the fundamentalist 
Taliban in Afghanistan in the 1990s and were considered real and legitimate. However, they 
were also often exaggerated by members of the Russian political elite (as well as in 
Uzbekistan and the Tajik governments) which tried to use them to justify their support for the 
former communist (Khojand-Kulyabi) rulers, as well as to legitimise the presence (and, to 
some extent the involvement) of Russian troops in the region.
b) The Russian-Speaking Diaspora
Another legacy of imperial Russian/Soviet rule which formed a specific Russian 
interest in this conflict was the presence of a Russian-speaking diaspora in the area. During
24 To meet the requirement that Union Republics had to have a population o f at least one million, the Soviet 
government moved the district o f Khujand in the Feragana valley from Uzbekistan to Tajikistan. See Barnett 
Rubin, “Russian Hegemony and State Breakdown in the Periphery: Causes and consequences o f the civil war in 
Tajikistan”, in Barnett R. Rubin and Jack Snyder (eds.), Post-Soviet Political Order (New York: Routledge,
1998), pp. 128-16, p. 138. Stalin also believed that breaking up the relations among the different ethnic groups 
within Turkestan would make its easier to consolidate Soviet influence.
25See for example, Zulfiye Kadir, “Muslim Political Movements in Russia”, Eurasian Studies, vol.3, no.2 
(Summer 1996), pp.48-56.
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the Soviet period, as in the former Soviet republics of Georgia and Moldova, the mass 
migration of Slavs into Tajikistan was encouraged. These “Russian-speakers” typically held 
the most important positions in industry, the professions, the security services and the 
military, although not in the cultural professions nor in the republican Communist Party and 
state apparatus.26 By 1989, there were 388,000 Russians in Tajikistan, forming 
approximately 6% of the population. Although, as shall be shown below, this percentage 
decreased after 1991, the diaspora issue was still debated during discussions of Russian 
involvement in the conflict. However, historically, by comparison with Moldova and 
Georgia, the policies of “Russification” and the forced migration of Russians and Slavs in 
Tajikistan were relatively minor -  with the result that the diaspora issue was also 
comparatively less significant in this conflict.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union the Russian political opposition, and later the 
Russian government, argued that the Russian diaspora in Tajikistan, as well as the diasporas 
in the other CIS states, had to be protected (by a variety of means including force). However 
the fact that the diaspora in Tajikistan was comparatively small and that its population was 
rapidly decreasing -  reduced the justification for a policy of the use of military force. 
Russians had settled in Tajikistan relatively recently and had little feeling of belonging 
compared to Russians in Ukraine, Kazakhstan or the Baltics. By 1996, the diaspora had 
decreased to less than 100,000, approximately 2% of the population.28 Nevertheless, 
members of the Russian political elite were concerned with the fate of the Tajikistan diaspora 
and they expressed apprehension about the potential outflow of hundreds of thousands of
OQrefugees back into Russia.
26 Edward Allworth, “Commensuals or Parasites? Russians, Kazakhs, Uzbeks, and Others in Central Asia”, in 
Beatrice F. Manz (ed.), Central Asia in Historical Perspective (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1994), 
pp. 185-201.
All-Union population census 1989 [Vsesoyuznaya perepis' naseleniya 1989] (Moskva: Gosudarstvennyi 
Komitet SSSRpo Statistike, 1990).
28 Russians in Tajikistan (as in the other former Soviet republics) have always been mostly concentrated in the 
large cities. Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh, “National reconciliation: the imperfect whim”, Central Asian Survey. 
vol. 15, no.3/4 (December 1996), pp.325-348.
29 This began in early 1992. See Olga Gorshunova, Rossivskive Vesti. September 22, 1992, p.3.
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The members of the Tajik Russian-speaking diaspora themselves had little direct
impact upon the development of Russian policy. The emigration o f approximately 300,000
ethnic Russians from 1991 to 1996 meant that neither the emigrants nor the tiny Russian
population of 80,000 left in Tajikistan could wield any real political influence. This was
unlike the situation of the Russians in Transdniestria where they formed sizable proportions
of the separatist areas. Moreover, since Russians had only settled in Tajikistan relatively
recently, they lacked deep historic roots or feeling of belonging. Most of those who stayed
 ^1
were elderly or disabled and did not have enough money to leave. Clearly the diaspora was
• • O')of relatively insignificant interest in Russia’s continued involvement in the Tajik conflict.
c) Russian Strategic Interests
Of much more significance to Russian national interest than the diaspora was the 
border between Tajikistan and Afghanistan. The importance of the border was conditioned 
by Soviet involvement in Afghanistan. The Soviet Union had withdrawn its troops from 
Afghanistan only in February 1989 and continued to aid the government it had installed there 
until the end of 1991. Obviously the protracted and brutal war, which had ended in Soviet 
withdrawal, contributed to the perception of the significance of the border between Tajikistan 
and Russia.34 The border was vulnerable both in terms of the proximity o f Islamic extremism 
in Afghanistan and Afghanistan’s support for the Tajik opposition group. Other border 
threats included terrorism, illegal migration, narcotics and the arms trade. These were all
30 Vadim Belykh and Nikolai Burbyga, Izvestiva. September 15, 1992, p.l
31 Gulnara Khasanova, Izvestiva. May 6, 1995, p.3.
32 Interview with Rakhmonov on National Issues and Ties with Russia by Sergey Ovsinko, in Rossiyskiye 
Vesti. January 26, 1995, p .l.
33 For a comprehensive analysis o f Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan see: Sarah E. Mendelson, Changing 
Course: Ideas. Politics and the Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan (Princeton N. J.: Princeton University 
Press, 1998).
34 The “Afghan syndrome” (the bitterness o f the blood shed in vain in the Afghan war, kept alive by the 
disabled veterans and the families o f the dead, as well as the inevitable social problems) continued to be a 
highly emotional issue although one whose influence upon the new Russian federation has been paradoxical. On 
the one hand, the Afghan war, like the later Chechen war, exposed Russian military weakness and eventually 
led to pressures for Russian withdrawal from conflicts in the near abroad. On the other hand, those who 
advocated Russian involvement in these conflicts could easily exploit it.
35 The issue o f having to gain the release o f former Soviet servicemen from captivity in Afghanistan was also a 
constant topic in the Russian press. See Vyacheslav Yelgin, Segodnva. October 28,1993, p.3.
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“real” threats which Russia could defend only through a military presence. Tajikistan lacked 
the finances, equipment and organization to protect the border itself.
The other major threat to Russia’s security concerned the question of what would 
happen if Russia withdrew from the region -  perhaps other states would fill the vacuum. 
Already with the end of the Soviet Union other regional and global powers had developed an 
interest in the Central Asian region because of its great mineral wealth. It was quite possible 
that historic rivalries over the region might be recreated. In the first years after the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russia had already partly withdrawn from its involvement 
in the other four Central Asian states. Therefore, to guarantee its foothold in the region in 
general, as well as to discourage the involvement of other states, it was believed important
• • * 57that Russia continue close military relations with Tajikistan.
Perhaps most significantly, a Russian military presence was needed within Tajikistan 
to provide a measure of political and economic stability, to guard Tajikistan’s territorial 
integrity and to prevent anarchy from developing and negatively affecting its Central Asian 
neighbours. As in the cases of Moldova and Georgia, Russia inherited a heavily militarised 
region in Tajikistan. Under the Soviet regime Tajikistan had been a border republic “... with 
difficult topography, and with a substantial number of deportees and politically unreliable 
elements, as well as forced labour camps, (which) required a high concentration of security 
forces, MVD (Interior Ministry) Border Guards -  specifically charged with safeguarding
- IQ
Soviet frontiers”. In 1979, the capital Dushanbe became one of the major bases for Soviet
OQ
troops on their way to invade Afghanistan. After the Afghan war, Soviet security forces in 
Tajikistan remained to guard the Afghan border.
When the Soviet Union disintegrated, it was unclear to whom the various military 
forces in Tajikistan would report, or what doctrine they should follow. The Russian force
36 Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan and Uzbekistan also sent contingents under CIS command to help guard the border. 
However, these were largely symbolic.
37 V. Skosyrev, Izvestiva. October 8, 1991, p.6.
38 Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, Russia and Nationalism in Central Asia: The Case o f Tadzhikistan (Baltimore: 
The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970) p.l 18
39 Tajik troops initially took part in the Afghan war alongside other Soviet troops but were withdrawn after the 
Red Army became worried by their growing fraternization with the Tajik Mujahidin in Afghanistan.
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consisted mainly of the 201st Motorized Division based in Dushanbe (approx. 6000 men)
tViwhich had previously been part of the 40 Army in Afghanistan. With the end of the Afghan 
war in 1989 it had been withdrawn to its pre-war base in Tajikistan, and when the Soviet 
Union collapsed in 1991 the forces passed first to CIS and then to Russian control.40 The 
much smaller 191st motorized regiment in Kurgan-Tyube and a motorized regiment in 
Kulyab also remained stationed in Tajikistan when the Soviet Union disintegrated 41 Thus, as 
in Moldova and Georgia, there was no need for any strategic reassessment by the Russian 
government or military to justify stationing troops in Tajikistan. Most of the conscripts of the 
201st Division were local ethnic Tajiks42 but the unit had not been integrated into the new 
Tajik state as a national army.43
Finally, left over from the Soviet period was an indeterminate number of Interior 
Ministry (OMON) troops and 2000-2500 border guards.44 These border guards were formerly 
under the jurisdiction of the KGB, and then came under the Russian Ministry of State 
Security. Until 1992, the Eastern and Central Asian Border Districts controlled the borders of 
the five Central Asian republics. Their abolition or “nationalization” in 1992 created a 
vacuum in regional border security. This was rendered more acute by political instability and 
threats from neighbouring states. In the case of Tajikistan, by placing the border guards under
40 The unit was at the time under the command o f a Garmi Tajik, Major General Mukhriddin Ashurov, who kept 
the unit out o f the early clashes. Michael Orr, “The Russian Army and the War in Tajikistan”, in Mahammad- 
Reza Djalili, et al (eds.), Tajikistan: The Trials o f Independence (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 1998), 
pp. 151-160, p.151.
41 Later, the CIS Joint Peacekeeping forces arrived as reinforcements to the 201st Division, along with a unit o f  
paratroops. James Sherr, “Escalation o f the Tajikistan Conflict”, Jane’s Intelligence Review, vol.5, no. 11 
(November 1993), pp.514-516
42 The conscripts were given work contracts. According to V. Povolyaev, secretary o f the Writer’s Union o f  
Russia, conditions in Tajikistan were such that the best way to survive was by finding employment with the 
Russian military, “ ...the pay was decent and, if  necessary, they will be provided with a roof over their heads... 
And the most important thing is that through working under a contract as employees o f the Russian army, they 
will be able to get Russian citizenship”. V. Povolyaev: “Outcasts: How Thousands o f Russian Families Have 
Become Misfits Today” in Central Asia Today. (Moscow: Moscow State University: Institute o f  Asian and 
Studies, 1994).
43 Only in the late autumn 1992, after President Nabiev had been deposed and the communist Emomali 
Rakhmonov returned to power, did the government create the Armed Forces o f  Tajikistan and establish a 
Ministry o f Defence.
^Catherine Poujol, “Some Reflections on Russian Involvement in the Tajik Conflict, 1992-1993” in 
Mahammad-Reza Djalili et al. (eds.), Tajikistan: The Trials o f Independence (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 
1998), pp.99-118, p. 101.
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Russian jurisdiction in August 1992 and not withdrawing them, Russia took a fateful step 
that would ensure its continued presence in the region. Over 80 percent of these troops were 
(and are) also ethnic Tajik conscripts who continue to guard the 1,200-km long, mountainous 
border between Tajikistan and Afghanistan.45
By the end of 1992, there were 10,200 Russian commanded troops (including the 
201st Motorized Division and the Russian Border Guards) based in Tajikistan. This figure 
grew to 18,000 in 1993 and then to 21,000 in 1994. By 1996, there were over 25,000 
Russian-commanded troops in Tajikistan as part of an operation nominally commanded by 
the CIS 46 The peacekeeping forces were financed by Russia and manned solely with 
volunteer servicemen or conscripts who went through special training.47 Nevertheless, by the 
end of the period under consideration, 1991-1996, Russia became more inclined to relinquish 
the excessive economic, political and military burden of responsibility for Tajikistan and to 
search more seriously for a compromise agreeable to both sides of the conflict.
d) Russian Economic Interests
Finally, historic ties also helped to determine Tajikistan’s dependence upon Russia’s 
limited economic interests in the region. Despite its other failings, the Soviet regime did 
stimulate economic growth in Central Asia. The collectivisation of agriculture and the 
construction of an extensive irrigation system, which permitted intensive cultivation of 
cotton, were especially significant.48 Light industry was also developed. As a consequence,
45 Dr. Irina Zviagelskaya, Author’s Interview. June 8, 1999. (Zviagelskaya is at the Institute o f Oriental Studies, 
Russian Academy o f Sciences and has been involved in the Tajik negotiations).
46About 8000 belonged to the 201st Motorized Rifle Division o f the Russian MoD and the rest belonged to the 
Border Security Forces answering to the office o f the Russian Presidency. In September 1993, the Russian 201st 
Motorized Rifle Division was designated a peacekeeping force. Both the border and peacekeeping troops 
include largely nominal contributions from the other Central Asian states, except Turkmenistan. The United 
Nations Mission o f Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) currently monitors these forces. See The Military 
Balance, 1997-1998 (London: IISS, Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 110.
47 This is according to General Kondratyev. “The collective peacekeeping forces include the 201st Motorized 
Infantry Division. The 27th Guards Motorized Infantry Division and the 45th Guards Motorized Infantry 
Division as well as a separate paratroop battalion were detached from the Russian Army to perform 
peacekeeping activities. See Kondratyev quotes in Nikolai Burbyga, Izvestiva. March 23, 1994, p.2.
48 Beginning in the 1920’s, hundreds o f thousands o f mountain Tajiks were moved en masse to the newly 
irrigated areas on the plains where the cotton fields were cultivated. “Tajikistan”, EIU Country Report. 4th 
quarter (1997), pp. 19-31.
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the healthcare and the education systems were improved. These achievements once again 
underlay the “imperialist” perception of many Russians that the Soviet Union had brought 
“civilization” to Tajikistan (and to the other former republics), at a considerable cost to 
Russians, and for which the Tajiks ought to be grateful.
Despite large subsidies from Moscow, by the end of the 1980’s Tajikistan’s living 
standard was the lowest of all the Soviet republics.49 Moscow’s main economic interest in the 
region from the beginning had been the enforcement of cotton production. The region in turn 
became dependent on Moscow for food -  which it still is today. Thus, many of Tajikistan’s 
current economic problems, which have aggravated the internal conflict, are largely the result 
of decades of imperial rule. With independence, Tajikistan lacked food supplies, fuel and 
housing, and continued to be dependent upon Moscow. The civil war exacerbated these 
conditions -  a fact which Russia has both exploited and attempted to alleviate.50
Russia had few economic interests in Tajikistan after 1991 and even these were of 
very minor importance in the debates about Russia’s involvement in the civil war. Although 
Tajikistan has great mineral wealth, especially in gold, aluminium and uranium, and the 
potential to generate hydroelectric power, these have remained unexploited because of the 
civil war.51 The issue, which did eventually become increasingly important, was the 
economic burden which Russia had accepted in order to support the Tajik government and to 
finance its military. Until May 1995, the Russian rouble was still used in Tajikistan and the 
subsequent new Tajik rouble remained dependent upon Russia’s Central Bank. 
Significantly, Tajikistan’s budget continued to be financed almost solely by Russia and from
49 International Support to Peace and Reconciliation in Tajikistan (Geneva: UNHCR, June 1997).
50 At the end o f 1996, Tajikistan’s GDP was estimated to be 40% o f  the 1991 level and its unemployment rate 
estimated at 40% by the World Bank - the highest o f any CIS country. Ibid. p.5. With a per capita income o f  
USD 330, Tajikistan ranks among the 20 poorest counfries in the world.
51 “Tajikistan”, EIU Country Report. 4th quarter 1997, pp. 19-31.
52 Russian newspapers reported that a group o f Russian advisors influenced Tajikistan’s decision to pull out o f  
the rouble zone. Apparently this was because o f the growing financial price for its pursuit o f  “primarily 
geopolitical interests in the Central Asian region”. “In addition to non-cash credits, the Russian Central Bank 
has already made 120 billion cash roubles available to the Tajikistan National Bank and there were plans to 
provide another 20 billion. The price o f political interest, however, has proved too high for Moscow, and 
therefore it effectively prompted the Tajikistan parliament to adopt the decision to introduce a national currency 
in the republic”. See Konstantin Levin, Kommersant-Daily. April 12, 1995, p .l.
53 Yury Golotyuk, Seeodnva. February 22, 1997, p.2.
236
1992 to 1997, trade with Russia continued to expand.54 As alluded to above, by 1995-96 the 
costs of remaining involved in Tajikistan (especially the financing of the border troops) was 
increasingly criticized by politicians across the political spectrum. Many members of the 
political elite began to favour Russian withdrawal from the region.
With time, the negative economic situation became one of the major factors which led 
to the shift in Russian foreign policy thinking and, subsequently, to a new search for a 
political, as opposed to a military means to solve the conflict.
3. The Debates and The Policies: Russia’s Military Involvement in Tajikistan 
1991-1996
This section examines the Russian domestic debate and policies towards Tajikistan 
concerning the civil war. As in Georgia and Moldova, political discussions about how Russia 
should act militarily in Tajikistan revealed a disparate variety of views. However, in the case 
of Tajikistan there was arguably more consistency -  largely due to a common perception of 
threats emanating from the vulnerable Afghan-Tajik border and the severe dependence of 
Tajikistan upon Russia. This consensus was largely due to the fact that these were consistent, 
“real” or “objective” interests which could not be ignored. On the other hand, the diaspora 
and economic interests in the Tajik case existed but were comparatively minor.
Russia’s involvement in the Tajik conflict did not begun until mid-1992 after debates 
concerning both the Moldova-Transdniestria and the Georgia-Abkhazia conflicts were 
underway. By then the Russian political elite had united around the pragmatic nationalist 
ideas of retaining influence in the near abroad and taking responsibility for ending the 
conflicts. There was, therefore, already a strong constituency lobbying for Russia to take firm 
action in Tajikistan.
The stages o f  debate and policy in the Tajik case are different than those used to 
examine the Moldova-Transdniestria and Georgia-Abkhazia conflicts because the Tajik civil
54 By the end o f 1996, Tajikistan’s GDP was at 20% o f  the level attained before the civil war broke out. 
“Tajikistan”, EIU Country Report. 4th quarter 1997, pp.19-31, especially pp. 20 and 31.
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war did not begin until May 1992 and also because Russian policy neglected all the Central 
Asian states until 1993. Stage one, therefore, covers the period August 1991 to October 1992. 
In stage two, October 1993 to June 1996, the political elite became more divided, positions 
formed and debate intensified. Policy discussions became urgent. By the end of the second 
stage, in early 1996, evidence of a subsequent shift in policy was appearing.
a) Stage One: The Atlanticist Period (August 1991-October 19921
i) The Debates
From the end of 1991 to the fall of 1992, there was a great deal of ignorance among 
the Russian political elite about the situation in Tajikistan -  just as there had been about the 
crises in Georgia and Moldova. The information was often unclear and how Russia should 
react was not obvious. The lack of understanding that Yeltsin and his government had about 
the situation characterized their initial misinformed criticism of the Tajik communist 
government. In the beginning, they sympathized with the Tajik democrats’ struggle against 
the communist regime and opposed Russia’s interference in the developing conflict. In an 
interview with the author, Russian academic and participant in the Tajik negotiations, Irina 
Zviagelskaya, declared that this was a “thought-out ideological policy”.55 In other words, the 
Russian government wanted democracy to flourish in the CIS states and believed that the 
communist Tajik nomenklatura was a threat to democratic government in Russia and to the 
new Russian elites.
Most of the Russian political elite at the time was unaware of the Islamic element in 
the Tajik opposition and was not especially concerned about the so-called “Islamic threat”.56 
Moreover, little was understood in Russia about the complicated nature of the struggle for 
power among the regional groupings or clans. This caused many initial misperceptions of the 
situation. For example, while the Soviet Union still existed, Yevgeny Ambartsumov, then 
Chair of the USSR Supreme Soviet Foreign Affairs Committee, argued that the government
55 Author’s Interview with Irina Zviagelskaya, June 8, 1999.
56 R. Zaripov, Komsomolskava Pravda. May 20, 1992, p .l .
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should support the Tajik anti-communist forces under the widely-held assumption that the
C'7
Tajik democrats were the primary opposition. Anatoly Sobchak, head of the Democratic 
Reform Movement, went to Tajikistan to discover a basis on which to unite democratic 
forces across the state. “The goal of our movement is to unite democratic movements in the 
republics with the national democratic movement, thereby creating a common movement. I 
believe that there is a good basis for the development of this movement in Tajikistan and we 
are prepared to contribute and provide assistance in organising it.58
After the break-up of the Soviet Union, the popular Russian youth weekly, 
Sobesednik. was one of the first Russian newspaper to argue that there was nothing 
“democratic” about the Tajik opposition in October 1992 and called for Russia to send in 
troops to support the opponents of Islamic fundamentalism.59 However, the Russian 
government’s initial anti-communist stance, its concern not to tamish relations with the West, 
and the belief that the CIS states were economic burdens to Russia, meant that relations with 
Tajikistan were neglected. Of course, Russia’s relations with the other Central Asian states 
were also neglected and there was a widespread belief that they might drift away from 
Moscow towards Turkey and Iran. The liberal westemists in charge of foreign policy made 
several assumptions about the area. They believed that Russia could find natural resources 
elsewhere; that Central Asia would continue to be a source of instability beyond Russia’s 
control; that geopolitically Russia’s priorities should be towards Europe and not Asia; and 
that Central Asian belonged to a different civilization because of its Islamic culture. Such 
liberal westemist ideas dominated foreign policy decision-making even though a stable 
national consensus was not reached about what precise policies to take.
Meanwhile, representatives of Russia’s nationalist and communist political parties 
advocated the use of force to protect the Tajik communist regime. From the beginning of the 
war they were in favour of Russia reasserting its influence in the region and specifically they 
sided with Russia’s traditional communist allies -  i.e. the Tajik regime.60 Thus, as in the
57 See Svetlana Lolaeva, “Tajikistan in Ruins”, Democratization, vol.l, no.4 (1993), pp.32-43, p.40.
58 Igor Rotar and Oleg Panfilov, Nezavisimava Gazeta. October 8,1991, p.3.
59 Kirill Svetitsky, Sobesednik. October 16, 1992, p.4.
60 Later when the communist President Rakhmon Nabiev was forced to resign he immediately sent a telegram
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case-studies of Abkhazia and Transdniestria where there were bonds between separatists and 
many members of the Russian political elite, at this early stage there was vocal support by 
Russians who held fundamentalist nationalist ideas (particularly the communists) for the 
Tajik communist government. The Tajik government itself also often spoke out in favour of 
the Russian communists.61
However, unlike in the previous conflicts, after the initial hesitation Russian 
politicians across the political spectrum (not only extremists) united in their support of the 
communist regime. A widespread perception rapidly developed that the Tajik opposition was 
the greater potential danger to Russia -  largely due to its promotion of Islam. Deputy Foreign 
Minister Shelov-Kovedyaev was the first member of the MFA to acknowledge publicly 
Tajikistan as a priority issue. He advocated immediate, peaceful action in the form of a 
signed treaty to secure relations between the two states. “If, on the other hand, we delay any 
further, it cannot be ruled out that we would soon lose Tajikistan as a state close to Russia, 
for which there is no justification”.
By the summer of 1992, articles appeared in Russian newspapers of all political 
persuasions sympathizing with the “tragic fate” of the Russian border guards along the Tajik 
border, their poor pay, isolation and the uncertainty of their position squeezed on the border
ATbetween two unstable foreign states. Most of the articles concluded that these border guards 
were necessary because of the influx of weapons and narcotics along the porous Tajik- 
Afghan border. They reasoned that since Tajikistan did not yet have its own army, Moscow 
had no choice but to defend its border. Otherwise, it was thought that it could prove to be the 
“first major breach among the outposts of the collapsed empire”.64
expressing his displeasure to the Russian parliament. Oleg Panfilov, Nezavisimava Gazeta. September 22, 1992, 
p.3.
1 Shabdolov, Chairman o f the Communist Party o f Tajikistan in Vladimir Kostyrko, Pravda. February 19, 
1994, p.2.
62 Interview by Aleksandr Gagua with Shelov-Kovedyaev, Nezavisimava Gazeta. July 30 1992, pp. 1,5.
63 According to Dr. Irina Zviagelskaya, the majority o f those killed had been border guards (80% o f  which are 
ethnic Tajik) and not from the 201st army. Therefore, it seems that the sympathy o f  the Russian public on behalf 
o f “their Russian boys” in the Tajik army was based somewhat upon a misconception. Author’s Interview, with 
Zviagelskaya, June 8, 1999.
64 Igor Rotar and Andrei Abrashitov, Nezavisimava Gazeta. August 15, 1992, p.3.
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Russian perceptions were also coloured by the rise of anti-Russian sentiments in 
Tajikistan. These were largely the product of calculated and politically motivated propaganda 
by both the Tajik government and the Tajik opposition to draw Russia into the conflict. For 
example, the Tajik government promised to allow Russians to hold dual citizenship and to 
elevate Russian to second state language. The government did not follow through on either 
promise. Russians in Tajikistan were also angered when, despite amnesty laws that had been 
adopted earlier, the Tajik special services conducted an active search for Russians involved 
in the People’s Democratic Army, which had been formed during the time of the coalition 
government.65
The diaspora’s opinions were published in Golos Taiikistana, the newspaper of the 
Communist Party of Tajikistan as well as, ironically, Charogi Ruz. a private and independent 
newspaper established by Tajik intellectuals and journalists in March 1991 in Tajikistan.66 
Charogi Ruz was banned in December 1992 and after July 1993 was published in exile in 
Moscow. Although the Russian diaspora in Tajikistan was supportive of the communist 
regime, this newspaper was sympathetic to their plight and tried to influence Russian 
thinking to their side by reporting about this issue. The concerns of those Russians who 
remained in Tajikistan were given voice to by two organisations: Migratsiya (Migration) led
A7by Galina Belgorodskaia and Russkaya Obshchina (Russian Community).
Generally the Russian-speaking population in Tajikistan understood communism to 
be the only defence against the Islamic movement and strongly opposed the Tajik democratic
Aftfactions. However, there seems to have been little mutual understanding between the 
indigenous population and the “outsiders” on this point or on other issues. Although the 
diaspora expressed nostalgia for the Soviet past and in particular bemoaned the 
disappearance of the unitary state, the most pressing issue for Feliks Dvomik, head of the
65 Many articles in the Russian press detailed the rise o f anti-Russian sentiments and prejudices in Tajikistan. 
See for example Oleg Panfilov, Nezavisimava Gazeta. July 10, 1993, p .l; Albert Plutnik, Izvestiva. July 17, 
1993, p.8.
66 For example, Golos Taiikistana. March 31-April 6, pp. 1-2.
67 Lidiya Grafova, Literatumava Gazeta. December 18, 1991: Rossivskava Gazeta. December 24,1992.
68 Igor Rotar, Nezavisimava Gazeta. October 5, 1991, p.3. Igor Rotar wrote about hearing the following 
statement: “I am a staunch anticommunist. But it’s better for me that this street by called Lenin Prospect than, 
say, Islamic Revolution Prospect”. Quote from Igor Rotar, Nezavisimava Gazeta. September 24, 1991, p.3.
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Russian community in Tajikistan, was the normalization of daily life -  i.e. to get electricity, 
water and gas supply systems working properly and to guarantee the personal safety of 
citizens.69
The diaspora’s fate, as in Moldova and Georgia, was often exaggerated by 
newspapers of all political persuasions. In lengthy reports about discrimination and attacks 
against the Russian population in Tajikistan, newspapers warned that in Tajikistan the 
chief danger of the situation is that anti-Russian sentiment has become a mass
7 nphenomenon”. Izvestiva quoted a Russian woman in Tajikistan as saying “We are living in 
terror, not knowing what will happen to us tomorrow. People are actually being hunted 
down... We are all hostages here. But where are we to go? What we have acquired over the 
years has been plundered. And it’s hardly likely that anyone is awaiting us in Russia”.71
In order to quell the panic over a probable mass departure of Russians from 
Tajikistan, Nezavisimava Gazeta released a poll, which predicted that the threat of an influx
• 77of migrants to Russia would turn out to be exaggerated. Ruslan Khasbulatov, Chairman of 
the Supreme Soviet, wrote on behalf of the parliament to the acting President Iskanderov 
expressing his concern about the conflict. Khasbulatov called for a cease-fire and dialogue 
between the two warring parties. He appealed to the Tajik government to guarantee the
•  •  I'Xsecurity of the Russians living in Tajikistan.
The Russian political elite’s early perceptions of the Islamic factor also influenced its 
policy positions towards Russian military involvement in the Tajik civil war. The adoption of 
Islamic slogans by small and independent grass root Tajik movements was interpreted as a 
potential threat to the integrity of the Russian state and its large Muslim population. 
Although this view broadly influenced policy it was based largely on ignorance of the 
reality.74 Decades of division among the different ethnic groups and the development of
69 Olga Gorshunova, Rossivskive Vesti. September 22, 1992, p, 2.
70 Ibid.. p, 2.
71 Vadim Belykh and Nikolai Burbyga, Izvestiva. September 15, 1992, pp. 1,3.
72 Natalya Zorkaya and Lev Gudkov “A Poll o f  the All-Russia Center for the Study o f Public Opinion”, 
Nezavisimava Gazeta. July 31, 1992, p.5.
73 Khasbulatov’s letter was published in Rossivskava Gazeta. September 30, 1992, p .l.
74 V. Skosyrev, Izvestiva. October 8, 1991, p.6.
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political parties divided along ethnic lines meant that it was unlikely that Islam would 
become a politically unifying force (at least in the near future) in Tajikistan or in the rest of 
Central Asia. Moreover, the Tajik Islamic-Democratic coalition did not actually support the 
creation of an Islamic state but instead advocated a democratic political system based on a 
new constitution and the maintenance of close relations with other Islamic states.75
Nevertheless, in an attempt to gain foreign support (especially from Russia, 
Uzbekistan and the West) the Tajik government continually exploited the religious element 
in the opposition and stressed the “threat of Islamic fundamentalism”. The fact that the 
Russian media widely reported the fear of Islamic fundamentalism among the Russian 
diaspora combined with the general atmosphere of “anti-Russian hysteria” outlined above, 
influenced the views of Russian politicians and foreign-policy makers.76 For example, 
Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev’s early foreign policy thinking derived from his expressed 
fear of Islamic fundamentalism and encirclement. Anatoly Adamishin, First Deputy Foreign 
Minister and Chief Negotiator to the Tajik conflict, told the author that Kozyrev believed that 
Russia had to contain this potential threat to regional security.77 In contrast, other foreign 
policy participants such as Aleksandr Rutskoi, Ruslan Khasbulatov and Alexei Mitrofonov 
stressed Russia’s common interests with the Islamic world and warned that hyping up the 
“Islamic threat” would likely have negative consequences on Russia’s large Muslim 
population.78
In this early period, therefore, the debate concerning Tajikistan was characterized by 
ignorance about events in Tajikistan and, as awareness of a potential threat from Islamic 
fundamentalism developed, a general agreement that Russia should support the communist
75 In Mesbahi’s analysis o f Tajik-Iranian relations, he explains the anti-Islamic and anti-Iranian orientations o f  
the pro-Communist Tajik factions as stemming from either “ideological conviction, the inertia o f  Soviet 
socialization, or political convenience”. Mohiaddin Mesbahi, “Tajikistan, Iran, and the international politics of  
the “Islamic factor”, Central Asian Survey, vol.6 no.2 (1997), pp.141-158, pp.143-44. Also see Dilo Hiro, 
“Tajikistan: The Rise and Decline o f  Islamists, in Dilhf Hiro (ed.), Between Marx and Muhammad: The 
Changing Face o f Central Asia (London: Harper Collins Publishers, 1994), pp. 189-227.
76 See for example the FIS Report on Russia and the CIS published in Rossivskava Gazeta. September 22, 1994,
pp. 1,6.
7 Author’s Interview. Anatoly Adamishin, June 9, 1999. Also Author’s Interview with Mikhail Astafiyev 
(Rutskoi’s deputy in charge o f international relations and foreign policy), June 25, 1995.
78 Ibid.
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government there. The debates focused on precisely how and to what extent and what form 
the support should take.
ii) The Policy
During this early period, few Russian policies of substance were developed towards 
Tajikistan although two particular steps did foreshadow the continuation of a close 
relationship. In January 1992, Russia delivered 30 billion rubles in cash to the newly 
independent Tajikistan while all the other former republics were denied similar financial
70  o aaid. On 21 July 1992, a protocol of intentions was signed between the two states. Only 
then was Russian Vice-Premier Aleksandr Shokhin, (who at the time favoured economic 
integration with Tajikistan) sent by President Yeltsin to Dushanbe to discuss, for the first 
time, the status of the border guards as well as the constitutional and legal protection of the
• o 1Russians in Tajikistan. However, generally, by September 1992 so little had been done in 
terms of building relations between the two states that there was still no Russian embassy in 
Dushanbe, and not even a single Russian diplomatic employee in Tajikistan. In fact two
year after the break-up of the Soviet Union, Foreign Minister Kozyrev still had not once
visited any Central Asian state. Meanwhile these states drifted away from Russia -  
introduced their own currencies and joined international organizations.
The government’s lack of an official position also reflected the great confusion over 
what exactly was happening in Tajikistan. To quote Yegor Gaidar:
We received information that the more radical wing of the 
Islamic forces was planning to use local Russians as hostages.
The trouble was that we couldn’t necessarily rely on the
information our sources were giving us about the Tadzhikistan
situation. The security ministry, as usual, had nothing concrete, 
the intelligence service’s information was unreliable, and from 
our recently established embassy in Dushanbe we continued to
79 The Russian State Committee on Economic Co-operation with the CIS confirmed this figure after the 
Ostankino news program aired a story on the exchange o f old ruble for new Russian rubles in Tajikistan. Ivan 
Zhagel, Izvestiva. January 11, 1992, p.2.
80 Nezavisimava Gazeta. August 1,1992.
81 Natalya Pachegina, Nezavisimava Gazeta. July 28, 1992, p.3.
82 Oleg Panfilov, Nezavisimava Gazeta. September 22, 1992, p.3.
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receive, with several days’ delay, utterly contradictory
83reports.
Thus, no coherent policy existed and the Russian military was once again left on its own to 
respond to events in Tajikistan. When the Soviet Union disintegrated, the Russian Border 
Troops remained in charge of die Afghan border and the 201st Motor Rifle Division remained 
in Dushanbe. Both became involved in Tajik internal affairs. When the civil war broke out in 
May 1992, Russian-led troops in Tajikistan attempted to follow a neutral course. However, 
by the fall of 1992, while the forces were still officially neutral, they became engaged on the 
side of the communists. This one-sided support soon became a source of political stability in 
the country. The Russian military helped to prop up the communist government and to guard 
economic infrastructure (e.g. hydro-electric stations) and thus provided a semblance of 
political order in Tajikistan.
Paramilitary groups operated throughout the country and the Tajik government was 
dependent upon Russia because it had no regular army of its own. Tajikistan was the only 
Central Asian state that had gained almost nothing from the division of the former Soviet 
army. Under the Soviet Union, Tajikistan had had no military district of its own but was part 
of the Central Asian Military District centred in the Uzbek capital of Tashkent. Also, the 
apprehension that an independent Tajik Army would split and opposing groups might attack 
each other (as had happened in Transdniestria in Moldova) meant that Russia decided not to 
officially hand over weapons to the Tajik government. It was thus unsurprising that many 
Tajik military professionals joined the Russian border forces or the 201st Division.84
The 201st division acted at the Tajik government’s request to separate opponents, to
Off
protect refugees and guard communication sites. Recently there has been an increasing 
amount of evidence that the Russian army was actively involved on the side of the Tajik 
communists from the beginning of the Tajik conflict although the 201st Motorized Infantry
83 Yegor Gaidar, Days o f Defeat and Victory. Jane Ann Miller (Trans.) (Seattle and London: University o f  
Washington Press, 2000) p. 177.
84 Mouzaffar Olimov, “The policy o f Russia in Central Asia: a perspective from Tajikistan”, in Gennady 
Chufrin (ed), Russia and Asia: The Emerging Security Agenda (Sweden: SIPRI/Oxford University Press, 1999) 
pp.l 10-122, p .l 16.
5 See, Aleksandr Karpov, Izvestiva. September 18,1992, p .l.
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• o/:
Division denied this at the time. Russian soldiers have now admitted to having used their 
tanks and armoured vehicles in the July and September 1992 clashes.87 In October, some of 
the 201st soldiers also helped to defend Dushanbe. However, largely because of Moscow’s 
lack of official policy objectives, the intervention on behalf of the communist regime was 
haphazard and unorganised. The Russian soldiers were preoccupied with trying to protect 
themselves and were not able to prevent the fighting. According to Col. Dzhurabek Aminov, 
First Vice-Chairman of Tajikistan’s National Security Committee, the border guards were too 
weak to stop the opposition groups from returning to Tajikistan from Afghanistan or to 
prevent arms smuggling. Col. Aminov declared that 10% to 15% of the weapons used in the 
conflict were coming across the border from Afghanistan and the rest were the property of 
the Russian Army headquartered in Tajikistan.88
The actual decision to involve the Russian troops directly seems to have been made 
by mid-level and junior military officers of the 201st Russian division, and also as a result of 
the coordination between the Tajik government and local Russian commanders.89 Most of the 
201st division officers were ethnic Russians (as opposed to the troops who were mainly 
Tajik) from the former Turkestan Military district of the USSR (which became the Ministry 
of Defence of Uzbekistan). These officers fought on the side of the Tajik communist regime 
because they identified themselves with the Russian-speaking residents of Tajikistan. The 
Russian officers also interpreted the opposition’s drive to oust the government by force as a 
threat to their own existence. The majority of the officers of Russian troops in Abkhazia and 
Transdniestria were also ethnic Russian which explains why early on in the conflict, they 
were especially sympathetic towards the Russian diaspora in Transdniestria and 
comparatively less sympathetic towards the Abkhaz.90
86 Oleg Panfilov, Nezavisimava Gazeta. September 22, 1992, p.3.
87 Charogi Ruz. no.l, 1994.
88 Col. Aminov explains that Russian border guards reported border crossings and also earned money by 
allowing weapons smuggling. “The methods o f barter transactions are also very interesting: According to 
information from military intelligence, the Afghans will gladly exchange a Kalashnikov assault rifle for one 
electric immersion heater and three assault rifles for one household air conditioner, and two guns for one bag of 
flour”. Oleg Panfilov, Nezavisimava Gazeta. September 22, 1992, p.3.
89 Itar-Tass. August 5, 1992.
90 See Chapters Five and Six.
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However, unlike Transdniestria and Abkhazia, the involvement of Russian military 
forces was soon clearly and officially supported by the senior command of the Russian 
military. By mid-1992 the military once again also had the support of the Russian Supreme 
Soviet and influential politicians such as Yevgeny Ambartsumov. Significantly, by actively 
choosing sides in the conflict, the initial Russian military action once again set the broad 
parameters within which future Russian debate and policy had to take place.
b) Stage Two: Achieving Consensus (October 1992 - June 1996)
i) The Debates
By late 1992, members of Russia’s political elite had begun to criticize the 
government’s lack of policy towards Tajikistan (as they had in the cases of Moldova and 
Georgia). Members of the political, military and industrial elite across the political spectrum 
denounced Yeltsin for failing to defend Russia’s traditional interests in Central Asia as well 
as for allowing the deaths of Russian soldiers in the Tajik conflict. This diverse alliance was 
too vocal and too powerful for the government to ignore. Many politicians were in favour of 
eurasianist views -  i.e., that Russia’s foreign policy should be oriented towards the South, not 
only towards the West, and that this was preordained by geography, history, culture, the 
Russian diaspora in Central Asia and Russia’s economic needs.91 Others adopted broader 
pragmatic nationalist foreign policy ideas: i.e., that Russia should preserve its interests in 
Central Asia including protecting the security of its southern borders, preserving its trade and 
economic relations and taking an active part in preserving peace in the region both to protect 
its Russian diaspora and to prevent other states from taking advantage of regional 
instability.92
The Communist faction was against Russian military withdrawal and continued to 
verbally support the Tajik government. That support was reciprocated.93 At a session of the
91Eurasianism was examined as a key idea in Russian foreign policy in Chapter 3. See Sergei Stankevich, 
Rossivskava Gazeta. June 23, 1992; Elgiz Pozdnyakov, Voennava Mvsl1. no.l (1993).
92 Yevgeny Ambartsumov, Megapolis-Express. May 6, 1992.
93 The day before the storming o f the White House in Moscow, Tajik newspapers sided with the Russian 
political opposition. One paper compared the actions o f  Russia’s democrats with the “evil deeds o f the
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Council of the Union of Communist Parties (which includes the communist parties in the 
former republics of the USSR), the Communist Party of Tajikistan put out a statement that 
“The Russian Communist Party should be a uniting force...Tajikistan’s Communists have 
not lost hope for the revival of a single Communist Party throughout the entire territory of the 
Soviet Union”.94 The Russian communists argued that Russia was responsible for the fate of 
Tajikistan: “Since Russia has declared itself the legal successor of the Union, it certainly 
should show some concern about the most vulnerable parts of the Union that it destroyed”.95 
Communists also believed that Russia now had the chance to make up for the Soviet defeat 
and to redeem the Russian army’s defeat in Afghanistan through military victory in the near 
abroad. 96 Moreover, preserving ties with Central Asian states was seen as a way to restore
07the Soviet legacy. Others in favour of a strong military presence included Afghan veterans, 
members of the Russian military-industrial complex who were critical of the dismantling of 
the Soviet military and strategic space, as well as members of the Russian diplomatic and 
military community in Dushanbe. They all believed that Russia’s military presence would 
both reassert hegemony and protect their personal interests.
Nationalist extremists such as those in Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s Liberal Democratic 
Party (LDPR) agreed that Russia had to strive to bring Tajikistan back under Russian control 
but thought that the best means to achieve this was through Russian withdrawal of assistance 
to Tajikistan. “We stop our aid, including military aid, to Tajikistan, and Rakhmonov will run
democrat-Islamists”, and spoke o f Aleksandr Rutskoi, as the “acting President of Russia". Quote from the 
weekly Tadzhikiston ovozi. cited in Oleg Panfilov, Nezavisimava Gazeta. October 19, 1993, p .l. For the next 
two weeks, Tajik radio, television and newspapers kept quiet about the events in Moscow. However, then 
Rakhmonov sent a telegram to Yeltsin describing his move to dissolve the Supreme Soviet as an action that 
“will lead to the establishment o f constitutionality, peace, order and legality”.
94 Shabdolov, Chairman o f the Communist Party o f Tajikistan in Vladimir Kostyrko, Pravda. February 19, 
1994, p.2.
95 Igor Lensky, Pravda. July 20, 1993, p.2.
96 “The Russian character cannot tolerate defeat or unfinished business. Isn’t it these feelings that are making 
Afghan vets rehabilitate themselves on the fronts o f ethnic conflicts, this time on the territory o f their former 
fatherland?” Yuri Vladimirov and Vladimir Dzhckhangir, Pravda. February 13,1993, p.3.
97 “Rising above the darkness that has engulfed the country are the in many ways contradictory but socially 
significant figures o f Rutskoi, Lebed, Aushev, Ochirov and other Afghan vets who dragged their friends out o f  
burning vehicles and shielded them with their own bodies, never asking what nationality they were. Doesn’t the 
future o f  our vast country and its unity lie with them? The Afghan experience should not go unheeded...” Yury 
Vladimorov and Vladimir Dzhakhangir, Pravda. February 13, 1993, p.3.
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to Moscow, getting there by any means of transportation, and ask: Admit us Russia, admit us
Q Q
as the Dushanbe Gubernia, I implore you....”. Zhirinovsky also envisioned future Russian 
military expeditions to end the threats emanating from Russia’s southern borders. In his 
book, The Final Drive to the South, he famously wrote that Russia’s destiny is to reach the 
shores of the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea: “I dream that any platoon of Russian 
soldiers will be able to establish order anywhere”.99 Alexei Mitrofonov, in charge of LDPR 
foreign policy, told the author that the LDPR position was that Tajikistan was a failed state 
which needed Russian aid and that Russia’s military should remain there in order to ensure 
stability.100
Members of Russia’s military elite compared the role of Russia’s army in Tajikistan 
to that of the Soviet Army in Afghanistan.101 According to Yuri Shatalin, former commander 
of the Fifth Guards Division which entered Afghanistan in 1979, the mission in Soviet times 
was to place “units on the borders of Afghanistan and to protect the borders with Iran and
•  1 (Y)Pakistan”. The former goal remained, the border had simply receded. Only now a new 
political language was used: “humanitarian aid” instead of “internationalist assistance”, 
“peacekeeping forces” for “limited contingents”, “new world order” instead of
t“internationalist assistance”. In another similarity to the Soviet era, the fundamentalist 
nationalist newspaper Den’ argued that once again the government had overestimated its 
military capabilities. However, the key difference was that unlike Russian soldiers today, 
Soviet soldiers had believed in the necessity and importance of their actions in terms of their 
geopolitical and ideological goals.104
98Much later, in 1998, to counter the flow o f Russian refugees from the CIS states back to Russia, Zhrinovsky 
proposed that Russia should retaliate by expelling their indigenous nationalities living in Russia. Interview with 
Vladimir Zhrinovsky, Izvestiva. November 30, 1998, p .l.
99 Zhirinovsky, Poslednii brosok na vug (Moscow: LDPR, 1993), pp.63-4.
100 Author’s Interview. June 20, 1995.
101 Boris Gromov, the former commander o f the Soviet 40th Army in Afghanistan made this observation. See 
Igor Rotar, Nezavisimava Gazeta. November 20, 1993, pp. 1,3.
102 Shatalin quoted at a roundtable on Soviet intervention in Afghanistan at Den’s editorial offices. Den’. 
February 14-20,1993, p.3.
103 Yury Vladimirov and Vladimir Dzhakhangin, Pravda. February 13, 1993, p.3.
104 Den’. February 14-20, 1993, p.2.
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The loss of Russian lives in Tajikistan, much greater than in Abkhazia or Georgia, 
similarly provoked a debate specifically over the need for Russia to guard the border.105 The 
most widely reported incidents were on 12 and 13 July 1993, when an armed group of 
militants (comprising approximately 200 Afghan mujahidin) based in Afghanistan crossed 
the Afghan-Tajik border and attacked Russian border outpost no. 12. Twenty Russian border 
guards were killed.106 Such raids had been common since December 1992 when the current 
Tajik government ousted the opposition forces from Dushanbe.
The cumulative effect (as in the cases of Moldova and Georgia) strengthened Russia’s 
proponents of a more militarised policy. Immediately after the July 1993 incidents, Defence 
Minister Pavel Grachev flew to the area for the first time. There he declared that Russia’s 
response ought to be to reinforce its border guards with units from Russia’s 201st Motorized
107Infantry Division. Russian Deputy Minister of Defence, General Konstantin Kobets, 
agreed with this proposal and in a visit to the Russian parliament introduced the subsequent 
debate over Russian military involvement in Tajikistan. In parliament Kobets declared that 
the withdrawal of Russian troops would have “disastrous results” and asked for permission to 
give the 201st division the right to provide full-scale assistance to the border guards. 
Apparently Yeltsin was aware of, and supported, this appeal to parliament by the Defence 
Ministry (which was necessary in accordance with Article 4 of the Law of Defence in which 
mandatory authorization by the Supreme Soviet is needed for the use of Russian troops 
abroad).108
A debate took place in the Supreme Soviet on 14 and 15 July 1993 over the correct 
response to the situation on the Tajik-Afghan border.109 The most vocal politician was the 
Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, Ruslan Khasbulatov, who in response to Konstantin 
Kobets’ speech, complained that there had been “a cautious attempt to draw the Supreme
105 As o f March 22 1994 Russian troops performing peacekeeping functions in Tajikistan suffered 53 dead and 
77 wounded compared to Transdniestria with 16 dead and 25 wounded and to Abkhazia with 6 dead and 15 
wounded. Nikolai Burbyga, Izvestiva. March 23, 1994, p.2.
106 James Sherr, “Escalation o f the Tajikistan Conflict”, Jane’s Intelligence Review, vol.5, n o .ll  (November 
1993), pp.514-516, p.514.
107 Aleksandr Karpov and Viktor Litovkin, Izvestiva. July 15,1993, p .l.
108 Ibid.
109 Ivan Rodin, Nezavisimava Gazeta. July 16,1993, pp. 1,3.
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Soviet into this conflict, which may be serious.”110 He went on to claim that he personally
could solve the problem through his contacts within the central Afghan government in Kabul.
According to him, they had promised that they would settle the situation in the northern part
of the country. Later Khasbulatov revealed that these contacts had been broken off because
of Andrei Kozyrev’s disapproval. However, he continued to call for state-to-state talks with
the leadership of Afghanistan.111
Concurrently, a Russian parliamentary delegation (reported in Segodnva to be already
inclined towards demanding greater participation in protecting the “common” border against
the “destabilizing Islamic factor”) flew to Tajikistan to form an “on the spot opinion of the
11^situation” in order to make appropriate recommendations to the Supreme Soviet. Upon the 
delegation’s return to Russia, the Supreme Soviet (obviously influenced by Khasbulatov’s 
statements) voted overwhelmingly in favour of Kobets’ proposals, called for talks with 
Afghanistan, and appealed to the Central Asian states to provide military assistance to 
Tajikistan. The Supreme Soviet’also instructed the Russian government to take “the 
necessary measures for the protection and safety of our compatriots with means appropriate 
to the circumstances”.113
The Supreme Soviet’s sanctioning of the build-up of armed forces and weapons along 
the Tajik-Afghan border occurred against the background of other similarly aggressive 
parliamentary resolutions. For example, only a short time before, parliament had passed a 
resolution which pressed Russian territorial claims against the Ukraine, and had also taken 
the unilateral step of increasing the military budget. The editors of Izvestiva argued that the 
Supreme Soviet was now running Russian politics and chastised Yeltsin for silence. 114In 
Yeltsin’s defence, Vyacheslav Kostikov, the Russian President’s Press Secretary, issued a 
statement blaming the Russian parliament for Russia’s lack of action and claimed that the 
government had always supported a more forceful policy.115 Similarly, although he continued
110 Ibid.
111 Ibid.
112 Pavel Felgangauer, Segodnva. July 16, 1993, p .l.
113 Ibid.
,l4 “The Editors’ Point o f View”, Izvestiva. July 24, 1993, p .l.
1,5 Kostikov quoted in Ivan Rodin, Nezavisimaya Gazeta. July 16,1993, pp. 1,3.
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to defend the MFA’s lack of immediate response to the crisis, Special Ambassador Valery 
Sukhin now adopted the political opposition’s argument that the fate of the Russian-speaking 
population in Tajikistan was “a subject of priority attention and practical work for us.. .”.116
An article in Izvestiva which claimed that the parliament had no choice now typified 
the general political and public opinion in Russia: “But what else can we do... Withdraw all 
Russian troops from Tajikistan... Allow the outside aggressors to satisfy their territorial 
claims? But what would happen to the Russian-speaking population and the entire civilian 
population? And how about those who are in power today, who are not simply oriented
117toward Russia but may be propped up by Russian bayonets?”. However, the question 
remained whether Russia was being dragged into another Afghanistan. And withdrawing 
from Tajikistan was made more complicated than withdrawal from Afghanistan by the 
presence of 200,000 ethnic Russians and the fact that if Russian troops withdrew they would
t i o
have to build another border which could have taken decades.
Nevertheless, despite the growing broad consensus over Russia’s security interests 
there remained fundamental differences in politicians’ perceptions of the “Islamic threat”. 
Khasbulatov continued to argue (against Kozyrev) that the Islamic threat had long been 
exaggerated and that Russia’s one-sided support of the Rakhmonov regime was detrimental 
to Russia’s interests and the development of favourable relations with Islamic states. 
Moreover, he claimed that this one-sided policy simply forced the Tajik opposition into the 
arms of Muslim radicals and increased anti-Russian feelings in the region.119 Key 
government leaders, such as Russia’s former Minister of Justice Nikolai Fedorov, also 
criticized Kozyrev’s policies upon this basis -  that they would destroy Russia’s relations with 
the Islamic world and the result would be the wrongful use of Russian force against Russia’s
1 7ftreal allies -  the Tajik opposition.
116 Ibid.
117 Albert Plutnik, Izvestiva. July 17, 1993, p.8.
118 Aleksandr Aleksandrov, Rossiskive Vesti. July 22,1993, p .l.
159 See Igor Rotar, Nezavisimava Gazeta. November 20, 1993, p.l; Igor Rotar, Nezavisimava Gazeta. 
November 19, 1993, p.3.
120 Nikolai Fedorov, Rossivskava Gazeta. May 14,1993, p.4. Also see Vladimir Koznechevskyi, Rossivskaya 
Gazeta. August 6,1993, p .l.
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Finally, the outcry of the 20 million plus Muslim population in Russia itself also
191influenced foreign policy thinking about the conflict. Official and unofficial Muslim 
leaders were uneasy about the effect of the war on Russia’s (and Central Asia’s) Muslim 
population. The intensive propaganda about the “evil deeds of the Islamic Fundamentalists” 
widened the circle of Muslims in Russia, Central Asia and the Caucasus which already 
sympathized with the Tajik refugees and supported the Tajik opposition. The involvement of 
Russian troops in attacks against opposition Tajik groups further increased their anger. The 
“Volga Region Muslims” appealed to Yeltsin to stop defending the Communist regime in 
Tajikistan. They warned Yeltsin that Russian Muslim sympathy for the Tajik opposition was 
increasing with the growth of anti-Islamic rhetoric and the flood of Tajik refugees into 
Russia.122
Mukaddas Bibarsov, leader of the Interregional Administration of Muslims of 
Saratov, Volgograd, and Penza Provinces made a public appeal to President Boris Yeltsin 
expressing his concern over the government’s handling of the Tajik conflict. “The latest 
events have shown that the red and brown forces are well organized nearly everywhere. We 
are very sorry that the Russian government continues to support the fascist-Communist 
regime in Tajikistan”. Although the position of Russia’s Muslims may have influenced the 
development of more sympathetic views among members of the Russian political elite 
towards the Tajik opposition, it also highlighted the need to stabilize the Tajik conflict in 
order for it not to “spill over” and affect Muslim regions in Russia and the other Central 
Asian states. Russian Defence Minister Pavel Grachev’s only response was that measures to
19Trestrain the Tajik opposition would protect the safety of Russia’s Muslims. However, 
along with the resurgence of Islam in Central Asia Russian foreign policy participants had to
121 As early as 1991, the Muslim clergy expressed dismay at the situation in Tajikistan. Although they generally 
professed not to interfere with politics, their invitations for example to Afghan opposition leaders to speak at 
mosques at least indicate Muslim thinking and preferences. To quote Sheik Ravil Gainutdin, President o f  the 
Islamic Center in Moscow, “The clergy’s task is to lead the people away from bloodshed”. Interview conducted 
by G. Bilyalitdinova, Pravda, December 3, 1991, p.3.
122 Mukaddas Bibarsov, leader o f the Interregional Administration o f Muslims o f Saratov, Volgograd, and 
Penza Provinces made a public appeal to President Boris Yeltsin published in Oleg Panfilov, Nezavisimava 
Gazeta. October 22, 1993, p.3.
123 Ibid.
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take into account the fact that the Central Asian states were moving closer together politically 
and establishing a new grouping within the CIS.
Throughout 1994 and 1995, Russian deputies travelled to Dushanbe in order to 
exchange views and to establish further co-operation between Tajikistan and Russia. Many, 
such as Konstantin Zatulin, Chairman of the Duma’s Committee on CIS Affairs and Liaison 
with Compatriots, continued to argue that “any expenses are warranted to preserve this 
southern outpost”.124 Similarly, in an article stressing the importance of Russian interests in 
the near abroad, Russian academic Sergei Kolchin argued that Central Asia, and especially 
Tajikistan, was of special interest for the development of Russian security policy. “If Russia 
withdraws, the country’s disintegration, the transfer of Islamic fundamentalism to the 
territory of neighbouring republics, and sharp negative changes in the balance of power from 
Russia’s viewpoint, are quite possible here”.125
However, many deputies were also now adopting more nuanced positions which 
seemed to signal the inception of a policy shift away from the continuation of military 
presence. This did not stop the Tajik opposition paper from blaming Russia’s military and 
MFA for following various half-hearted policies, and lacking a nuanced understanding of the 
situation:, “ ...they seriously repeat the fairy tales of border-troop commanders who claim 
that some field commander has declared a jihad against all Russians. Everyone talks about 
impartiality and objectivity, but they write only what they hear from military and border 
troop commanders”. In 1995 Vladimir Lukin, Chairman of the State Duma’s Committee on 
International Affairs, along with Nikolai Bezborodov, the Deputy Chairman of the 
Committee of Defence, continued to argue that Russia’s relations with countries in the post- 
Soviet space should be strengthened. However, he also worried about the absence of money
1 77with which to pay the existing border guards.
124 Zatulin made this statement on May 5, 1995. Quoted in Igor Rotar, Nezavisimava Gazeta. September 17, 
1995, p.3.
125 Sergey Kolchin is the head of the section on the “CIS States” at the Institute o f International Economic and 
Political Research o f the Russian Academy o f Sciences. Sergey Kolchin, Mirovava Ekonomika i 
Mezhdunarodnava Otnosheniva. April 1995.
126 Dododzhoni Atovullo, Charogi Ruz. excerpts in Izvestiva. April 13, 1995, p.5.
127 Mikhail Karpov, Interview with Vladimir Lukin, Nezavisimava Gazeta. March 14, 1995, pp. 1-2.
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A general view among the political elite evolved along the lines that Russia was in a
1 JQ
no-win situation. Russian forces could not leave Tajikistan because that would weaken 
Russia’s influence overall in Central Asia and leave the Tajik-Afghan border open. However, 
at the same time the official military line was that Russia could neither financially nor 
politically solve the Tajik war and Russia’s involvement would make her the enemy of all
19QIslamic countries. There was elite anxiety that the Tajik civil war would likely continue for
11ftdecades and result in the deaths of many Russian soldiers. Izvestiva reasoned that most 
Russian-speakers had already left Tajikistan, and that with every month of armed struggle 
Tajik support for Islamic fundamentalism was growing and increasingly adopting an “anti- 
Russia cast”. Thus, according Izvestiva. Russia should solve the issue in a peaceful manner 
and withdraw (even if it didn’t have the finances to build a new fully-fledged state border 
with Kazakhstan) because it would have to leave sooner or later anyway.
Other early proponents of Russian military involvement in Tajikistan also espoused 
increasingly isolationist policies while continuing to locate Tajikistan within Russia’s sphere 
of vital interests. Duma deputy Andrannik Migranyan, for example, proposed to relocate 
Russians in Tajikistan back to Russia in order to strengthen Russia’s ethno cultural unity and 
to improve its demographic situation. Without the presence of a Russian population in 
Tajikistan, Migranyan reasoned, Russia could withdraw from protecting the Afghan-Tajik 
border. Migranyan also believed that Russia’s military presence in 1994 was not to protect 
Russia from aggression by Afghanistan but amounted to “direct involvement in a civil war, 
in which it will inevitably encounter opposition from many contiguous Muslim 
countries.”13 !Thus, he proposed that Russia withdraw its military but find the means to 
prevent third countries from intervening in the region. In contrast, Boris Titenko, member of 
the Duma Committee for Federation Affairs and Regional Policy argued that Russia should 
remain in Tajikistan. “We are not talking about a Russian expansion but about the
128 According to my readings o f the Russian press at the time and my interview with Valery Solovey 
(Gorbachev foundation) who has written on the communists and is currently preparing a book on the Russian 
nationalist movements. Author’s Interview with Solovey, June 1, 1999.
129 Anatoly Ladin and Vitaly Strugovets, Krasnaya Zvezda. April 11, 1995, p .l.
130 Leonid Mlechin, Izvestiva. April 22,1995, p .l .
131 Migranyan, Nezavisimava Gazeta. January 18, 1994, pp.4-5, 8.
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strengthening of co-operation with our brethren who were brought together by history several 
decades or hundred of years ago”. Titenko was a member of a Duma delegation that visited 
Tajikistan and which included Gennady Zyuganov, leader of the Russian Communist Party
1 T)and Yekaterina Lakhova, head of the Women of Russia faction.
The notion of an enemy was used both to support Russian military involvement in the
region and to encourage its withdrawal. The Russian press popularised the image of an
enemy at the gates by printing stories about alleged Arab mercenaries fighting in Tajikistan
1 ^and an imminent “clash between Islamic South and Christian North.” Russian news
agencies termed the Tajik opposition’s attacks on Russian border guards as a “jihad” against
Russia.134 During this period, there were also attempts to spread rumours that various states
were threatening Russian interests in Tajikistan. For example, the Russian Ministry of
Foreign Economic Relations denounced the decision to establish an intergovernmental
coalition among the five Central Asian states (to be known as the Central Asian Regional
Union (CARU)). CARU was described as a pan-Turkic strategy designed to impede Russia’s
economic and political relations with its southern neighbours. “One of the chief aims of this
strategy is to draw Russia into a protracted war in Tajikistan on the side of Uzbekistan... and
1thereby to put Russia at loggerheads with Afghanistan, China and Pakistan”.
During 1996 the political debate over Russian military involvement in Tajikistan 
continued, and the debate became more of an issue of party politics than it had been 
previously. The controversial question of Russian troop withdrawal from Tajikistan was 
brought to the attention of the Duma Committee on Geopolitics in July 1996 by Liberal 
Democratic Party member Aleksei Mitrofonov. The Liberal Democratic Party dominated the 
debate and the committee concluded that the government needed to radically change its
132 Galina Gridneva, Itar-Tass. April 29, 1994.
133 Oleg Panfilov, Novava Yezhednevnava Gazeta. August 31, 1995, p .l.
134 See for example Boris Vinogradov, Izvestiva. April 11, 1995, p .l. Much o f this hysteria was brought on by 
more attacks on the border guards. Russian border troops were attacked 30 times in the first 3 months o f  1995, 
resulting in the death o f 10 Russian servicemen. Andrei Smirnov, Kommersant-Daily. April 13, p.4.
135 The ministry also accused Uzbekistan of attempting to expand its territory with the support o f Turkey and o f  
having plans to intervene militarily in Kyrgystan. Vladimir Yurtayev and Anatoly Shestakov, Nezavisimava 
Gazeta. May 13, 1993, p.4.
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1policy but still remained divided over how this should be done. This debate polarized those 
who were for withdrawal versus those for military involvement.
In review, stage two of the debate was characterized by an assertive rhetoric and 
similar criticisms of government policy towards Tajikistan by members of the Russian elite 
across the whole political spectrum. The most vocal were the fundamentalist nationalists who 
argued for the use of military force. There was a consensus that a military presence was, and 
would continue to be needed in order to protect Russian interests. However, by the end of 
this period, this consensus came to be increasingly questioned.
ii) The Official Position
During this period official rhetoric towards the Tajik conflict fell in line with Russian
Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev’s developing interest in the other former Soviet states.137 In
the spring of 1993, Kozyrev officially acknowledged for the first time the need for Russia to
maintain close relations with Tajikistan. He declared that Russia had a “zone of special
1responsibility and special interests” in the region. This statement signalled the 
government’s decision to maintain Russian control over Tajikistan, to take responsibility for 
resolving the conflict and to act as regional leader. As a result of this decision, Tajikistan (as 
in the previous cases of Georgia and Moldova) was officially highlighted as an area 
important to Russia’s national security interests. Kozyrev even suggested the possibility of 
using missile strikes against the Tajik opposition in Afghanistan since most of the weapon
11Qstockpiles and terrorist training camps were there.
Then, on 4 August 1993, in an article in Izvestiva. Andrei Kozyrev for the first time 
explicitly listed Russia’s national interests in Tajikistan -  interests that he had only 
acknowledged the existence of a few months before. These “real” interests included: the 
security and legitimate rights of the Russian community in the region, the need to “ ...put up
136 Ekaterina Sytaya, Nezavisimava Gazeta. October 15, 1996; Ekaterina Sytaya, Nezavisimava Gazeta. 
October 18, 1996, p.3. The debate continued and in the spring o f 1997 several Duma factions united around a 
proposal for “a gradual withdrawal o f Russian troops from Tajikistan”.
137 See Chapter Four, as well as the Moldova and Georgia case studies -  Chapters Five and Six.
138 Oleg Panfilov, Nezavisimava Gazeta. April 29, 1993, p.3.
139 See Kozyrev’s comments in Segodnva. July 30, 1993, p.3. and Izvestiva. July 27, 1993, p .l.
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a barrier to regional-clan and Islamic extremism in Central Asia” and to “ensure security in 
Western and Southern Asia”.140 He called for co-operation with other CIS states as well as 
with other “clear-thinking forces” in the Muslim world, the UN and the CSCE. Kozyrev also 
legitimately criticized the Supreme Soviet for hypocritically using loud rhetoric about 
defending Russian interests and the Russian-speaking population while at the same time 
withholding its consent both to allocate additional contingents of border and peacekeeping 
forces and to ratify the Collective Security Treaty.141 However, when speaking to an 
international audience, Kozyrev contradicted his own statements by stating that Russia did 
not link the Tajik problems with the situation of the Russian-speaking diaspora.142 This 
demonstrates how government rhetoric was chosen to suit its particular audience.
At a conference of Central Asian and Russian heads of state, participants viewed the 
Tajik-Afghan border as “part of the common CIS border” and signed documents declaring 
the inviolability of the border. 143Thus, the vulnerability of the Tajik-Afghan border was 
finally officially acknowledged. It was clear that Russia was the only state which could guard 
the Tajik-Afghan border, and knew that if it withdrew there would no longer be a manned 
border all the way from the Russian Federation to Afghanistan (Russia had no defensive 
borders to the South except the old Soviet ones -  there are no manned borders between 
Russia and Kazakhstan, and Kazakhstan and Tajikistan). As Yeltsin put it: the Tajik-Afghan 
border was “in effect Russia’s”.144 Deputy Foreign Minister Adamishin, supported by many 
liberal experts in Moscow such as Sergei Blagovolin145, also argued that Russian 
involvement in the conflict was necessary to curb the “instability and terrorism fuelled by 
Islamic fundamentalism”.146
140 Andrei Kozyrev, Izvestiva. August 4, 1993, p.4.
141 As seen in Chapter Four, the major multilateral document, the May 15 1992 Tashkent agreement on 
collective security, was significant in that it legalized Russian military presence within many CIS states as well 
as the joint use of military force to repel aggression. Ivan Novikov, “Duma ratifies CIS Collective Security 
Treaty Protocol”, Itar-Tass. 5 November 1999.
142 Kozyrev speaking with Douglas Hurd, quote in Maksim Yusin, Izvestiva. 29 October 1993, p.3.
143“Press Briefing by Grigory Karasin, from the Russian Ministry o f Foreign Affairs”, Official Kremlin 
International News Broadcast. August 10,1993 (Lexis-Nexis)
144 “Hie Empire Strikes Back”, The Economist. August 7, 1993, p.36.
145 Sergei Blagovolin Moskovskive Novosti. no.31 (1 August 1993).
146 Author’s Interview with Adamishin. June 9, 1999.
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However, this was not a signal that a common great-power imperial drive was 
motivating politicians across the political spectrum, the parliament and the government. 
Rather, there was an expressed consensus that the military presence in Tajikistan was vital to 
Russia in order to defend a border which was threatened by Islamic radicalism, terrorism and 
trade in drugs and arms. Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Georgy Kunadze, in charge of 
Russia’s relations with the Central Asian states, defined Russia’s interest in Central Asia as a 
“specific geopolitical interest -  to prevent the explosive charge of Islamic extremism (by no 
means fundamentalism) from penetrating into Russia. His understanding of Russia’s practical 
interest was expressed as -  “if we leave this frontier, then we must decide where we are 
going to build a new border, and in what time period”. 147 An alliance with a weak Tajik state 
supported by Russian troops was seen therefore as the least risky way to ensure the defence 
of the border. The issue of the poorly armed border was also used to legitimise the views of 
those who wanted to increase Russian presence in the region.
Kozyrev’s position continued to harden. At the beginning of the inter-Tajik talks in 
1995 he declared that Russia “will not tolerate the deaths of its servicemen on the Tajik- 
Afghan border” and if necessary will use “all means at its disposal” to protect the southern 
borders of the CIS”. This emphasis on the use of force was similarly repeated at a meeting 
of the Foreign Policy Council but this time concerned the problem of the Russian-speaking 
population outside the Russian Federation. Aleksei Vasil’ev, a Middle-East expert, proposed 
a set of actions to prevent the violations of the rights of Russians abroad, including the use of 
direct force.149 This interest in the fate of the Russian soldiers and diaspora in Tajikistan was 
part of Russia’s increasingly assertive position.
The emphasis of the official rhetoric shifted with the appointed o f Yevgeny Primakov 
as foreign minister in early 1996. Earlier at a forum on NATO expansion in 1990, Primakov 
had argued that the Islamic threat was exaggerated. He criticized the West and its
147 Interview with Deputy Minister o f Foreign Affairs, Georgy Kunadze in Nezavisimava Gazeta. July 29, 1993, 
pp. 1,3.
148 Lenonid Velekhov, Segodnva. April 20, 1995, p.5.
149 Vasil’ev was director o f the Russian Academy o f Science’s Institute o f Asian and African Studies. Dmitry 
Gomostavev. Nezavisimava Gazeta. April 19, 1995, p .l.
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undifferentiated labelling of political Islam as religious fundamentalism.150 In other words, 
Primakov interpreted the Islamic movement in Tajikistan not as a threat but as a “legitimate” 
political phenomenon -  a return to Islamic roots and traditions characteristic of the Islamic 
revival in most of the Muslim word. His tolerant and realistic perspective of Islam 
contributed to a shift in foreign policy. Those officials responsible for Tajikistan at the MFA 
were replaced.151 He placed emphasis on political, as opposed to military, instruments in 
order to end the civil war. By 1996 Russia was “vitally interested” in seeing the situation 
stabilized and called for negotiations to be stepped up.152 Of course, this also reflected the 
position of Rakhmonov who was now calling for negotiations with the Islamic opposition to
t ^“forgive joint injuries and build a new Tajikistan together”. 
iiO The Policy
The foreign policy debates seen above, which responded to events in Tajikistan and 
Central Asia as well as Russian domestic politics, prompted a change in Russian policy in 
1993. The relative agreement in perception among the members of the political elite, military 
and the executive about Russia’s interests in Tajikistan made Russian policy more stable than 
towards the Transdniestria and Abkhazia conflicts. In line with its new position, on 23 May 
1993 the Russian government signed a “Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual 
Assistance” with Tajikistan as well as an agreement on the status of Russian Federation 
border troops and military formations in Tajikistan. The agreement stipulated that Russian 
troops would remain in Tajikistan until the Tajik government could deploy its own border 
troops. Russia was now committed to continuing to protect the Tajik-Afghan border as well 
as defending the incumbent Tajik government.154 Its involvement was finally 
institutionalised.
150 Interfax. April 5,1996.
151 In February 1996, Deputy Foreign Minister, Boris Pastukov, became the Russian envoy to Tajikistan, and in 
July 1996, Yevgeny Mikhailov was appointed the new special representative o f President Yeltsin to Tajikistan.
152 Leonid Velekhov, Segodnva. January 30,1996, p.3.
153 Umed Babakhanov, “Dushanbe’s Road to China”, Focus Central Asia, no.2 (February 1996), pp.51-54, p.53.
154 See Keith Martin, “Tajikistan: Civil War without End?”, RFE/RL Research Report, vol.2, no.23 (August 20, 
1993), pp. 18-29, p.27.
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After the series of border shootings described above, Yeltsin reasserted his control
over foreign-policy making and took a key step in coordinating its implementation. On 27
July 1993, he appointed Andrei Kozyrev as the President’s special representative for the
settlement of the conflict and charged Minister of Defence Pavel Grachev with the overall
day-to-day responsibility to coordinate the manpower and resources of the various
ministries.155 The very next day, in keeping with decisions previously made by parliament,
Yeltsin signed a decree “On Measures to Settle the Conflict on the Tajik-Afghan Border and
to Normalize the Overall Situation on the Russian Federation’s Borders”.156 This decree
assigned different tasks to the various Russian government ministries in order to provide
social services and, in effect, prop up the Tajik state.
There followed a period of “shuttle diplomacy” in which Russia reasserted its
interests in Central Asia. The then Director of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service,
Yevgeny Primakov, was sent on a trip to Afghanistan and Iran. Adamishin visited Tajikistan
and the Central Asian states.157 The rise of Islam in Central Asia as a whole explains (along
with the economic crises) why the Central Asian elite began to increase bilateral and
multilateral co-operation with Russia in 1993.
Yeltsin also asserted his control over the Tajik situation by firing Viktor Barannikov,
the Security Minister and head of the Russian Border troops on 28 July 1993. Although
Barannikov was officially accused of “violation of ethical norms and shortcomings related to
his leadership” of the Border Troops, it seems more probable that the real reason for his
1firing was his criticism of the Security Council. A new Security Council was formed 
whose authority remained in question. Its new Secretary, Yevgeny Shaposhnikov, confirmed 
that the Security Council lacked any real influence and when asked how the situation in 
Tajikistan was being dealt with he replied, “The President is on vacation”.159 Thus Yeltsin’s
155 “Nothing Will Change for the Better”, Nezavisimava Gazeta. July 28, 1993, p.3.
156 It was reported in the Russian media that the President believed the exacerbation o f the situation was a threat 
to Russia’s vitally important interests and its security, and that the low level o f readiness to repel armed attacks 
on border-troops was leading to unjustified casualties. Viktor Litovkin, Izvestiva. July 29, 1993, p.2.
157 Nikolai Paklin, Izvestiva. August 3, 1993, p .l; Aleksandr Karpov, Izvestiva. July 31, 1993, p .l. Also, 
Author’s Interview with Adamishin, June 9, 1999.
158 Rossivskive Vesti. July 28. 1993. p .l. Izvestiva. July 29. 1993, pp. 1-2.
159 Interview with Yevgeny Shaposhnikov in Mikhail Ivanchikov, Megapolis-Express. no.29 (July 29,1993),
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control of foreign policy was seen as paramount (and more effective than at this stage in the 
Transdniestria and Abkhazia conflicts) -  even if his leadership was at times lacking.
Finally, in August 1993, the Russian government began to advocate political as well 
as military solutions to the conflict. That month for the first time, Russia, followed by 
Uzbekistan, exerted pressure on the Tajik leaders to conduct political negotiations with the 
leaders of the opposition. Significantly, the Russian government also committed itself to 
increasing the number of border troops in Tajikistan and promised additional military, 
economic and humanitarian aid.160 Also for the first time, Russia began to actively seek the 
involvement of the United Nations in the settlement of the conflict.161
Meanwhile, the government’s Popular Front’s military forces continued to attack 
opposition supporters and rival ethnic groups in the countryside. By mid 1993, most o f 
Tajikistan was under its control. However resistance continued and the conflict turned into a 
guerrilla war with the opposition forces concentrated in refugee camps across the Afghan 
border. Soon after the July 1993 attacks on Border Post no. 12, at Tajikistan’s request Russia 
assumed the burden of peacekeeping in August 1993, making its involvement in the conflict 
official. A CIS peacekeeping force was formed mostly drawn from the Russian 201st division 
with token contingents from Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan and Uzbekistan. Even this minor 
involvement of other CIS states showed Russia’s willingness to develop relations within the 
CIS framework.162
From 1994-96 Russian policy supported the inter-Tajik negotiations and maintained a
1 f tXmilitary presence. During these years, the Russian MFA actively promoted Russia’s role as 
mediator in the negotiations between the Tajik regime and its opposition while supporting the
p. 13.
160 This occurred at the Central Asian-Russia Summit on Tajikistan on 9 August 1993. See RFE/RL News 
Briefs, vol.2, no.33 (August 9-13,1993), p.8.
161 During the UN General Assembly in September 1993, Kazakhstan and Russia asked the UN to give the CIS 
armed forces in Tajikistan (the 201st Division) a mandate to operate as a UN peacekeeping force. Dmitry 
Gomostayev, Nezavisimava Gazeta. September 30, 1993, p .l.
162 This CIS force was deployed in October 1993 and commanded by Russian Colonel-General Boris Pyankov.
163 See Semyon Bagdasarov (Chief expert o f the Asia Strategic Studies Foundation), in Nezavisimove 
vovennove obozrenive. supplement to Nezavisimava Gazeta. April 22, 1995, pp. 1-2. There was a widespread 
feeling that it was time that “Russia’s interests” were served rather than those o f an individual or department.
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Rakhmonov regime. Negotiations under UN aegis began in Moscow in April 1994, during 
which three main issues were discussed: measures to reach a political settlement of the 
conflict in Tajikistan; repatriation of refugees; changes in the constitution; and the integration 
of the Tajik people.164 The negotiations resulted in a temporary cease-fire agreement on 17 
September 1994, which came into effect that October with the arrival of UN observers.165
Immediately after the cease-fire, Yevgeny Primakov, then the director of Russia’s 
Federal Intelligence Service, presented the 1994 FIS Report which stated that “ ... the 
neutrality o f the Russian forces involved in resolving conflicts is guaranteed by the pledges 
made by the Russian Federation when coordinating the terms and framework of the 
peacekeeping operations with all the interested parties”.166 Russia’s other policy priorities at 
the time were to bring about early presidential and parliamentary elections in Tajikistan as 
well as a referendum on a new Tajik constitution which would legitimise the regime in the
1 A 7eyes of the international community. However, because only Rakhmonov and Abdumalik 
Abdulladzhanov contested the presidential elections in November 1994, and predictably 
Rakhmonov’s power was confirmed, many analysts have dubbed Russian political support as 
one-sided. Western analyst Lena Jonson, for example, argues that the election was a serious
1 Aftexample of Russian interference in Tajikistan. Similarly, in the parliamentary elections of 
February 1995, the Tajik opposition was prevented from participating.
Russian policy at the same time continued to advocate close military relations with 
Tajikistan. In 1995, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Aleksei Bolshakov negotiated an accord 
in which Russia would provide the Tajik state with Russian military equipment. The attempt 
to create a Tajik army made little progress, however, leaving internal and external security in
164 Mekman Gefarly, Segodnya. April 14, 1994, p.5.
165A Joint Commission was set up in accordance with the 1994 cease-fire agreement. See UN Document. 
S/1994/1102. annex 1.
166 “Text o f FIS Report Presented by Primakov”, in Rossivskava Gazeta. September 22, 1994, pp. 1,6.
167 See Lena Jonson, The Taiik War. A Challenge to Russian Policy (London: RIIA, 1997), p, 9.
168 Allegedly both the chairman o f the Russian delegation at the inter-Tajik talks, Alexander Oblov, and Deputy 
Foreign Minister Albert Chernyshev, confirmed that Yeltsin actually gave orders for the elections and the 
referendum to be carried out in order to allow Rakhmonov to remain in control. Oleg Panfilov, Nezavisimava 
Gazeta. May 17,1996, p.3; Arkady Dubnov, Izvestiva. November 2, 1994, p.3; Oleg Panfilov, Nezavisimava 
Gazeta. March 2,1995, pp. 1-2.
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Russian hands and prompting General Grachev to declare in 1995 that the 201st division 
would remain in Tajikistan at least until 1999.169 Grachev thought that the army should 
protect the border, whereas Andrei Nikolaev, Commander in Chief of the Border troops, 
believed that this was the job of the border troops.170
Russia’s key goals of providing peace and stability remained elusive. Although the 
1994 ceasefire declaration stated that future negotiations would consider the state’s political 
and constitutional structure, there was no accommodation over power-sharing. Neither did 
the Peace negotiations progress much during 1995 and meanwhile the Tajik opposition 
advanced militarily into the interior of Tajikistan.171 Then, on 25 May 1995, an agreement of 
Co-operation and Mutual Assistance was signed in Moscow between the conflicting 
parties.172 This agreement called for mutual respect of national sovereignty and territorial 
integrity, peaceful resolution of conflicts and non-use of force, equal rights and non­
interference in each other’s internal affairs.173
In spite of the 25 May agreement, the civil war progressed. Russia’s 201st Division 
was drawn further into the conflict and there is substantial evidence that it helped the former- 
communist Tajik government remain in power. Some analysts have gone so far as to claim 
that Russia “never pursued a policy of trying to limit the conflict and forcing the warring 
clans to negotiate”.174 However, although Russia’s military role was at first ill defined and 
biased, it also helped to guard key economic installations and later assisted with humanitarian 
aid and the migration of refugees. Most significantly, it acted (or attempted to act) as 
guarantor of agreements between the warring parties.
169 Andrei Smirnov, Kommersant-Dailv. April 13, 1995, p.4.
170 Igor Rotar, Nezavisimava Gazeta. September 17, 1994, p.3.
171 In a sign that this was o f concern to Moscow, Dmitry Ryurikov, aide to Yeltsin on international affairs, was 
sent to Tajikistan. Oleg Panfilov, Nezavisimava Gazeta. November 23, 1995, p.3.
172 The text o f this agreement was printed in News o f the Parliament. Dushanbe, no. 14 (1993), p. 148.
173 In the winter o f 1995-96, Tajikistan decided to join the CIS Customs Union and signed other bilateral 
agreements with Russia on trade and economics. However, virtually none were implemented and, by the end o f  
1995, Tajikistan was the last CIS member obliged to leave the rouble zone. The Customs Union was formed on 
January 20th 1995 between Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia. Kyrgystan joined in May 96. See Elmira 
Akhundova, Literatumava Gazeta. no.23 (June 5, 1996), p.2.
174 William Odom and Robert Dujarric, Commonwealth or Empire?: Russia. Central Asia and the 
Transcaucasus (Indianapolis: Hudson Int., 1995), p.256.
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However, despite the numerical and technical superiority of the Tajik government 
forces aided by the Russian troops, poor lines of communication gradually undermined 
Russia’s control of the region.175 Russian garrisons inside Tajikistan did not manage to 
maintain peace in the countryside but only in most of the large cities and towns (with the 
exception of Gorno-Badakhshan where local warlords dominated). A large segment of the 
population joined paramilitary units and thus the Russian troops and “peacekeepers” had to
1 7Aengage them as well as guerrilla incursions from Afghanistan.
Some analysts are inclined to view Tajikistan’s civil war as the first drug war on the 
territory of the former USSR, waged primarily with the aim of carving out permanent paths 
for narcotics from the “Golden Crescent” to the CIS states and Europe. It seems that 
throughout the post-Soviet space, local wars, separatism and the narcotics business have been 
interconnected. Extremist forces needed money to continue their wars and this was readily 
available if they form liaisons with the drug mafia. Moreover, the area was characterized by 
ideal conditions for the drug trade: a wealth of raw materials for narcotics, the easy 
penetrability of borders, the absence of strong and well-organized special services, political 
instability, corruption and poverty. Deputy Foreign Minister and Chief Negotiator to the 
Tajik crisis, Anatoly Adamishin, went so far as to say that drug trafficking was responsible
1 77for most events in Tajikistan.
Officially, the Russian border troops were not supposed to intervene in the internal 
Tajik conflict but simply seal the border. However, since the border played such an important
1 7Rrole in the conflict, the border guards became party to the conflict by their very presence.
175 An article in Izvestiva. written from the Tajik-Afghan border, detailed a July 13, 1993 attack on Russian 
border guards and blamed the lack o f communications, which the reporter said have “changed little” from the 
time o f the Russian Civil War. “...all hope rests on a telephone with a hand-held receiver and a wire that can 
easily be cut...” Vadim Belyk, Izvestiva. July 17, 1993, pp. 1,8.
176 Yulia Goryacheva, Nezavisimava Gazeta. May 5, 1993, p.6.
177 Author’s Interview with Adamishin, June 9, 1999. There have been rumours in the media that elements 
within the Russian military had been involved in the drug trade and that large amounts o f arms and munitions 
were freely distributed by the Russian army to political groups or sold for food and alcohol supplies. See Yulia 
Goryacheva, Nezavisimava Gazeta. May 5, 1993, p.6.
178In Tajikistan, the Russian Group o f Border Troops represents the largest force operating outside Russia. A 
series o f  deaths o f Russian border guards in Tajikistan in June 1993 seen above led Yeltsin to overhaul the 
intelligence and security organs in late December 1993. In August 1993 Col. General Andrei Nikolaev became 
Commander o f the Border Troops as well as deputy minister for National Security. Richard Woff, “The Border
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Similar to the Russian and CIS “peacekeeping” troops, they also at times acted in support of 
the Tajik government against the military units of the Tajik opposition.179 Of course, often
1 ROthis was in self-defence since they were repeatedly attacked and harassed and they were
1 01
unable to seal the border effectively.
The general stability during this period which allowed the beginning of peace talks, 
may have been partly due to the presence of the CIS peacekeepers. However, since there was 
little success in the forming of a Tajik army or contingent of border guards, the burden of the 
war continued to rest upon the Russian Border Guards and the 201st division. The CIS force 
was in no position to ensure the victory of either side. It basically followed its mandate which 
was to support the border guards and prevent rebels from Afghanistan from crossing the 
border into Tajikistan. These tactics helped Russia to support the Tajik government but could
•  1 ft*}not solve the problems or bring long-term peace. The war reached a stalemate.
Then, consistent with the appointment of Primakov as Foreign Minster in early 1996 
and the stalemate in the war, a distinct change in Russian policy became discernible. At the 
January 1996 CIS summit meeting Russia began to pressure Rakhmonov into reaching a
• 1M .compromise with the political opposition in order to bring the conflict to an end. The costs 
of the war were becoming such that withdrawal was starting to look like a serious option. At 
this time, the Tajik government also received assistance from the IMF, thus relieving some of 
the responsibility for Tajikistan’s problems from Russia’s shoulders. Also, Rakhmonov 
seemed to be losing authority, which made Russia’s one-sided support of the regime even 
more tenuous. Therefore, the Tajik government was warned by Russia that the CIS
Troops o f the Russian Federation”, Jane’s Intelligence Review, vol.7, no.2 (February 1995), pp.70-73.
179 Anatoly Adamishin acknowledged this in a conversation with the head o f the Tajik’s opposition delegation, 
Hajji Akbar Turadzhonzoda. See interview with Turadzhonzoda in Arkady Dubnov, Izvestiva. March 10,1993, 
p.3.
80 Human Rights Watch/1997 Helsinki Overview in UNHCR, REFWORLD Country Information. 1998.
181 Nassim Jawad and Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh, Tajikistan: A forgotten Civil War (London: Minority Right 
Group, 1995), p.22.
182 To quote Michael Orr, “Thus Russia is leading a CIS intervention which falls between two stools; it is too 
compromised by its support for one party in the dispute to be accepted as a peace-keeping force, but not 
sufficiently committed to fight a counter-insurgency campaign”. Michael Orr, The Russian Army and the War 
in Tajikistan (Camberly: CSRC, February 1996), pp.6-7.
183 Yuliya Ulyanova, Nezavisimava Gazeta. January 13, 1996, p.2.
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peacekeeping force’s mandate would not be extended indefinitely. Then in a shift from 
previous policy, during the June 1996 inter-Tajik talks Primakov met for the first time with 
the leaders of the Tajik opposition.184 He now took a more neutral position in finding a 
political solution to the war.
4. Conclusions
As in the Moldova-Transdniestria and Georgia-Abkhazia conflicts, Russian interests 
in the Tajik civil war were influenced by Soviet and Tsarist history in the region. Russia 
inherited a relatively small diaspora in Tajikistan, a large military presence and a history of 
Tajik economic dependence. Its key interest was in security: to protect the Tajikistan-Afghan 
border in order to ensure stability in Tajikistan and prevent the spread of Islamic 
fundamentalism.
The security interest (particularly protecting the border) allowed little room for debate 
over policy options. It also dictated that continued military presence would be the obvious 
means to achieve this goal. The questions of whether or not Russia should protect its tiny 
diaspora or preserve its economic ties were more debatable, but also much less important in 
the perception of the Russian elite. Since significant material interests in Tajikistan were 
easily identified by the political elite both inside and outside of government, the debates over 
Russia's involvement were far less controversial than in the other two case studies.
In the first stage, August 1991 to October 1992, the Russian government and political 
elite began by supporting the Tajik opposition which they believed to be the "democratic" 
side. This was reflective of their liberal westemist general foreign policy ideas which 
consisted of rebuttals of legacies of the Soviet era legacy and focus on the West.
184 The result (outside the time frame o f this thesis) was an agreement between Rakhmonov and Abdullo Nuri 
signed on December 23, 1996 which created the Council o f National Reconciliation. Already by October 1996, 
the issue of defending the porous Tajik-Afghan border (from the rebels) was a secondary issue. The Tajik 
opposition had already moved the majority o f  its fighters into central Tajikistan, and aware o f increased Russian 
attention on this area, was attempting to avoid conflict with CIS forces. “Summary o f Inter-Tajik Peace Talks 
(1996-97) and Prospects for Voluntary Repatriation to Tajikistan” in UNHCR Memorandum. April 1, 1997, 
97/MA04/M/07.
267
After some initial confusion and hesitation, the key issues discussed became fear of 
the spread of Islamic fundamentalism and the fate of the Russia diaspora, border guards and 
troops. This led relatively quickly to elite consensus that Russian involvement was necessary 
to bring peace to the region and that supporting the Tajik communists would best serve 
Russia's strategic interests. In this case, by the time Russia's military became officially 
involved in Tajikistan, liberal westemist ideas had already been discarded in political 
debates. Meanwhile, however, no official polices were developed towards the mounting 
conflict in the area. The Russian army on the ground at first independently became involved 
on the ground in its support of the Tajik communists. Thus, after initial hesitation and until 
the end of 1992 the dominant pragmatic nationalist ideas expressed in the Russian debates 
were in line with the involvement of the Russian army even though no coherent policy was 
announced.
By the beginning of the second stage, from October 1992 to January 1996, Russia 
was already militarily involved in the Moldovan and Georgian conflicts. Due to experience 
from these two situations, and a consensus in debates over foreign policy in general, a broad 
agreement developed across the political spectrum that Russia should remain involved in 
Tajikistan and protect its interests through military means if necessary. This position was 
backed up by many of those who favoured eurasianist views and was even dominant in the 
debates before an official Russian policy developed. The attacks on Russian border guards 
(in particular the incidents in July 1993) brought the Tajik issue to a broader Russian 
audience, encouraged official rhetoric to be more forceful, and brought about increasingly 
sophisticated political debates. Considerable differences in the details of policy positions 
began to emerge - for example, over how great the threat was from Islamic fundamentalism 
and how long Russia could afford to remain involved in Tajikistan.
Meanwhile, foreign policy positions in this period became more coherent and 
co-ordinated. They reflected the dominant foreign policy ideas in the political debates as 
there was an official acknowledgement of the border as an issue of paramount concern and 
Fundamentalist Islam as a threat. Across the political spectrum, the issue of the Russian
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diaspora (which was of little objective concern) was used to convince the public of the need 
for Russian military engagement. Following the "road map" which had been outlined in the 
debates, Russia institutionalised its role as a peacekeeper in the conflict and provided official 
support for the communist government.
A study by RAND concluded that Russian policy in Tajikistan "was not based on 
assessments of long-term Russian interests in the region, but on ad hoc evaluations, as well 
as on personal preferences and antipathies". This contention is disputed by the present 
analysis which has shown that Russian foreign policy was broadly in line with a pragmatic 
assessment of Russian interests. The shift in policy in 1993 when an agreement was signed 
that Russian troops would remain in Tajikistan and Russia committed itself to protecting the 
Tajik-Afghan border and the partial shift in 1996 when efforts were initiated to reach an 
impartial political solution to the Tajik war, were preceded by a change in the thinking of the 
political elite. By 1996, the high costs (financial and in terms of human lives), the emigration 
of the Russian diaspora from Tajikistan, and the intractability of the conflict encouraged a 
shift in thinking towards a political solution and the possibility of withdrawal. Once again, 
ideas and their evolution in political circles along with the events in the field were important 
in the development and support of Russian foreign policies.
185 Arkady Dubnov, “Tadjikistan” in Jeremy Azrael and Emil Pay in (eds.), US and Russian Policymaking with 
Respect to the Use o f Force (Santa Monica: RAND, 1996).
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C hapter Eight: C onclusions
This thesis aimed to provide a detailed and nuanced interpretation of the pattern of 
interests, ideas/debates, policies and actions concerning Russia’s political and military 
involvement in specific CIS conflicts. It began by asking what the dominant ideas expressed 
in Russia’s foreign policy debates were, and whether they were reflected in Russia’s policies 
towards specific military conflicts in the CIS states from 1991 to 1996. To answer this, the 
dominant ideas were identified, the major stages in the debates and policies were traced, and 
a comparison was made between Russia’s political debates, policies and actions towards the 
Moldova-Transdniestria, Georgia-Abkhazia and Tajikistan conflicts.
Several avenues of inquiry were pursued -  a study of how ideas may influence policy 
choice, detailed evidence from primary sources and personal interviews concerning the range 
of foreign policy views of members of the political elite, distinctions between Russia’s “real” 
and perceived interests (including the facts of their historical development), and a carefully 
documented examination of debates, policies and actions specific to the three case studies. In 
reviewing the evidence, the general finding of the thesis was that broad foreign policy ideas 
and orientations provided the framework or context within which debates occurred and 
policies were formulated and pursued. In all three cases, the ideas and debates helped to 
define the parameters of acceptable foreign policy options. On the whole, there was 
congruence between the dominant ideas within the debates and the foreign policies enacted 
towards the specific conflicts. Debates and policies were both developed within, and 
conditioned by, the domestic environment in Russia and in response to particular events in 
the near abroad. Military actions tended to start independently as local initiatives, but later 
fell in line with government policy.
1. Content
First, the thesis identified the broad, dominant ideas about foreign policy and showed 
how they set the parameters for both the general foreign policy thinking of the Russian
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political elite and also the narrower, more specific policy orientations and proposals 
concerning the near abroad. When the new post-Soviet era began, several different options 
were debated concerning how to define Russia and its future policies. A matrix of ideas 
helped to shape the political elites’ perceptions, motives, commitments and approaches to 
specific issues.
The ideas expressed by members of the political elite as they sought to define a new 
national identity for Russia -  a new state mission, self-perception, geography, politics and 
economics -  provided the policy options that were debated. These ideas acted as “focal 
points” which structured the three basic foreign policy orientations -  liberal westemism, 
pragmatic nationalism and fundamentalist nationalism. These ways of thinking about foreign 
policy in turn suggested “road maps”, framed foreign policy issues and thus guided a range 
of foreign policy proposals towards the near abroad. Political parties’ foreign policy 
proposals generally fit into these three orientations with the nationalists and communists 
essentially adhering to the fundamentalist nationalist view, the centrists to pragmatic 
nationalist views and the reformers or liberal democrats to liberal westemist views. Political 
parties affected the general foreign policy debates through their expression of general, and 
often relatively undeveloped and sometimes incoherent, ideas in their policy platforms and in 
the media, and impacted on the formulation of policy particularly through their involvement 
in parliament.
Second, the thesis indicated that foreign policy debates evolved in relation to shifts in 
the domestic political context. It linked the three broad foreign policy orientations to 
prominent foreign policy participants -  paying particular attention to their views as 
articulated in the media. Three periods of historical importance in the evolution of debates 
and policy were traced: the Atlanticist period (August 1991 - March 1992), the period in 
which there was a battle of ideas (March 1992 - November 1993) and the period in which a 
consensus was formed (November 1993 - June 1996). Gradually over these three stages, 
pragmatic nationalist ideas became dominant in the debates; and the broad contours of 
foreign policy followed pragmatic nationalist prescriptions. This guidance was useful to
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many members of the political elite in their search for (as well as justification of) concrete 
foreign policies.
Adoption of these ideas in the general political discourse of the elite and in the 
official government position occurred at a time when competing ideas and ideologies were 
relatively tarnished. Marxism-Leninism, with its emphasis on class conflict and its “zero 
sum” view of international politics, was in disrepute. Disillusionment with the liberal 
westemist views and the policy prescriptions they entailed set in relatively quickly. Foreign 
policy throughout the three stages was not based on a unifying idea like socialism, but rather 
on how the political elite conceived Russia and its role in the world, the actions of a 
government seeking legitimacy, and external events in international relations, particularly in 
the near abroad. Despite the fact that pragmatic nationalist ideas did not have the prescriptive 
value of a comprehensive ideology, they did provide a basis on which to create and develop 
general policy goals.
Pragmatic nationalist ideas affected foreign policy choices in the domestic political 
process by creating conceptual “road maps” which helped to steer foreign policy. Influenced 
by domestic and external events, pragmatic nationalism significantly influenced the broad 
foreign policy direction, was adopted in government rhetoric and official statements, 
institutionalised in official doctrine (the Foreign Policy Concept and Military Doctrine) and it 
was sometimes reflected in action. However, despite the overall congruence between the 
ideas within the debates and official policy towards the near abroad, pragmatic nationalism 
did not dictate all specific foreign policy outcomes primarily because of Russia’s limited 
financial resources and military means.
Third, the thesis detailed the evolution of Russia’s debates, official policies, and 
military and political actions towards the conflicts in three CIS states where Russia was 
militarily involved: the separatist war between Moldova and Transdniestria; the separatist 
war between Georgia and Abkhazia; and the civil war in Tajikistan. The case studies located 
the specific debates about Russia’s involvement within the context of internal and external 
events and Russian interests. All three case studies began with an examination of Russia’s
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key security, diaspora and economic interests in the particular conflict and briefly showed 
how they were conditioned by Soviet and Tsarist Russian history.
In all three cases it was found that Russia inherited from Tsarist and Soviet history a 
geographical proximity that made the conflicts difficult to ignore and a large military 
presence. In 1991, the Russian Federation inherited the responsibilities and difficulties of 
dealing with these and other “remnants of empire”. However, the extent of Russia’s 
economic ties varied from case to case and so did the size of the Russian diaspora.
The uniqueness of Russia’s historical relations with Moldova, Georgia and Tajikistan 
also helps to explain differences in the debates about each conflict. For example, there were 
fewer disagreements over how to act in the case of Tajikistan partly because Tajikistan was, 
and continued to be, the most dependent of the three states upon Russia (economically and 
militarily). This reinforced the perception that Tajikistan’s stability and security was in 
Russia’s interest. The Soviet legacy in Tajikistan had left it with the poorest economy, the 
weakest sense of national identity and the highest number of Russian troops. Most 
significantly, it was perceived as the most vulnerable of the three states to pressures from 
other states and from Islamic fundamentalism.
However, these historical legacies did not dictate particular policies. There was a 
significant amount of controversy about their significance and whether and how to protect 
them. Members of the political elite’s perceptions of Russian interests also evolved over time 
as new events took place and more knowledge became available. Therefore, in each case, 
when the conflict broke out there was some room for debate about the direction of Russian 
foreign policy. In the case of Tajikistan, the environment was significantly more constraining 
and from the outset, therefore, there was greater consensus within the elite as to what needed 
to be done.
The thesis showed that the debates about Russia’s policies towards these specific 
conflicts often remained at a general or ideological level. Thus, the general political debates 
and the search for the principles of Russian foreign policy broadly informed more precise 
questions about what policy Russia should adopt towards the specific conflicts and helped to
273
define policy options. A consensus developed that Russia should attempt to develop close 
relations with the near abroad states, and should be involved in solving the conflicts on its 
borders (by political or even military means if necessary). This general consensus paralleled 
a shift in the debates and policies towards the specific conflicts: a reordering (or 
development) of foreign policy goals and priorities; the adoption of more assertive official 
rhetoric; a practical emphasis on defining and protecting Russian interests; and the 
continuation of Russian political and military involvement in bringing about peace and 
finding solutions to end the conflicts. Not surprisingly, this was a cyclical relationship in that 
the specific debates about the three conflicts also informed the more general debates and 
policy concerns towards the near abroad as a whole.
Pragmatic nationalism consisted of a set of broad, overarching ideas that were held by 
members of the political elite who also held various specific viewpoints. It thus formed the 
foundation for the adoption of policies. Foreign policy “involves the discovery of goals as 
much as it involves using decisions to achieve particular outcomes”.1 The search for foreign 
policy goals was particularly significant in Russia because of the immense difficulty and 
need to rapidly define national interests in a new state undergoing tumultuous change. In a 
strategically complex situation, Russia was trying to maintain its power base and to define its 
position in the world while saddled with many of the ambitions, strengths, and burdens of the 
old Soviet Union.
The thesis also found that the ideas dominant among members of the political elite 
and those dominant within the state institutions did not always coincide. For example in early 
1992, although there was little debate, the government’s liberal westemist ideas were not 
shared by the wider political elite. Neither did state officials hesitate to take the lead in 
giving impetus to certain ideas and use their authority to legitimise some of them over others, 
for example, pragmatic nationalism in late 1992 and 1993. Also, across the political 
spectrum, members of the political elite often used foreign policy for domestic ends.
1 Paul A. Anderson, “What do Decision-Makers do when they Make a Foreign Policy Decision?”, in Charles 
Hermann, Charles Kegley and James Rosenau (eds.), New Directions in the Study o f Foreign Policy. (London: 
Harper-Collins Academic, 1987), p.290.
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2. The Role of Ideas in the Three Case Studies
In the three cases examined here, ideas helped to resolve policy dilemmas (to 
formulate Russia’s national interests and translate them into goals). They played a role in the 
way members of the political elite “learned” from events, and suggested “pathways” which 
guided policy and made other policy options more or less likely.
Moldova
Russia’s historical inheritance in Moldova, which included the initial threat that 
Moldova might join Romania, the presence of the 14th army in Moldova, a large Russian- 
speaking diaspora concentrated particularly in Transdniestria, and weak economic ties, 
ensured Russia’s general interest in the war but did not dictate particular policies. In 
particular, there was controversy over the significance to Russian policy of the diaspora. 
There was, therefore, “room” for ideas to matter in the search to define Russia’s national 
interests towards Moldova.
The Moldova-Transdniestria war was the first conflict in the former Soviet space in 
which Russia became militarily active. When fighting broke out in March 1992, it created a 
“window of opportunity” for the Russian political elite to express its concerns and for new 
ideas to be expressed. In an open debate, various options were proposed about how Russia 
should react and what Russia’s future in Moldova and elsewhere in the former Soviet Union, 
ought to be. Members of the political elite who were most critical of Yeltsin’s policies 
quickly learned that the emotional issue of Russian-speakers in the near abroad could easily 
be exploited to score domestic points. They exposed Russia’s earlier policies towards the 
near abroad as non-existent at worst, and as hesitant and ineffective at best. This led to a 
widespread belief that the Russian government should publicly outline its policy and define 
its relations with Moldova and other states in the near abroad.
Subsequently, in mid-June 1992, in response to the debates and wider domestic 
development, and after the second major outbreak of violence in Moldova, there was a shift 
in the foreign policy ideas of Russia’s decision-makers, particularly those of Yeltsin and
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Kozyrev. This shift was part of a process of “learning” from the debates and events and 
paralleled a shift in thinking among the broader political elite. First, it became generally 
believed that Russia’s 14th Army’s success in capturing Bendery proved that the West would 
not criticise or intervene in response to Russia’s actions in the CIS states. Therefore, the 
earlier liberal westemist premise that the West might react to Russia’s involvement in the 
near abroad in a way that was harmful to Russia’s domestic or foreign interests was no longer 
of significant concern. Second, the 14th Army’s military success in Bendery seemed to 
confirm that military force might actually prove effective in solving conflicts and protecting 
Russian interests. Third, continuing tensions in Moldova, as well as the outbreaks of conflict 
elsewhere, showed that military bases in strategic areas of the near abroad could prove 
necessary in order to solve, or at least prevent, the spread of conflicts. These were all lessons 
which contributed to the adoption of pragmatic nationalist ideas and which were applied in 
the formation of official policy goals towards Moldova and subsequent conflicts.
The appointment of General Alexander Lebed to command the 14th Army also helped 
to introduce his way of thinking about the near abroad. Lebed’s words and actions 
popularised aspects of pragmatic nationalism: the need to define Russia’s interests in the near 
abroad and to be more assertive in protecting these interests -  especially the right of the 
Russian speakers. Specifically, Lebed, along with Konstantin Zatulin, popularised the idea 
that Russia’s military should remain in Moldova in order to prevent further fighting and 
protect the local Transdniestrian population.
Before the war, generally only extreme right and left wing groups and their 
newspapers had been active in support of the diaspora communities that were trying to 
achieve autonomy. Now this cause was taken up by a broader political spectrum. After 
Bendery, Russian government rhetoric became similar to that of the majority of deputies in 
the parliament -  sympathetic towards the Transdniestrians and concerned with the issue o f 
discrimination and violence against the Russian population. Pragmatic nationalism became 
articulated in the official statements of Yeltsin and Kozyrev, and after 1992, Russian policy
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continued to support Moldova’s territorial integrity but became (for a time) more openly 
sympathetic to the separatists in terms of military support and in the negotiations.
Russia pursued a more engaged policy in which it helped to obtain peace in the 
region, establish a military presence and secure general economic interests. These policies 
(and the pragmatic nationalist ideas on which they were based) were in effect 
“institutionalised” in the July 21 cease-fire agreement that created a tripartite peacekeeping 
force and a commitment to the territorial integrity of Moldova and, in effect, preserved 
Transdniestria’s de facto independence. Under economic and military pressure from 
Moscow, Moldova entered the CIS and Russia’s military presence in Transdniestria 
continued.
Thus, after an initial period of hesitation - because of a high level of uncertainty, lack 
of information and confusion both within Russia and the near abroad - Russia’s foreign 
policy developed along lines similar to the policy of most states. The consensus over 
pragmatic nationalism suggested that Russia would react in a pragmatic and ad hoc fashion in 
the pursuit of its perceived interests -  just as policy makers do most of the time in most 
countries. Yeltsin’s primary objective continued to be to ensure external conditions 
favourable to the political and economic reforms. Pragmatic nationalism did not mean 
discarding all liberal westemist ideas. It did, however, help to guide policy by providing a 
“road map” which advocated Russian active engagement in the conflict and sought to define 
and protect Russia’s interests. This “road map” precluded (at this time) Russia’s military 
withdrawal from Moldova and its neglect of the conflict -  courses of action that the liberal 
westemist road map suggested. It also made less likely that Russia would attempt to use 
military force to impose Russian control over Moldova -  a fundamentalist nationalist idea -  
quite apart from the key fact that Russia did not have the means to pursue such a strategy.
Georgia
In the case of Georgia, Russia inherited the unstable and fractious region of the 
Caucasus on her border, as well as a small Russian diaspora, a large military presence and
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relatively strong economic ties. Russia’s paramount interests in the conflict was strategic -  to 
stop the violence and prevent the dissolution of the Georgian state. The threat of anarchy in 
the Caucasus was real and so was the threat that it would spread into the North Caucasus, 
part of the Russian Federation. However, the extent of the threat to Russia itself was 
controversial and how to deal with it was not obvious. Although there was a small Russian 
diaspora in Georgia, it was not clear what influence it should have on policy development. 
Therefore, when war broke out in August 1992, there was no elite consensus about how 
Russia should react. The environment conditioned but did not dictate Russia’s specific 
actions.
Even before the war began in August 1992, political parties across the political 
spectrum were criticising the government for not acting to prevent the outbreak of a crisis. 
Particularly, but not only, the fundamentalist nationalists were putting into practice what they 
had learned from the Moldova war -  that the government’s lack of policy could be used to 
score domestic points. Since the violence in Georgia’s South Ossetia affected Russia’s North 
Ossetia, it was also becoming increasingly clear that turmoil in the Transcaucasus could 
spread into Russia and that it was, therefore, in Russia’s direct interest to help maintain peace 
in the region. Nevertheless, as in the Moldova case, early Russian policy followed the 
officially articulated liberal westemist “road map” that neglected the growing unrest in 
Abkhazia and supported Georgia’s territorial integrity and the withdrawal of many troops.
However, by October 1992 the Russian government, had “learned” from Moldova 
that neglecting to take an active stance would bring domestic criticism, and therefore it 
responded reasonably quickly. Members of the military, for its part, had realised by this stage 
that more should be done by Russia to retain its security interests in the near abroad -  in the 
case of Georgia this included retaining Russia’s bases in Abkhazia. Pragmatic nationalist 
ideas were officially adopted in government statements and Russia took relatively quick 
action to localise the conflict, prevent spill over into Russia and discourage the involvement 
of other powers. Military actions on the ground were less one-sided than in the Moldova 
case.
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Later, the shooting down of a Russian helicopter helped to popularise the view that 
Russia should pursue the same self-interested policy that most other states would: that is, be 
actively involved in the pursuit of peace and the protection of Russian interests. In 1993 
Grachev declared Russia to have strategic interests on the Black Sea Coast and began to link 
the removal of Russian troops to peace. Once again the official adoption of pragmatic 
nationalism precluded (at this time) neglect, withdrawal or forceful reintegration.
The political elite also learned from the Moldova crisis that the Abkhaz problem 
could be solved within the boundaries of Georgia, and by 1996 even many fundamentalist 
nationalists were in favour of finding a solution compatible with the maintenance of 
Georgia’s territorial integrity. By now Russia itself was involved in a difficult war in 
Chechnya which also showed the dangers and financial costs of pursuing a policy based on 
force and introduced a new cautionary tone to the debates. At the same time, Russia’s 
economic interests were growing as Georgia was increasingly perceived as an important 
Eurasian transit crossroad for oil and gas pipelines.
Thus, pragmatic nationalist ideas were dominant in the debate and in the government 
position, and once again provided a “road map” which suggested that Russia should retain 
influence, continue its military ties and protect its interests in the region. When Russian 
troops helped Shevardnadze regain control after an Abkhaz offensive, these ideas were, in 
effect, institutionalised in several ways -  through a series of military treaties signed with 
Georgia; Georgia’s entry into the CIS; the retention of Russian military bases and border 
guards in the region; and the introduction of Russian peacekeepers.
Tajikistan
In the Tajik case, ideas played a much less significant role in guiding Russian policy 
towards the conflict than in Moldova or Georgia. The reason was that in the case of 
Tajikistan, Russia had concrete interests which could not be ignored. Moreover, most 
members of the political elite, of all political hues, both inside and outside the government, 
agreed on what those interests were: to protect the Tajik-Afghan border in order to ensure
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stability in Tajikistan and prevent the spread of Islamic fundamentalism -  both of which were 
crucial to Russia’s own security. These interests also demanded a continued military 
presence as the obvious means to achieve them. Diaspora and economic interests existed, but 
they were relatively minor.
Nevertheless, in the first stage, liberal westemist ideas dominated and, as a result, 
policy toward Tajikistan was neglected until October 1992 -  longer than in the other two 
.cases. Events and realities in Tajikistan were initially ignored because, once again, the 
Russian government was confused about events in the region. Its priority was Russia’s 
relations with the West, and the former Soviet republics -  especially those in Central Asia 
that were perceived as economic burdens -  were neglected. However, as awareness of the 
possible threat from Islamic fundamentalism increased, and information about events in 
Tajikistan became more widespread, a general agreement was rapidly formed that Russia 
ought to support the communist Tajik government and protect the border. This meant that, 
although the military was at first left on its own to respond to events, it came under official 
control comparatively rapidly.
By October 1992, Russia was already military involved in the other two conflicts. 
Due to experiences from these involvements, and the consensus in debates over foreign 
policy in general, an agreement was soon reached among the political elite that the Russian 
military should remain in Tajikistan to protect Russia’s interests. The close fit between ideas 
in the debate and Russia’s desperate need to protect Tajikistan’s vulnerable border indicate 
why Russian policy was comparatively more consistent towards this conflict than towards the 
other two and precluded other options at this time.
In the cases of Georgia and Moldova, it was mainly extreme nationalists and 
communists inside and outside the parliament who by 1993 pushed the debate towards 
sympathy for the Abkhaz and Transdniestrians. In the Tajik case it was not only 
fundamentalist nationalists and a few other key foreign policy participants who denounced 
Yeltsin for failing to defend Russian traditional interests in Central Asia. Criticism came 
from a far broader array of the political and military elite. Raids on Russia’s border troops
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and the death of Russian soldiers also popularised the view that Russia needed to define its 
policy and act. Russia’s interests in Tajikistan were compatible with the consensus over 
pragmatic nationalism in the general debates that suggested that Russia should preserve its 
interests in Central Asia, secure the borders to Russia’s south, protect its diaspora and stop 
other states from taking advantage of regional instability. However, differences in the details 
of policy positions emerged -  especially over how great the threat was from Islamic 
fundamentalism and how long Russia could remain involved. In time, it was also understood 
that Russia had little choice -  it could not leave and it was not financially or militarily 
feasible that a military victory would provide a quick solution to end the war.
Tajikistan was termed a zone of “special interest” as Russia agreed to take 
responsibility for the conflict, act as regional leader, guard the border and protect the 
diaspora. These ideas were institutionalised in the May 1993 Friendship Treaty in which it 
was decided that Russian troops and peacekeepers would remain in Tajikistan in the pursuit 
of peace. By 1996, as towards the other two conflicts and partly due to events in the near 
abroad, isolationist feelings were on the rise and there was more emphasis on political versus 
military instruments to solve the conflict. In the Tajik case, the high cost (in terms of finance 
and human lives), the emigration of the Russian diaspora and the intractability of the conflict 
were leading to a change of thinking. A shift in official rhetoric towards Tajikistan seemed to 
presage a new policy emphasis as Primakov advocated a more tolerant and realistic policy 
towards Islam, emphasised a less biased policy in relation , to its support of the Tajik 
Communist government, and the possibility of military withdrawal.
3. Contributions of the Thesis to Understanding the Role of Ideas/Debates in 
Russian Foreign Policy
The thesis made several observations about the role of ideas in Russian foreign policy 
as illuminated by the various theoretical approaches.
First, ideas or underlying preferences helped the elite to structure policy options (seen 
in Chapter Three) and to discover foreign policy goals. This gives credence to the importance
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of the role of ideas as described by the “psychological approach”. As the dominant ideas in 
the debates changed, so did the ways in which members of the political elite defined policy 
towards the conflicts. Second, the thesis also supports the research finding that ideas matter 
significantly in “non-routine” situations. In all three case studies, Russian policy developed 
within uncertain or even ambiguous situations and unanticipated events on the ground. This 
situation of uncertainty and crisis seems to have increased the significance of the debates and 
the clash of ideas in the formation of policy. Specifically, the condition of uncertainty and the 
lack of accurate and detailed information about the conflicts in early 1992 meant that broad 
ideas in the policy debates could provide policy direction.
Third, as mentioned above, a consensus over broad ideas developed and this guided 
the articulation of official policy goals. In this sense, the publicly articulated views of key 
political actors in parliament, foreign policy institutions and the media were influential. Of 
course, it is always going to be difficult to prove the exact role that ideas play in politics and 
in the making of policy. The three case studies examined here provide examples of policy 
preceding ideas, for example in the case of Moldova. They also show that policy contradicted 
a key idea underlying pragmatic nationalism: that Russia remains a great power. This was a 
myth designed to assuage policy-makers’ own pride and to help impose the regime’s 
legitimacy. However, Russia’s desire to be a great power could not be translated into policy 
because of the limited financial resources and military means available to policy-makers. 
Moreover, although the Russian government vocally supported the rights of Russians abroad, 
and used them as reasons to be involved in the solutions of the conflicts, no real actions were 
taken to protect the diasporas in these cases (just as there were no attempts to expand the 
borders of the Russian Federation). Nevertheless, on the whole, the pragmatic nationalist 
foreign policy orientation was congruent with the foreign policies in the three cases studied. 
Of course, if the consensus had been over the means rather than general goals, and if Russia 
had had adequate resources to finance its goals, it would likely have had more influence in 
directing specific policies.
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Fourth, a process of “learning” occurred in which the debates and policies that 
responded to events in one conflict carried over to the next. The perceived successes and 
failures from the conflict in Moldova were useful in resolving the succeeding one in Georgia 
and later in Tajikistan. The composition of the participants in the specific foreign policy 
debates also changed and those involved in examining the Tajik conflict (for example, 
Primakov in 1996) brought with them new ideas about how Russia should react.
Fifth, the broad, overlapping consensus over pragmatic nationalism was eventually 
adopted by Yeltsin, the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the military 
and became a guiding principle in official doctrine. Also, the broad consensus that evolved 
concerning Russia’s policies towards each conflict was institutionalised through its 
ratification in treaties and by the continuation of military involvement in the form of army 
bases and “peacekeepers” in all three regions.
Finally, while it is easy to make generalisations about supposed relations among 
ideas, debates, politics and action, it is very difficult to be accurate about their relative weight 
in specific relationships. The task was made even more difficult because during the years 
studied in this thesis, Russia was a new state and the period 1991-1996 was one of 
tremendous internal and external flux. The three stages used in the case studies to analyse the 
debate were artificial; in reality, they blended into one another. Also, in examining the 
debates, it was impossible to be certain what politicians “really thought” or how they would 
have reacted if they had actually assumed power -  especially as their views evolved over the 
period. It was observed that when given the chance to implement foreign policy decisions, 
Vice President Rutskoi’s actions were more moderate than his words had been. Thus, 
sometimes ideas and debates explained more of the process than the outcome, or more or the 
style than the substance, of foreign policy-making. However, this is not to trivialise the 
importance of ideas, since process and style are often as important as objective conditions in 
foreign policy formulation. There are many factors, therefore, that indicate the need to be 
cautious in reaching generalisations.
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Scholars who focus on the role of ideas in politics may benefit to consider carefully 
whether the origins and impact of the intellectual shifts they highlight are endogenous to the 
material environment. Moreover, while the examination in this thesis was confined to the 
individual and domestic levels, further research might find a more integrative approach 
which stresses the impact of “epistemic communities” (transnational networks of experts) 
and globalisation on Russia’s foreign policy, and gives more details of the economic costs of 
pursuing particular options, useful. Examining debates over issues other than those relating to 
military conflict (for example, economic relations with Belarus or diaspora relations with 
Kazakhstan) would also add nuance to the appraisal of the role of debates in foreign policy in 
general.
4. Summary
Ideas and debates in the three case studies helped to set the parameters for foreign 
policy choice and played a key role in shaping what policy actions were possible and which 
were probable. On the whole, there clearly was congruence between policy in the three cases 
and the overall shift to a pragmatic nationalist line of thought. The dominant pragmatic 
nationalist foreign policy orientation ultimately affected the way in which Russia defined its 
foreign policies because a broad consensus developed over these general ideas, the ideas 
were adopted by key foreign policy actors in their rhetoric and they were institutionalised in 
government statements, official doctrine, and sometimes actions.
Russia’s foreign policy ideas changed over time, and shifted with changes in the 
socio-economic context of the state and events outside the state. This thesis indicated how 
pragmatic nationalism influenced policy -  by helping to resolve strategic dilemmas, by 
playing a role in the “learning” process of decision-making and by creating “focal points” 
and “road maps” in time of high uncertainty and instability. However, ideas played a less 
significant role when material interests were particularly significant (e.g. in Tajikistan), and 
the influence of ideas on policy was always constrained by Russia’s limited financial and 
military means.
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In other words, shared, articulated views formed a backdrop or “framework of 
meaning” for political actors and foreign policy-makers. Key elements of this framework 
were manifested in Russian policies and actions towards the Moldova-Transdniestria, 
Georgia-Abkhazia and Tajikistan conflicts. Although the influence of ideas and debates often 
seemed elusive or intangible, there is little doubt that they exercised a powerful influence on 
the prospects for foreign policy towards these three conflicts. They exerted a pervasive, yet 
subtle, influence on the development of policy, serving to define the parameters of acceptable 
policy options.
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A ppendix 1; Interview s
During my research I spent approximately one year in Moscow conducting interviews as well 
as visiting research institutions and the Duma library. I interviewed Russian politicians and 
academics involved in debating and creating Russian foreign policy over three research trips 
in 1995, 1996 and 1999. In the spring/summer of 1995 I was at the Moscow Institute for 
Political and Economic Studies with an internship at the Russian Federation Duma working 
for the office of the Press Secretary of the Yabloko political movement. In 1996,1 spent five 
months at Moscow State University and Moscow Institute for Political and Economic 
Studies. My final research trip was in 1999 this time interviews were conducted through 
personal contacts in London (Prof. Margot Light, Dr. Chris Donnelly, and Dr. Roy Allison).
1995
20 June: Grigory Yavlinsky, (Head,Yabloko movement)
20 June: Alexei Mitrofonov, (LDPR number two, Chairman of State Duma’s Committee on 
Geopolitics)
25 June: Mikhail Astafiyev, (Rutskoi’s deputy in charge of international relations and foreign 
policy, member of the “All Russia’s Right Center”, part of the Motherland Movement)
28 June: Mikhail Mitiokov, (professor of law, First Deputy Chairman of State Duma, 
member of Democratic Choice of Russia, Head of the Constitutional Assembly)
28 June: Ivan Rybkin, (Speaker of the Duma)
11 July: Anatoly Chubais, (First Deputy Chairman)
15 July: Gavriil Popov, (1991-2: Mayor of Moscow, since 92 -Chair, Russia’s Movement for 
Democratic Reforms/President Moscow International University)
21 July: Tairpov Sharbad, (Deputy in State Duma, Democratic Choice of Russia, aid to 
Sakharov in human rights committee)
25 July: Prof. Aleksandr Sholov, (member Mothers of Soldiers of the Chechen War)
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29 July: Sergey Magaril, (Chairman of International Commission of Social Democratic Party 
of Russia)
2 August: Anatoly Golov, (Chairman of Social Democratic Party of Russia);
17 August: the late Galina Staravoiteva, (advisor to Yeltsin on inter-ethnic issues, Co-Chair 
“Democratic Russia movement).
1996
8 June: Yusup Soslambekov, (President of the North Caucasus National Assembly)
14 June: Gennady Burbulis, (former Deputy Prime Minister, Yeltsin Advisor 92, co-ordinator 
Russia’s Choice)
28 June: Irina Khakamada, (1992-94 Secretary General of Economic Freedom Party, Duma 
deputy, head of “Common Cause,”
2 July: Gennady Zyuganov, (leader CPRF)
8 July: Gavriil Popov, (as above)
1999
21 May: Konstantin Borovoi, (independent Duma deputy, Head of “For Atlantic Group” in 
Duma)
21 May: Sergei Baburin, (Head, Russian Popular Union)
24 May: Dr. Tatiana Parkhalina, (Dept Director Institute of Scientific Information for Social 
Sciences (INION), Head of NATO Documentation Center for European Security Issues)
25 May: Dr. Dimitry Trenin, (Carnegie Moscow Center)
28 May: Dr. Andrei Zagorsky, (Vice Rector, MGIMO -  Moscow State Institute for
International Relations)
1 June: Dr. Valery Solovey, (Gorbachev Foundation)
2 June: Col. Rimarchuk, (Colonel in Russian Army, Headquarters of the CIS)
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4 June: Fred Weir, (Journalist - Canadian Press, Hindustan Times)
8 June: Dr. Irina Zviagelskaya, (Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences; 
involved in Tajik negotiations)
8 June: Col. General Andrei Nikolaev, (Commander of the Border Troops and Deputy 
Minister of Security)
9 June: Anatoly Adamishin, (Deputy Foreign Minister/ Chief Negotiator to the Tajik 
conflict)
I also had the opportunity to consult with other prominent politicians and academics who 
visited the LSE, SEES and Chatham House in London as well as at the IISS where I worked 
in spring/summer 2000 as Programme Assistant on the Russia Military Reform Programme.
Key Interviews/Talks outside Moscow Used in Thesis
13 April 1995: Igor Zevelev (Deputy Director, IMEMO) Stanford
15 May 1996: Prof. Nodari Simoniya, (Deputy director, IMEMO) LSE
20 March 1998: Gen. Klaus Naumann (Chair Military Committee, NATO) Chatham House
22 June 1998: Karen Ohanjanian, (member of Nagorno-Karabakh parliament, co-ordinator of 
the Nagorno-Karabakh committee of “Helsinki initiative-92”) LSE.
23 November 1999: Dr. Gyorgi Otyerba, (Deputy Foreign Minister of Abkhazia), LSE
